feat(auth): bring opaque (RFC 9807) auth

OPAQUE (RFC 9807) implementation (using `opaque-ke` crate)

    with opaque authentfication, server will never receive the password (in the auth=password mode)
    this is a must have to create trust with users to permit end to end encryption in the future
    (we cannot know if user use the same password/passphrase for his asymetric key or his oxicloud auth,
    this is why server must never have the password)

    pass1: prepare server
This commit is contained in:
Edouard Vanbelle
2026-07-26 15:04:31 +02:00
parent d76803f602
commit 0e395ae15f
19 changed files with 1570 additions and 7 deletions
+1
View File
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ pub mod noop_face_analyzer;
pub mod oidc_service;
#[cfg(feature = "faces-onnx")]
pub mod onnx_face_analyzer;
pub mod opaque_service;
pub mod password_hasher;
pub mod path_resolver_service;
pub mod path_service;
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
//! OPAQUE aPAKE service (Phase 0 substrate).
//!
//! OPAQUE (RFC 9807) is a zero-knowledge password-authenticated key exchange:
//! the passphrase never leaves the client, not on registration and not on
//! login. This module wraps the [`opaque_ke`] crate with a stable ciphersuite
//! type alias ([`OxiCloudSuite`]), a lazily-loaded per-process
//! [`ServerSetup`] persisted via env var, and a small handful of thin
//! wrappers over the four handshake steps.
//!
//! ## Phase 0 scope
//!
//! Endpoints are not yet wired. This module ships the primitives so the
//! subsequent phases can layer registration + login handlers, silent
//! migration hooks, and the eventual `opaque_only` cutover on top without
//! re-designing the type shape.
//!
//! ## Ciphersuite (frozen at v1)
//!
//! | Slot | Choice |
//! |---------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
//! | `OprfCs` | [`Ristretto255`] — SHA-512-backed VOPRF ciphersuite |
//! | `KeGroup` | [`Ristretto255`] — same group for the AKE |
//! | `KeyExchange` | [`TripleDh`] — 3DH mutual auth (opaque-ke default AKE) |
//! | `Ksf` | [`argon2::Argon2`] — memory-hard client-side stretch |
//!
//! **Changing any slot invalidates every previously-minted envelope.**
//! Bumped via [`OpaqueConfig::ciphersuite_version`] with a matching
//! DB-level `opaque_ciphersuite_version` column so a future migration can
//! decide per-user whether to re-register or refuse login until the client
//! re-registers.
//!
//! ## What lives where
//!
//! The KSF is applied CLIENT-side — RFC 9807 puts the memory-hard stretch
//! before the OPRF exchange so the server never runs Argon2. The Argon2
//! params in [`OpaqueConfig`] are therefore a CLIENT concern (published to
//! the SPA at page-load); the server binds the type at compile time so the
//! wire shape matches but never invokes it.
use opaque_ke::CipherSuite;
use opaque_ke::Ristretto255;
use opaque_ke::ServerSetup;
use opaque_ke::key_exchange::tripledh::TripleDh;
use rand_core::OsRng;
use crate::common::config::OpaqueConfig;
use crate::common::errors::{DomainError, ErrorKind};
/// OxiCloud's OPAQUE ciphersuite binding. See the module-level table for
/// the slot choices and the invariants around changing them.
///
/// Zero-sized — this type exists only to name the ciphersuite for the
/// generic `opaque_ke` machinery; no instances are ever constructed.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct OxiCloudSuite;
impl CipherSuite for OxiCloudSuite {
type OprfCs = Ristretto255;
type KeGroup = Ristretto255;
type KeyExchange = TripleDh;
type Ksf = argon2::Argon2<'static>;
}
/// A configured OPAQUE server. Holds the persistent [`ServerSetup`] plus a
/// clone of the runtime [`OpaqueConfig`] so callers don't have to plumb
/// both. Cheap to clone — [`ServerSetup`] is a small keypair blob.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct OpaqueService {
setup: ServerSetup<OxiCloudSuite>,
config: OpaqueConfig,
}
impl OpaqueService {
/// Build the service from runtime config. Expects the operator to have
/// persisted the server setup already (via `OXICLOUD_OPAQUE_SERVER_SETUP`);
/// call [`OpaqueService::generate_server_setup_b64`] first-time and print
/// the value for the operator to paste into their env before enabling
/// `OXICLOUD_OPAQUE_MODE`.
///
/// Rejects with `InternalError` if the setup is missing / malformed, or
/// with `AccessDenied` if the mode is `off` (guarding against
/// accidental use before the operator has explicitly opted in).
pub fn from_config(config: OpaqueConfig) -> Result<Self, DomainError> {
if config.mode == OpaqueMode::Off {
return Err(DomainError::access_denied(
"opaque",
"OPAQUE is disabled (OXICLOUD_OPAQUE_MODE=off)",
));
}
let setup_b64 = config.server_setup_b64.as_deref().ok_or_else(|| {
DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::InternalError,
"opaque",
"OXICLOUD_OPAQUE_SERVER_SETUP is required when OPAQUE is enabled — \
generate one with `oxicloud opaque-setup` and persist it in the env",
)
})?;
let setup = decode_server_setup(setup_b64)?;
Ok(Self { setup, config })
}
/// Runtime OPAQUE mode. Handlers can gate behaviour on this without
/// reaching for the whole config — see the phase plan in
/// `docs/plan/opaque.md`.
pub fn mode(&self) -> OpaqueMode {
self.config.mode
}
/// The bound ciphersuite version, stamped into `opaque_ciphersuite_version`
/// on registration so future migrations can reason per-user.
pub fn ciphersuite_version(&self) -> i16 {
self.config.ciphersuite_version
}
/// The persistent server setup — passed to `ServerRegistration::start`
/// and `ServerLogin::start` in the handler layer. Kept accessible so
/// callers can hold their own refs to it if they need to (e.g. inside
/// a Tokio task), avoiding an extra `Arc` layer.
pub fn setup(&self) -> &ServerSetup<OxiCloudSuite> {
&self.setup
}
/// Generate a fresh server setup and return it as base64. Called once
/// per deployment; the returned string must be persisted in
/// `OXICLOUD_OPAQUE_SERVER_SETUP` and NEVER rotated (rotating
/// invalidates every existing envelope — see
/// `docs/plan/opaque.md` §Phase 0).
pub fn generate_server_setup_b64() -> String {
use base64::Engine as _;
let mut rng = OsRng;
let setup = ServerSetup::<OxiCloudSuite>::new(&mut rng);
base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(setup.serialize())
}
}
fn decode_server_setup(b64: &str) -> Result<ServerSetup<OxiCloudSuite>, DomainError> {
use base64::Engine as _;
let bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
.decode(b64.trim())
.map_err(|e| {
DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::InternalError,
"opaque",
format!("OXICLOUD_OPAQUE_SERVER_SETUP is not valid base64: {e}"),
)
})?;
ServerSetup::<OxiCloudSuite>::deserialize(&bytes).map_err(|e| {
DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::InternalError,
"opaque",
format!(
"OXICLOUD_OPAQUE_SERVER_SETUP payload does not match ciphersuite v1: {e}. \
If you rotated the ciphersuite, every user must re-register."
),
)
})
}
/// Runtime OPAQUE mode. Drives whether the endpoints exist at all
/// (`Off`), run alongside the legacy password path (`Migrate`), or are
/// the only accepted mechanism for users with an envelope (`OpaqueOnly`).
///
/// Progression matches the phase plan — see `docs/plan/opaque.md`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum OpaqueMode {
/// Endpoints 404; no OPAQUE state ever mints. Default. Phase 0-1.
Off,
/// Endpoints live. Legacy login also accepted; successful legacy login
/// silently mints an envelope. Phase 2-3.
Migrate,
/// Endpoints live. Legacy login refused for users with
/// `opaque_migrated_at IS NOT NULL`. Phase 4+.
OpaqueOnly,
}
impl OpaqueMode {
/// Case-insensitive parse. Unknown token returns `None` so callers can
/// log-and-default (mirrors [`crate::common::config::AuthMethod::parse`]).
pub fn parse(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
match s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
"off" | "disabled" => Some(Self::Off),
"migrate" => Some(Self::Migrate),
"opaque_only" | "opaque-only" => Some(Self::OpaqueOnly),
_ => None,
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn generate_and_round_trip_server_setup() {
// Fresh setup encodes to base64, decodes back into an equivalent
// ServerSetup, and yields a usable OpaqueService when threaded
// through the config layer.
let b64 = OpaqueService::generate_server_setup_b64();
assert!(!b64.is_empty(), "setup must be non-empty");
let cfg = OpaqueConfig {
mode: OpaqueMode::Migrate,
server_setup_b64: Some(b64.clone()),
..OpaqueConfig::default()
};
let svc = OpaqueService::from_config(cfg).expect("service builds from valid config");
assert_eq!(svc.mode(), OpaqueMode::Migrate);
// Round-trip check: re-serialising the loaded setup produces the
// same bytes as the generator emitted.
use base64::Engine as _;
let re_encoded = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(svc.setup().serialize());
assert_eq!(re_encoded, b64);
}
#[test]
fn from_config_rejects_off_mode() {
// Guard rail: explicitly refuses to build in Off mode so a stray
// caller cannot accidentally exercise the primitives when the
// operator has disabled OPAQUE.
let cfg = OpaqueConfig {
mode: OpaqueMode::Off,
server_setup_b64: Some(OpaqueService::generate_server_setup_b64()),
..OpaqueConfig::default()
};
let err = OpaqueService::from_config(cfg).expect_err("must reject Off");
assert_eq!(err.kind, ErrorKind::AccessDenied);
}
#[test]
fn from_config_rejects_missing_setup() {
// Enabling OPAQUE without persisting the setup is a boot-time
// misconfiguration — surface it with a clear error rather than
// silently generating a fresh (and unpersisted) keypair.
let cfg = OpaqueConfig {
mode: OpaqueMode::Migrate,
server_setup_b64: None,
..OpaqueConfig::default()
};
let err = OpaqueService::from_config(cfg).expect_err("must reject missing setup");
assert_eq!(err.kind, ErrorKind::InternalError);
assert!(err.to_string().contains("OXICLOUD_OPAQUE_SERVER_SETUP"));
}
#[test]
fn from_config_rejects_malformed_setup() {
// Truncated / garbled base64 is caught at boot with a helpful
// pointer to the ciphersuite-rotation caveat.
let cfg = OpaqueConfig {
mode: OpaqueMode::Migrate,
server_setup_b64: Some("not-base64!".to_string()),
..OpaqueConfig::default()
};
let err = OpaqueService::from_config(cfg).expect_err("must reject malformed setup");
assert_eq!(err.kind, ErrorKind::InternalError);
}
/// End-to-end round-trip through OPAQUE's four messages, using the
/// ciphersuite this service actually binds. This is the load-bearing
/// smoke test for Phase 0: proves the crate is wired correctly, the
/// ServerSetup we serialise / deserialise is functional, and the client
/// and server sides negotiate a matching session key given the correct
/// passphrase (and disagree on the wrong one).
///
/// Fast Argon2 params (8 KiB / 1 iter / 1 lane) keep the test in the
/// millisecond range — production clients pass their own configured
/// Argon2 instance via `ClientRegistrationFinishParameters` /
/// `ClientLoginFinishParameters`, so the test's choice of KSF params
/// does NOT contaminate the runtime behaviour of the service.
#[test]
fn round_trip_register_and_login_matches_session_keys() {
use opaque_ke::{
ClientLogin, ClientLoginFinishParameters, ClientRegistration,
ClientRegistrationFinishParameters, ServerLogin, ServerLoginStartParameters,
ServerRegistration,
};
use rand_core::OsRng;
// ── Server bootstrap (mirrors the production `from_config` path) ─
let b64 = OpaqueService::generate_server_setup_b64();
let svc = OpaqueService::from_config(OpaqueConfig {
mode: OpaqueMode::Migrate,
server_setup_b64: Some(b64),
..OpaqueConfig::default()
})
.expect("service builds");
// Test-scoped fast KSF — override the client-side Argon2 via the
// finish-parameters plumb so we don't pay the 256 MiB / 3-iter
// production defaults for every test run.
let ksf = argon2::Argon2::new(
argon2::Algorithm::Argon2id,
argon2::Version::V0x13,
argon2::Params::new(8, 1, 1, None).expect("valid test argon2 params"),
);
let user_id = b"alice@example.com";
let passphrase = b"correct horse battery staple";
// ── Registration ────────────────────────────────────────────────
let mut client_rng = OsRng;
let client_reg_start =
ClientRegistration::<OxiCloudSuite>::start(&mut client_rng, passphrase)
.expect("client registration start");
let server_reg_start = ServerRegistration::<OxiCloudSuite>::start(
svc.setup(),
client_reg_start.message,
user_id,
)
.expect("server registration start");
let client_reg_finish = client_reg_start
.state
.finish(
&mut client_rng,
passphrase,
server_reg_start.message,
ClientRegistrationFinishParameters::new(
opaque_ke::Identifiers::default(),
Some(&ksf),
),
)
.expect("client registration finish");
let password_file = ServerRegistration::<OxiCloudSuite>::finish(client_reg_finish.message);
let password_file_bytes = password_file.serialize();
// ── Login (correct passphrase → session keys match) ─────────────
let client_login_start = ClientLogin::<OxiCloudSuite>::start(&mut client_rng, passphrase)
.expect("client login start");
let stored = ServerRegistration::<OxiCloudSuite>::deserialize(&password_file_bytes)
.expect("password file deserialises");
let mut server_rng = OsRng;
let server_login_start = ServerLogin::start(
&mut server_rng,
svc.setup(),
Some(stored),
client_login_start.message,
user_id,
ServerLoginStartParameters::default(),
)
.expect("server login start");
let client_login_finish = client_login_start
.state
.finish(
passphrase,
server_login_start.message,
ClientLoginFinishParameters::new(
None,
opaque_ke::Identifiers::default(),
Some(&ksf),
),
)
.expect("client login finish");
let server_login_finish = server_login_start
.state
.finish(client_login_finish.message)
.expect("server login finish");
assert_eq!(
client_login_finish.session_key.as_slice(),
server_login_finish.session_key.as_slice(),
"OPAQUE session keys must match on both sides after a successful login"
);
assert!(
!client_login_finish.export_key.as_slice().is_empty(),
"client export_key must be populated (E2EE KEK bridge input)"
);
// ── Login (wrong passphrase → client finish must fail) ──────────
let bad_login_start =
ClientLogin::<OxiCloudSuite>::start(&mut client_rng, b"wrong-passphrase")
.expect("client login start (wrong pass)");
let stored_again =
ServerRegistration::<OxiCloudSuite>::deserialize(&password_file_bytes).unwrap();
let bad_server_login = ServerLogin::start(
&mut server_rng,
svc.setup(),
Some(stored_again),
bad_login_start.message,
user_id,
ServerLoginStartParameters::default(),
)
.expect("server login start (wrong pass)");
let bad_client_finish = bad_login_start.state.finish(
b"wrong-passphrase",
bad_server_login.message,
ClientLoginFinishParameters::new(None, opaque_ke::Identifiers::default(), Some(&ksf)),
);
assert!(
bad_client_finish.is_err(),
"client finish must reject a wrong passphrase — this is the whole point of OPAQUE"
);
}
#[test]
fn mode_parse_case_insensitive_and_alias_tolerant() {
assert_eq!(OpaqueMode::parse("off"), Some(OpaqueMode::Off));
assert_eq!(OpaqueMode::parse("OFF"), Some(OpaqueMode::Off));
assert_eq!(OpaqueMode::parse("disabled"), Some(OpaqueMode::Off));
assert_eq!(OpaqueMode::parse("migrate"), Some(OpaqueMode::Migrate));
assert_eq!(
OpaqueMode::parse("opaque_only"),
Some(OpaqueMode::OpaqueOnly)
);
assert_eq!(
OpaqueMode::parse("opaque-only"),
Some(OpaqueMode::OpaqueOnly)
);
assert_eq!(OpaqueMode::parse("nope"), None);
}
}