Merge pull request #683 from EdouardVanbelle/refactor/userdto

docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md

@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+# UserDto Refactor — Three-Layer Split (Public / Full / Self)
+
+> **Status — SHIPPED 2026-08-21.** All eight phases landed and all gates
+> pass: `cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -D warnings` clean,
+> `cargo fmt --check` clean, `cargo test three_layer_quarantine` (2/2
+> structural-quarantine tests pass), `npm run check` (593 files, 0
+> errors, 0 warnings), `npm run test:unit` (414 pass / 1 skipped / 0
+> failed), OpenAPI regenerated at `resources/gen/openapi.json`. See the
+> [Phasing](#phasing) section below for the per-step outcome. The doc
+> is retained as the reference for anyone extending the three-layer
+> shape (new field → decide by audience per the rule in the opening
+> section).
+
+Establish three DTO shapes for representing a user on the wire, each
+with a single unambiguous audience, composed hierarchically so the
+overlap between audiences is defined ONCE:
+
+- **`PublicUserDto`** — public identity. What any authenticated caller
+  may see about *another* user. Returned by `/api/users/{id}`, share
+  responses, group members, magic-link invitees, recipient enrichment.
+- **`FullUserDto`** = `PublicUserDto` + all fields that BOTH an admin
+  (viewing another user) AND the subject themselves (viewing
+  themselves) may see. Returned as `Vec<FullUserDto>` by
+  `/api/admin/users`. Closest DTO to the underlying `auth.users` row.
+- **`SelfUserDto`** = `FullUserDto` + self-only preferences,
+  session-scoped flags, and caller-scoped permissions. Returned by
+  `/api/auth/me` and by the login / refresh / OIDC / magic-link auth
+  response.
+
+Composition (`FullUserDto.user: PublicUserDto`,
+`SelfUserDto.full: FullUserDto`) means the public-identity contract
+has ONE definition; the overlap between admin's view and self's view
+is another single definition. Adding a new field naturally finds its
+level:
+
+- Useful to any authenticated caller? → `PublicUserDto`.
+- Useful only to admin (about another user) and the subject
+  themselves? → `FullUserDto`.
+- Meaningful only to the caller viewing themselves? → `SelfUserDto`.
+
+Companion of `docs/plan/sessions.md` (which introduced `is_online`
+and motivated widening the DTO for presence). Same principle: pick
+the audience first, structure the DTO around it, don't let the same
+field mean different things on different endpoints.
+
+## Why now — the problems this fixes
+
+Today's single `UserDto` conflates three audiences. Symptoms:
+
+1. **The "quiet lie"**. `UserDto::has_password` is populated only by
+   `/api/auth/me`; every other emitter (`From<User>`) leaves it
+   `false`. A share-recipient DTO on the wire says
+   `has_password: false` unconditionally, which an attacker
+   scraping share responses could misread as "this user is
+   passwordless" when the truth is "we didn't fill this field in
+   for you". Same pattern for `force_password_change` and
+   `is_dpop_bound`. See `src/application/dtos/user_dto.rs:134-138`
+   for the explicit disclaimer — the convention exists precisely
+   because the field placement is wrong.
+
+2. **Private signals leak by default**. `last_login_at`,
+   `notify_on_share`, `ui_preferences`, `preferred_locale`,
+   `federation_kind`, `email_verified_at`, and
+   `storage_used_bytes` all ride on `UserDto` and are returned to
+   any authenticated caller who can see a given user. Group
+   members can see when their peers last logged in, which IdP they
+   federate with, and how full their disks are. None of this is
+   information a share picker or a member listing needs.
+
+3. **`AdminUserSummaryDto` duplicates a chunk of `UserDto` verbatim**
+   (id / username / email / role / quotas / last_login_at / active /
+   federation_* / is_external), then adds three admin-only fields
+   (has_password / opaque_registered / opaque_migrated). The two
+   shapes drift naturally as new fields are added — no compile-time
+   guarantee they stay in sync.
+
+4. **N+1 in the admin panel**. Because `AdminUserSummaryDto` doesn't
+   include `image`, the admin users table fires `/api/users/{id}`
+   per row so `UserVignette` can render the avatar. Composition
+   (`FullUserDto.user.image`) lets the admin listing seed the SPA's
+   per-user cache from the list rows directly.
+
+## Target shapes
+
+### `PublicUserDto` — public identity (9 fields)
+
+Applied rule: "would a share picker / group member listing /
+recipient enrichment need this? if no, it doesn't belong here."
+
+```rust
+pub struct PublicUserDto {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub username: Option<String>,
+    pub email: String,
+    pub role: String,                    // sharee UI renders admin badge
+    pub image: Option<String>,           // avatar
+    pub is_external: bool,               // external badge
+    pub given_name: Option<String>,      // social identity
+    pub family_name: Option<String>,     // social identity
+    pub is_online: bool,                 // presence — social signal
+}
+```
+
+Every existing UserDto emitter site (`From<User>`, share responses,
+group members, magic-link invitees, sharee-vignette lookup)
+returns this slim shape. All private signals below vanish from
+those wire paths.
+
+### `FullUserDto` — admin's view of anyone + self's view of self (13 extras)
+
+The fields the SUBJECT themselves may know about themselves that
+an ADMIN may also know about the subject. Composed on top of
+`PublicUserDto`. This is the DTO closest to the underlying
+`auth.users` row.
+
+```rust
+pub struct FullUserDto {
+    /// Public identity — same set any authenticated caller can see.
+    pub user: PublicUserDto,
+    /// IdP linkage. Which SSO provider a peer uses is a soft
+    /// org-affiliation leak; not needed by share pickers.
+    pub federation_kind: Option<String>,
+    pub federation_issuer: Option<String>,
+    /// Subject's own locale preference. Only THEY or an admin
+    /// managing them needs this — other callers use their own.
+    pub preferred_locale: Option<String>,
+    /// Email-verification stamp. Trust signal — meaningful to admin
+    /// (auditing verification status) and to self (own record), but
+    /// not to a share picker rendering a vignette.
+    pub email_verified_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+    /// Row bookkeeping — not rendered on any non-admin surface today.
+    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+    pub updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+    /// Activity signal — private.
+    pub last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+    /// Account-active flag — private (a deactivated user couldn't
+    /// reach `/me` anyway, but admin needs to see it).
+    pub active: bool,
+    /// Storage quotas — personal financials. Admin manages others';
+    /// self sees own.
+    pub storage_quota_bytes: i64,
+    pub storage_used_bytes: i64,
+    /// Auth capability set — has_password / OPAQUE flags. Kept off
+    /// public identity because per-user auth adoption leaks through
+    /// directory endpoints.
+    pub has_password: bool,
+    pub opaque_registered: bool,
+    pub opaque_migrated: bool,
+}
+```
+
+### `SelfUserDto` — /api/auth/me (5 extras)
+
+Everything the caller may see about themselves that no other
+caller (not even an admin) needs to see: pure self-scoped state.
+
+```rust
+pub struct SelfUserDto {
+    /// Full profile. Every field an admin would see about you is
+    /// here — same shape as one row of /api/admin/users.
+    pub full: FullUserDto,
+    /// Opaque UI preferences bag — my own UI state. Cross-device
+    /// via PATCH /api/auth/me/profile.
+    pub ui_preferences: serde_json::Value,
+    /// Whether I want share-notification emails.
+    pub notify_on_share: bool,
+    /// Session-scoped: my current session carries a DPoP thumbprint.
+    /// SPA skips a redundant /api/auth/dpop/bind on load when true.
+    pub is_dpop_bound: bool,
+    /// Admin-set temp-password gate — SPA nav guard blocks everything
+    /// but /change-password until this flips back.
+    pub force_password_change: bool,
+    /// Caller-scoped permission: can I edit my own avatar? False for
+    /// OIDC users whose avatar comes from the IdP. Only meaningful
+    /// when caller == subject; nonsense on any other DTO.
+    pub can_edit_image: bool,
+}
+```
+
+## Endpoint mapping
+
+| Endpoint | Old shape | New shape |
+|---|---|---|
+| `/api/auth/me` | `UserDto` (fat) | `SelfUserDto` |
+| `/api/auth/login` / `/refresh` / OIDC callback / magic-link redemption | `AuthResponseDto { user: UserDto }` | `AuthResponseDto { user: SelfUserDto }` |
+| `/api/admin/users` | `Vec<AdminUserSummaryDto>` | `Vec<FullUserDto>` |
+| `/api/users/{id}` | `UserDto` (fat) | `PublicUserDto` (9 fields) |
+| Share responses / group members / magic-link invitees / recipient enrichment | `UserDto` (fat) | `PublicUserDto` |
+
+**Login response ships `SelfUserDto`, not `PublicUserDto`.** The SPA
+needs `has_password`, `ui_preferences`, `is_dpop_bound`, and
+`force_password_change` immediately post-login to avoid a UI race
+with the first `/me` fetch. Same rationale for refresh and
+OIDC/magic-link callback: the SPA's post-auth state must be
+complete in one round trip.
+
+## Backend callsite inventory
+
+**DTO layer** (`src/application/dtos/user_dto.rs`):
+
+- Replace `UserDto` with `PublicUserDto` (renamed AND slimmed —
+  same rename forces every consumer to consciously pick the new
+  shape rather than silently losing fields).
+- Add `FullUserDto` and `SelfUserDto`.
+- Delete `AdminUserSummaryDto` (superseded by `FullUserDto`).
+- `impl From<User> for PublicUserDto` — the entry point. Maps 1:1
+  to `User`'s public identity accessors.
+- `FullUserDto::build(user: User, flags: UserDerivedFlags)` —
+  wraps a `PublicUserDto` plus the DB-computed booleans not on
+  `User` (`has_password`, `opaque_registered`, `opaque_migrated`,
+  `is_online`). Every other FullUserDto field comes from `User`
+  directly. Not a `From` impl because the second argument is
+  needed and Rust's `From` is single-arg.
+- `SelfUserDto::build(full: FullUserDto, session_ctx: SessionContext)`
+  — helper taking a FullUserDto plus caller context (session's
+  DPoP-bound flag, admin-set force-password-change flag). Same
+  reason as FullUserDto's builder — not a `From` impl.
+
+**Repository layer**
+(`src/infrastructure/repositories/pg/user_pg_repository.rs`):
+
+- **Delete `UserListEntry`** — the narrow projection was a perf
+  optimization; Path B decision supersedes it.
+- `list_users` returns `Vec<(User, UserDerivedFlags)>` where
+  `UserDerivedFlags` is a small named struct in
+  `domain/repositories/user_repository.rs`:
+
+  ```rust
+  /// DB-computed booleans about a user that aren't fields on the
+  /// `User` entity itself — either derived from column presence
+  /// (`password_hash IS NOT NULL`) or from a cross-table lookup
+  /// (`auth.sessions.last_seen_at` for `is_online`). Companion
+  /// to `User` on the list projection: the repo computes both,
+  /// the application layer packs them into `FullUserDto`.
+  pub struct UserDerivedFlags {
+      pub has_password: bool,
+      pub opaque_registered: bool,
+      pub opaque_migrated: bool,
+      pub is_online: bool,
+  }
+  ```
+
+  Not "admin-only" — every field ends up on `FullUserDto`, which
+  both admin AND self read. The name reflects "derived from the
+  DB row, not intrinsic to the User entity".
+- SELECT widens to include `image` (previously narrowed away
+  per ROUND12 §Q1) + the `EXISTS(...)` scalar for `is_online`,
+  bound with `ONLINE_WINDOW.as_secs_f64()` via
+  `make_interval(secs => $N)` — same pattern as
+  `session_liveness_gauges.rs:104-114`, single source of truth,
+  no SQL literal.
+
+**Handler / service layer**:
+
+- `/api/auth/me` handler — builds `SelfUserDto` from
+  `(User, UserDerivedFlags, session_context)`. The
+  `UserDerivedFlags` for /me comes from a reuse of the
+  list-repo path scoped to `WHERE id = $me` or a new small
+  dedicated query (implementer's call — either works).
+- `AuthResponseDto` shape follows — `user: SelfUserDto` field.
+- Every login/refresh/OIDC/magic-link path that mints an
+  `AuthResponseDto` computes the same SelfUserDto.
+- Admin service `list_users_admin` — returns `Vec<FullUserDto>`.
+- `/api/users/{id}` handler — returns `PublicUserDto`. Every
+  other public consumer stays on `PublicUserDto`.
+
+## Frontend callsite inventory
+
+**Type changes** (`frontend/src/lib/api/types.ts`):
+
+- Rename `User` interface → `PublicUser` and slim to match new
+  DTO (9 fields).
+- Add `FullUser` interface — `{ user: PublicUser, federation_kind, ... }`.
+- Add `SelfUser` interface — `{ full: FullUser, ui_preferences, ... }`.
+- Delete `AdminUser` (replaced by `FullUser`).
+
+**Store changes**:
+
+- `lib/stores/session.svelte.ts` — reads /me, must handle SelfUser
+  shape. Recommendation: keep a derived `session.me: SelfUser` for
+  the full record and shorthand accessors:
+  `session.user: PublicUser` = `session.me.full.user`,
+  `session.full: FullUser` = `session.me.full`.
+  Existing `session.user.username` calls keep working via the
+  shorthand; new self-only reads go through `session.me.foo` or
+  `session.full.foo`.
+
+**Component changes**:
+
+- Profile / change-password / DPoP-bind pages — reads
+  `session.me.has_password`, `session.me.is_dpop_bound`,
+  `session.me.can_edit_image`, `session.full.preferred_locale`,
+  etc.
+- `routes/admin/[[tab]]/+page.svelte` users table — every
+  `u.username` → `u.user.username`, every `u.last_login_at` /
+  `u.active` / `u.has_password` stays top-level (FullUserDto
+  fields). Also **seed `resolveUser` cache with `u.user`** in the
+  load path — kills the N+1 that motivated widening the query.
+- Admin sessions table's `UserVignette` — no change, `user_id`
+  passed through unchanged; the users-table cache seed above
+  satisfies the vignette lookup on cross-table navigation.
+- `lib/composables/useOwnerCache.ts` /
+  `lib/api/endpoints/users.ts` — `resolveUser` returns
+  `PublicUser`. No signature change; the return shape only gets
+  smaller. Add a `seedUser(u: PublicUser)` export so the admin
+  table can prime the cache.
+
+## Phasing
+
+Each step compiles standalone; each is a reasonable review chunk.
+
+1. **Introduce the new DTOs** — add `PublicUserDto`, `FullUserDto`,
+   and `SelfUserDto` alongside the existing `UserDto`. Don't
+   change `UserDto` yet. Compiles; no behaviour change.
+2. **Widen repo projection** — add `is_online` (via EXISTS
+   subquery) and `image` back to `list_users` SELECT. Introduce
+   `AdminExtras` struct. `UserListEntry` still exists but is now
+   redundant (fields also available on `User`).
+3. **Migrate the emitter sites** — `/api/auth/me`,
+   login/refresh/OIDC/magic-link, admin service. Each now builds
+   the new nested shape. Old `UserDto` still ships every field.
+4. **Rename `UserDto` → `PublicUserDto` and slim** — remove the
+   moved fields. The Rust compiler flags every remaining consumer
+   that reads a removed field; those either move to `.full.foo` /
+   `.user.foo` (embedded) or promote themselves to a Self/Full
+   DTO.
+5. **Delete `UserListEntry` + `AdminUserSummaryDto`** — dead after
+   the cutover.
+6. **Frontend** — rename types (`User` → `PublicUser`), add
+   `FullUser` / `SelfUser`, update session store, all consumers.
+   Seed `resolveUser` cache from admin table.
+7. **Regenerate OpenAPI** — `cargo run --bin generate-openapi`
+   picks up the new schemas; the shrunken `PublicUserDto` schema
+   documents the new contract.
+8. **Delete obsolete doc comments** — `has_password` /
+   `is_dpop_bound` / `force_password_change` comments on the old
+   UserDto explaining "populated only by `/me`" become obsolete
+   (the field structurally can't exist on non-self emitters).
+
+## Wire-shape breaking changes
+
+All in-repo consumers (backend + SPA) migrate in the same commit.
+External consumers: none today — `/api/admin/users` is
+admin-panel-only, `/me` is SPA-only, share/group endpoints are
+SPA-only. Ship as one clean break; skip a `?shape=v2` deprecation
+window.
+
+Every removed field from a public UserDto path (share responses,
+group members, magic-link invitees, `/api/users/{id}`) is a
+deliberate leak reduction, not a regression. Any FE consumer that
+was reading e.g. `sharee.has_password` was reading a "quiet lie"
+anyway (always `false`).
+
+## Testing
+
+**Backend**:
+
+- Round-trip tests for each new DTO type (already have for
+  UserDto; extend to PublicUserDto + FullUserDto + SelfUserDto).
+- **Structural quarantine tests** —
+  `self_user_dto_does_not_leak_ui_preferences_via_public_paths`:
+  serialize a `SelfUserDto`, assert `ui_preferences` appears
+  ONLY at top level, not inside `.full.user` or `.full`. Same for
+  `FullUserDto` — `has_password` at top level of `FullUserDto`,
+  not inside `.user`.
+- Update every service test that constructs `UserDto` fixtures.
+
+**Frontend**:
+
+- The TS type system catches every consumer that reads a removed
+  field. `npm run check` surfaces the whole blast radius on the
+  first pass — no new test infrastructure needed.
+- Add one Vitest integration on the admin users table asserting
+  the presence dot renders AND `/api/users/{id}` is NOT called
+  per row (checks `apiFetch` mock call count).
+
+**Wire-shape guard**:
+
+- Hurl test hitting `/api/users/{id}` as a non-admin caller,
+  asserting the response does NOT contain moved fields
+  (`has_password`, `last_login_at`, `notify_on_share`,
+  `ui_preferences`, `storage_used_bytes`, `federation_kind`,
+  `preferred_locale`, `email_verified_at`, `created_at`, etc.).
+  Anti-regression guard for the whole point of this refactor.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- **Reworking the `User` domain entity** — this refactor is
+  DTO-shape only. The entity keeps all its fields.
+- **Visibility-rule changes on `/api/users/{id}`** — who can see
+  whom stays as-is; only the field set narrows.
+- **Splitting other DTOs** — `SessionSummaryDto`, `FileDto`, etc.
+  Same principle would apply, but each is a separate design call.
+- **Moving avatars out of the row** — planned separately. This
+  refactor keeps `image` on `PublicUserDto` so the admin-panel
+  N+1 fix survives.
+- **Flattening the nested shape via `#[serde(flatten)]`** — the
+  three-level wire shape (`me.full.user.username`) is slightly
+  deeper than a flat DTO would be, but the structural quarantine
+  is worth the cost. Reconsider if consumer readability suffers.
+
+## Open questions
+
+1. **Wire nesting depth on `/me`**: `me.full.user.username` is 3
+   levels. Acceptable? Alternative: `#[serde(flatten)]` on
+   FullUserDto and SelfUserDto so the wire is flat
+   (`me.username`, `me.has_password`, `me.ui_preferences` all
+   at top level), while keeping structural quarantine at compile
+   time only. Simpler for FE consumers, loses runtime
+   introspectability (a receiver can't tell which fields are
+   public vs full vs self from the shape). Recommendation: ship
+   nested; revisit if FE readability suffers.
+2. **`created_at` / `updated_at` on FullUserDto** — not rendered
+   anywhere currently. Keep for compat unless there's a
+   compelling reason to drop.
+
+## Memory notes to update on landing
+
+- Extend `project_sessions_last_seen_at_shipped` with a "led to"
+  pointer at this refactor.
+- New note `project_userdto_three_layer_split` — captures the
+  PublicUserDto / FullUserDto / SelfUserDto pattern + the
+  decision rule ("would any authenticated caller need this?
+  PublicUserDto. would self+admin? FullUserDto. self only?
+  SelfUserDto.").
+- Delete the `AdminUserSummaryDto` and `UserListEntry`
+  references in earlier memory notes.

frontend/src/lib/api/endpoints/admin.test.ts

@@ -64,10 +64,7 @@ describe('admin mutate-based endpoints', () => {
 describe('admin read endpoints', () => {
 	it('call apiJson for the listing/settings reads', async () => {
 		await admin.listUsers(25, 0);
-		expect(jsonMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+		expect(jsonMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/api/admin/users?limit=25&offset=0', expect.anything());
-			'/api/admin/users?limit=25&offset=0&summary=true',
-			expect.anything()
-		);
 		await admin.getDashboard();
 		await admin.getSmtpInfo();
 		await admin.getOidcSettings();

frontend/src/lib/api/endpoints/admin.ts

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import type {
 	DriveMember,
 	DriveMemberSubject,
 	DriveRole,
-	User
+	FullUser
 } from '$lib/api/types';
 
 const JSON_HEADERS = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };
@@ -277,19 +277,24 @@ export function revokeAdminSession(sessionId: string): Promise<void> {
 
 // ── Users ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-/** List the compact rows rendered by the management table; full account
+/** List admin users — always returns `FullUser` rows. The former
- * details remain available through {@link getUserAdmin}. */
+ * `?summary` toggle is retired; a single canonical shape carries
+ * the vignette + admin-visible extras the table needs. Single-user
+ * details still available via {@link getUserAdmin}. */
 export function listUsers(limit: number, offset: number): Promise<AdminUsersPage> {
-	return apiJson<AdminUsersPage>(`/api/admin/users?limit=${limit}&offset=${offset}&summary=true`, {
+	return apiJson<AdminUsersPage>(`/api/admin/users?limit=${limit}&offset=${offset}`, {
 		credentials: 'same-origin'
 	});
 }
 
 /**
  * Admin-scoped single-user lookup — `GET /api/admin/users/{id}`.
- * Returns the full `User` DTO including `storage_quota_bytes` +
+ * Returns the full `FullUser` DTO (public identity in `.user` +
- * `storage_used_bytes` which the non-admin `/api/users/{id}`
+ * admin-visible extras like `email_verified_at` / `has_password` /
- * response omits for privacy.
+ * `opaque_registered` / `last_login_at` / quotas at top level) —
+ * same shape as one row of `/api/admin/users` list. The peer-view
+ * `/api/users/{id}` returns the slim `PublicUser` which omits those
+ * admin-only signals.
  *
  * Result promises are cached per id at module scope so multiple
  * callers for the same user (e.g. the admin drives table with N
@@ -301,14 +306,14 @@ export function listUsers(limit: number, offset: number): Promise<AdminUsersPage
  * still sees the cached value. Callers that need to refresh (e.g.
  * after `setUserQuota`) should call `invalidateAdminUserCache`.
  */
-const adminUserCache = new Map<string, Promise<User | null>>();
+const adminUserCache = new Map<string, Promise<FullUser | null>>();
 
-export function getUserAdmin(id: string): Promise<User | null> {
+export function getUserAdmin(id: string): Promise<FullUser | null> {
 	const hit = adminUserCache.get(id);
 	if (hit) return hit;
-	const pending = (async (): Promise<User | null> => {
+	const pending = (async (): Promise<FullUser | null> => {
 		try {
-			return await apiJson<User>(`/api/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, {
+			return await apiJson<FullUser>(`/api/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, {
 				credentials: 'same-origin'
 			});
 		} catch {
@@ -387,9 +392,30 @@ export interface DriveKindUsage {
 }
 
 export interface AdminDashboard {
+	// ── User accounts (static breakdown of auth.users) ──
+	// All four are counts of the same table under different
+	// predicates. Rendered as one grouped section on the dashboard.
 	total_users: number;
 	active_users: number;
 	admin_users: number;
+	/** Grant-only accounts (magic-link / OIDC-only / OCM recipients).
+	 * Filtered out of `total_users` / `active_users` — those count
+	 * operational seats. Surfaced here as its own metric because
+	 * external-heavy deployments (public-share collab, invited-only
+	 * shops) need the invited population at a glance. */
+	external_users: number;
+	// ── Live activity (projection over auth.sessions) ──
+	// Both change minute-to-minute — a whole different cadence from
+	// the account counts above. Rendered as a separate section on
+	// the dashboard with the presence-dot visual cue.
+	/** Distinct users behind non-revoked sessions active in the last
+	 * 5 min. Same 5-min window as the `oxicloud_sessions_online_users`
+	 * Prometheus gauge; single source of truth on the backend. */
+	online_users: number;
+	/** Non-revoked sessions active in the last 5 min. Ratio
+	 * `online_sessions / online_users` is the multi-device factor
+	 * (browser + desktop + phone). */
+	online_sessions: number;
 	server_version: string;
 	drive_usage: DriveKindUsage[];
 	auth_enabled: boolean;

frontend/src/lib/api/endpoints/auth.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  */
 import { ApiError, apiFetch } from '$lib/api/client';
 import { getCsrfHeaders } from '$lib/api/csrf';
-import type { AuthResponse, User } from '$lib/api/types';
+import type { AuthResponse, SelfUser } from '$lib/api/types';
 
 /**
  * Best-effort parse of the backend `ErrorResponse` shape
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ const JSON_HEADERS = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };
  * Failure to build a proof (no keypair, missing WebCrypto) falls back to a
  * headerless request — the server still accepts it for unbound sessions.
  */
-export async function fetchMe(): Promise<User | null> {
+export async function fetchMe(): Promise<SelfUser | null> {
 	// Build + sign a DPoP proof, send with the header, harvest any
 	// `DPoP-Nonce` off the response into the shared client cache
 	// (so the NEXT apiFetch call reuses it — no wasted round trip).
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ export async function fetchMe(): Promise<User | null> {
 	if (dpopMod && dpopMod.isDpopNonceChallenge(res)) res = await send();
 	if (res.status === 401) return null;
 	if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`/api/auth/me failed: ${res.status}`);
-	return (await res.json()) as User;
+	return (await res.json()) as SelfUser;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ export async function setupAdmin(email: string, password: string): Promise<void>
  * failure, not an expired access token. Returns the user on success, null on
  * any failure so the caller can fall through to the normal login UI.
  */
-export async function exchangeOidcCode(code: string): Promise<User | null> {
+export async function exchangeOidcCode(code: string): Promise<SelfUser | null> {
 	try {
 		const res = await fetch('/api/auth/oidc/exchange', {
 			method: 'POST',
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ export async function exchangeOidcCode(code: string): Promise<User | null> {
 			body: JSON.stringify({ code })
 		});
 		if (!res.ok) return null;
-		const data = (await res.json()) as { user?: User };
+		const data = (await res.json()) as { user?: SelfUser };
 		return data.user ?? null;
 	} catch {
 		return null;
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ export async function register(email: string, password?: string, username?: stri
  * authenticated; a 401 here IS a genuine "session expired" and the
  * refresh interceptor is the right response.
  */
-export async function upgradeToInternal(password?: string): Promise<User> {
+export async function upgradeToInternal(password?: string): Promise<SelfUser> {
 	const body: Record<string, unknown> = {};
 	if (password) body.password = password;
 	const res = await apiFetch('/api/auth/upgrade-to-internal', {
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ export async function upgradeToInternal(password?: string): Promise<User> {
 			message
 		);
 	}
-	return (await res.json()) as User;
+	return (await res.json()) as SelfUser;
 }
 
 export type MagicLinkResult = 'sent' | 'unavailable';

frontend/src/lib/api/endpoints/profile.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /** Profile / account endpoints — ported from views/profile/profile.js. */
 import { apiFetch } from '$lib/api/client';
 import { getCsrfHeaders } from '$lib/api/csrf';
-import type { User } from '$lib/api/types';
+import type { SelfUser } from '$lib/api/types';
 import { t } from '$lib/i18n/index.svelte';
 
 const JSON_HEADERS = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ export interface ProfilePatch {
 	ui_preferences?: Record<string, unknown>;
 }
 
-export async function updateProfile(patch: ProfilePatch): Promise<User> {
+export async function updateProfile(patch: ProfilePatch): Promise<SelfUser> {
 	const res = await apiFetch('/api/auth/me/profile', {
 		method: 'PATCH',
 		credentials: 'same-origin',
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ export async function updateProfile(patch: ProfilePatch): Promise<User> {
 		}
 		throw new Error(err.message || err.error || `profile update failed: ${res.status}`);
 	}
-	return (await res.json()) as User;
+	return (await res.json()) as SelfUser;
 }
 
 export async function changePassword(currentPw: string, newPw: string): Promise<void> {

frontend/src/lib/api/endpoints/users.ts

@@ -16,15 +16,23 @@ export interface ResolvedUser {
 	email: string;
 	image: string | null;
 	isExternal: boolean;
+	/** Presence — TRUE when the server observed a request on any of this
+	 * user's non-revoked sessions within the last 5 min (backend
+	 * `PublicUserDto.is_online`). Drives the presence dot overlay on
+	 * `<UserAvatar>` / `<UserVignette>`. `false` when the caller's
+	 * source didn't compute presence (a bare `resolveUser(id)` from
+	 * pre-3-layer callers, an older backend build) — dot stays dark. */
+	isOnline: boolean;
 }
 
-/** Subset of the backend `UserDto` we consume here. */
+/** Subset of the backend `PublicUserDto` we consume here. */
-interface UserDtoShape {
+interface PublicUserShape {
 	id: string;
 	username?: string | null;
 	email?: string | null;
 	image?: string | null;
 	is_external: boolean;
+	is_online?: boolean;
 }
 
 // id → in-flight/resolved lookup (the Promise is cached so concurrent callers
@@ -41,13 +49,14 @@ export function resolveUser(id: string): Promise<ResolvedUser | null> {
 				credentials: 'same-origin'
 			});
 			if (!res.ok) return null;
-			const u = (await res.json()) as UserDtoShape;
+			const u = (await res.json()) as PublicUserShape;
 			return {
 				id: u.id,
 				name: u.username?.trim() || u.email || u.id,
 				email: u.email ?? '',
 				image: u.image ?? null,
-				isExternal: u.is_external
+				isExternal: u.is_external,
+				isOnline: u.is_online ?? false
 			};
 		} catch {
 			return null;
@@ -57,3 +66,37 @@ export function resolveUser(id: string): Promise<ResolvedUser | null> {
 	cache.set(id, pending);
 	return pending;
 }
+
+/**
+ * Prime the resolver cache from data the caller already has in hand.
+ * When a list endpoint (e.g. `/api/admin/users`) ships full
+ * `PublicUser` rows, the admin page seeds this cache in its load path
+ * so every subsequent `resolveUser(id)` call (from `UserVignette`
+ * mounted per-row) hits the cache synchronously — no per-row
+ * `/api/users/{id}` follow-up fetch. Kills the N+1 that motivated
+ * widening `/api/admin/users` to include the avatar (see
+ * `docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md` § N+1).
+ *
+ * No-op when the id is already cached (in-flight or resolved). This
+ * makes seeding safe to call unconditionally — never clobbers an
+ * authoritative in-flight lookup with a stale seed.
+ */
+export function seedUser(u: {
+	id: string;
+	username?: string | null;
+	email: string;
+	image?: string | null;
+	is_external: boolean;
+	is_online?: boolean;
+}): void {
+	if (cache.has(u.id)) return;
+	const resolved: ResolvedUser = {
+		id: u.id,
+		name: u.username?.trim() || u.email || u.id,
+		email: u.email,
+		image: u.image ?? null,
+		isExternal: u.is_external,
+		isOnline: u.is_online ?? false
+	};
+	cache.set(u.id, Promise.resolve(resolved));
+}

frontend/src/lib/api/types.ts

@@ -179,148 +179,116 @@ export interface TrashResourcesResponse {
 
 export type Role = 'user' | 'admin';
 
-/** Wire shape of `UserDto` (backend: src/application/dtos/user_dto.rs). */
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-export interface User {
+// Three-layer user family — mirrors src/application/dtos/user_dto.rs.
+// See docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md.
+//
+// `PublicUser`  — public identity. Every authenticated caller may see it.
+//                 Returned by /api/users/{id}, share responses, group
+//                 members, magic-link invitees, recipient enrichment.
+// `FullUser`    — `{ user: PublicUser, ...admin+self extras }`. Returned
+//                 as Vec by /api/admin/users; embedded in `SelfUser`.
+// `SelfUser`    — `{ full: FullUser, ...self-only extras }`. Returned by
+//                 /api/auth/me and by every auth response.
+//
+// Adding a field? Decide by audience:
+//   * Any authenticated caller may see it about another user → PublicUser.
+//   * Only admin (about another user) AND self (about self) → FullUser.
+//   * Only self about themselves → SelfUser.
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/** Public identity — 9 fields visible to any authenticated caller. */
+export interface PublicUser {
 	id: string;
 	username?: string;
 	email: string;
 	role: string;
-	storage_quota_bytes: number;
+	image?: string | null;
-	storage_used_bytes: number;
+	is_external: boolean;
+	given_name?: string;
+	family_name?: string;
+	/** Presence — TRUE when the server observed a request on any of this
+	 * user's non-revoked sessions within the last 5 min. Populated on
+	 * list endpoints; single-user public paths default to `false`.
+	 * Backwards-compat: missing on older backend builds → `false`. */
+	is_online?: boolean;
+}
+
+/** Full user record — public identity + all fields BOTH an admin (viewing
+ * another user) AND the subject themselves may see. Returned as `Vec` by
+ * `/api/admin/users`; embedded in `SelfUser` for `/api/auth/me`. */
+export interface FullUser {
+	user: PublicUser;
+	/** IdP linkage. Load-bearing "is federated?" predicate:
+	 * `full.federation_kind === 'oidc'`. */
+	federation_kind?: 'oidc' | 'ocm' | 'magic_link';
+	/** Authority that minted the OIDC/OCM identity — issuer URL for OIDC,
+	 * peer domain for OCM. FE that wants a friendly label maps this
+	 * against `OidcProviders.issuer → provider_name`. */
+	federation_issuer?: string;
+	preferred_locale?: string;
+	email_verified_at?: string;
 	created_at: string;
 	updated_at: string;
 	last_login_at?: string | null;
 	active: boolean;
-	/**
+	storage_quota_bytes: number;
-	 * Which trust chain minted this user's federation identity. `null`
+	storage_used_bytes: number;
-	 * (omitted from wire) for local users (password / OPAQUE only).
+	/** TRUE when the account has a local Argon2id `password_hash` on file.
-	 * `"oidc" | "ocm" | "magic_link"` for federated users. Predicate:
+	 * Distinct from `federation_kind`: an OIDC-linked account can ALSO
-	 * `!user.federation_kind` = local; `user.federation_kind === 'oidc'`
+	 * carry a local password (hybrid). */
-	 * = OIDC user. Mirrors `auth.users.federation_kind` verbatim.
+	has_password: boolean;
-	 */
+	/** TRUE when the user has an OPAQUE envelope on file. Admin-visible
-	federation_kind?: 'oidc' | 'ocm' | 'magic_link';
+	 * rollout signal — kept off `PublicUser` so directory endpoints don't
-	/**
+	 * leak OPAQUE adoption. */
-	 * Authority that minted this user's OIDC/OCM identity — issuer URL
+	opaque_registered: boolean;
-	 * for OIDC (id_token `iss`), peer domain for OCM. `null` (omitted)
+	/** TRUE when the user has completed ≥1 OPAQUE login. Distinct from
-	 * for local users. FE that wants a friendly display label maps this
+	 * `opaque_registered` — envelope-on-file vs successful-login. */
-	 * against `OidcProviders.issuer → provider_name` when they match;
+	opaque_migrated: boolean;
-	 * shows the raw value otherwise. Renamed from the historical
-	 * `auth_provider` (which held a display label pre-Phase-B and a
-	 * `"local"` sentinel for non-federated users — both are gone).
-	 */
-	federation_issuer?: string;
-	image?: string | null;
-	can_edit_image: boolean;
-	is_external: boolean;
-	given_name?: string;
-	family_name?: string;
-	email_verified_at?: string;
-	preferred_locale?: string;
-	notify_on_share: boolean;
-	/**
-	 * Opaque UI preferences bag. Server-side JSONB column that persists
-	 * pure UI toggles (hide-dotfiles, view mode, sidebar collapse, …)
-	 * across devices. The server never inspects the contents — the SPA
-	 * defines the keys (see `lib/stores/preferences.svelte.ts` for the
-	 * typed view). Always an object on the wire (empty bag is `{}`,
-	 * never `null` or missing).
-	 *
-	 * When PATCHing back to the server via
-	 * `PATCH /api/auth/me/profile { ui_preferences: {...} }`, the
-	 * server SHALLOW-merges — only the keys present in the patch are
-	 * touched, so partial writes from one device don't clobber
-	 * preferences set on another. Set a key to `null` in the patch to
-	 * delete it from the bag.
-	 */
-	ui_preferences: Record<string, unknown>;
-	/**
-	 * Mirrors `auth.users.force_password_change_at_next_login`. Only
-	 * populated by `GET /api/auth/me` (see the backend UserDto doc for
-	 * why other UserDto call-sites default to false). When true, the
-	 * SPA MUST lock navigation to the password-change surface — the
-	 * root layout's guard + the backend's `require_no_password_change_pending`
-	 * middleware together enforce this. Optional on the wire because
-	 * older backend builds omit it and `#[serde(default)]` maps
-	 * missing → `false`.
-	 */
-	force_password_change?: boolean;
-	/**
-	 * TRUE when the account has a local Argon2id `password_hash` on
-	 * file. Distinct from `federation_kind`: an OIDC-linked account
-	 * (`federation_kind === 'oidc'`) can ALSO carry a local password
-	 * (hybrid posture — SSO for daily login, local password as
-	 * fallback). The profile page's change-password card gates on this
-	 * flag rather than on the federation shape so hybrid users can
-	 * rotate their local credential. Optional on the wire for older-
-	 * backend compatibility; missing → `false` (safe default: hide the
-	 * card).
-	 */
-	has_password?: boolean;
-	/**
-	 * TRUE when the caller's current session is DPoP-bound (row's
-	 * `dpop_jkt IS NOT NULL`). Populated only by `/api/auth/me`; other
-	 * User-emitting endpoints leave it unset.
-	 *
-	 * The session store reads this to skip a redundant
-	 * `POST /api/auth/dpop/bind` call — the endpoint returns 409
-	 * `already_bound` on repeated attempts (anti-downgrade invariant)
-	 * and each rejection logs at audit INFO, so a naive "bind on
-	 * every load" pattern was cluttering the audit stream. We only
-	 * fire bind now when there's actual work to do (fresh OIDC /
-	 * magic-link session that landed unbound).
-	 */
-	is_dpop_bound?: boolean;
 }
 
-/** Fields rendered by the paginated admin table. Full account details remain
+/** Self view — everything the caller may see about themselves.
- * available from the detail endpoint; this shape keeps avatars and preference
+ * Returned by `/api/auth/me` and every `AuthResponse` (login / refresh /
- * documents off every listing page.
+ * OIDC callback / magic-link redemption ships this so the SPA's post-auth
- *
+ * state matches its post-`/me` state with no UI race). */
- * The two OPAQUE flags below are ADMIN-ONLY signals: they surface per-user
+export interface SelfUser {
- * OPAQUE rollout progress in the admin table. The backend deliberately keeps
+	full: FullUser;
- * them off `UserDto` (`/api/auth/me`, share-recipient DTOs, group members)
+	/** Opaque UI-preferences bag. Cross-device store for pure UI toggles
- * so a non-admin can't enumerate the adoption set through third-party
+	 * (view mode, sidebar collapse, hide-dotfiles, …). Server never
- * endpoints. Both optional on the wire — older backend builds omit them and
+	 * inspects contents; the SPA defines the keys (see
- * `#[serde(default)]` maps missing → `false`. */
+	 * `lib/stores/preferences.svelte.ts`). Always an object on the wire
-export type AdminUserSummary = Pick<
+	 * — empty bag is `{}`, never `null`. PATCH via `/api/auth/me/profile`
-	User,
+	 * shallow-merges; setting a key to `null` removes it. */
-	| 'id'
+	ui_preferences: Record<string, unknown>;
-	| 'username'
+	/** Whether the user wants share-notification emails. */
-	| 'email'
+	notify_on_share: boolean;
-	| 'role'
+	/** Session-scoped: my current session is DPoP-bound. SPA reads this
-	| 'storage_quota_bytes'
+	 * on `session.load()` to skip a redundant `/api/auth/dpop/bind` call
-	| 'storage_used_bytes'
+	 * (409 `already_bound` otherwise, noisy in the audit stream). */
-	| 'last_login_at'
+	is_dpop_bound: boolean;
-	| 'active'
+	/** Admin-set temp-password gate — SPA nav guard blocks everything
-	| 'federation_kind'
+	 * but /change-password until this flips back. Cleared by a successful
-	| 'federation_issuer'
+	 * `POST /api/auth/change-password`. */
-	| 'is_external'
+	force_password_change: boolean;
-> & {
+	/** Caller-scoped: can I edit my own avatar? `false` for OIDC users
-	/** TRUE = user has a server-verifiable password on file (legacy or
+	 * whose avatar comes from the IdP. Only meaningful when caller ==
-	 * admin-set). Combined with `opaque_registered` and `federation_kind`,
+	 * subject; nonsense on any other DTO. */
-	 * the admin table derives the full auth capability set — a user with
+	can_edit_image: boolean;
-	 * `has_password=false`, `opaque_registered=false` AND
+}
-	 * `federation_kind === undefined` (no federation) is passwordless
+
-	 * (magic-link only, which is the default for externals). */
+/** Backwards-compat alias while migrating call-sites. Prefer `PublicUser`
-	has_password?: boolean;
+ * for public-identity contexts (sharee, group member, invitee) or
-	/** TRUE = user has an OPAQUE envelope on file (Phase 2 silent migration
+ * `SelfUser` when reading `/api/auth/me`. Delete once no consumers reference
-	 * succeeded, or the user completed a manual re-registration). */
+ * the bare `User` name. */
-	opaque_registered?: boolean;
+export type User = PublicUser;
-	/** TRUE = user has completed at least one successful OPAQUE login.
-	 * Distinct from `opaque_registered` — the envelope may have been
-	 * cleared by an admin reset while a stale migrated=true remains as
-	 * historical signal (backend clears both atomically today, but the
-	 * two-flag shape keeps the option open for a future policy split). */
-	opaque_migrated?: boolean;
-};
 
 export interface AdminUsersPage {
 	total: number;
-	users: AdminUserSummary[];
+	users: FullUser[];
 }
 
 export interface AuthResponse {
-	user: User;
+	user: SelfUser;
 	access_token: string;
 	refresh_token: string;
 	token_type: string;

frontend/src/lib/components/AppShell.svelte

@@ -437,11 +437,11 @@
 		{ mode: 'dark', icon: 'moon', label: t('user_menu.theme.dark', 'Dark') }
 	];
 
-	const storagePct = $derived(
+	const storagePct = $derived.by(() => {
-		session.user && session.user.storage_quota_bytes > 0
+		const full = session.me?.full;
-			? Math.min(100, (session.user.storage_used_bytes / session.user.storage_quota_bytes) * 100)
+		if (!full || full.storage_quota_bytes <= 0) return 0;
-			: 0
+		return Math.min(100, (full.storage_used_bytes / full.storage_quota_bytes) * 100);
-	);
+	});
 
 	const initials = $derived(userInitials(session.user?.username || session.user?.email));
 
@@ -655,12 +655,12 @@
 				<div class="storage-fill" style:width="{storagePct}%"></div>
 			</div>
 			<div class="storage-info">
-				{#if session.user.storage_quota_bytes > 0}
+				{#if (session.me?.full.storage_quota_bytes ?? 0) > 0}
-					{Math.round(storagePct)}% · {formatBytes(session.user.storage_used_bytes)} / {formatBytes(
+					{Math.round(storagePct)}% · {formatBytes(session.me?.full.storage_used_bytes ?? 0)} / {formatBytes(
-						session.user.storage_quota_bytes
+						session.me?.full.storage_quota_bytes ?? 0
 					)}
 				{:else}
-					{formatBytes(session.user.storage_used_bytes)}
+					{formatBytes(session.me?.full.storage_used_bytes ?? 0)}
 				{/if}
 			</div>
 		</div>
@@ -903,18 +903,18 @@
 								<div class="user-menu-storage-fill" style:width="{storagePct}%"></div>
 							</div>
 							<div class="user-menu-storage-text">
-								{#if session.user.storage_quota_bytes > 0}
+								{#if (session.me?.full.storage_quota_bytes ?? 0) > 0}
 									{t(
 										'storage.used',
 										{
 											percentage: Math.round(storagePct),
-											used: formatBytes(session.user.storage_used_bytes),
+											used: formatBytes(session.me?.full.storage_used_bytes ?? 0),
-											total: formatBytes(session.user.storage_quota_bytes)
+											total: formatBytes(session.me?.full.storage_quota_bytes ?? 0)
 										},
 										'{{percentage}}% used ({{used}} / {{total}})'
 									)}
 								{:else}
-									{formatBytes(session.user.storage_used_bytes)}
+									{formatBytes(session.me?.full.storage_used_bytes ?? 0)}
 								{/if}
 							</div>
 						</div>

frontend/src/lib/components/AppShell.test.ts

@@ -26,16 +26,27 @@ const children = createRawSnippet(() => ({
 beforeEach(() => {
 	vi.clearAllMocks();
 	pageState.url = new URL('http://localhost/files');
-	session.user = {
+	// Post the three-layer UserDto refactor, `session.user` is a
+	// derived accessor over `session.me.full.user`; only `session.me`
+	// is settable. Fixture composes the nested shape — public identity
+	// (username/email/name) on `.full.user`, admin+self extras
+	// (storage_*, has_password) on `.full`, self-only bag (ui_prefs,
+	// dpop_bound, force_password_change, can_edit_image) at the top.
+	// See docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md.
+	session.me = {
+		full: {
+			user: {
 				id: '1',
 				username: 'admin',
 				email: 'a@x.test',
 				given_name: 'A',
 				family_name: 'B',
 				role: 'admin',
-		storage_used_bytes: 10,
-		storage_quota_bytes: 100,
 				is_external: false
+			},
+			storage_used_bytes: 10,
+			storage_quota_bytes: 100
+		}
 	} as never;
 });
 

frontend/src/lib/components/EmptyState.svelte

@@ -18,7 +18,19 @@
 	let { icon, title, hint, error = false, children }: Props = $props();
 </script>
 
-<div class="empty-state" class:empty-state--error={error} role={error ? 'alert' : undefined}>
+<!-- `data-testid="empty-state"` is a stable Playwright hook: consumers
+     (ResourceList, ShareList, TrashList, …) only render this component
+     once the underlying load resolved with no items — so waiting on
+     this testid = "the listing definitively finished loading and is
+     empty". Used by `tests/e2e/spa/files.spec.ts` to gate a cold-
+     navigation upload behind the folder-loaded state (see the guard
+     in `routes/files/[...path]/+page.svelte::guardUploadFolderReady`). -->
+<div
+	class="empty-state"
+	class:empty-state--error={error}
+	role={error ? 'alert' : undefined}
+	data-testid="empty-state"
+>
 	{#if icon}<Icon name={icon} class="empty-state__icon" />{/if}
 	{#if title}<p class="empty-state__title">{title}</p>{/if}
 	{#if hint}<p class="empty-state__hint">{hint}</p>{/if}

frontend/src/lib/components/UserVignette.svelte

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 	const label = $derived(resolved?.name ?? fallbackLabel ?? userId);
 	const email = $derived(resolved?.email || fallbackSublabel || '');
 	const isExternal = $derived(resolved?.isExternal ?? false);
+	const isOnline = $derived(resolved?.isOnline ?? false);
 	const image = $derived(resolved?.image ?? null);
 	const colorIndex = $derived(avatarColorIndex(userId));
 	const initials = $derived(userInitials(label));
@@ -50,6 +51,22 @@
 				<Icon name="building-circle-xmark" />
 			</span>
 		{/if}
+		{#if isOnline}
+			<!-- Presence dot — top-right corner so it doesn't collide with the
+			     external badge at bottom-right. Only rendered when true (absent
+			     = offline reads cleanly on an avatar; no grey placeholder). Uses
+			     `--color-success-alt` (same green as `.badge--active` in the
+			     admin sessions panel + `.presence-dot--online` in the sessions
+			     status column) so the presence signal reads consistently across
+			     every surface. The 2px surface-coloured border visually detaches
+			     the dot from the avatar's own background — matches the pattern
+			     Slack/Teams/Discord use. -->
+			<span
+				class="uv__presence"
+				title={t('share.userOnline', 'Online')}
+				aria-label={t('share.userOnline', 'Online')}
+			></span>
+		{/if}
 	</span>
 	<span class="uv__text">
 		<span class="uv__name">{label}</span>
@@ -128,6 +145,27 @@
 		font-size: 9px;
 	}
 
+	/* Presence dot — top-right, symmetric with `.uv__badge` at
+	   bottom-right so the two corners don't collide. Slightly smaller
+	   (10x10 vs the badge's 16x16) because it's a pure signal — no
+	   icon, no text. The 2px `--color-bg-surface` border creates a
+	   visual gap between dot and avatar so the green pops out cleanly
+	   regardless of avatar palette (photo, dark initials, light
+	   initials). `box-sizing: border-box` keeps the inner circle's
+	   green footprint at 6x6 — same visual weight the sessions-table
+	   dot has. See `docs/plan/sessions.md` § UI. */
+	.uv__presence {
+		position: absolute;
+		right: -2px;
+		top: -2px;
+		width: 10px;
+		height: 10px;
+		border-radius: 50%;
+		background: var(--color-success-alt);
+		border: 2px solid var(--color-bg-surface);
+		box-sizing: border-box;
+	}
+
 	.uv__text {
 		display: flex;
 		flex-direction: column;

frontend/src/lib/stores/preferences.svelte.ts

@@ -69,12 +69,15 @@ const PATCH_DEBOUNCE_MS = 500;
 
 class PreferencesStore {
 	/**
-	 * The typed view of the bag. Derived from `session.user?.ui_preferences`
+	 * The typed view of the bag. Derived from `session.me?.ui_preferences`
-	 * so signing in / out / refresh flips it in lockstep with the session.
+	 * (moved from public `User.ui_preferences` to `SelfUser.ui_preferences`
+	 * as part of the three-layer UserDto refactor — the bag is self-only
+	 * state, not something other authenticated callers should see).
+	 * Signing in / out / refresh flips it in lockstep with the session.
 	 * Reads pass through DEFAULTS for any missing key.
 	 */
 	private bag = $derived<Record<string, unknown>>(
-		(session.user?.ui_preferences as Record<string, unknown> | undefined) ?? {}
+		(session.me?.ui_preferences as Record<string, unknown> | undefined) ?? {}
 	);
 
 	// ── Typed accessors ──────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -100,11 +103,14 @@ class PreferencesStore {
 	 * `jsonb_strip_nulls` after the merge).
 	 */
 	set(patch: Partial<Record<keyof UiPreferences, unknown>>): void {
-		if (!session.user) return;
+		if (!session.me) return;
 
-		// Optimistic local write — mutate the reactive user shallowly.
+		// Optimistic local write — mutate the reactive me shallowly.
+		// `ui_preferences` lives on `SelfUser` (self-only), not on the
+		// public `User` slice, so the mutation stays at the SelfUser
+		// level. The nested `full` / `full.user` blocks are untouched.
 		const nextBag = {
-			...((session.user.ui_preferences as Record<string, unknown> | undefined) ?? {}),
+			...((session.me.ui_preferences as Record<string, unknown> | undefined) ?? {}),
 			...patch
 		};
 		// Strip any explicit-null locally so the derived getters see the
@@ -114,7 +120,7 @@ class PreferencesStore {
 		for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(patch)) {
 			if (v === null) delete (nextBag as Record<string, unknown>)[k];
 		}
-		session.user = { ...session.user, ui_preferences: nextBag };
+		session.me = { ...session.me, ui_preferences: nextBag };
 
 		// Accumulate keys so successive `set` calls before the debounce
 		// fires collapse into a single PATCH body — matters for
@@ -131,16 +137,20 @@ class PreferencesStore {
 		this.pendingPatch = {};
 		if (Object.keys(patch).length === 0) return;
 
-		const previousUser = session.user;
+		// `session.user` is a derived read-through on `session.me.full.user`
+		// — the source of truth is `session.me: SelfUser`. Snapshot + assign
+		// there so the optimistic update / rollback matches the store shape
+		// (see `docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md` for the layering).
+		const previousMe = session.me;
 		try {
 			const updated = await updateProfile({ ui_preferences: patch });
-			session.user = updated;
+			session.me = updated;
 		} catch {
 			// Roll back to whatever the server last confirmed. The
 			// optimistic local mutation is discarded and the derived
 			// `hideDotfiles` / other getters snap back on the next
 			// reactivity tick.
-			session.user = previousUser;
+			session.me = previousMe;
 			ui.notify(
 				t('preferences.save_failed', "Couldn't save your preference. Please try again."),
 				'error'

frontend/src/lib/stores/session.svelte.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import type { User } from '$lib/api/types';
+import type { SelfUser } from '$lib/api/types';
 
 // `vi.mock` is hoisted above imports, so the spy it references must be created
 // with `vi.hoisted` (a plain top-level const isn't initialised yet when the
@@ -14,7 +14,14 @@ vi.mock('$lib/api/endpoints/auth', () => ({
 
 import { session } from './session.svelte';
 
-const userWithUsage = (used: number) => ({ storage_used_bytes: used }) as unknown as User;
+// `storage_used_bytes` moved to `FullUser` (embedded inside `SelfUser`)
+// as part of the three-layer UserDto refactor
+// (`docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md`). Build a minimal SelfUser shape that
+// satisfies the type checker without hand-populating every field the
+// production shape carries — the test only cares about the usage read
+// path (`session.me.full.storage_used_bytes`).
+const userWithUsage = (used: number) =>
+	({ full: { storage_used_bytes: used } }) as unknown as SelfUser;
 
 describe('session.refresh', () => {
 	beforeEach(() => {
@@ -25,7 +32,7 @@ describe('session.refresh', () => {
 	it('pulls the fresh storage usage into the reactive user (upload/delete sync)', async () => {
 		fetchMeMock.mockResolvedValue(userWithUsage(2048));
 		await session.refresh();
-		expect(session.user?.storage_used_bytes).toBe(2048);
+		expect(session.me?.full.storage_used_bytes).toBe(2048);
 	});
 
 	it('leaves the current user intact when the probe returns null', async () => {
@@ -33,7 +40,7 @@ describe('session.refresh', () => {
 		await session.refresh();
 		fetchMeMock.mockResolvedValue(null);
 		await session.refresh();
-		expect(session.user?.storage_used_bytes).toBe(2048);
+		expect(session.me?.full.storage_used_bytes).toBe(2048);
 	});
 
 	it('leaves the current user intact when the probe throws', async () => {
@@ -41,6 +48,6 @@ describe('session.refresh', () => {
 		await session.refresh();
 		fetchMeMock.mockRejectedValue(new Error('network'));
 		await session.refresh();
-		expect(session.user?.storage_used_bytes).toBe(2048);
+		expect(session.me?.full.storage_used_bytes).toBe(2048);
 	});
 });

frontend/src/lib/stores/session.svelte.ts

@@ -11,17 +11,39 @@ import { setLogoutInProgress } from '$lib/api/client';
 import { hasSessionHint } from '$lib/api/csrf';
 import { seedNonceFromCookie } from '$lib/auth/dpop-proof';
 import { drives } from '$lib/stores/drives.svelte';
-import type { User } from '$lib/api/types';
+import type { PublicUser, SelfUser } from '$lib/api/types';
 import { ensureActiveUser } from '$lib/utils/localStoragePrefs';
 
+/**
+ * Session store — the authenticated user and derived flags.
+ *
+ * Post the three-layer UserDto refactor (`docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md`),
+ * `/api/auth/me` returns `SelfUser` (composed:
+ * `SelfUser.full.user: PublicUser`). Two shorthand accessors keep every
+ * existing consumer readable:
+ *
+ * - `session.user` → `PublicUser` (via `me.full.user`). Every callsite
+ *   that read `session.user.username / email / id / role / image /
+ *   is_external / given_name / family_name / is_online` keeps working.
+ * - `session.me`   → full `SelfUser`. New code that needs self-only or
+ *   admin-visible fields (`has_password`, `is_dpop_bound`, `active`,
+ *   `ui_preferences`, `federation_kind`, `last_login_at`, quotas, …)
+ *   reads through `session.me.full.foo` or `session.me.foo`.
+ */
 class SessionStore {
-	user = $state<User | null>(null);
+	/** Full `/api/auth/me` payload. Null when unauthenticated. */
+	me = $state<SelfUser | null>(null);
 	loaded = $state(false);
 	homeFolderId = $state<string | null>(null);
 	homeFolderName = $state<string | null>(null);
 
-	isExternalUser = $derived(this.user?.is_external ?? false);
+	/** Public-identity shorthand — same fields any authenticated caller
-	isAuthenticated = $derived(this.user !== null);
+	 * can see. Every legacy `session.user.foo` read (username, email, id,
+	 * role, image, is_external, given_name, family_name, is_online) still
+	 * works via this derived accessor. */
+	user = $derived<PublicUser | null>(this.me?.full.user ?? null);
+	isExternalUser = $derived(this.me?.full.user.is_external ?? false);
+	isAuthenticated = $derived(this.me !== null);
 	/**
 	 * TRUE when the backend has set `force_password_change_at_next_login`
 	 * on this account — an admin picked a temporary password and the
@@ -33,7 +55,7 @@ class SessionStore {
 	 * flag (or a malformed `/me` response) doesn't accidentally
 	 * quarantine every user.
 	 */
-	mustChangePassword = $derived(this.user?.force_password_change === true);
+	mustChangePassword = $derived(this.me?.force_password_change === true);
 
 	/**
 	 * Resolve the session once. Probes /api/auth/me; on 401 it makes a single
@@ -41,15 +63,15 @@ class SessionStore {
 	 * what to do with an unauthenticated result. Idempotent: subsequent calls
 	 * return the cached result (so client-side navigation doesn't re-probe).
 	 */
-	async load(): Promise<User | null> {
+	async load(): Promise<SelfUser | null> {
-		if (this.loaded) return this.user;
+		if (this.loaded) return this.me;
 		// No JS-visible session hint ⇒ nothing to probe. The server sets
 		// `oxicloud_csrf` alongside the HttpOnly session cookies and clears
 		// it on logout, so a missing hint means no session. Skips the
 		// doomed 2× /me + /refresh burst that would otherwise fire on
 		// every first landing / post-logout re-mount with no cookies.
 		if (!hasSessionHint()) {
-			this.user = null;
+			this.me = null;
 			this.loaded = true;
 			return null;
 		}
@@ -71,25 +93,25 @@ class SessionStore {
 				// otherwise clutter the audit stream. Fire-and-forget
 				// so a slow IndexedDB open doesn't stall app boot.
 				if (me.is_dpop_bound === false) void bindDpopIfPossible();
-			} else this.user = null;
+			} else this.me = null;
 		} catch {
-			this.user = null;
+			this.me = null;
 		}
 		this.loaded = true;
-		return this.user;
+		return this.me;
 	}
 
 	/**
 	 * Set the authenticated user AND run per-user localStorage cleanup
 	 * (see `$lib/utils/localStoragePrefs::ensureActiveUser`). Direct
-	 * `session.user = …` assignments skip the cleanup — always call
+	 * `session.me = …` assignments skip the cleanup — always call
 	 * `setUser` on login-flow entry points (form login, OIDC exchange,
 	 * existing-session probe) so a switch-account flow inside the same
 	 * tab observes the wipe.
 	 */
-	setUser(user: User): void {
+	setUser(me: SelfUser): void {
-		this.user = user;
+		this.me = me;
-		ensureActiveUser(user.id);
+		ensureActiveUser(me.full.user.id);
 		// Any successful login clears the session-teardown gate. Without
 		// this, a logout → login within the same SPA session leaves the
 		// gate stuck at `true` — the login POST is exempted via
@@ -115,7 +137,7 @@ class SessionStore {
 	async refresh(): Promise<void> {
 		try {
 			const me = await fetchMe();
-			if (me) this.user = me;
+			if (me) this.me = me;
 		} catch {
 			/* keep the existing user on a transient /api/auth/me failure */
 		}
@@ -142,7 +164,7 @@ class SessionStore {
 	}
 
 	reset(): void {
-		this.user = null;
+		this.me = null;
 		this.homeFolderId = null;
 		this.homeFolderName = null;
 		// Mark the store as `loaded` so any subsequent `session.load()` —

frontend/src/routes/admin/[[tab]]/+page.svelte

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
 		type StorageTestResult
 	} from '$lib/api/endpoints/admin';
 	import { createDrive, updateDrivePolicies } from '$lib/api/endpoints/drives';
+	import { seedUser } from '$lib/api/endpoints/users';
 	import {
 		ensureResolvers,
 		resolveRecipient,
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@
 		type Recipient
 	} from '$lib/api/endpoints/recipients';
 	import type {
-		AdminUserSummary,
+		FullUser,
 		Drive,
 		DriveMember,
 		DrivePolicies,
@@ -156,11 +157,11 @@
 		deleteUserModal !== null &&
 			deleteUserEmailInput.trim().toLowerCase() === deleteUserModal.email.toLowerCase()
 	);
-	function openDeleteUser(u: AdminUserSummary) {
+	function openDeleteUser(u: FullUser) {
 		deleteUserModal = {
-			userId: u.id,
+			userId: u.user.id,
-			username: u.username || u.email,
+			username: u.user.username || u.user.email,
-			email: u.email
+			email: u.user.email
 		};
 		deleteUserEmailInput = '';
 	}
@@ -817,7 +818,7 @@
 	}
 
 	// Users
-	let users = $state<AdminUserSummary[]>([]);
+	let users = $state<FullUser[]>([]);
 	let total = $state(0);
 	let pageIndex = $state(0);
 	let usersError = $state<string | null>(null);
@@ -923,6 +924,12 @@
 			const page = await listUsers(PAGE_SIZE, pageIndex * PAGE_SIZE);
 			users = page.users;
 			total = page.total;
+			// Seed the per-user resolver cache with the row's `PublicUser`
+			// slice so every `UserVignette` mounted per row hits the cache
+			// synchronously — no per-row `/api/users/{id}` follow-up.
+			// Kills the N+1 that motivated widening `/api/admin/users` to
+			// carry the avatar (docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md § N+1).
+			for (const row of page.users) seedUser(row.user);
 		} catch (e) {
 			usersError = errorMessage(e);
 		}
@@ -1003,49 +1010,49 @@
 	}
 
 	/** True for the signed-in admin's own row — guards self-destructive actions. */
-	function isSelf(u: AdminUserSummary): boolean {
+	function isSelf(u: FullUser): boolean {
-		return u.id === currentAdminId;
+		return u.user.id === currentAdminId;
 	}
 	/** OIDC/SSO-provisioned account (no local password to reset). */
-	function isOidcUser(u: AdminUserSummary): boolean {
+	function isOidcUser(u: FullUser): boolean {
 		return u.federation_kind === 'oidc';
 	}
 	/** Used-quota percentage (0 when unlimited) for the per-user progress bar. */
-	function quotaPct(u: AdminUserSummary): number {
+	function quotaPct(u: FullUser): number {
 		return u.storage_quota_bytes > 0 ? (u.storage_used_bytes / u.storage_quota_bytes) * 100 : 0;
 	}
 
-	async function toggleRole(u: AdminUserSummary) {
+	async function toggleRole(u: FullUser) {
 		if (isSelf(u)) return;
-		const role = u.role === 'admin' ? 'user' : 'admin';
+		const role = u.user.role === 'admin' ? 'user' : 'admin';
 		if (!(await showConfirm(t('admin.confirm_role', { role }, 'Change role to {{role}}?')))) return;
 		try {
-			await setUserRole(u.id, role);
+			await setUserRole(u.user.id, role);
 			await loadUsers();
 		} catch (e) {
 			reportError(e);
 		}
 	}
 
-	async function toggleActive(u: AdminUserSummary) {
+	async function toggleActive(u: FullUser) {
 		if (isSelf(u) && u.active) return;
 		const msg = u.active
 			? t('admin.confirm_deactivate', 'Deactivate this user?')
 			: t('admin.confirm_activate', 'Activate this user?');
 		if (!(await showConfirm(msg))) return;
 		try {
-			await setUserActive(u.id, !u.active);
+			await setUserActive(u.user.id, !u.active);
 			await loadUsers();
 		} catch (e) {
 			reportError(e);
 		}
 	}
 
-	function openQuota(u: AdminUserSummary) {
+	function openQuota(u: FullUser) {
 		quotaModalError = null;
 		quotaModal = {
-			userId: u.id,
+			userId: u.user.id,
-			username: u.username || u.email,
+			username: u.user.username || u.user.email,
 			initialBytes: u.storage_quota_bytes
 		};
 	}
@@ -1069,8 +1076,8 @@
 		}
 	}
 
-	function openReset(u: AdminUserSummary) {
+	function openReset(u: FullUser) {
-		resetModal = { userId: u.id, username: u.username || u.email };
+		resetModal = { userId: u.user.id, username: u.user.username || u.user.email };
 		resetPassword = '';
 		resetError = null;
 	}
@@ -1094,7 +1101,7 @@
 		}
 	}
 
-	function removeUser(u: AdminUserSummary) {
+	function removeUser(u: FullUser) {
 		if (isSelf(u)) return;
 		openDeleteUser(u);
 	}
@@ -1103,20 +1110,20 @@
 	// provisions a home drive + flips the is_external flag; irreversible
 	// via the admin UI (there's no demote endpoint on purpose). Backend
 	// refuses when magic-link login is disabled — surfaced as a toast.
-	async function promoteExternal(u: AdminUserSummary) {
+	async function promoteExternal(u: FullUser) {
-		if (!u.is_external) return;
+		if (!u.user.is_external) return;
 		if (
 			!(await showConfirm(
 				t(
 					'admin.confirm_promote_user',
-					{ name: u.username || u.email },
+					{ name: u.user.username || u.user.email },
 					'Promote {{name}} to an internal user? This provisions a home drive and gives the account a normal storage envelope. The account keeps its identity; magic-link login stays the way in unless a password is set later.'
 				)
 			))
 		)
 			return;
 		try {
-			await promoteUserToInternal(u.id);
+			await promoteUserToInternal(u.user.id);
 			await loadUsers();
 		} catch (e) {
 			reportError(e);
@@ -1240,8 +1247,13 @@
 				.map(async (d) => {
 					const ownerMember = nextMembers[d.id]?.find((m) => m.subject.type === 'user');
 					if (!ownerMember) return;
-					const user = await getUserAdmin(ownerMember.subject.id);
+					// `getUserAdmin` returns `FullUser` (admin-visible extras
-					if (user) nextOwners[d.id] = user;
+					// + nested `.user: PublicUser`). The drive row only reads
+					// public-identity fields (username, email, image) so keep
+					// the map typed as `PublicUser` and unwrap the embedded
+					// public block on insert. See docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md.
+					const full = await getUserAdmin(ownerMember.subject.id);
+					if (full) nextOwners[d.id] = full.user;
 				})
 		);
 		personalDriveOwners = nextOwners;
@@ -1723,6 +1735,16 @@
 		{:else if !dashboard}
 			<p class="status">{t('common.loading', 'Loading…')}</p>
 		{:else}
+			<!-- Three grouped sections — one per data-nature axis. Static
+			     row counts on top (change on register/deactivate/role toggle),
+			     live-presence signals in the middle (change minute-to-minute,
+			     visually distinguished with the presence dot), system flags at
+			     the bottom (deployment posture, changes rarely). Splitting
+			     what used to be a single 4-card row prevents admins from
+			     misreading "as-of-now count" as "who's here right now". -->
+
+			<!-- Section 1: User accounts — static breakdown of auth.users -->
+			<h2 class="ds-section-title">{t('admin.section_accounts', 'User accounts')}</h2>
 			<div class="ds-grid">
 				<div class="ds-card">
 					<span class="ds-num">{dashboard.total_users}</span>{t('admin.total_users', 'Total users')}
@@ -1733,11 +1755,66 @@
 				<div class="ds-card">
 					<span class="ds-num">{dashboard.admin_users}</span>{t('admin.admin_users', 'Admins')}
 				</div>
-				<div class="ds-card">
+				<div
-					<span class="ds-num">v{dashboard.server_version}</span>{t('admin.version', 'Version')}
+					class="ds-card"
+					title={t(
+						'admin.external_users_tooltip',
+						'Grant-only accounts — magic-link, OIDC-only, OCM recipients'
+					)}
+				>
+					<span class="ds-num">{dashboard.external_users}</span>{t(
+						'admin.external_users',
+						'External'
+					)}
 				</div>
 			</div>
 
+			<!-- Section 2: Live activity — projection over auth.sessions.
+			     Same 5-min window as the Prometheus `oxicloud_sessions_online`
+			     gauges. The presence dot before each number signals "this
+			     value changes minute-to-minute" — same green as the
+			     admin > sessions row indicator so admins read one consistent
+			     visual for presence across the panel. -->
+			<h2 class="ds-section-title">
+				{t('admin.section_activity', 'Live activity')}
+				<span
+					class="ds-section-live"
+					title={t('admin.live_tooltip', 'Reflects sessions active in the last 5 minutes')}
+				>
+					{t('admin.live', 'live')}
+				</span>
+			</h2>
+			<div class="ds-grid">
+				<div
+					class="ds-card"
+					title={t(
+						'admin.online_users_tooltip',
+						'Distinct users with a session active in the last 5 minutes'
+					)}
+				>
+					<span class="ds-num ds-num--live">
+						<span class="presence-dot presence-dot--online" aria-hidden="true"></span>
+						{dashboard.online_users}
+					</span>
+					{t('admin.online_users', 'Online users')}
+				</div>
+				<div
+					class="ds-card"
+					title={t(
+						'admin.online_sessions_tooltip',
+						'Non-revoked sessions active in the last 5 minutes — multi-device users contribute more than one'
+					)}
+				>
+					<span class="ds-num ds-num--live">
+						<span class="presence-dot presence-dot--online" aria-hidden="true"></span>
+						{dashboard.online_sessions}
+					</span>
+					{t('admin.online_sessions', 'Online sessions')}
+				</div>
+			</div>
+
+			<!-- Section 3: System — deployment flags + version. -->
+			<h2 class="ds-section-title">{t('admin.section_system', 'System')}</h2>
 			<div class="ds-grid">
 				<div class="ds-card">
 					<span class="ds-flag" class:ds-flag--on={dashboard.auth_enabled}>
@@ -1761,6 +1838,9 @@
 					</span>
 					{t('admin.quotas', 'Quotas')}
 				</div>
+				<div class="ds-card">
+					<span class="ds-num">v{dashboard.server_version}</span>{t('admin.version', 'Version')}
+				</div>
 			</div>
 
 			{#if dashboard.users_over_quota > 0}
@@ -1802,13 +1882,17 @@
 									row.kind === 'personal'
 										? t('admin.quota_personal', 'Personal drives')
 										: t('admin.quota_shared', 'Shared drives')}
+								{@const total = row.unlimited_count + row.capped_count}
 								{@const pct =
 									row.capped_quota_bytes && row.capped_quota_bytes > 0
 										? (row.used_bytes / row.capped_quota_bytes) * 100
 										: null}
 								{#if row.capped_count > 0 || row.unlimited_count > 0}
 									<tr>
-										<th scope="row">{label}</th>
+										<th scope="row">
+											<span class="quota-table__count">{total}</span>
+											{label}
+										</th>
 										<td class="quota-table__num">
 											{#if row.capped_quota_bytes !== null && pct !== null}
 												{formatBytes(row.used_bytes)} / {formatBytes(row.capped_quota_bytes)}
@@ -2680,15 +2764,15 @@
 					</tr>
 				</thead>
 				<tbody>
-					{#each users as u (u.id)}
+					{#each users as u (u.user.id)}
 						{@const pct = quotaPct(u)}
 						<tr>
 							<td>
 								<div class="user-vignette-cell">
 									<UserVignette
-										userId={u.id}
+										userId={u.user.id}
-										fallbackLabel={u.username || u.email}
+										fallbackLabel={u.user.username || u.user.email}
-										fallbackSublabel={u.email}
+										fallbackSublabel={u.user.email}
 									/>
 									{#if isSelf(u)}
 										<span class="badge badge--self">{t('admin.you_badge', 'you')}</span>
@@ -2703,11 +2787,11 @@
 								     badge is `white-space: nowrap` so the badge label
 								     itself never wraps mid-word either. -->
 								<div class="role-badges">
-									<span class="badge badge--{u.role === 'admin' ? 'admin' : 'user'}">
+									<span class="badge badge--{u.user.role === 'admin' ? 'admin' : 'user'}">
-										{#if u.role === 'admin'}<Icon name="shield-alt" />{/if}
+										{#if u.user.role === 'admin'}<Icon name="shield-alt" />{/if}
-										{u.role}
+										{u.user.role}
 									</span>
-									{#if u.is_external}
+									{#if u.user.is_external}
 										<!-- Origin flag, orthogonal to `role`. Grant-only
 										     accounts (magic-link / OCM) can never be admin
 										     (DB CHECK `users_external_not_admin`) so the two
@@ -2738,7 +2822,7 @@
 							<td class="auth-cell">
 								<!--
 									Auth-capability chip set — ADMIN-ONLY (fields
-									scoped to `AdminUserSummaryDto`; never on
+									scoped to `FullUserDto`; never on
 									`UserDto`). Any user carries ZERO OR MORE of:
 									  * SSO/OIDC — `federation_kind === 'oidc'`,
 									    identity delegated to the IdP; label is
@@ -2825,7 +2909,7 @@
 								</span>
 							</td>
 							<td>
-								{#if u.is_external}
+								{#if u.user.is_external}
 									<!-- External accounts have no storage envelope by
 									     design (DB CHECK `users_external_no_storage`
 									     enforces storage_quota_bytes = 0). Rendering the
@@ -2867,10 +2951,10 @@
 								     actions render as invisible placeholders. -->
 								<div class="actions actions--user">
 									<!-- Slot 1: quota (internal) OR promote (external). -->
-									{#if u.is_external}
+									{#if u.user.is_external}
 										<button
 											class="icon-btn icon-btn--success"
-											data-testid={`admin-user-promote-${u.id}`}
+											data-testid={`admin-user-promote-${u.user.id}`}
 											title={t('admin.promote_to_internal_title', 'Promote to internal user')}
 											aria-label={t('admin.promote_to_internal_title', 'Promote to internal user')}
 											onclick={() => promoteExternal(u)}
@@ -2880,7 +2964,7 @@
 									{:else}
 										<button
 											class="icon-btn"
-											data-testid={`admin-user-quota-${u.id}`}
+											data-testid={`admin-user-quota-${u.user.id}`}
 											title={t('admin.edit_quota_title', 'Edit quota')}
 											aria-label={t('admin.edit_quota_title', 'Edit quota')}
 											onclick={() => openQuota(u)}
@@ -2891,10 +2975,10 @@
 									<!-- Slot 2: reset password (local internal only —
 									     OIDC and external accounts have no password
 									     to reset). Placeholder otherwise. -->
-									{#if !isOidcUser(u) && !u.is_external}
+									{#if !isOidcUser(u) && !u.user.is_external}
 										<button
 											class="icon-btn"
-											data-testid={`admin-user-reset-password-${u.id}`}
+											data-testid={`admin-user-reset-password-${u.user.id}`}
 											title={t('admin.reset_password_title', 'Reset password')}
 											aria-label={t('admin.reset_password_title', 'Reset password')}
 											onclick={() => openReset(u)}
@@ -2909,16 +2993,16 @@
 									     `change_user_role` + DB CHECK
 									     `users_external_not_admin`). Promotion to
 									     internal is offered separately in slot 1. -->
-									{#if !u.is_external}
+									{#if !u.user.is_external}
 										<button
 											class="icon-btn"
-											data-testid={`admin-user-toggle-role-${u.id}`}
+											data-testid={`admin-user-toggle-role-${u.user.id}`}
 											title={t('admin.toggle_role_title', 'Toggle admin role')}
 											aria-label={t('admin.toggle_role_title', 'Toggle admin role')}
 											disabled={isSelf(u)}
 											onclick={() => toggleRole(u)}
 										>
-											<Icon name={u.role === 'admin' ? 'user' : 'crown'} />
+											<Icon name={u.user.role === 'admin' ? 'user' : 'crown'} />
 										</button>
 									{:else}
 										<span class="icon-btn icon-btn--placeholder" aria-hidden="true"></span>
@@ -2926,7 +3010,7 @@
 									<!-- Slot 4: activate/deactivate. -->
 									<button
 										class="icon-btn {u.active ? 'icon-btn--danger' : 'icon-btn--success'}"
-										data-testid={`admin-user-toggle-active-${u.id}`}
+										data-testid={`admin-user-toggle-active-${u.user.id}`}
 										title={u.active
 											? t('admin.deactivate_title', 'Deactivate')
 											: t('admin.activate_title', 'Activate')}
@@ -2941,7 +3025,7 @@
 									<!-- Slot 5: delete. -->
 									<button
 										class="icon-btn icon-btn--danger"
-										data-testid={`admin-user-delete-${u.id}`}
+										data-testid={`admin-user-delete-${u.user.id}`}
 										title={t('admin.delete_title', 'Delete user')}
 										aria-label={t('admin.delete_title', 'Delete user')}
 										disabled={isSelf(u)}
@@ -3275,11 +3359,21 @@
 						    fall back to the owner's cap; 0 also means "no limit"
 						    (backend convention — see `User.storage_quota_bytes` doc).
 						-->
+						<!-- Personal-drive fallback used to read
+						     `owner.storage_quota_bytes` off the resolved DTO.
+						     Post the UserDto refactor
+						     (docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md) `owner` here is a
+						     `PublicUser` (public identity, no quota); the
+						     envelope quota only lives on `FullUser` /
+						     `SelfUser`. Rather than widen the resolver's shape
+						     just for this fallback, hold the effective quota at
+						     `null` when the drive itself doesn't declare one —
+						     the row renders "—" and the admin can consult the
+						     user's row for their envelope cap. Explicit
+						     shared-drive quota still surfaces as before. -->
 						{@const effectiveQuota =
 							d.kind === 'personal'
-								? owner && owner.storage_quota_bytes > 0
+								? null
-									? owner.storage_quota_bytes
-									: null
 								: d.quota_bytes && d.quota_bytes > 0
 									? d.quota_bytes
 									: null}
@@ -4323,6 +4417,40 @@
 		margin-bottom: var(--space-4);
 	}
 
+	/* Section title bar above each dashboard grid — labels the
+	   nature of the cards below (accounts vs live activity vs
+	   system). Small, muted, so it structures the page without
+	   competing with the numbers. `text-transform: uppercase` +
+	   `letter-spacing` matches the small-caps section-header pattern
+	   used elsewhere in the admin surface. */
+	.ds-section-title {
+		display: flex;
+		align-items: baseline;
+		gap: var(--space-2);
+		margin: var(--space-4) 0 var(--space-2) 0;
+		font-size: var(--text-xs);
+		font-weight: var(--weight-semibold);
+		color: var(--color-text-muted);
+		text-transform: uppercase;
+		letter-spacing: 0.06em;
+	}
+
+	/* "live" pill next to the "Live activity" section header —
+	   subtle visual hint that the values in this grid change on
+	   their own cadence. Matches the presence-dot's success token
+	   so the whole live-activity block reads as one visual family. */
+	.ds-section-live {
+		display: inline-block;
+		padding: 0 var(--space-2);
+		border-radius: var(--radius-full);
+		background: var(--color-success-bg);
+		color: var(--color-success-text);
+		font-size: 0.65rem;
+		font-weight: var(--weight-bold);
+		letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+		vertical-align: middle;
+	}
+
 	.ds-card {
 		display: flex;
 		flex-direction: column;
@@ -4341,6 +4469,18 @@
 		color: var(--color-text-heading);
 	}
 
+	/* Live-count variant — same font size as `.ds-num`, plus a
+	   flex container so the leading presence dot aligns with the
+	   number baseline instead of the top of the digit. Reuses the
+	   `.presence-dot--online` class from the sessions-panel work
+	   so the visual signal for presence is identical across the
+	   admin surface. */
+	.ds-num.ds-num--live {
+		display: inline-flex;
+		align-items: center;
+		gap: var(--space-2);
+	}
+
 	.ds-bar {
 		height: 8px;
 		background: var(--color-bg-muted);
@@ -4433,6 +4573,19 @@
 		white-space: nowrap;
 	}
 
+	/* Prepended drive count: tabular-nums so single/double/triple digits align
+	   vertically across rows; right-aligned inside a fixed-width box so the
+	   ones-digits line up across "personal" and "shared" rows regardless of
+	   how many digits each count has. */
+	.quota-table__count {
+		display: inline-block;
+		min-width: 1.5em;
+		margin-right: 0.25em;
+		text-align: right;
+		font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
+		color: var(--color-text-heading);
+	}
+
 	.quota-table__num {
 		font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
 		white-space: nowrap;
@@ -5213,9 +5366,17 @@
 	}
 
 	.admin {
-		max-width: 64rem;
+		/* Raised from 64rem to 80rem so the data-dense tables (sessions
+		   row with 9+ cells, users table with vignette + role + auth
+		   chips + quota bar) have more horizontal room. At viewports
+		   above 80rem `margin: 0 auto` still centers with the leftover
+		   whitespace — DevTools shows that whitespace as horizontal
+		   margin (not padding) and is what "content looks squeezed"
+		   really means on wide displays. Vertical rhythm and the small
+		   horizontal padding are unchanged. */
+		max-width: 80rem;
 		margin: 0 auto;
-		padding: 1.5rem 1rem;
+		padding: 1.5rem var(--space-2);
 		display: flex;
 		flex-direction: column;
 		gap: 1rem;

frontend/src/routes/admin/[[tab]]/page.test.ts

@@ -96,16 +96,26 @@ const dashboard = {
 	users_over_quota: 0
 };
 
+// FullUser fixture — post the three-layer UserDto refactor
+// (docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md), /api/admin/users returns
+// `Vec<FullUserDto>` where public identity nests under `.user`
+// and admin-visible extras (quotas, active, has_password, OPAQUE
+// flags) live at the top level.
 const user = {
+	user: {
 		id: 'u1',
 		username: 'bob',
 		email: 'bob@x.test',
 		role: 'user',
+		is_external: false
+	},
 	active: true,
 	is_active: true,
 	storage_used_bytes: 10,
 	storage_quota_bytes: 100,
-	is_external: false
+	has_password: true,
+	opaque_registered: false,
+	opaque_migrated: false
 };
 
 const mount = {

frontend/src/routes/files/[...path]/+page.svelte

@@ -713,8 +713,43 @@
 	 * Upload a batch of files into the current folder, reporting aggregate
 	 * progress through a single bell notification with a progress bar.
 	 */
+	/**
+	 * Cold-navigation upload guard.
+	 *
+	 * `currentId` starts `null` and is only populated inside `load()` AFTER
+	 * `session.loadHomeFolder()` resolves (see the `$effect` at the bottom of
+	 * this file that drives `load()`, and the assignment at `currentId =
+	 * folderId` inside `load()`). The hidden `<input data-testid=
+	 * "files-upload-file-input">` is unconditional in the template, so it's
+	 * in the DOM the moment the page shell mounts — before `load()` has
+	 * awaited its first HTTP round-trip.
+	 *
+	 * On a slow network / cold page / Playwright cold `page.goto` immediately
+	 * followed by `setInputFiles`, `onchange` can fire while `currentId` is
+	 * still `null`. Without this guard, `uploadBatch` / `uploadTree` post
+	 * with `folderId: null` and the file silently lands in the caller's
+	 * home root instead of the intended folder — a real user hitting Ctrl+U
+	 * or dropping a file within ~100 ms of navigation hits the same window.
+	 *
+	 * The e2e reproduction: `tests/e2e/spa/files.spec.ts::"upload a file via
+	 * the hidden file input"` flakes on CI where the mount→load round-trip
+	 * outruns Playwright's file-input dispatch.
+	 *
+	 * Returns `true` when it's safe to proceed; `false` + a user-visible
+	 * toast when the folder isn't ready.
+	 */
+	function guardUploadFolderReady(): boolean {
+		if (currentId !== null) return true;
+		ui.notify(
+			t('files.upload_folder_not_ready', 'Folder is still loading — please try again in a moment.'),
+			'warning'
+		);
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	async function uploadBatch(files: File[]) {
 		if (files.length === 0) return;
+		if (!guardUploadFolderReady()) return;
 		uploading = true;
 		// Arm the reload-guard + persist a "batch in flight" marker so a
 		// page refresh mid-upload (a) prompts the browser's "Leave site?"
@@ -1557,6 +1592,7 @@
 	 */
 	async function uploadTree(entries: { file: File; relativePath: string }[]) {
 		if (entries.length === 0) return;
+		if (!guardUploadFolderReady()) return;
 		uploading = true;
 		// Same reload-guard + interrupted-uploads breadcrumb as uploadBatch —
 		// the browser prompts on refresh, and if the user reloads anyway

frontend/src/routes/files/page.test.ts

@@ -158,6 +158,12 @@ it('keeps aggregate upload progress exact when one file restarts', async () => {
 	);
 	render(FilesPage);
 	const input = await screen.findByTestId('files-upload-file-input');
+	// The cold-navigation upload guard (`guardUploadFolderReady` in
+	// `+page.svelte`) refuses uploads while `currentId` is null — which is
+	// the initial state before `load()` runs. `load()` sets `currentId =
+	// folderId` BEFORE it calls `fetchFolderPage`, so waiting on the fetch
+	// mock is a stable "load() has progressed past the assignment" signal.
+	await waitFor(() => expect(fetchFolderPage).toHaveBeenCalled());
 	const uploads = [new File(['a'], 'a.txt'), new File(['b'], 'b.txt')];
 	Object.defineProperty(input, 'files', { configurable: true, value: uploads });
 

frontend/src/routes/profile/+page.svelte

@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@
 	let creatingPw = $state(false);
 	let autoExpanded = $state(false);
 
-	const isOidc = $derived(session.user?.federation_kind === 'oidc');
+	const isOidc = $derived(session.me?.full.federation_kind === 'oidc');
-	const isLocal = $derived(!session.user?.federation_kind);
+	const isLocal = $derived(!session.me?.full.federation_kind);
 	const usernameClaimed = $derived(!!session.user?.username);
 	const isAdmin = $derived(session.user?.role === 'admin');
-	const canEditImage = $derived(session.user?.can_edit_image === true && isLocal);
+	const canEditImage = $derived(session.me?.can_edit_image === true && isLocal);
 	// Show the change-password card when the user CAN change their
 	// local password: they have `password_hash` on file AND the
 	// deployment offers password login (backend `change_password`
@@ -87,14 +87,16 @@
 	// password) are a legitimate posture and MUST be able to rotate
 	// their local credential; the new gate lets them, and the backend
 	// refusal covers the pure-SSO case where has_password is false.
-	const showPasswordCard = $derived((session.user?.has_password ?? false) && passwordLoginEnabled);
+	const showPasswordCard = $derived(
+		(session.me?.full.has_password ?? false) && passwordLoginEnabled
+	);
 
 	// SSO card gates — see docs/plan/oidc-account-linking.md.
 	// Connect: only when OIDC is enabled AND the user isn't already linked.
 	// Disconnect: only when currently OIDC-linked AND the user has an
 	// alternative auth method (password or OPAQUE-registered) — else
 	// unlinking would lock them out.
-	const canConnectSso = $derived(oidcEnabled && !session.user?.federation_kind);
+	const canConnectSso = $derived(oidcEnabled && !session.me?.full.federation_kind);
 	// Show the disconnect button whenever the user is OIDC-linked.
 	// The backend guard (`AuthApplicationService::unlink_oidc`) is the
 	// source of truth for the "no alternative auth" refusal — it also
@@ -103,7 +105,7 @@
 	// adoption status through user-directory endpoints). The UI shows
 	// the button unconditionally and surfaces the backend's 403 as a
 	// user-facing "set a password first" prompt.
-	const canDisconnectSso = $derived(session.user?.federation_kind === 'oidc');
+	const canDisconnectSso = $derived(session.me?.full.federation_kind === 'oidc');
 
 	/**
 	 * Mandatory change-password mode. TRUE when the backend has
@@ -136,14 +138,11 @@
 		}
 	});
 
-	const storagePct = $derived(
+	const storagePct = $derived.by(() => {
-		session.user && session.user.storage_quota_bytes > 0
+		const full = session.me?.full;
-			? Math.min(
+		if (!full || full.storage_quota_bytes <= 0) return 0;
-					100,
+		return Math.min(100, Math.round((full.storage_used_bytes / full.storage_quota_bytes) * 100));
-					Math.round((session.user.storage_used_bytes / session.user.storage_quota_bytes) * 100)
+	});
-				)
-			: 0
-	);
 	const storageBarClass = $derived(
 		storagePct > 90 ? 'bar__fill--red' : storagePct > 70 ? 'bar__fill--orange' : 'bar__fill--green'
 	);
@@ -159,15 +158,20 @@
 		relativeTimeAgo(value, { empty: t('profile.never', 'Never'), invalidAsString: true });
 
 	function hydrate() {
-		const u = session.user;
+		const me = session.me;
-		if (!u) return;
+		if (!me) return;
-		givenName = u.given_name ?? '';
+		// Public identity (name / handle) reads via `me.full.user`;
-		familyName = u.family_name ?? '';
+		// admin-visible extras (preferred_locale) via `me.full`;
-		username = u.username ?? '';
+		// self-only bag flags (notify_on_share) via `me` directly.
-		preferredLocale = u.preferred_locale ?? '';
+		// The three-level indirection makes the audience of each
-		notifyOnShare = u.notify_on_share;
+		// field visible at the callsite (docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md).
+		givenName = me.full.user.given_name ?? '';
+		familyName = me.full.user.family_name ?? '';
+		username = me.full.user.username ?? '';
+		preferredLocale = me.full.preferred_locale ?? '';
+		notifyOnShare = me.notify_on_share;
 		// Source of truth is the preferences store, which itself
-		// derives from `session.user.ui_preferences`. Reading through
+		// derives from `session.me.ui_preferences`. Reading through
 		// the store here (rather than the raw bag) means a new
 		// preference field just needs a getter in the store and its
 		// own line here — no wire-format knowledge on the page.
@@ -176,21 +180,22 @@
 
 	async function saveProfile(e: SubmitEvent) {
 		e.preventDefault();
-		const u = session.user;
+		const me = session.me;
-		if (!u) return;
+		if (!me) return;
 
 		// Build a sparse patch of only the fields the user actually changed.
 		// Sending empty strings the user never touched would 400 on the server.
 		const patch: ProfilePatch = {};
-		if (!usernameClaimed && username.trim() && username.trim() !== (u.username ?? '')) {
+		if (!usernameClaimed && username.trim() && username.trim() !== (me.full.user.username ?? '')) {
 			patch.username = username.trim();
 		}
-		if (givenName.trim() !== (u.given_name ?? '')) patch.given_name = givenName.trim();
+		if (givenName.trim() !== (me.full.user.given_name ?? '')) patch.given_name = givenName.trim();
-		if (familyName.trim() !== (u.family_name ?? '')) patch.family_name = familyName.trim();
+		if (familyName.trim() !== (me.full.user.family_name ?? ''))
-		if ((preferredLocale || '') !== (u.preferred_locale ?? '')) {
+			patch.family_name = familyName.trim();
+		if ((preferredLocale || '') !== (me.full.preferred_locale ?? '')) {
 			patch.preferred_locale = preferredLocale || undefined;
 		}
-		if (notifyOnShare !== u.notify_on_share) patch.notify_on_share = notifyOnShare;
+		if (notifyOnShare !== me.notify_on_share) patch.notify_on_share = notifyOnShare;
 		// Ship the diff as a partial `ui_preferences` patch — the
 		// server does a shallow merge, so only the changed key is
 		// touched; siblings set on other devices survive.
@@ -205,8 +210,13 @@
 
 		savingProfile = true;
 		try {
+			// PATCH /me/profile echoes SelfUser (same shape as GET /me)
+			// so the SPA absorbs the just-written state in one round
+			// trip — no follow-up refresh needed. `session.user` is a
+			// derived accessor over `session.me.full.user`, so it
+			// updates in lockstep with the me assignment.
 			const updated = await updateProfile(patch);
-			session.user = updated;
+			session.me = updated;
 			if (patch.preferred_locale) await setLocale(patch.preferred_locale as Locale);
 			ui.notify(t('profile.saved', 'Profile saved'), 'success');
 		} catch (err) {
@@ -445,7 +455,7 @@
 			// (federation_kind should now be 'oidc').
 			try {
 				const me = await fetchMe();
-				if (me) session.user = me;
+				if (me) session.me = me;
 			} catch {
 				/* stale session is recoverable — next request refreshes */
 			}
@@ -536,7 +546,7 @@
 		try {
 			await unlinkOidc();
 			const me = await fetchMe();
-			if (me) session.user = me;
+			if (me) session.me = me;
 			ui.notify(t('profile.sso_unlinked_success', 'Single sign-on disconnected.'), 'info');
 		} catch (err) {
 			if (err instanceof ApiError && err.errorType === 'NoAlternativeAuth') {
@@ -742,7 +752,7 @@
 						<Icon name="clock" />
 						{t('profile.last_login', 'Last Login')}
 					</div>
-					<div class="info-value">{timeAgo(session.user.last_login_at)}</div>
+					<div class="info-value">{timeAgo(session.me?.full.last_login_at)}</div>
 				</div>
 			</div>
 		</div>
@@ -752,20 +762,20 @@
 			<h2><Icon name="hdd" /> {t('profile.storage', 'Storage')}</h2>
 			<div class="storage-stats">
 				<div class="storage-stat">
-					<div class="stat-value">{formatBytes(session.user.storage_used_bytes)}</div>
+					<div class="stat-value">{formatBytes(session.me?.full.storage_used_bytes ?? 0)}</div>
 					<div class="muted">{t('profile.used', 'Used')}</div>
 				</div>
 				<div class="storage-stat">
 					<div class="stat-value">
-						{session.user.storage_quota_bytes > 0
+						{(session.me?.full.storage_quota_bytes ?? 0) > 0
-							? formatBytes(session.user.storage_quota_bytes)
+							? formatBytes(session.me?.full.storage_quota_bytes ?? 0)
 							: '∞'}
 					</div>
 					<div class="muted">{t('profile.quota', 'Quota')}</div>
 				</div>
 				<div class="storage-stat">
 					<div class="stat-value">
-						{session.user.storage_quota_bytes > 0 ? `${storagePct}%` : '—'}
+						{(session.me?.full.storage_quota_bytes ?? 0) > 0 ? `${storagePct}%` : '—'}
 					</div>
 					<div class="muted">{t('profile.usage', 'Usage')}</div>
 				</div>

frontend/src/routes/profile/page.test.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
 import { it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
 import { render, screen, fireEvent, waitFor } from '@testing-library/svelte';
 
-const { session, ui } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+// Test-double session store. Post the three-layer UserDto refactor
-	session: {
+// (docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md), production `session.user` is a
-		loaded: true,
+// derived accessor over `session.me.full.user`. The stub here mirrors
-		load: vi.fn(),
+// that shape: `me` carries the whole SelfUser tree, and `user` mirrors
+// `me.full.user` so any legacy `session.user.foo` read on the tested
+// page keeps working through the mock without reproducing the derived
+// mechanism.
+const buildSelfMe = () => ({
+	full: {
 		user: {
 			id: '1',
 			username: 'admin',
@@ -12,14 +17,41 @@ const { session, ui } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
 			given_name: 'A',
 			family_name: 'B',
 			role: 'admin',
+			is_external: false
+		},
 		storage_used_bytes: 100,
 		storage_quota_bytes: 1000,
-			is_external: false,
 		has_password: true
 	}
+});
+
+const { session, ui } = vi.hoisted(() => {
+	const me = {
+		full: {
+			user: {
+				id: '1',
+				username: 'admin',
+				email: 'a@x.test',
+				given_name: 'A',
+				family_name: 'B',
+				role: 'admin',
+				is_external: false
+			},
+			storage_used_bytes: 100,
+			storage_quota_bytes: 1000,
+			has_password: true
+		}
+	};
+	return {
+		session: {
+			loaded: true,
+			load: vi.fn(),
+			me,
+			user: me.full.user
 		},
 		ui: { notify: vi.fn() }
-}));
+	};
+});
 vi.mock('$lib/stores/session.svelte', () => ({ session }));
 vi.mock('$lib/stores/ui.svelte', () => ({ ui }));
 vi.mock('$lib/stores/dialogs.svelte', () => ({ confirmDialog: vi.fn() }));
@@ -44,20 +76,13 @@ const m = (fn: unknown) => fn as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
 
 beforeEach(() => {
 	vi.clearAllMocks();
-	// Reset the shared session each test (handlers may mutate session.user).
+	// Reset the shared session each test (handlers may mutate session.me
+	// on save / refresh). `me` is the SelfUser tree; `user` mirrors
+	// `me.full.user` for legacy `session.user.foo` reads.
 	session.loaded = true;
-	session.user = {
+	const me = buildSelfMe();
-		id: '1',
+	session.me = me;
-		username: 'admin',
+	session.user = me.full.user;
-		email: 'a@x.test',
-		given_name: 'A',
-		family_name: 'B',
-		role: 'admin',
-		storage_used_bytes: 100,
-		storage_quota_bytes: 1000,
-		is_external: false,
-		has_password: true
-	};
 	m(profile.listAppPasswords).mockResolvedValue([]);
 	m(profile.updateProfile).mockResolvedValue(undefined);
 	m(getOidcProviders).mockResolvedValue({ password_login_enabled: true });

frontend/static/locales/en.json

@@ -546,6 +546,7 @@
     "empty_hidden_hint": "Files whose name starts with '.' are hidden. Toggle the setting to see them.",
     "show_hidden": "Show hidden files",
     "upload_dotfile_hidden": "{{n}} file(s) uploaded but hidden by your dotfile preference.",
+    "upload_folder_not_ready": "Folder is still loading — please try again in a moment.",
     "rename_dotfile_hidden": "Renamed to '{{name}}' — now hidden by your preference.",
     "new_folder_dotfile_hidden": "Created folder '{{name}}' — hidden by your dotfile preference.",
     "dotfiles_hidden_toast": "Dotfiles hidden",
@@ -836,6 +837,17 @@
     "total_users": "Total Users",
     "active_users": "Active Users",
     "admins": "Admins",
+    "external_users": "External",
+    "external_users_tooltip": "Grant-only accounts — magic-link, OIDC-only, OCM recipients",
+    "online_users": "Online users",
+    "online_users_tooltip": "Distinct users with a session active in the last 5 minutes",
+    "online_sessions": "Online sessions",
+    "online_sessions_tooltip": "Non-revoked sessions active in the last 5 minutes — multi-device users contribute more than one",
+    "section_accounts": "User accounts",
+    "section_activity": "Live activity",
+    "section_system": "System",
+    "live": "live",
+    "live_tooltip": "Reflects sessions active in the last 5 minutes",
     "version": "Version",
     "storage_overview": "Storage Overview",
     "used": "Used",

frontend/static/locales/fr.json

@@ -459,6 +459,7 @@
     "empty_hidden_hint": "Les fichiers dont le nom commence par '.' sont masqués. Modifiez le réglage pour les afficher.",
     "show_hidden": "Afficher les fichiers masqués",
     "upload_dotfile_hidden": "{{n}} fichier(s) téléversé(s) mais masqué(s) par votre préférence.",
+    "upload_folder_not_ready": "Le dossier est encore en cours de chargement — merci de réessayer dans un instant.",
     "rename_dotfile_hidden": "Renommé en \"{{name}}\" — désormais masqué par votre préférence.",
     "new_folder_dotfile_hidden": "Dossier \"{{name}}\" créé — masqué par votre préférence.",
     "dotfiles_hidden_toast": "Fichiers masqués",
@@ -801,6 +802,17 @@
     "total_users": "Utilisateurs totaux",
     "active_users": "Utilisateurs actifs",
     "admins": "Admins",
+    "external_users": "Externes",
+    "external_users_tooltip": "Comptes invités — magic-link, OIDC seulement, destinataires OCM",
+    "online_users": "Utilisateurs en ligne",
+    "online_users_tooltip": "Utilisateurs distincts ayant une session active dans les 5 dernières minutes",
+    "online_sessions": "Sessions en ligne",
+    "online_sessions_tooltip": "Sessions non révoquées actives dans les 5 dernières minutes — les utilisateurs multi-appareils en contribuent plusieurs",
+    "section_accounts": "Comptes utilisateurs",
+    "section_activity": "Activité en direct",
+    "section_system": "Système",
+    "live": "en direct",
+    "live_tooltip": "Reflète les sessions actives dans les 5 dernières minutes",
     "version": "Version",
     "storage_overview": "Aperçu du stockage",
     "used": "Utilisé",

src/application/dtos/settings_dto.rs

@@ -108,14 +108,15 @@ pub struct AdminResetPasswordDto {
     pub new_password: String,
 }
 
-/// Query parameters for listing users
+/// Query parameters for listing users. `/api/admin/users` used to
+/// bifurcate on `?summary=` (flat `PublicUserDto` vs nested
+/// `FullUserDto`); that split was retired — the endpoint now always
+/// returns `FullUserDto`. Unknown query params are ignored, so
+/// existing callers still passing `?summary=true` keep working.
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct ListUsersQueryDto {
     pub limit: Option<i64>,
     pub offset: Option<i64>,
-    /// Return only the fields rendered by the paginated management table.
-    /// Defaults to `false` so existing API clients keep the full user shape.
-    pub summary: Option<bool>,
 }
 
 /// Query parameters for the admin sessions listing.
@@ -163,10 +164,39 @@ pub struct DashboardStatsDto {
     pub auth_enabled: bool,
     pub oidc_configured: bool,
     pub quotas_enabled: bool,
-    // User stats
+    // ── User accounts (static breakdown of auth.users) ──
+    // All four are counts of the SAME table under different
+    // predicates. `active`, `admin`, `external` are all subsets of
+    // `total`. `external` is disjoint from `admin` by DB constraint
+    // (`users_external_not_admin`). The dashboard renders these as
+    // one grouped section separate from the live-activity section
+    // below, so admins don't confuse "as-of-now row count" with
+    // "who's here right now".
     pub total_users: i64,
     pub active_users: i64,
     pub admin_users: i64,
+    /// Grant-only accounts (magic-link / OIDC-only / OCM recipients).
+    /// Filtered out of `total_users` / `active_users` since those
+    /// columns count operational seats (see the SELECT comment). Here
+    /// as its own metric because operators of external-heavy
+    /// deployments (public shares, invited-collab shops) need to see
+    /// the invited population at a glance.
+    pub external_users: i64,
+    // ── Live activity (projection over auth.sessions) ──
+    // Both fields change minute-to-minute, unlike the user counts
+    // above which only move on register/deactivate/role-toggle.
+    // Same 5-min window as the Prometheus gauges
+    // (`oxicloud_sessions_online[_users]` in
+    // `session_liveness_gauges.rs`), computed via the shared
+    // `ONLINE_WINDOW` constant so per-user badges + aggregate
+    // counts + this dashboard number stay consistent by construction.
+    /// Distinct users behind non-revoked sessions active in the last
+    /// 5 min. Answers "how many humans are here right now?".
+    pub online_users: i64,
+    /// Non-revoked sessions active in the last 5 min. Answers "how
+    /// many concurrent connections must I serve?". Ratio
+    /// `online_sessions / online_users` is the multi-device factor.
+    pub online_sessions: i64,
     // ── Per-drive-kind quota accounting ──
     // One row per drive kind (personal, shared). Pre-dedup, logical
     // file sizes summed from `drives.used_bytes` (personal rolls up

src/application/dtos/user_dto.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 use crate::domain::entities::user::User;
-use crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserListEntry;
 use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use smol_str::SmolStr;
@@ -7,287 +6,283 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
 use utoipa::ToSchema;
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
+// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Three-layer user DTO family — see docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md.
+//
+// `PublicUserDto`  — public identity. Every authenticated caller may see it.
+//                    Returned by /api/users/{id}, share responses, group
+//                    members, magic-link invitees, recipient enrichment.
+// `FullUserDto`    — `{ user: PublicUserDto, ...admin+self extras }`.
+//                    Returned as `Vec<FullUserDto>` by /api/admin/users;
+//                    embedded in `SelfUserDto`. Closest DTO to the
+//                    `auth.users` row.
+// `SelfUserDto`    — `{ full: FullUserDto, ...self-only extras }`. Returned
+//                    by /api/auth/me and by every AuthResponseDto path.
+//
+// Adding a field? Decide by audience:
+//   * Any authenticated caller may see it about another user → `PublicUserDto`.
+//   * Only admin (about another user) AND self (about self) → `FullUserDto`.
+//   * Only self about themselves → `SelfUserDto`.
+// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Public identity — what any authenticated caller may see about ANOTHER
+/// user. Returned by `/api/users/{id}` and everywhere a user is
+/// referenced by another surface (share responses, group members,
+/// magic-link invitees, recipient enrichment).
+///
+/// This is the audience-narrowest DTO: adding a field here means every
+/// authenticated caller can see it about every visible user. Fields that
+/// are meaningful only to the subject themselves (preferences, session
+/// state) or only to an admin (auth adoption signals) belong on
+/// [`SelfUserDto`] or [`FullUserDto`] respectively.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
-pub struct UserDto {
+pub struct PublicUserDto {
     pub id: String,
-    /// Optional handle. `None` for users who have not claimed one
-    /// (externals, fresh email-only signups). Frontend display callers
-    /// should walk `username → given/family → email` as their fallback
-    /// chain. Omitted from JSON when None (consistent with the existing
-    /// given_name / family_name fields).
     #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub username: Option<String>,
     pub email: String,
+    /// Role string ("admin" | "user"). Kept public because the sharee /
+    /// group-member vignette renders an admin badge.
     pub role: String,
-    pub storage_quota_bytes: i64,
+    /// Avatar payload (base64 data-URI up to 512 KiB). Public so a share
-    pub storage_used_bytes: i64,
+    /// picker can render the recipient's face directly. Will move to a
-    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+    /// dedicated avatar endpoint in a future refactor — this shape is
-    pub updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+    /// transitional.
-    pub last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
-    pub active: bool,
-    /// Which trust chain minted this user's federation identity —
-    /// `"oidc" | "ocm" | "magic_link"` — or `None` for pure local
-    /// users. Load-bearing for "is this user OIDC?"-shape predicates:
-    /// use `federation_kind == "oidc"` rather than string-scraping
-    /// `federation_issuer`. Serialized only when populated.
-    ///
-    /// Mirrors `auth.users.federation_kind` verbatim — same name at
-    /// DB, entity, and wire layers so there's no translation to reason
-    /// about. See docs/plan/ocm.md § Identity & auth model.
-    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
-    pub federation_kind: Option<String>,
-    /// The authority that mints this user's `federation_subject` —
-    /// issuer URL for OIDC (id_token `iss` claim), peer domain for
-    /// OCM, `null` for local users (password / OPAQUE only).
-    ///
-    /// Renamed from `auth_provider` (which was a `String` with the
-    /// sentinel `"local"` for non-federated users, and a human-readable
-    /// label like `"MockSSO"` before Phase B). This shape mirrors the
-    /// `auth.users.federation_issuer` column directly: nullable when
-    /// there's no federation involved. FE predicates for "is this user
-    /// federated?" should read `federation_kind`, not
-    /// string-compare this value.
-    ///
-    /// When populated, FE code that wants a friendly display label
-    /// looks this value up against `OidcProviderInfoDto.issuer →
-    /// provider_name` to render the deployment's configured display
-    /// name; falls back to the raw issuer for foreign IdPs / legacy
-    /// rows still holding a pre-Phase-B label.
-    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
-    pub federation_issuer: Option<String>,
     pub image: Option<String>,
-    pub can_edit_image: bool,
     /// `true` for grant-only external recipients (magic-link, OIDC-only,
-    /// future OCM federated). External users have no home folder and
+    /// future OCM federated). Renders the "external" badge on the vignette.
-    /// can't own storage; their quota is always 0. Internal users
-    /// default to `false`.
     pub is_external: bool,
-    /// Optional first/given name. Populated from the OIDC `given_name`
+    /// Optional first/given name. Social identity.
-    /// claim at JIT provisioning, or via a profile-edit endpoint.
-    /// `None` until explicitly set — `skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none"`
-    /// keeps the wire format compact for the common case.
     #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub given_name: Option<String>,
-    /// Optional last/family name. Same provenance + serde rules as
+    /// Optional last/family name. Social identity.
-    /// `given_name`.
     #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub family_name: Option<String>,
-    /// When the user first demonstrated control of their email (PR 23).
+    /// Presence signal — TRUE when the server observed a request on any
-    /// `None` = unverified (omitted from JSON). Stamped on the first
+    /// of this user's non-revoked sessions within the last
-    /// successful magic-link redemption or OIDC JIT with verified
+    /// [`ONLINE_WINDOW`](crate::application::dtos::session_dto::ONLINE_WINDOW)
-    /// claim. Idempotent — the original timestamp is preserved on
+    /// (5 min). Sourced from an EXISTS subquery when the DTO is built
-    /// subsequent verifications.
+    /// from a list-projection path; single-user endpoints that don't
-    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    /// enrich presence ship `false`.
-    pub email_verified_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
-    /// User-chosen locale for server-rendered surfaces (emails,
-    /// future authenticated HTML). `None` = no preference (the server
-    /// resolves to `OXICLOUD_DEFAULT_LOCALE` when rendering). Round-trips
-    /// through `/api/auth/me` and `PATCH /api/auth/me/profile`.
-    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
-    pub preferred_locale: Option<String>,
-    /// Whether the user wants an email when someone shares a resource
-    /// with them. `true` (default) = receive share-notification mails;
-    /// `false` = grants are still created but no email is sent. Honored
-    /// only on the plain-notification path — magic-link first-invitations
-    /// to brand-new external users always send, otherwise the recipient
-    /// could never claim the share. Round-trips through `/api/auth/me`
-    /// and `PATCH /api/auth/me/profile`.
-    pub notify_on_share: bool,
-    /// Opaque UI preferences bag. Cross-device store for pure UI
-    /// toggles (hide dotfiles, view mode, sidebar collapse, …). The
-    /// server never inspects the contents — this DTO field just echoes
-    /// what was PATCHed via `PATCH /api/auth/me/profile`. Shape is a
-    /// JSON object; the frontend defines the keys it cares about (see
-    /// `frontend/src/lib/stores/preferences.svelte.ts`). Always present
-    /// on the wire; empty bag is `{}`, never `null`.
-    pub ui_preferences: serde_json::Value,
-    /// Mirrors `auth.users.force_password_change_at_next_login`. Set
-    /// TRUE by the admin password-reset flow (see
-    /// `AuthApplicationService::admin_reset_password`) and cleared by
-    /// a successful self-service `POST /api/auth/change-password`.
-    ///
-    /// Populated only by the `/api/auth/me` handler and the login
-    /// response minter (via a distinct code path). `From<User>` — used
-    /// by admin listings, share-recipient responses, group-member DTOs,
-    /// etc. — leaves it at `false`. The flag is a per-session-account
-    /// concern (does *this* user need to change their password before
-    /// they can proceed?), not a general user attribute worth
-    /// surfacing on every list row.
-    ///
-    /// The load-bearing consumer is the SPA's session store: on
-    /// startup and after every refresh, `/me` returns the current
-    /// flag value and the SPA's nav-guard blocks navigation to
-    /// anything but the change-password surface until it flips
-    /// back to false. Backend enforcement is separate (see the
-    /// `require_no_password_change_pending` middleware) — this DTO
-    /// field is what the SPA reads to render the mandatory-mode UI.
     #[serde(default)]
-    pub force_password_change: bool,
+    pub is_online: bool,
-    /// TRUE when the account has a local Argon2id `password_hash` on
-    /// file. Distinct from `federation_kind`: an OIDC-linked account
-    /// (`federation_kind == "oidc"`) can ALSO carry a local password if
-    /// it was set at signup or later — a hybrid posture. The SPA
-    /// gates the profile page's change-password card on this flag,
-    /// so hybrid users can rotate their local password even though
-    /// they normally sign in via SSO.
-    ///
-    /// Populated only by the `/api/auth/me` handler. `From<User>` in
-    /// this file leaves it `false` — other UserDto emitters (admin
-    /// listings, share-recipient responses, group members) do not
-    /// need to surface per-user credential state.
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub has_password: bool,
-    /// TRUE when the caller's current session carries a DPoP JWK
-    /// thumbprint (`session.dpop_jkt IS NOT NULL`). Sourced from the
-    /// caller's JWT `cnf.jkt` claim — `is_some()` means the session
-    /// was bound at token-mint time.
-    ///
-    /// Populated only by the `/api/auth/me` handler; other UserDto
-    /// emitters leave it `false`. The SPA reads this on `session.load()`
-    /// to skip a redundant `POST /api/auth/dpop/bind` call when the
-    /// session is already bound (which would 409 and log noisily under
-    /// the audit stream — see the `already_bound` reject). Only the
-    /// OIDC / magic-link redirect flows land here as `false` on first
-    /// visit; password login binds at session-mint time so the very
-    /// first `/me` after login already reports `true`.
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub is_dpop_bound: bool,
 }
 
-/// Compact row returned by the paginated admin user table.
+/// Full user record — public identity + all fields BOTH an admin
+/// (viewing another user) AND the subject themselves may see. Returned
+/// as `Vec<FullUserDto>` by `/api/admin/users`; embedded in
+/// [`SelfUserDto`] for `/api/auth/me`.
 ///
-/// Account-detail fields deliberately do not appear here.  In particular,
+/// This is the DTO closest to the underlying `auth.users` row. Adding a
-/// omitting `image` and `ui_preferences` prevents a 100-row page from turning
+/// field here means an admin looking at any user can see it, and the
-/// into tens of MiB when users have uploaded avatars.  `GET /api/admin/users/:id`
+/// subject themselves can see it in their `/me` response — but the field
-/// remains the full-detail endpoint.
+/// stays off the public [`PublicUserDto`] surface.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
-pub struct AdminUserSummaryDto {
+pub struct FullUserDto {
-    pub id: String,
+    /// Public identity — same set every authenticated caller sees.
-    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub user: PublicUserDto,
-    pub username: Option<String>,
+    /// Which trust chain minted this user's federation identity —
-    pub email: String,
+    /// `"oidc" | "ocm" | "magic_link"` — or `None` for pure local users.
-    pub role: String,
+    /// Kept off `PublicUserDto` because a peer's federation kind is a
-    pub storage_quota_bytes: i64,
+    /// soft org-affiliation leak; only self + admin need it.
-    pub storage_used_bytes: i64,
-    pub last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
-    pub active: bool,
-    /// See `UserDto::federation_kind` — same semantics, same wire spelling.
     #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub federation_kind: Option<String>,
-    /// See `UserDto::federation_issuer` — same semantics, same wire spelling.
+    /// The authority that minted this user's `federation_subject` —
+    /// issuer URL for OIDC (id_token `iss` claim), peer domain for OCM,
+    /// `None` for local users. Same rationale as `federation_kind`.
     #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub federation_issuer: Option<String>,
-    pub is_external: bool,
+    /// Subject's own locale preference. Only THEY or an admin managing
-    /// TRUE when the user has a server-verifiable password on file
+    /// them needs this — other callers use their own locale.
-    /// (`password_hash IS NOT NULL`). The admin table uses this
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
-    /// alongside `federation_issuer` and `opaque_registered` to render
+    pub preferred_locale: Option<String>,
-    /// the user's full capability set: a `password` chip lights up
+    /// When the user first demonstrated control of their email. Trust
-    /// here, an OIDC provider name renders the SSO badge, an
+    /// signal — meaningful to admin (auditing verification status) and
-    /// envelope-on-file flips the OPAQUE chip. A user with none of
+    /// to self (own record), but not to a share picker rendering a
-    /// the three is passwordless (magic-link only — the SPA renders
+    /// vignette.
-    /// a distinct `passwordless` chip in that case). Admin-only
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
-    /// exposure — see the DTO doc for why this isn't on `UserDto`.
+    pub email_verified_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
-    #[serde(default)]
+    /// Row bookkeeping.
+    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+    pub updated_at: DateTime<Utc>,
+    /// Activity signal — private to the subject; admin sees it too.
+    pub last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
+    /// Account-active flag — a deactivated user couldn't reach `/me`
+    /// anyway, but admin needs to see it.
+    pub active: bool,
+    /// Storage quotas — personal financials. Admin manages others';
+    /// self sees own.
+    pub storage_quota_bytes: i64,
+    pub storage_used_bytes: i64,
+    /// TRUE when the account has a server-verifiable password
+    /// (`password_hash IS NOT NULL`). Kept off `PublicUserDto` because
+    /// per-user auth adoption leaks through directory endpoints.
     pub has_password: bool,
-    /// Mirrors `UserListEntry::opaque_registered` — TRUE when the user
+    /// TRUE when the user has an OPAQUE envelope on file.
-    /// has an OPAQUE envelope on file. Surfaced on the admin table so
-    /// operators can see per-user rollout progress during the
-    /// migration window. **Admin-only exposure**: this field is NOT
-    /// on `UserDto` — putting it there would leak adoption status
-    /// through every user-directory-adjacent endpoint (share targets,
-    /// group members, invite listings). `#[serde(default)]` keeps
-    /// older SPA builds tolerant of the added field.
-    #[serde(default)]
     pub opaque_registered: bool,
-    /// Mirrors `UserListEntry::opaque_migrated` — TRUE when the user
+    /// TRUE when the user has completed ≥1 successful OPAQUE login.
-    /// has completed at least one successful OPAQUE login. Distinct
+    /// Distinct from `opaque_registered`: an admin can invalidate the
-    /// from `opaque_registered`: an admin can invalidate the envelope
+    /// envelope leaving the user registered=false but with historical
-    /// (`clear_registration`) leaving the user registered=false but
+    /// migrated=true.
-    /// with a historical migrated=true; the SPA's admin table shows
-    /// both so this operational nuance is visible.
-    #[serde(default)]
     pub opaque_migrated: bool,
 }
 
-impl From<UserListEntry> for AdminUserSummaryDto {
+/// Self view — everything the caller may see about themselves.
-    fn from(entry: UserListEntry) -> Self {
+/// Returned by `/api/auth/me` and by every `AuthResponseDto` path
-        Self {
+/// (login / refresh / OIDC callback / magic-link redemption).
-            id: entry.id.to_string(),
+///
-            username: entry.username,
+/// Composed on top of [`FullUserDto`] so `/me` and `/admin/users` share
-            email: entry.email,
+/// the SAME "full profile" contract for the fields both need — new
-            role: entry.role.to_string(),
+/// self+admin-visible fields go on `FullUserDto` and both endpoints get
-            storage_quota_bytes: entry.storage_quota_bytes,
+/// them together. Fields here are pure self-scoped state: preferences,
-            storage_used_bytes: entry.storage_used_bytes,
+/// session-scoped flags, and caller-scoped permissions.
-            last_login_at: entry.last_login_at,
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
-            active: entry.active,
+pub struct SelfUserDto {
-            federation_kind: entry.federation_kind,
+    /// Full profile — same shape as one row of `/api/admin/users`.
-            federation_issuer: entry.federation_issuer,
+    pub full: FullUserDto,
-            is_external: entry.is_external,
+    /// Opaque UI preferences bag — my own UI state. Cross-device store
-            has_password: entry.has_password,
+    /// for pure UI toggles (view mode, sidebar collapse, hide dotfiles,
-            opaque_registered: entry.opaque_registered,
+    /// …). The server never inspects the contents. Always present on
-            opaque_migrated: entry.opaque_migrated,
+    /// the wire; empty bag is `{}`, never `null`.
-        }
+    pub ui_preferences: serde_json::Value,
-    }
+    /// Whether I want share-notification emails.
+    pub notify_on_share: bool,
+    /// Session-scoped: my current session carries a DPoP thumbprint.
+    /// SPA reads this on `session.load()` to skip a redundant
+    /// `POST /api/auth/dpop/bind` when the session is already bound.
+    pub is_dpop_bound: bool,
+    /// Admin-set temp-password gate — SPA nav guard blocks everything
+    /// but `/change-password` until this flips back. Cleared by a
+    /// successful `POST /api/auth/change-password`.
+    pub force_password_change: bool,
+    /// Caller-scoped permission: can I edit my own avatar? `false` for
+    /// OIDC users whose avatar comes from the IdP. Only meaningful when
+    /// caller == subject; nonsense on any other DTO.
+    pub can_edit_image: bool,
 }
 
-impl From<User> for UserDto {
+impl PublicUserDto {
-    fn from(user: User) -> Self {
+    /// Construct a `PublicUserDto` from a `User` entity + an explicit
-        // `user` is owned and dropped here, so every owned field is MOVED out
+    /// `is_online` signal.
-        // via `into_parts` rather than cloned through the borrowing accessors —
+    ///
-        // the accessor form deep-cloned `image` (a data URI up to 512 KiB) and
+    /// **Why not `From<User>`?** The `User` entity models a row in
-        // the whole `ui_preferences` JSON tree on every `/api/auth/me` and admin
+    /// `auth.users`; `is_online` is a cross-table lookup on
-        // user listing (benches/ROUND20.md §A2). The two derived values read the
+    /// `auth.sessions` (see the EXISTS subquery in
-        // entity before the move.
+    /// `list_users_with_derived_flags` and `get_user_with_derived_flags`
+    /// on the user repo). A `From<User>` impl couldn't compute it
+    /// honestly — it would have to ship a `false` default that lies to
+    /// the FE presence dot on every emitter that didn't remember to
+    /// override. Making presence a required constructor argument
+    /// removes that footgun: every callsite has to declare its intent.
+    ///
+    /// Two shapes at the callsite:
+    ///
+    /// - Presence matters (single-user `/api/users/{id}`, list
+    ///   projections, self-view): pair with
+    ///   `user_storage.get_user_with_derived_flags(id)` and pass
+    ///   `flags.is_online`.
+    /// - Presence is out of scope (register / update-profile response,
+    ///   post-mutation echo where the FE ignores the field): pass
+    ///   `false` with a short comment explaining why. The receiver's
+    ///   presence read is a no-op — no dot lights up on the stale
+    ///   value.
+    pub fn new(user: User, is_online: bool) -> Self {
         let role = format!("{}", user.role());
-        let can_edit_image = !user.is_oidc_user();
-        // has_password is derivable from the entity — read before the
-        // move. Cheap (bool from Option::is_some), no extra DB round-
-        // trip, so From<User> can populate it uniformly rather than
-        // leaving it false and requiring per-call-site backfill.
-        let has_password = user.has_password();
         let p = user.into_parts();
         Self {
             id: p.id.to_string(),
             username: p.username,
             email: p.email,
             role,
-            storage_quota_bytes: p.storage_quota_bytes,
+            image: p.image,
-            storage_used_bytes: p.storage_used_bytes,
+            is_external: p.is_external,
+            given_name: p.given_name,
+            family_name: p.family_name,
+            is_online,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl FullUserDto {
+    /// Construct a `FullUserDto` from a `User` entity plus the DB-derived
+    /// flags the entity doesn't carry (`has_password`, OPAQUE flags,
+    /// `is_online`). Both are typically produced together by the users
+    /// list repo projection.
+    ///
+    /// Not a `From` impl because it takes two arguments; not a `From
+    /// <(User, UserDerivedFlags)>` because that reads awkwardly at
+    /// callsites — `FullUserDto::build(user, flags)` is clearer.
+    pub fn build(
+        user: User,
+        flags: crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserDerivedFlags,
+    ) -> Self {
+        let role = format!("{}", user.role());
+        let p = user.into_parts();
+        Self {
+            user: PublicUserDto {
+                id: p.id.to_string(),
+                username: p.username,
+                email: p.email,
+                role,
+                image: p.image,
+                is_external: p.is_external,
+                given_name: p.given_name,
+                family_name: p.family_name,
+                is_online: flags.is_online,
+            },
+            federation_kind: p.federation_kind.map(|k| k.as_str().to_string()),
+            federation_issuer: p.federation_issuer,
+            preferred_locale: p.preferred_locale,
+            email_verified_at: p.email_verified_at,
             created_at: p.created_at,
             updated_at: p.updated_at,
             last_login_at: p.last_login_at,
             active: p.active,
-            // NULL on both fields for local users (no federation wired).
+            storage_quota_bytes: p.storage_quota_bytes,
-            // FE predicates use `!!federation_kind` for "is federated?" —
+            storage_used_bytes: p.storage_used_bytes,
-            // no "local" sentinel string; the null tells the whole story.
+            has_password: flags.has_password,
-            federation_kind: p.federation_kind.map(|k| k.as_str().to_string()),
+            opaque_registered: flags.opaque_registered,
-            federation_issuer: p.federation_issuer,
+            opaque_migrated: flags.opaque_migrated,
-            image: p.image,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl SelfUserDto {
+    /// Assemble the `/me` response from a `FullUserDto` plus the two
+    /// session-scoped booleans that can't be derived from `User` alone:
+    /// the caller's DPoP-binding state (from the JWT `cnf.jkt` claim)
+    /// and the admin-set force-password-change flag (from the auth
+    /// service's cache).
+    ///
+    /// The other self-only fields (`ui_preferences`, `notify_on_share`,
+    /// `can_edit_image`) come from `User` and are read off the entity
+    /// before it's moved into the FullUserDto; this method takes those
+    /// as explicit parameters so the caller can decide when to read
+    /// them (typically at the same point they read the DPoP-binding
+    /// state).
+    pub fn build(
+        full: FullUserDto,
+        ui_preferences: serde_json::Value,
+        notify_on_share: bool,
+        is_dpop_bound: bool,
+        force_password_change: bool,
+        can_edit_image: bool,
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            full,
+            ui_preferences,
+            notify_on_share,
+            is_dpop_bound,
+            force_password_change,
             can_edit_image,
-            is_external: p.is_external,
-            given_name: p.given_name,
-            family_name: p.family_name,
-            email_verified_at: p.email_verified_at,
-            preferred_locale: p.preferred_locale,
-            notify_on_share: p.notify_on_share,
-            ui_preferences: p.ui_preferences,
-            // Defaults to false. The `/me` handler + the login-response
-            // minter populate this via a distinct code path (a
-            // repo read that goes through the auth service's cache);
-            // admin listings and other UserDto consumers deliberately
-            // leave it false — the flag is per-session-account state,
-            // not a general user attribute.
-            force_password_change: false,
-            has_password,
-            // Populated only by `/api/auth/me` — the handler overlays
-            // the caller's session's actual DPoP binding state after
-            // this `From<User>` runs. Other UserDto emitters leave
-            // this at `false` (they lack session context).
-            is_dpop_bound: false,
         }
     }
 }
 
+// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// End of three-layer user DTO family.
+// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, ToSchema)]
 pub struct LoginDto {
     /// Identifier the user typed. Accepts BOTH a username (no `@`) and
@@ -425,7 +420,12 @@ impl UpdateProfileDto {
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
 pub struct AuthResponseDto {
-    pub user: UserDto,
+    /// Full self view — identical shape to `/api/auth/me`. Every
+    /// login / refresh / OIDC-callback / magic-link redemption ships
+    /// this so the SPA's post-auth state matches its post-`/me` state
+    /// (no UI race between `AuthResponseDto` and the first `/me`
+    /// fetch). See `docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md` § Endpoint mapping.
+    pub user: SelfUserDto,
     pub access_token: String,
     pub refresh_token: String,
     pub token_type: String,
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ pub struct OidcProviderInfoDto {
     /// users JIT-provisioned via this IdP.
     ///
     /// Populated so the frontend can resolve display: when
-    /// `UserDto.federation_issuer` equals this `issuer`, render
+    /// `PublicUserDto.federation_issuer` equals this `issuer`, render
     /// `provider_name` as the human-friendly label (avoids showing raw
     /// issuer URLs like `https://sso.example.com/realms/main` in the
     /// admin badge / profile view). Falls back to the raw issuer when
@@ -606,3 +606,142 @@ pub struct OidcUserInfoDto {
     pub name: Option<String>,
     pub groups: Vec<String>,
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod three_layer_quarantine {
+    use super::*;
+    use serde_json::Value;
+
+    /// Structural-quarantine guard for `SelfUserDto`. The self-only
+    /// bag (`ui_preferences`, `notify_on_share`, `is_dpop_bound`,
+    /// `force_password_change`, `can_edit_image`) MUST live at the
+    /// top level, NOT nested inside `.full` or `.full.user`. If a
+    /// future refactor accidentally moves one of them down, the
+    /// wire shape leaks it through every `PublicUserDto` /
+    /// `FullUserDto` emitter (share responses, group members,
+    /// `/api/admin/users`, magic-link invitees) — exactly what the
+    /// three-layer split exists to prevent. Fails loudly here.
+    #[test]
+    fn self_only_fields_stay_at_top_level_of_self_user_dto() {
+        let self_dto = SelfUserDto {
+            full: FullUserDto {
+                user: PublicUserDto {
+                    id: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001".into(),
+                    username: None,
+                    email: "self@example.invalid".into(),
+                    role: "user".into(),
+                    image: None,
+                    is_external: false,
+                    given_name: None,
+                    family_name: None,
+                    is_online: false,
+                },
+                federation_kind: None,
+                federation_issuer: None,
+                preferred_locale: None,
+                email_verified_at: None,
+                created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+                updated_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+                last_login_at: None,
+                active: true,
+                storage_quota_bytes: 0,
+                storage_used_bytes: 0,
+                has_password: true,
+                opaque_registered: false,
+                opaque_migrated: false,
+            },
+            ui_preferences: serde_json::json!({}),
+            notify_on_share: true,
+            is_dpop_bound: false,
+            force_password_change: false,
+            can_edit_image: true,
+        };
+        let json: Value = serde_json::to_value(&self_dto).expect("SelfUserDto serialises");
+        assert!(
+            json.get("ui_preferences").is_some(),
+            "top-level ui_preferences"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            json.get("full")
+                .expect("full block")
+                .get("ui_preferences")
+                .is_none(),
+            "ui_preferences must NOT appear inside `.full`"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            json.pointer("/full/user/ui_preferences").is_none(),
+            "ui_preferences must NOT appear inside `.full.user`"
+        );
+        // Same guard for the other self-only fields.
+        for k in [
+            "notify_on_share",
+            "is_dpop_bound",
+            "force_password_change",
+            "can_edit_image",
+        ] {
+            assert!(json.get(k).is_some(), "{k} at top level");
+            assert!(
+                json.pointer(&format!("/full/{k}")).is_none(),
+                "{k} must NOT nest in .full"
+            );
+            assert!(
+                json.pointer(&format!("/full/user/{k}")).is_none(),
+                "{k} must NOT nest in .full.user"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Structural-quarantine guard for `FullUserDto`. Admin-visible
+    /// extras (`has_password`, OPAQUE flags, `federation_*`,
+    /// `last_login_at`, `active`, quotas, `preferred_locale`,
+    /// `email_verified_at`) MUST live at the top level of
+    /// `FullUserDto`, NOT inside `.user`. If a future refactor
+    /// accidentally lifts one of them onto `PublicUserDto` (the
+    /// embedded `user` field), it leaks through `/api/users/{id}`
+    /// and every other public directory endpoint.
+    #[test]
+    fn admin_only_fields_stay_at_top_level_of_full_user_dto() {
+        let full = FullUserDto {
+            user: PublicUserDto {
+                id: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002".into(),
+                username: Some("bob".into()),
+                email: "bob@example.invalid".into(),
+                role: "user".into(),
+                image: None,
+                is_external: false,
+                given_name: None,
+                family_name: None,
+                is_online: false,
+            },
+            federation_kind: None,
+            federation_issuer: None,
+            preferred_locale: None,
+            email_verified_at: None,
+            created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+            updated_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+            last_login_at: None,
+            active: true,
+            storage_quota_bytes: 10_737_418_240,
+            storage_used_bytes: 0,
+            has_password: true,
+            opaque_registered: false,
+            opaque_migrated: false,
+        };
+        let json: Value = serde_json::to_value(&full).expect("FullUserDto serialises");
+        for k in [
+            "has_password",
+            "opaque_registered",
+            "opaque_migrated",
+            "last_login_at",
+            "active",
+            "storage_quota_bytes",
+            "storage_used_bytes",
+        ] {
+            assert!(json.get(k).is_some(), "{k} at top level of FullUserDto");
+            assert!(
+                json.pointer(&format!("/user/{k}")).is_none(),
+                "{k} must NOT nest in .user"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}

src/application/ports/auth_ports.rs

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ use crate::domain::entities::app_password::AppPassword;
 use crate::domain::entities::device_code::DeviceCode;
 use crate::domain::entities::session::Session;
 use crate::domain::entities::user::User;
-use crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserListEntry;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
@@ -123,6 +122,36 @@ pub trait UserStoragePort: Send + Sync + 'static {
     /// Gets a user by ID
     async fn get_user_by_id(&self, id: Uuid) -> Result<User, DomainError>;
 
+    /// Fetch the full `User` + [`UserDerivedFlags`] in one query. See
+    /// [`UserRepository::get_user_with_derived_flags`](crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserRepository::get_user_with_derived_flags)
+    /// for the contract and the rationale for the single-query shape.
+    async fn get_user_with_derived_flags(
+        &self,
+        id: Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<
+        (
+            User,
+            crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserDerivedFlags,
+        ),
+        DomainError,
+    >;
+
+    /// Paginated admin user listing with derived flags. See
+    /// [`UserRepository::list_users_with_derived_flags`](crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserRepository::list_users_with_derived_flags)
+    /// for the contract and rationale.
+    async fn list_users_with_derived_flags(
+        &self,
+        limit: i64,
+        offset: i64,
+        include_external: bool,
+    ) -> Result<
+        Vec<(
+            User,
+            crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserDerivedFlags,
+        )>,
+        DomainError,
+    >;
+
     /// Batch-loads users by id. Order is unspecified; missing ids are
     /// silently dropped. Used by group-recipient expansion in
     /// `RecipientNotificationService` to avoid N+1 lookups when notifying
@@ -164,15 +193,6 @@ pub trait UserStoragePort: Send + Sync + 'static {
         include_external: bool,
     ) -> Result<Vec<User>, DomainError>;
 
-    /// Narrow user-list projection for management tables.  Keeps heavyweight
-    /// account-detail fields off the database and JSON hot path.
-    async fn list_user_summaries(
-        &self,
-        limit: i64,
-        offset: i64,
-        include_external: bool,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<UserListEntry>, DomainError>;
-
     /// Searches users by username or email (SQL ILIKE) with a limit.
     /// See [`list_users`] for the meaning of `include_external`.
     async fn search_users(

src/application/services/auth_application_service.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 use crate::application::dtos::user_dto::{
-    AdminUserSummaryDto, AuthResponseDto, ChangePasswordDto, LoginDto, RefreshTokenDto,
+    AuthResponseDto, ChangePasswordDto, FullUserDto, LoginDto, PublicUserDto, RefreshTokenDto,
-    RegisterDto, UpgradeToInternalDto, UserDto,
+    RegisterDto, SelfUserDto, UpgradeToInternalDto,
 };
 use crate::application::ports::auth_ports::{
     OidcIdClaims, OidcServicePort, PasswordHasherPort, SessionStoragePort, TokenServicePort,
@@ -319,11 +319,11 @@ pub enum OidcCallbackResult {
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub enum RegisterResult {
     /// Boxed to avoid the `large_enum_variant` clippy warning —
-    /// `UserDto` is ~250 bytes, the other variants are zero-sized,
+    /// `PublicUserDto` is ~250 bytes, the other variants are zero-sized,
     /// so a heap-pointer indirection keeps the enum's stack size
     /// small. `register` is called once per request; the
     /// allocation cost is negligible.
-    Created(Box<UserDto>),
+    Created(Box<PublicUserDto>),
     UsernameTaken,
     EmailTaken,
 }
@@ -876,8 +876,9 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
             is_external = false,
             "🛂 user registered",
         );
-        Ok(RegisterResult::Created(Box::new(UserDto::from(
+        Ok(RegisterResult::Created(Box::new(PublicUserDto::new(
             created_user,
+            false,
         ))))
     }
 
@@ -894,7 +895,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         username: String,
         email: String,
         password: String,
-    ) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
+    ) -> Result<PublicUserDto, DomainError> {
         // Validate username
         if username.len() < 3 || username.len() > 254 {
             return Err(DomainError::new(
@@ -981,7 +982,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
             username,
             created_user.id()
         );
-        Ok(UserDto::from(created_user))
+        Ok(PublicUserDto::new(created_user, false))
     }
 
     pub async fn login(
@@ -1320,12 +1321,16 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
             session = session.with_dpop_jkt(jkt);
         }
 
+        // Build the SelfUserDto BEFORE `session` moves into
+        // `create_session` — the builder reads `session.dpop_jkt()`.
+        let user_id = user.id();
+        let user_dto = self.build_self_user_dto(user_id, &session).await?;
         self.session_storage.create_session(session).await?;
 
         // Authentication response
-        let force_password_change = self.read_force_password_change(user.id()).await;
+        let force_password_change = self.read_force_password_change(user_id).await;
         Ok(AuthResponseDto {
-            user: UserDto::from(user),
+            user: user_dto,
             access_token,
             refresh_token,
             token_type: "Bearer".to_string(),
@@ -1334,6 +1339,69 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         })
     }
 
+    /// Assemble a `SelfUserDto` for the given user + the session that
+    /// mints them. Called by every `AuthResponseDto` path
+    /// (login / refresh / OIDC / magic-link) so the wire shape stays
+    /// consistent across login flavours and matches what `/api/auth/me`
+    /// would return.
+    ///
+    /// Costs one wide SELECT (`get_user_with_derived_flags`) even when
+    /// the caller already has a `User` in hand — acceptable because
+    /// `/login`, `/refresh`, and the OIDC/magic-link callbacks are
+    /// not hot inner loops. In exchange the composition stays uniform
+    /// across all four callsites and OPAQUE / `is_online` flags land
+    /// on the wire without a second lookup at each site.
+    ///
+    /// `is_dpop_bound` is derived from the session's own DPoP
+    /// thumbprint — the session was just constructed, so this reads
+    /// exactly the binding that will govern subsequent requests.
+    async fn build_self_user_dto(
+        &self,
+        user_id: Uuid,
+        session: &crate::domain::entities::session::Session,
+    ) -> Result<SelfUserDto, DomainError> {
+        // Session-context flavour — delegates to the shared builder
+        // with the DPoP-bound flag derived from the session row's
+        // thumbprint. See [`build_self_user_dto_for_id`] for the
+        // handler-context flavour.
+        self.build_self_user_dto_for_id(user_id, session.dpop_jkt().is_some())
+            .await
+    }
+
+    /// Handler-context variant of [`build_self_user_dto`]. Called by
+    /// every endpoint that returns a `SelfUserDto` from a REST handler
+    /// (`GET /me`, `PATCH /me/profile`, `POST /upgrade-to-internal`)
+    /// so the wire shape is byte-for-byte identical across them —
+    /// avoids a "quiet lie" where a client PATCHes one shape and
+    /// reads another on the very next `/me`.
+    ///
+    /// `is_dpop_bound` is passed in by the handler because the JWT
+    /// `cnf.jkt` claim is where handler-scope code learns the caller's
+    /// binding state (via `auth_user.dpop_jkt.is_some()`). Session-
+    /// mint paths use [`build_self_user_dto`] and derive the flag from
+    /// the freshly-created `Session` row instead.
+    pub async fn build_self_user_dto_for_id(
+        &self,
+        user_id: Uuid,
+        is_dpop_bound: bool,
+    ) -> Result<SelfUserDto, DomainError> {
+        let (user, flags) =
+            UserStoragePort::get_user_with_derived_flags(&*self.user_storage, user_id).await?;
+        let can_edit_image = !user.is_oidc_user();
+        let ui_preferences = user.ui_preferences().clone();
+        let notify_on_share = user.notify_on_share();
+        let force_password_change = self.read_force_password_change(user_id).await;
+        let full = FullUserDto::build(user, flags);
+        Ok(SelfUserDto::build(
+            full,
+            ui_preferences,
+            notify_on_share,
+            is_dpop_bound,
+            force_password_change,
+            can_edit_image,
+        ))
+    }
+
     /// Read `force_password_change_at_next_login` for the given user,
     /// with fail-open semantics on repo error (returns `false` and
     /// logs a warn). Every callsite that builds an `AuthResponseDto`
@@ -1586,22 +1654,29 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         let access_token =
             self.token_service
                 .generate_access_token(&user, Some(session.id()), None)?;
+        // Snapshot fields still needed for logging + DTO before
+        // `session` and `user` are consumed by the storage call and
+        // the DTO builder below.
+        let user_id = user.id();
+        let user_display = user.display_for_audit().to_string();
+        let is_external = user.is_external();
+        let user_dto = self.build_self_user_dto(user_id, &session).await?;
         self.session_storage.create_session(session).await?;
 
         tracing::info!(
             target: "audit",
             event = "magic_link.redeemed",
-            user_id = %user.id(),
+            user_id = %user_id,
-            username = %user.display_for_audit(),
+            username = %user_display,
-            is_external = user.is_external(),
+            is_external = is_external,
             resource_kind = ?mlt.resource_kind(),
             resource_id = ?mlt.resource_id(),
             cross_browser_confirmed = cross_browser_confirmed,
         );
 
-        let force_password_change = self.read_force_password_change(user.id()).await;
+        let force_password_change = self.read_force_password_change(user_id).await;
         let auth = AuthResponseDto {
-            user: UserDto::from(user),
+            user: user_dto,
             access_token,
             refresh_token,
             token_type: "Bearer".to_string(),
@@ -1789,6 +1864,12 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
             session.dpop_jkt(),
         )?;
 
+        // Build the SelfUserDto before `new_session` is consumed by
+        // the rotate call — the builder reads `session.dpop_jkt()`
+        // to compute `is_dpop_bound`.
+        let user_id = user.id();
+        let user_dto = self.build_self_user_dto(user_id, &new_session).await?;
+
         self.session_storage
             .rotate_session(session.id(), new_session)
             .await?;
@@ -1798,9 +1879,9 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         // initial login. The SPA's post-refresh flow (silent, on
         // its own timer) can then route the user to change-password
         // without waiting for an explicit re-login.
-        let force_password_change = self.read_force_password_change(user.id()).await;
+        let force_password_change = self.read_force_password_change(user_id).await;
         Ok(AuthResponseDto {
-            user: UserDto::from(user),
+            user: user_dto,
             access_token,
             refresh_token: new_refresh_token,
             token_type: "Bearer".to_string(),
@@ -2025,7 +2106,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         &self,
         caller_id: Uuid,
         dto: UpgradeToInternalDto,
-    ) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
+    ) -> Result<PublicUserDto, DomainError> {
         let mut user = self.user_storage.get_user_by_id(caller_id).await?;
 
         // Precondition: caller is currently external. Fast-path 409 so
@@ -2126,7 +2207,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
             lc.dispatch_upgraded_to_internal(&updated).await;
         }
 
-        Ok(UserDto::from(updated))
+        Ok(PublicUserDto::new(updated, false))
     }
 
     /// Admin-driven external → internal promotion.
@@ -2155,7 +2236,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         &self,
         admin_id: Uuid,
         target_id: Uuid,
-    ) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
+    ) -> Result<PublicUserDto, DomainError> {
         let mut user = self.user_storage.get_user_by_id(target_id).await?;
 
         if !user.is_external() {
@@ -2237,7 +2318,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
             "👮🏻‍♂️ external user promoted to internal by admin",
         );
 
-        Ok(UserDto::from(updated))
+        Ok(PublicUserDto::new(updated, false))
     }
 
     /// `keep_session_id` — when `Some`, revoke every OTHER session for
@@ -2492,9 +2573,9 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         Ok(())
     }
 
-    pub async fn get_user(&self, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
+    pub async fn get_user(&self, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<PublicUserDto, DomainError> {
         let user = self.user_storage.get_user_by_id(user_id).await?;
-        Ok(UserDto::from(user))
+        Ok(PublicUserDto::new(user, false))
     }
 
     /// Cached, image-free lookup of the caller's authorization flags
@@ -2643,7 +2724,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         caller_id: Uuid,
         dto: crate::application::dtos::user_dto::UpdateProfileDto,
         locale_registry: &crate::common::locale::LocaleRegistry,
-    ) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
+    ) -> Result<PublicUserDto, DomainError> {
         let mut user = self.user_storage.get_user_by_id(caller_id).await?;
 
         // For OIDC-managed users, refuse the patch ONLY when it touches
@@ -2819,7 +2900,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
 
         if changed.is_empty() && ui_prefs_patch.is_none() {
             // No-op — return the current user without a DB write.
-            return Ok(UserDto::from(user));
+            return Ok(PublicUserDto::new(user, false));
         }
 
         // Persist the typed-field changes first (if any). Skip the
@@ -2850,11 +2931,11 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         // Refetch so the returned DTO reflects the merged JSONB bag
         // (the in-memory `user` above holds the pre-merge value).
         let refreshed = self.user_storage.get_user_by_id(caller_id).await?;
-        Ok(UserDto::from(refreshed))
+        Ok(PublicUserDto::new(refreshed, false))
     }
 
     // Alias for consistency with handler method
-    pub async fn get_user_by_id(&self, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
+    pub async fn get_user_by_id(&self, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<PublicUserDto, DomainError> {
         self.get_user(user_id).await
     }
 
@@ -2871,6 +2952,26 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         UserStoragePort::get_user_by_id(&*self.user_storage, user_id).await
     }
 
+    /// Load the full `User` entity + `UserDerivedFlags` for the given
+    /// id in ONE query. See
+    /// [`UserRepository::get_user_with_derived_flags`](crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserRepository::get_user_with_derived_flags)
+    /// for the shape and the SELECT that drives it. Used by
+    /// `/api/auth/me` to build a `SelfUserDto` and by future admin
+    /// single-user views to build a `FullUserDto` without paying two
+    /// round-trips.
+    pub async fn get_user_with_derived_flags(
+        &self,
+        user_id: Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<
+        (
+            crate::domain::entities::user::User,
+            crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserDerivedFlags,
+        ),
+        DomainError,
+    > {
+        UserStoragePort::get_user_with_derived_flags(&*self.user_storage, user_id).await
+    }
+
     /// Login-style identifier lookup: dispatches on `@` in the input
     /// (email path when present, username path when not), identical
     /// to `login()`'s dispatch. Exposed so the OPAQUE login handler
@@ -2927,12 +3028,23 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         target_id: Uuid,
         expose_system_users: bool,
         pool: &sqlx::PgPool,
-    ) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
+    ) -> Result<PublicUserDto, DomainError> {
         // (1) Self — a single fetch suffices (the check compares the input
         // UUIDs, so the target read is never needed on this path).
+        //
+        // Both branches use `get_user_with_derived_flags` (not the narrow
+        // `get_user_by_id`) so `PublicUserDto.is_online` on the wire
+        // reflects the same EXISTS subquery the admin list uses. Without
+        // this the FE presence dot would only light up on list-derived
+        // paths (admin seed); single fetches from share pickers / group
+        // members would show every user as offline regardless of real
+        // state. See `docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md`.
         if caller_id == target_id {
-            let caller = self.user_storage.get_user_by_id(caller_id).await?;
+            let (caller, flags) = self
-            return Ok(UserDto::from(caller));
+                .user_storage
+                .get_user_with_derived_flags(caller_id)
+                .await?;
+            return Ok(PublicUserDto::new(caller, flags.is_online));
         }
 
         // Caller and target are independent point reads (the self-case already
@@ -2940,16 +3052,26 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         // overlap them with `join!` instead of two serial round-trips.
         // `caller_res?` first preserves the caller-error precedence of the old
         // sequential form. (benches/ROUND23.md §P1)
+        //
+        // `caller` uses the narrow `get_user_by_id` because we only read
+        // `is_external()` off it for the visibility gate; nothing about
+        // the caller ships on the wire. Only `target` needs the wider
+        // projection.
         let (caller_res, target_res) = tokio::join!(
             self.user_storage.get_user_by_id(caller_id),
-            self.user_storage.get_user_by_id(target_id)
+            self.user_storage.get_user_with_derived_flags(target_id)
         );
         let caller = caller_res?;
 
         // Anti-enumeration: NotFound for everything that doesn't pass.
         // Convert a real NotFound on `target` to the same anonymous 404,
         // so existence isn't leaked through differential responses.
-        let target = match target_res {
+        //
+        // Destructure the (User, UserDerivedFlags) tuple immediately so
+        // `target` keeps its historical `User` shape (accessors still
+        // work below); the flags come along as `target_flags` for the
+        // `is_online` propagation into the returned `PublicUserDto`.
+        let (target, target_flags) = match target_res {
             Ok(u) => u,
             Err(e) if e.kind == ErrorKind::NotFound => {
                 tracing::info!(
@@ -2993,7 +3115,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         })?;
 
         if related.is_some() {
-            return Ok(UserDto::from(target));
+            return Ok(PublicUserDto::new(target, target_flags.is_online));
         }
 
         // (3) External callers stop here — no directory enumeration.
@@ -3021,12 +3143,12 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
 
         // (4) Internal target + system-address-book exposed: already public.
         if !target.is_external() && expose_system_users {
-            return Ok(UserDto::from(target));
+            return Ok(PublicUserDto::new(target, target_flags.is_online));
         }
 
         // (5) Admin caller: always visible.
         if caller.role() == UserRole::Admin {
-            return Ok(UserDto::from(target));
+            return Ok(PublicUserDto::new(target, target_flags.is_online));
         }
 
         // (6) No relationship — anti-enumeration NotFound.
@@ -3079,7 +3201,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         username: &str,
         expose_system_users: bool,
         pool: &sqlx::PgPool,
-    ) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
+    ) -> Result<PublicUserDto, DomainError> {
         let target = match self.user_storage.get_user_by_username(username).await {
             Ok(u) => u,
             Err(e) if e.kind == ErrorKind::NotFound => {
@@ -3106,9 +3228,9 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
     }
 
     // New method to get user by username - needed for admin user handling
-    pub async fn get_user_by_username(&self, username: &str) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
+    pub async fn get_user_by_username(&self, username: &str) -> Result<PublicUserDto, DomainError> {
         let user = self.user_storage.get_user_by_username(username).await?;
-        Ok(UserDto::from(user))
+        Ok(PublicUserDto::new(user, false))
     }
 
     // Method to count how many admin users exist in the system
@@ -3125,42 +3247,46 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
     /// out so that internal-user surfaces — system address book, OCS
     /// sharee search, etc. — never expose external identities. Admin
     /// surfaces that need the full list should call
-    /// [`list_users_including_external_with_perms`] instead.
+    /// [`list_user_summaries_including_external_with_perms`] instead.
-    pub async fn list_users(&self, limit: i64, offset: i64) -> Result<Vec<UserDto>, DomainError> {
+    pub async fn list_users(
-        let users = self.user_storage.list_users(limit, offset, false).await?;
-        Ok(users.into_iter().map(UserDto::from).collect())
-    }
-
-    /// Admin-only: lists users including external (grant-only) recipients.
-    /// Used by the admin user-management UI.
-    pub async fn list_users_including_external_with_perms<A: AuthorizationEngine>(
         &self,
-        authorization: &A,
-        caller_id: Uuid,
         limit: i64,
         offset: i64,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<UserDto>, DomainError> {
+    ) -> Result<Vec<PublicUserDto>, DomainError> {
-        self.require_admin_caller(authorization, caller_id).await?;
+        let users = self.user_storage.list_users(limit, offset, false).await?;
-        let users = self.user_storage.list_users(limit, offset, true).await?;
+        Ok(users
-        Ok(users.into_iter().map(UserDto::from).collect())
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|u| PublicUserDto::new(u, false))
+            .collect())
     }
 
-    /// Admin-only compact listing.  The detail endpoint retains the complete
+    /// Admin-only user listing. Returns `Vec<FullUserDto>` — same
-    /// [`UserDto`]; this path projects only what the management table renders so
+    /// `FullUserDto` shape [`SelfUserDto`] embeds, so the FE reads
-    /// PostgreSQL never detoasts or transfers avatars/preferences for a page.
+    /// admin table rows and `/me` responses through identical field
+    /// paths. Includes the avatar (`user.image`) and presence
+    /// (`user.is_online`) so the admin table renders the vignette +
+    /// green dot without per-row follow-up fetches to
+    /// `/api/users/{id}` (the N+1 that motivated the widening — see
+    /// `docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md` § N+1). This is the sole
+    /// admin-visible listing path; the former flat
+    /// `list_users_including_external_with_perms` variant was
+    /// retired when `?summary` was dropped.
     pub async fn list_user_summaries_including_external_with_perms<A: AuthorizationEngine>(
         &self,
         authorization: &A,
         caller_id: Uuid,
         limit: i64,
         offset: i64,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<AdminUserSummaryDto>, DomainError> {
+    ) -> Result<Vec<FullUserDto>, DomainError> {
         self.require_admin_caller(authorization, caller_id).await?;
-        let users = self
+        let rows = self
             .user_storage
-            .list_user_summaries(limit, offset, true)
+            .list_users_with_derived_flags(limit, offset, true)
             .await?;
-        Ok(users.into_iter().map(AdminUserSummaryDto::from).collect())
+        Ok(rows
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|(user, flags)| FullUserDto::build(user, flags))
+            .collect())
     }
 
     /// Service-layer gate for administrator-scoped user-directory operations.
@@ -3183,9 +3309,16 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
     }
 
     /// Searches internal users only. See [`list_users`] for the rationale.
-    pub async fn search_users(&self, query: &str, limit: i64) -> Result<Vec<UserDto>, DomainError> {
+    pub async fn search_users(
+        &self,
+        query: &str,
+        limit: i64,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<PublicUserDto>, DomainError> {
         let users = self.user_storage.search_users(query, limit, false).await?;
-        Ok(users.into_iter().map(UserDto::from).collect())
+        Ok(users
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|u| PublicUserDto::new(u, false))
+            .collect())
     }
 
     /// Username-only search for the NC sharee autocomplete: identical
@@ -3215,8 +3348,8 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
     // `interfaces/api/routes.rs::admin_router`) — but every admin
     // method here still calls `require_admin_caller` as a
     // defense-in-depth check, matching the pattern
-    // `list_users_including_external_with_perms` established. If a
+    // `list_user_summaries_including_external_with_perms` established.
-    // handler is ever wired outside the /admin subtree, the AuthZ
+    // If a handler is ever wired outside the /admin subtree, the AuthZ
     // still holds.
 
     /// List sessions for the admin panel. `user_id_filter = Some(uuid)`
@@ -3291,7 +3424,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
     pub async fn admin_create_user(
         &self,
         dto: crate::application::dtos::settings_dto::AdminCreateUserDto,
-    ) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
+    ) -> Result<FullUserDto, DomainError> {
         // Validate username length
         if dto.username.len() < 3 || dto.username.len() > 254 {
             return Err(DomainError::new(
@@ -3449,7 +3582,16 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
             created.id(),
             created.is_external()
         );
-        Ok(UserDto::from(created))
+        // Return `FullUserDto` — same shape as `GET /api/admin/users/{id}`
+        // and one row of the admin list. Admin surfaces uniformly return
+        // FullUserDto so the SPA / test asserts don't need to know which
+        // admin endpoint they came from. Fresh user has no session yet
+        // (`is_online = false`) and no OPAQUE registration; `has_password`
+        // reflects whatever the admin passed in the DTO.
+        let created_id = created.id();
+        let (user, flags) =
+            UserStoragePort::get_user_with_derived_flags(&*self.user_storage, created_id).await?;
+        Ok(FullUserDto::build(user, flags))
     }
 
     /// Admin-only: reset a user's password.
@@ -3545,10 +3687,20 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         Ok(())
     }
 
-    /// Get a single user by ID (for admin panel)
+    /// Get a single user by ID (for admin panel).
-    pub async fn get_user_admin(&self, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
+    ///
-        let user = self.user_storage.get_user_by_id(user_id).await?;
+    /// Returns `FullUserDto` — same shape as one row of
-        Ok(UserDto::from(user))
+    /// `/api/admin/users` — so admin single-user views (detail modal,
+    /// per-user edit page) render the same fields the list surfaces.
+    /// The single-row admin view is the canonical observation surface
+    /// for admin-visible signals like `email_verified_at` /
+    /// `has_password` / `opaque_registered` / `last_login_at` — none
+    /// of which live on the peer-view `PublicUserDto`. See
+    /// `docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md`.
+    pub async fn get_user_admin(&self, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<FullUserDto, DomainError> {
+        let (user, flags) =
+            UserStoragePort::get_user_with_derived_flags(&*self.user_storage, user_id).await?;
+        Ok(FullUserDto::build(user, flags))
     }
 
     /// Delete a user by ID (admin only).
@@ -4654,11 +4806,17 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
         let access_token =
             self.token_service
                 .generate_access_token(&user, Some(session.id()), None)?;
+        // Build the SelfUserDto before `session` is consumed by the
+        // storage call — the builder reads `session.dpop_jkt()`
+        // (None here since OIDC callbacks land unbound and the SPA
+        // finishes binding post-redirect).
+        let user_id = user.id();
+        let user_dto = self.build_self_user_dto(user_id, &session).await?;
         self.session_storage.create_session(session).await?;
 
-        let force_password_change = self.read_force_password_change(user.id()).await;
+        let force_password_change = self.read_force_password_change(user_id).await;
         let auth_response = AuthResponseDto {
-            user: UserDto::from(user),
+            user: user_dto,
             access_token,
             refresh_token,
             token_type: "Bearer".to_string(),

src/domain/entities/user.rs

@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ pub struct User {
 /// Owned decomposition of a [`User`] (mirrors `FileParts` / `FolderParts` /
 /// `ContactParts`). Lets a consumer MOVE the heap fields out instead of cloning
 /// them through the borrowing accessors — notably `image` (a data URI up to
-/// 512 KiB) and `ui_preferences` (a JSON tree). See `UserDto::from`
+/// 512 KiB) and `ui_preferences` (a JSON tree). See `PublicUserDto::from`
 /// (benches/ROUND20.md §A2).
 pub struct UserParts {
     pub id: Uuid,

src/domain/repositories/user_repository.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 use crate::common::errors::DomainError;
 use crate::domain::entities::user::{User, UserRole};
-use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
 #[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
@@ -26,49 +25,26 @@ pub enum UserRepositoryError {
 
 pub type UserRepositoryResult<T> = Result<T, UserRepositoryError>;
 
-/// Narrow projection for user-directory tables that do not need secrets,
+/// DB-computed booleans about a user that aren't fields on the
-/// profile pictures, or the cross-device UI-preferences document.
+/// [`User`](crate::domain::entities::user::User) entity itself —
+/// either derived from column presence (`password_hash IS NOT NULL`)
+/// or from a cross-table lookup (`auth.sessions.last_seen_at` for
+/// `is_online`). Companion to `User` on the list projection: the
+/// repo computes both, the application layer packs them into
+/// [`FullUserDto`](crate::application::dtos::user_dto::FullUserDto).
 ///
-/// The full [`User`] row intentionally carries all of those fields for account
+/// Not "admin-only" — every field ends up on `FullUserDto`, which
-/// detail and the system address book.  Reusing it for the paginated admin
+/// both admin AND self read. The name reflects "derived from the DB
-/// table made PostgreSQL detoast and transfer an avatar of up to 512 KiB per
+/// row, not intrinsic to the User entity".
-/// row, only for the handler to serialize it back to the browser where the
+///
-/// table never reads it.  Keeping the projection explicit prevents a future
+/// See `docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md` for the design; this type
-/// full-row field from silently returning to that hot path.
+/// replaced the earlier `UserListEntry` narrow projection as of P6.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
-pub struct UserListEntry {
+pub struct UserDerivedFlags {
-    pub id: Uuid,
-    pub username: Option<String>,
-    pub email: String,
-    pub role: UserRole,
-    pub storage_quota_bytes: i64,
-    pub storage_used_bytes: i64,
-    pub last_login_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
-    pub active: bool,
-    pub federation_kind: Option<String>,
-    pub federation_issuer: Option<String>,
-    pub is_external: bool,
-    /// TRUE when `auth.users.password_hash IS NOT NULL` — user has a
-    /// server-verifiable password on file (legacy or admin-set).
-    /// Distinct from `opaque_registered` (which is the zero-knowledge
-    /// envelope): a fully-migrated user carries BOTH — password for
-    /// the fallback / operator flows, envelope for the actual login.
-    /// A user with `has_password = false AND !opaque_registered AND
-    /// federation_issuer IS NULL` is passwordless — the only path in is
-    /// via magic-link (or, for externals, whatever grant they hold).
     pub has_password: bool,
-    /// TRUE when `auth.users.opaque_envelope IS NOT NULL` — the user
-    /// has completed OPAQUE registration (typically via the Phase 2
-    /// silent-migration hook after a successful legacy login). Surfaced
-    /// on the admin user table so operators can see rollout progress
-    /// per-user. Admin-only exposure — see `AdminUserSummaryDto`.
     pub opaque_registered: bool,
-    /// TRUE when `auth.users.opaque_migrated_at IS NOT NULL` — the
-    /// user has completed at least one successful OPAQUE login. Distinct
-    /// from `opaque_registered` because a user can have an envelope on
-    /// file without having actually logged in via OPAQUE yet (e.g.
-    /// admin cleared the envelope, silent-migration hasn't re-run).
     pub opaque_migrated: bool,
+    pub is_online: bool,
 }
 
 // Conversion from UserRepositoryError to DomainError
@@ -94,6 +70,20 @@ pub trait UserRepository: Send + Sync + 'static {
     /// Gets a user by ID
     async fn get_user_by_id(&self, id: Uuid) -> UserRepositoryResult<User>;
 
+    /// Fetch the full `User` entity + the [`UserDerivedFlags`] in a
+    /// single query. Used by `/api/auth/me` and future admin single-user
+    /// views — anywhere the caller needs both the row itself AND the
+    /// derived booleans (`has_password`, OPAQUE flags, `is_online`) to
+    /// build a [`FullUserDto`](crate::application::dtos::user_dto::FullUserDto)
+    /// or [`SelfUserDto`](crate::application::dtos::user_dto::SelfUserDto).
+    /// Single query is cheaper than `get_user_by_id` + separate lookups
+    /// for OPAQUE state + `is_online`; the EXISTS subquery is cheap
+    /// thanks to the partial index `idx_sessions_last_seen_at`.
+    async fn get_user_with_derived_flags(
+        &self,
+        id: Uuid,
+    ) -> UserRepositoryResult<(User, UserDerivedFlags)>;
+
     /// Batch-loads a set of users by id, preserving no particular order
     /// and silently skipping ids that don't match any row. Caller is
     /// responsible for de-duplicating the input vec. Returns an empty
@@ -152,15 +142,22 @@ pub trait UserRepository: Send + Sync + 'static {
         include_external: bool,
     ) -> UserRepositoryResult<Vec<User>>;
 
-    /// Lists the columns needed by compact user-management tables.  Unlike
+    /// Paginated admin user listing — full `User` entity + the derived
-    /// [`Self::list_users`], this never fetches password hashes, OIDC subjects,
+    /// booleans (`has_password`, OPAQUE flags, `is_online`) in one wide
-    /// avatars, names, locale state, or UI preferences.
+    /// SELECT. Called by the admin service to build
-    async fn list_user_summaries(
+    /// `Vec<FullUserDto>` for `/api/admin/users` without paying two
+    /// round-trips per row (once for User, once for derived flags).
+    ///
+    /// Same `include_external` semantics as [`Self::list_users`]:
+    /// admin management UI passes `true`; every other caller passes
+    /// `false` so external / grant-only users stay off internal-user
+    /// surfaces.
+    async fn list_users_with_derived_flags(
         &self,
         limit: i64,
         offset: i64,
         include_external: bool,
-    ) -> UserRepositoryResult<Vec<UserListEntry>>;
+    ) -> UserRepositoryResult<Vec<(User, UserDerivedFlags)>>;
 
     /// Searches users by username or email (SQL ILIKE) with a limit.
     /// See [`list_users`] for the meaning of `include_external`.

src/infrastructure/repositories/pg/user_pg_repository.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ use crate::application::ports::auth_ports::UserStoragePort;
 use crate::common::errors::DomainError;
 use crate::domain::entities::user::{User, UserFlags, UserRole};
 use crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::{
-    StorageStats, UserListEntry, UserRepository, UserRepositoryError, UserRepositoryResult,
+    StorageStats, UserRepository, UserRepositoryError, UserRepositoryResult,
 };
 use crate::infrastructure::repositories::pg::transaction_utils::with_transaction;
 
@@ -388,6 +388,90 @@ impl UserRepository for UserPgRepository {
         ))
     }
 
+    async fn get_user_with_derived_flags(
+        &self,
+        id: Uuid,
+    ) -> UserRepositoryResult<(
+        User,
+        crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserDerivedFlags,
+    )> {
+        // Same column set as `get_user_by_id` plus the three IS-NOT-NULL
+        // derivations for auth-capability flags AND the EXISTS scalar
+        // for `is_online`. The `interval` argument is bound as `$2`
+        // (seconds, `ONLINE_WINDOW.as_secs_f64()`) via
+        // `make_interval(secs => $2)` — same pattern as
+        // `session_liveness_gauges.rs`. Partial index
+        // `idx_sessions_last_seen_at WHERE revoked = FALSE` covers the
+        // EXISTS scan, so per-row cost is ~μs.
+        let row = sqlx::query(
+            r#"
+            SELECT
+                id, username, email, password_hash, role::text as role_text,
+                storage_quota_bytes, storage_used_bytes,
+                created_at, updated_at, last_login_at, active,
+                federation_kind, federation_issuer, federation_subject, image, is_external,
+                given_name, family_name, email_verified_at, preferred_locale, notify_on_share,
+                ui_preferences,
+                (password_hash IS NOT NULL)       AS has_password,
+                (opaque_envelope IS NOT NULL)     AS opaque_registered,
+                (opaque_migrated_at IS NOT NULL)  AS opaque_migrated,
+                EXISTS (
+                    SELECT 1 FROM auth.sessions s
+                     WHERE s.user_id = auth.users.id
+                       AND s.revoked = FALSE
+                       AND s.last_seen_at > NOW() - make_interval(secs => $2)
+                )                                 AS is_online
+            FROM auth.users
+            WHERE id = $1
+            "#,
+        )
+        .bind(id)
+        .bind(crate::application::dtos::session_dto::ONLINE_WINDOW.as_secs_f64())
+        .fetch_one(&*self.pool)
+        .await
+        .map_err(Self::map_sqlx_error)?;
+
+        let role_str: Option<String> = row.try_get("role_text").unwrap_or(None);
+        let role = match role_str.as_deref() {
+            Some("admin") => UserRole::Admin,
+            _ => UserRole::User,
+        };
+
+        let user = User::from_data_full(
+            row.get("id"),
+            row.get("username"),
+            row.get("email"),
+            row.get("password_hash"),
+            role,
+            row.get("storage_quota_bytes"),
+            row.get("storage_used_bytes"),
+            row.get("created_at"),
+            row.get("updated_at"),
+            row.get("last_login_at"),
+            row.get("active"),
+            row.get::<Option<String>, _>("federation_kind")
+                .as_deref()
+                .and_then(crate::domain::entities::user::FederationKind::parse),
+            row.get("federation_issuer"),
+            row.get("federation_subject"),
+            row.get("image"),
+            row.get("is_external"),
+            row.get("given_name"),
+            row.get("family_name"),
+            row.get("email_verified_at"),
+            row.get("preferred_locale"),
+            row.get("notify_on_share"),
+            row.get::<serde_json::Value, _>("ui_preferences"),
+        );
+        let flags = crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserDerivedFlags {
+            has_password: row.get("has_password"),
+            opaque_registered: row.get("opaque_registered"),
+            opaque_migrated: row.get("opaque_migrated"),
+            is_online: row.get("is_online"),
+        };
+        Ok((user, flags))
+    }
+
     /// Gets a user by username
     async fn get_user_by_username(&self, username: &str) -> UserRepositoryResult<User> {
         let row = sqlx::query(
@@ -835,51 +919,47 @@ impl UserRepository for UserPgRepository {
         Ok(users)
     }
 
-    async fn list_user_summaries(
+    async fn list_users_with_derived_flags(
         &self,
         limit: i64,
         offset: i64,
         include_external: bool,
-    ) -> UserRepositoryResult<Vec<UserListEntry>> {
+    ) -> UserRepositoryResult<
-        let rows = sqlx::query_as::<
+        Vec<(
-            _,
+            User,
-            (
+            crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserDerivedFlags,
-                Uuid,
+        )>,
-                Option<String>,
+    > {
-                String,
+        // Full `User` column set (matches `get_user_by_id`) + the four
-                String,
+        // derived booleans (IS-NOT-NULL for auth capability, EXISTS for
-                i64,
+        // `is_online`) in one SELECT. Same rationale as the single-user
-                i64,
+        // `get_user_with_derived_flags` variant. Widened over the older
-                Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
+        // `list_user_summaries` projection because the FE now consumes
-                bool,
+        // the full user profile from these rows (killing the per-row
-                Option<String>,
+        // `/api/users/{id}` fetch the admin table used to fire for
-                Option<String>,
+        // avatars — see docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md § N+1).
-                bool,
+        //
-                bool,
+        // `interval` bound as `$4` seconds
-                bool,
+        // (`ONLINE_WINDOW.as_secs_f64()`), same pattern as
-                bool,
+        // `session_liveness_gauges.rs` and `get_user_with_derived_flags`.
-            ),
+        let rows = sqlx::query(
-        >(
-            // Auth-credential columns projected as booleans via `IS NOT
-            // NULL` rather than as timestamps / hashes so the row-mapping
-            // tuple stays small and the wire shape is exactly what the
-            // admin table needs. Per-row scalar tests — no cost beyond
-            // the full-table sequential scan the LIMIT/OFFSET already
-            // pays. `has_password` on the password_hash column tells
-            // the admin table whether a server-verifiable password is
-            // on file; combined with the two OPAQUE flags and
-            // federation_kind / federation_issuer, the SPA derives the
-            // full "capability set" per user (password / OPAQUE / SSO /
-            // passwordless).
             r#"
             SELECT
-                id, username, email, role::text,
+                id, username, email, password_hash, role::text as role_text,
                 storage_quota_bytes, storage_used_bytes,
-                last_login_at, active,
+                created_at, updated_at, last_login_at, active,
-                federation_kind, federation_issuer, is_external,
+                federation_kind, federation_issuer, federation_subject, image, is_external,
-                (password_hash IS NOT NULL)       AS has_password,
+                given_name, family_name, email_verified_at, preferred_locale, notify_on_share,
+                ui_preferences,
+                (password_hash IS NOT NULL)       AS has_password_flag,
                 (opaque_envelope IS NOT NULL)     AS opaque_registered,
-                (opaque_migrated_at IS NOT NULL)  AS opaque_migrated
+                (opaque_migrated_at IS NOT NULL)  AS opaque_migrated,
+                EXISTS (
+                    SELECT 1 FROM auth.sessions s
+                     WHERE s.user_id = auth.users.id
+                       AND s.revoked = FALSE
+                       AND s.last_seen_at > NOW() - make_interval(secs => $4)
+                )                                 AS is_online
             FROM auth.users
             WHERE ($3 OR is_external = FALSE)
             ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC
@@ -889,49 +969,57 @@ impl UserRepository for UserPgRepository {
         .bind(limit)
         .bind(offset)
         .bind(include_external)
-        .fetch_all(self.pool.as_ref())
+        .bind(crate::application::dtos::session_dto::ONLINE_WINDOW.as_secs_f64())
+        .fetch_all(&*self.pool)
         .await
         .map_err(Self::map_sqlx_error)?;
 
+        // Note: the `has_password_flag` alias avoids colliding with the
+        // `password_hash` column selected above (the tuple destructure
+        // in `list_user_summaries` uses a shorter projection so it
+        // could reuse the raw `has_password` alias; here we keep both).
         Ok(rows
             .into_iter()
-            .map(
+            .map(|row| {
-                |(
+                let role_str: Option<String> = row.try_get("role_text").unwrap_or(None);
-                    id,
+                let role = match role_str.as_deref() {
-                    username,
+                    Some("admin") => UserRole::Admin,
-                    email,
+                    _ => UserRole::User,
+                };
+                let user = User::from_data_full(
+                    row.get("id"),
+                    row.get("username"),
+                    row.get("email"),
+                    row.get("password_hash"),
                     role,
-                    storage_quota_bytes,
+                    row.get("storage_quota_bytes"),
-                    storage_used_bytes,
+                    row.get("storage_used_bytes"),
-                    last_login_at,
+                    row.get("created_at"),
-                    active,
+                    row.get("updated_at"),
-                    federation_kind,
+                    row.get("last_login_at"),
-                    federation_issuer,
+                    row.get("active"),
-                    is_external,
+                    row.get::<Option<String>, _>("federation_kind")
-                    has_password,
+                        .as_deref()
-                    opaque_registered,
+                        .and_then(crate::domain::entities::user::FederationKind::parse),
-                    opaque_migrated,
+                    row.get("federation_issuer"),
-                )| UserListEntry {
+                    row.get("federation_subject"),
-                    id,
+                    row.get("image"),
-                    username,
+                    row.get("is_external"),
-                    email,
+                    row.get("given_name"),
-                    role: if role == "admin" {
+                    row.get("family_name"),
-                        UserRole::Admin
+                    row.get("email_verified_at"),
-                    } else {
+                    row.get("preferred_locale"),
-                        UserRole::User
+                    row.get("notify_on_share"),
-                    },
+                    row.get::<serde_json::Value, _>("ui_preferences"),
-                    storage_quota_bytes,
+                );
-                    storage_used_bytes,
+                let flags = crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserDerivedFlags {
-                    last_login_at,
+                    has_password: row.get("has_password_flag"),
-                    active,
+                    opaque_registered: row.get("opaque_registered"),
-                    federation_kind,
+                    opaque_migrated: row.get("opaque_migrated"),
-                    federation_issuer,
+                    is_online: row.get("is_online"),
-                    is_external,
+                };
-                    has_password,
+                (user, flags)
-                    opaque_registered,
+            })
-                    opaque_migrated,
-                },
-            )
             .collect())
     }
 
@@ -1302,6 +1390,21 @@ impl UserStoragePort for UserPgRepository {
             .map_err(DomainError::from)
     }
 
+    async fn get_user_with_derived_flags(
+        &self,
+        id: Uuid,
+    ) -> Result<
+        (
+            User,
+            crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserDerivedFlags,
+        ),
+        DomainError,
+    > {
+        UserRepository::get_user_with_derived_flags(self, id)
+            .await
+            .map_err(DomainError::from)
+    }
+
     async fn get_users_by_ids(&self, ids: Vec<Uuid>) -> Result<Vec<User>, DomainError> {
         UserRepository::get_users_by_ids(self, ids)
             .await
@@ -1356,13 +1459,19 @@ impl UserStoragePort for UserPgRepository {
             .map_err(DomainError::from)
     }
 
-    async fn list_user_summaries(
+    async fn list_users_with_derived_flags(
         &self,
         limit: i64,
         offset: i64,
         include_external: bool,
-    ) -> Result<Vec<UserListEntry>, DomainError> {
+    ) -> Result<
-        UserRepository::list_user_summaries(self, limit, offset, include_external)
+        Vec<(
+            User,
+            crate::domain::repositories::user_repository::UserDerivedFlags,
+        )>,
+        DomainError,
+    > {
+        UserRepository::list_users_with_derived_flags(self, limit, offset, include_external)
             .await
             .map_err(DomainError::from)
     }
@@ -1743,26 +1852,27 @@ mod integration_tests {
         )
         .await;
 
-        let page = UserRepository::list_user_summaries(&repo, 3, 0, true)
+        // Migrated from the (now-deleted) `list_user_summaries` +
+        // `UserListEntry` to `list_users_with_derived_flags`, which
+        // returns `Vec<(User, UserDerivedFlags)>`. Field checks read
+        // through the `User` accessors instead of struct-field access.
+        let page = UserRepository::list_users_with_derived_flags(&repo, 3, 0, true)
             .await
             .expect("compact projection query must decode");
-        assert_eq!(page.iter().map(|entry| entry.id).collect::<Vec<_>>(), ids);
+        assert_eq!(page.iter().map(|(u, _)| u.id()).collect::<Vec<_>>(), ids);
-        assert_eq!(page[0].username.as_deref(), Some(username_a.as_str()));
+        assert_eq!(page[0].0.username(), Some(username_a.as_str()));
-        assert_eq!(page[0].role, UserRole::Admin);
+        assert_eq!(page[0].0.role(), UserRole::Admin);
-        assert_eq!(page[0].storage_quota_bytes, 10_737_418_240);
+        assert_eq!(page[0].0.storage_quota_bytes(), 10_737_418_240);
-        assert_eq!(page[1].username, None);
+        assert_eq!(page[1].0.username(), None);
-        assert!(page[1].is_external);
+        assert!(page[1].0.is_external());
-        assert_eq!(
+        assert_eq!(page[1].0.federation_issuer(), Some("integration-idp"));
-            page[1].federation_issuer.as_deref(),
-            Some("integration-idp")
-        );
 
-        let internal = UserRepository::list_user_summaries(&repo, 10, 0, false)
+        let internal = UserRepository::list_users_with_derived_flags(&repo, 10, 0, false)
             .await
             .expect("internal compact projection query must decode");
-        assert!(internal.iter().any(|entry| entry.id == ids[0]));
+        assert!(internal.iter().any(|(u, _)| u.id() == ids[0]));
-        assert!(internal.iter().any(|entry| entry.id == ids[2]));
+        assert!(internal.iter().any(|(u, _)| u.id() == ids[2]));
-        assert!(!internal.iter().any(|entry| entry.id == ids[1]));
+        assert!(!internal.iter().any(|(u, _)| u.id() == ids[1]));
 
         sqlx::query("DELETE FROM auth.users WHERE id = ANY($1)")
             .bind(ids.as_slice())

src/interfaces/api/handlers/admin_handler.rs

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ use crate::application::dtos::settings_dto::{
     TestOidcConnectionDto, TestStorageConnectionDto, UpdateUserActiveDto, UpdateUserQuotaDto,
     UpdateUserRoleDto,
 };
-use crate::application::dtos::user_dto::{AdminUserSummaryDto, UserDto};
+use crate::application::dtos::user_dto::{FullUserDto, PublicUserDto};
 use crate::application::ports::authorization_ports::AuthorizationEngine;
 use crate::application::ports::plugin_ports::{LogQuery, PluginManagementPort, PluginMgmtError};
 // JobStoreProvider is used only by the storage-migration shims below,
@@ -39,16 +39,14 @@ use crate::interfaces::middleware::auth::AuthUser;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
-#[derive(serde::Serialize)]
+/// Response envelope for `GET /api/admin/users`. `users` is always
-#[serde(untagged)]
+/// `Vec<FullUserDto>` — same shape one row of `/me`'s embedded
-enum AdminUsersPayload {
+/// `full` block carries; the FE seeds `resolveUser` cache from
-    Full(Vec<UserDto>),
+/// `row.user` (kills the per-row `/api/users/{id}` fetch). See
-    Summary(Vec<AdminUserSummaryDto>),
+/// `docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md`.
-}
-
 #[derive(serde::Serialize)]
 struct AdminUsersPageResponse {
-    users: AdminUsersPayload,
+    users: Vec<FullUserDto>,
     total: i64,
     limit: i64,
     offset: i64,
@@ -931,6 +929,51 @@ pub async fn get_dashboard_stats(
     .await
     .map_err(|e| AppError::internal_error(format!("Database query failed: {}", e)))?;
 
+    // External account count — distinct query (not FILTERed into
+    // `stats_row` above) because `stats_row` scopes to
+    // `is_external = false` for the operational-seat counts.
+    // Externals form their own population; the dashboard renders them
+    // as a separate stat card in the "User accounts" section.
+    let external_users: i64 =
+        sqlx::query_scalar(r#"SELECT COUNT(*)::INT8 FROM auth.users WHERE is_external = true"#)
+            .fetch_one(db_pool.as_ref())
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| AppError::internal_error(format!("External user count failed: {}", e)))?;
+
+    // Live-activity counts — projection over auth.sessions, same
+    // `ONLINE_WINDOW` (5 min) the Prometheus gauges use so the
+    // dashboard number, admin-table green dot, and
+    // `oxicloud_sessions_online` scrape all agree by construction.
+    // Bound as `$1 = window_secs` via `make_interval(secs => $1)`
+    // to keep the single-source-of-truth pattern (no SQL literal
+    // for the window). Both queries hit the partial index
+    // `idx_sessions_last_seen_at WHERE revoked = FALSE` so per-run
+    // cost is ~μs even at tens of thousands of session rows.
+    let online_window_secs: f64 =
+        crate::application::dtos::session_dto::ONLINE_WINDOW.as_secs_f64();
+    let online_sessions: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
+        r#"
+        SELECT COUNT(*)::INT8 FROM auth.sessions
+        WHERE revoked = FALSE
+          AND last_seen_at > NOW() - make_interval(secs => $1)
+        "#,
+    )
+    .bind(online_window_secs)
+    .fetch_one(db_pool.as_ref())
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| AppError::internal_error(format!("Online session count failed: {}", e)))?;
+    let online_users: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
+        r#"
+        SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT user_id)::INT8 FROM auth.sessions
+        WHERE revoked = FALSE
+          AND last_seen_at > NOW() - make_interval(secs => $1)
+        "#,
+    )
+    .bind(online_window_secs)
+    .fetch_one(db_pool.as_ref())
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| AppError::internal_error(format!("Online user count failed: {}", e)))?;
+
     use sqlx::Row;
 
     // Per-drive-kind quota panel:
@@ -1015,6 +1058,9 @@ pub async fn get_dashboard_stats(
         total_users: stats_row.get("total_users"),
         active_users: stats_row.get("active_users"),
         admin_users: stats_row.get("admin_users"),
+        external_users,
+        online_users,
+        online_sessions,
         drive_usage,
         users_over_80_percent: stats_row.get("users_over_80"),
         users_over_quota: stats_row.get("users_over_quota"),
@@ -1037,13 +1083,20 @@ pub async fn get_dashboard_stats(
 // ============================================================================
 
 /// GET /api/admin/users?limit=50&offset=0 — list all users
+///
+/// Always returns `Vec<FullUserDto>` — the shape one row of the
+/// `/me` response's embedded `full` block carries. The former
+/// `?summary` toggle (flat `PublicUserDto` vs nested `FullUserDto`)
+/// has been retired: admin listing is low-volume and the FE always
+/// asked for the nested shape anyway, so the two-shape split served
+/// no caller and only invited jq-path bugs. See
+/// `docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md`.
 #[utoipa::path(
     get,
     path = "/api/admin/users",
     params(
         ("limit" = Option<i64>, Query, description = "Max users to return (default 100, max 500)"),
-        ("offset" = Option<i64>, Query, description = "Pagination offset"),
+        ("offset" = Option<i64>, Query, description = "Pagination offset")
-        ("summary" = Option<bool>, Query, description = "Return the compact management-table projection")
     ),
     responses(
         (status = 200, description = "List of users"),
@@ -1071,9 +1124,8 @@ pub async fn list_users(
     // internal-only variant is used by system address book / sharee
     // search, where surfacing externals would leak identities. See
     // `auth_application_service::list_users` doc for the split.
-    let users = if query.summary.unwrap_or(false) {
+    let users = auth
-        AdminUsersPayload::Summary(
+        .auth_application_service
-            auth.auth_application_service
         .list_user_summaries_including_external_with_perms(
             state.authorization.as_ref(),
             auth_user.id,
@@ -1081,21 +1133,7 @@ pub async fn list_users(
             offset,
         )
         .await
-                .map_err(AppError::from)?,
+        .map_err(AppError::from)?;
-        )
-    } else {
-        AdminUsersPayload::Full(
-            auth.auth_application_service
-                .list_users_including_external_with_perms(
-                    state.authorization.as_ref(),
-                    auth_user.id,
-                    limit,
-                    offset,
-                )
-                .await
-                .map_err(AppError::from)?,
-        )
-    };
 
     let total = auth
         .auth_application_service
@@ -1562,7 +1600,7 @@ pub async fn reset_user_password(
     path = "/api/admin/users/{id}/promote-to-internal",
     params(("id" = String, Path, description = "Target user id")),
     responses(
-        (status = 200, description = "User promoted", body = UserDto),
+        (status = 200, description = "User promoted", body = PublicUserDto),
         (status = 400, description = "Magic-link login is disabled on this deployment"),
         (status = 401, description = "Unauthorized"),
         (status = 403, description = "Admin required (or target is OIDC-linked)"),

src/interfaces/api/handlers/app_password_handler.rs

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ async fn create_app_password(
     }
 
     // Require a claimed username. NextCloud Basic Auth resolves users by
-    // username; an app password is unusable without one. UserDto carries
+    // username; an app password is unusable without one. PublicUserDto carries
     // an empty string when the underlying `users.username` is NULL — the
     // entity rejects empty strings on construction, so empty here is an
     // unambiguous signal that the column is NULL.

src/interfaces/api/handlers/auth_handler.rs

@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
 
 use crate::application::dtos::user_dto::{
     AuthResponseDto, ChangePasswordDto, LoginDto, OidcCallbackQueryDto, OidcExchangeDto,
-    OidcProviderInfoDto, RefreshTokenDto, RegisterDto, SetupAdminDto, UpgradeToInternalDto,
+    OidcProviderInfoDto, PublicUserDto, RefreshTokenDto, RegisterDto, SelfUserDto, SetupAdminDto,
-    UserDto,
+    UpgradeToInternalDto,
 };
 use crate::application::services::auth_application_service::{OidcCallbackResult, RegisterResult};
 use crate::common::di::AppState;
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ pub fn setup_route() -> Router<Arc<AppState>> {
 ///   the `audit` channel as `auth.register` with `reason` one of
 ///   `created`, `email_taken`, `username_taken`.
 /// - **SMTP not configured**: there is no welcome-mail cover story, so
-///   the classic `201 + UserDto` on success and `409` on collision
+///   the classic `201 + PublicUserDto` on success and `409` on collision
 ///   apply. Anti-enumeration would just be misleading UX (telling the
 ///   user to check an email that will never arrive). Email-only
 ///   signup is **503** in this mode because the user would otherwise
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pub fn setup_route() -> Router<Arc<AppState>> {
     request_body = RegisterDto,
     responses(
         (status = 200, description = "Uniform registration response (SMTP configured, anti-enumeration mode)"),
-        (status = 201, description = "User registered successfully (SMTP not configured)", body = UserDto),
+        (status = 201, description = "User registered successfully (SMTP not configured)", body = PublicUserDto),
         (status = 400, description = "Validation error (malformed request body)"),
         (status = 403, description = "Registration disabled (admin setting or OIDC-only mode)"),
         (status = 409, description = "Username or email already taken (SMTP not configured)"),
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ pub async fn register(
                 }
                 Ok(resp)
             } else {
-                // Classic mode: clear 201 + UserDto so the frontend can
+                // Classic mode: clear 201 + PublicUserDto so the frontend can
                 // log the user in directly with the password they just
                 // submitted. Unbox the DTO for the JSON serialisation.
                 Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(*user)).into_response())
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ pub async fn refresh_token(
     get,
     path = "/api/auth/me",
     responses(
-        (status = 200, description = "Current user profile", body = UserDto),
+        (status = 200, description = "Current user profile", body = SelfUserDto),
         (status = 401, description = "Not authenticated"),
     ),
     security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
@@ -652,37 +652,21 @@ pub async fn get_current_user(
     // Semantics (`docs/plan/drive.md` §7): `storage_used_bytes` is the SUM
     // of `used_bytes` across the user's personal drives only. Shared drives
     // never count against this envelope — collaborating in a team drive
-    // costs no personal bytes. The matching cap is
+    // costs no personal bytes.
-    // `storage_quota_bytes` (admin-only mutation).
+    //
-    let mut user = auth_service
+    // Delegate to the shared `build_self_user_dto_for_id` — same code
+    // path `PATCH /me/profile` and `POST /upgrade-to-internal` use so
+    // all three self endpoints ship byte-for-byte identical shapes.
+    // The DPoP-bound signal comes from the JWT `cnf.jkt` claim
+    // (surfaced by the auth middleware into `AuthUser.dpop_jkt`);
+    // when present the session that minted this JWT is bound and
+    // the SPA can skip a redundant `/dpop/bind` call.
+    let self_dto = auth_service
         .auth_application_service
-        .get_user_by_id(user_id)
+        .build_self_user_dto_for_id(user_id, auth_user.dpop_jkt.is_some())
         .await?;
 
-    // Overlay the cached `force_password_change` flag (see UserFlags).
+    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(self_dto)))
-    // `From<User>` defaults to false; the SPA reads this field on
-    // startup to decide whether to enter mandatory change-password
-    // mode. Using the cached path (`get_user_flags` → `user_flags_cache`)
-    // avoids a second DB round-trip on this hot endpoint.
-    if let Ok(flags) = auth_service
-        .auth_application_service
-        .get_user_flags(user_id)
-        .await
-    {
-        user.force_password_change = flags.force_password_change;
-    }
-
-    // Session-binding state — read from the JWT `cnf.jkt` claim
-    // (surfaced by the auth middleware into `CurrentUser.dpop_jkt`).
-    // Present ⇒ the session that minted this JWT was bound; absent ⇒
-    // the session is unbound and the SPA should call `/dpop/bind`
-    // to attach the browser's keypair (OIDC / magic-link redirect
-    // flow). Skips an otherwise-redundant `POST /dpop/bind` on every
-    // page load which would return 409 `already_bound` and litter
-    // the audit stream.
-    user.is_dpop_bound = auth_user.dpop_jkt.is_some();
-
-    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(user)))
 }
 
 /// DTO for updating the user's profile image.
@@ -837,14 +821,16 @@ pub async fn change_password(
 /// self-registration policy. Refused with 403
 /// `error_type = "RegistrationDomainNotAllowed"`.
 ///
-/// Response: the updated `UserDto` (post-upgrade view — `is_external`
+/// Response: the updated `SelfUserDto` (same shape as `GET /me`) so the SPA
-/// is false, `storage_quota_bytes` is set).
+/// absorbs the post-upgrade state — new `storage_quota_bytes`,
+/// `is_external = false`, updated OPAQUE / auth capability flags — in one
+/// round trip without a follow-up `/me` fetch.
 #[utoipa::path(
     post,
     path = "/api/auth/upgrade-to-internal",
     request_body = UpgradeToInternalDto,
     responses(
-        (status = 200, description = "Upgrade succeeded", body = UserDto),
+        (status = 200, description = "Upgrade succeeded — returns SelfUserDto (same shape as GET /me)", body = SelfUserDto),
         (status = 400, description = "Password missing / too short"),
         (status = 401, description = "Not authenticated"),
         (status = 403, description = "OIDC user, or domain not in allowlist"),
@@ -855,9 +841,10 @@ pub async fn change_password(
 )]
 pub async fn upgrade_to_internal(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    CurrentUserId(user_id): CurrentUserId,
+    auth_user: AuthUser,
     Json(dto): Json<UpgradeToInternalDto>,
 ) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, AppError> {
+    let user_id = auth_user.id;
     let auth_service = state
         .auth_service
         .as_ref()
@@ -905,7 +892,11 @@ pub async fn upgrade_to_internal(
         }
     }
 
-    let updated = auth_service
+    // Apply the upgrade. Service returns the updated `PublicUserDto`;
+    // we discard it and rebuild the full self view via the shared
+    // `build_self_user_dto_for_id` helper so the wire shape matches
+    // `GET /me` and `PATCH /me/profile` byte-for-byte.
+    let _ = auth_service
         .auth_application_service
         .upgrade_to_internal(user_id, dto)
         .await
@@ -924,7 +915,11 @@ pub async fn upgrade_to_internal(
             _ => AppError::from(err),
         })?;
 
-    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(updated)))
+    let self_dto = auth_service
+        .auth_application_service
+        .build_self_user_dto_for_id(user_id, auth_user.dpop_jkt.is_some())
+        .await?;
+    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(self_dto)))
 }
 
 /// Update the caller's profile (PR 24).
@@ -942,7 +937,7 @@ pub async fn upgrade_to_internal(
     path = "/api/auth/me/profile",
     request_body = crate::application::dtos::user_dto::UpdateProfileDto,
     responses(
-        (status = 200, description = "Updated profile (UserDto)", body = UserDto),
+        (status = 200, description = "Updated profile (SelfUserDto) — same shape as GET /me so the SPA sees the just-written state without a follow-up fetch", body = SelfUserDto),
         (status = 400, description = "Validation error (e.g. invalid handle format, empty given_name)"),
         (status = 401, description = "Not authenticated"),
         (status = 403, description = "OIDC-managed profile — edit at the IdP"),
@@ -953,20 +948,39 @@ pub async fn upgrade_to_internal(
 )]
 pub async fn update_profile(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
-    CurrentUserId(user_id): CurrentUserId,
+    auth_user: AuthUser,
     Json(dto): Json<crate::application::dtos::user_dto::UpdateProfileDto>,
 ) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, AppError> {
+    let user_id = auth_user.id;
     let auth_service = state
         .auth_service
         .as_ref()
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::internal_error("Authentication service not configured"))?;
 
-    let updated = auth_service
+    // Apply the patch. The service returns the updated `PublicUserDto`
+    // internally; we discard it and re-fetch the full self view below
+    // so the response matches `GET /me`'s `SelfUserDto` shape.
+    //
+    // Why SelfUserDto instead of PublicUserDto: a self-write endpoint
+    // whose response mirrors GET /me lets the SPA update its session
+    // store in one round trip. Returning a slim PublicUserDto would
+    // force the SPA to follow up with GET /me anyway to observe the
+    // just-written `ui_preferences` / `notify_on_share` / etc — those
+    // fields live on SelfUserDto only, not on the public identity
+    // slice. Same shape for both endpoints avoids "quiet lie" reads
+    // where a client PATCHes and then reads a stale local value.
+    let _ = auth_service
         .auth_application_service
         .update_profile_with_perms(user_id, dto, &state.locale_registry)
         .await?;
 
-    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(updated)))
+    // Rebuild via the shared helper so the wire shape matches
+    // `GET /me` and `POST /upgrade-to-internal` byte-for-byte.
+    let self_dto = auth_service
+        .auth_application_service
+        .build_self_user_dto_for_id(user_id, auth_user.dpop_jkt.is_some())
+        .await?;
+    Ok((StatusCode::OK, Json(self_dto)))
 }
 
 // TODO: add utoipa
@@ -1226,7 +1240,7 @@ pub struct BackchannelLogoutForm {
     path = "/api/setup",
     request_body = SetupAdminDto,
     responses(
-        (status = 201, description = "First admin created and system initialized", body = UserDto),
+        (status = 201, description = "First admin created and system initialized", body = PublicUserDto),
         (status = 403, description = "System already initialized"),
         (status = 503, description = "Auth service not configured"),
     ),
@@ -1820,10 +1834,12 @@ pub async fn oidc_exchange(
     tracing::info!(
         "OIDC token exchange successful for user: {}",
         auth_response
+            .user
+            .full
             .user
             .username
             .as_deref()
-            .unwrap_or(&auth_response.user.email)
+            .unwrap_or(&auth_response.user.full.user.email)
     );
 
     // Set HttpOnly cookies for the browser

src/interfaces/api/handlers/contacts_handler.rs

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ use crate::application::dtos::contact_dto::{
     AddressDto, ContactDto, ContactGroupDto, CreateContactDto, CreateContactGroupDto, EmailDto,
     GroupMembershipDto, PhoneDto, UpdateContactDto, UpdateContactGroupDto,
 };
-use crate::application::dtos::user_dto::UserDto;
+use crate::application::dtos::user_dto::PublicUserDto;
 use crate::application::ports::carddav_ports::{AddressBookUseCase, ContactUseCase};
 use crate::application::services::auth_application_service::AuthApplicationService;
 use crate::application::services::contact_service::ContactService;
@@ -185,14 +185,14 @@ fn if_match_passes(if_match: Option<&str>, stored_etag: &str) -> bool {
     }
 }
 
-/// Map a `UserDto` to a `ContactDto` so OxiCloud users appear as contacts
+/// Map a `PublicUserDto` to a `ContactDto` so OxiCloud users appear as contacts
 /// inside the virtual system address book.
 ///
 /// `given_name`/`family_name` come from OIDC standard claims at JIT
 /// provisioning (or NULL for password-only or pre-OIDC users). When
 /// they're present, prefer a "First Last" full name; otherwise fall
 /// back to the username (which is always present).
-fn user_to_contact(user: UserDto) -> ContactDto {
+fn user_to_contact(user: PublicUserDto) -> ContactDto {
     // Display fallback chain: given+family name → username → email.
     // Username is `Option<String>` post PR 16; externals start with None.
     let full_name = match (user.given_name.as_deref(), user.family_name.as_deref()) {
@@ -222,8 +222,19 @@ fn user_to_contact(user: UserDto) -> ContactDto {
         photo_url: user.image.clone(),
         birthday: None,
         anniversary: None,
-        created_at: user.created_at,
+        // System-book contacts are VIRTUAL projections of the user
-        updated_at: user.updated_at,
+        // directory — they have no independent creation history. Stamp
+        // both timestamps with `Utc::now()` so the ContactDto shape is
+        // satisfied; CardDAV clients ETag on the vCard content (see
+        // `etag` below, keyed on the stable user id), not on these
+        // wrapper timestamps.
+        //
+        // Previously read `user.created_at` / `user.updated_at` from the
+        // fat `UserDto`; those fields moved to `FullUserDto` under the
+        // three-layer refactor (docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md) and are
+        // not exposed on the slim `PublicUserDto` this function receives.
+        created_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
+        updated_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
         etag: user.id,
     }
 }

src/interfaces/api/handlers/magic_link_handler.rs

@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ fn redirect_target(redemption: &MagicLinkRedemption) -> String {
         (Some(MagicLinkResourceKind::Folder), Some(folder_id)) => {
             format!("/files/{}", folder_id)
         }
-        _ if redemption.auth.user.is_external => "/shared-with-me".to_string(),
+        _ if redemption.auth.user.full.user.is_external => "/shared-with-me".to_string(),
         _ => "/files".to_string(),
     }
 }

src/interfaces/api/handlers/users_handler.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //! User-profile lookup for the frontend.
 //!
-//! `GET /api/users/{id}` returns a [`UserDto`] for the target user iff
+//! `GET /api/users/{id}` returns a [`PublicUserDto`] for the target user iff
 //! the authenticated caller has a legitimate relationship with them.
 //! The visibility rule lives in
 //! [`AuthApplicationService::get_user_profile`] — handlers never embed

src/interfaces/api/mod.rs

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ use crate::application::dtos::trash_dto::{
 };
 use crate::application::dtos::user_dto::{
     AuthResponseDto, ChangePasswordDto, LoginDto, OidcExchangeDto, OidcProviderInfoDto,
-    RefreshTokenDto, RegisterDto, SetupAdminDto, UserDto,
+    PublicUserDto, RefreshTokenDto, RegisterDto, SetupAdminDto,
 };
 use crate::application::ports::chunked_upload_ports::{
     ChunkUploadResponseDto, CreateUploadResponseDto, UploadStatusResponseDto,
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ use crate::interfaces::api::handlers::file_handler::MoveFilePayload;
             PaginationDto,
             PaginationRequestDto,
             // User / Auth schemas
-            UserDto,
+            PublicUserDto,
             LoginDto,
             RegisterDto,
             SetupAdminDto,
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ mod tests {
             "FolderDto",
             "ShareDto",
             "TrashedItemDto",
-            "UserDto",
+            "PublicUserDto",
         ] {
             assert!(schemas.contains_key(name), "missing schema: {name}");
         }

src/interfaces/nextcloud/ocs_handler.rs

@@ -191,7 +191,15 @@ async fn user_provisioning_response(
         return Json(ocs_err(997, "Database pool not available")).into_response();
     };
 
-    let user_dto = match auth_service
+    // Two-step lookup: (1) `get_user_profile_by_username_with_perms`
+    // gates access via the same visibility engine the REST endpoint
+    // uses; (2) if visibility passes, `get_user_with_derived_flags`
+    // hydrates the OCS-specific fields (federation_kind / last_login_at
+    // / active) that live on `FullUserDto` but not on the slim
+    // `PublicUserDto` returned by the visibility gate. Second call is
+    // ~1 DB round-trip on the maintenance pool; NC OCS provisioning is
+    // not on any hot inner loop.
+    let public = match auth_service
         .get_user_profile_by_username_with_perms(
             user.id,
             &userid,
@@ -205,9 +213,27 @@ async fn user_provisioning_response(
             return Json(ocs_err(404, "User not found")).into_response();
         }
     };
+    let target_id = match uuid::Uuid::parse_str(&public.id) {
+        Ok(u) => u,
+        Err(_) => {
+            // Should be unreachable — PublicUserDto.id is always the
+            // serialised form of a Uuid. Fail closed if this invariant
+            // is ever violated.
+            return Json(ocs_err(500, "Malformed user id")).into_response();
+        }
+    };
+    let user_dto = match auth_service.get_user_with_derived_flags(target_id).await {
+        Ok((user, flags)) => crate::application::dtos::user_dto::FullUserDto::build(user, flags),
+        Err(_) => {
+            // Visibility already passed above; a miss here would mean
+            // the user was deleted between the two round-trips. Fall
+            // back to the 404 shape (anti-enum invariant still holds).
+            return Json(ocs_err(404, "User not found")).into_response();
+        }
+    };
 
     // Determine groups based on role
-    let groups = if user_dto.role == "admin" {
+    let groups = if user_dto.user.role == "admin" {
         vec!["admin", "users"]
     } else {
         vec!["users"]
@@ -235,7 +261,7 @@ async fn user_provisioning_response(
     // Fetch quota from storage usage service
     let quota: (i64, i64) = match state.storage_usage_service.as_ref() {
         Some(service) => match service
-            .get_user_storage_info(uuid::Uuid::parse_str(&user_dto.id).unwrap_or_default())
+            .get_user_storage_info(uuid::Uuid::parse_str(&user_dto.user.id).unwrap_or_default())
             .await
         {
             Ok((used, total)) => (used, total),
@@ -256,10 +282,10 @@ async fn user_provisioning_response(
             "meta": { "status": "ok", "statuscode": statuscode, "message": "OK" },
             "data": {
                 "enabled": user_dto.active,
-                "id": user_dto.username,
+                "id": user_dto.user.username,
-                "display-name": user_dto.username,
+                "display-name": user_dto.user.username,
-                "displayname": user_dto.username,
+                "displayname": user_dto.user.username,
-                "email": user_dto.email,
+                "email": user_dto.user.email,
                 "phone": "",
                 "address": "",
                 "website": "",

tests/api/admin_user_ops.hurl

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-charlie_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+charlie_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{charlie_token_v1}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.storage_quota_bytes" == 209715200
+jsonpath "$.full.storage_quota_bytes" == 209715200
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{charlie_token_v1}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.role" == "admin"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.role" == "admin"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/auth_login.hurl

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
 jsonpath "$.access_token" exists
-jsonpath "$.user.email" == "{{email}}"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.email" == "{{email}}"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
 jsonpath "$.access_token" exists
-jsonpath "$.user.email" == "{{email}}"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.email" == "{{email}}"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/auth_magic_link_login.hurl

@@ -142,10 +142,10 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{alice_magic_access_token}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.email" == "{{email}}"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.email" == "{{email}}"
-jsonpath "$.username" == "{{username}}"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" == "{{username}}"
 [Captures]
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/auth_session_lifecycle.hurl

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{access_v2}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.username" == "{{username}}"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" == "{{username}}"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/auth_upgrade_to_internal.hurl

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{bob_token}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.is_external" == true
+jsonpath "$.full.user.is_external" == true
-jsonpath "$.storage_quota_bytes" == 0
+jsonpath "$.full.storage_quota_bytes" == 0
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -88,8 +88,8 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.is_external" == false
+jsonpath "$.full.user.is_external" == false
-jsonpath "$.storage_quota_bytes" > 0
+jsonpath "$.full.storage_quota_bytes" > 0
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{bob_token}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.is_external" == false
+jsonpath "$.full.user.is_external" == false
-jsonpath "$.storage_quota_bytes" > 0
+jsonpath "$.full.storage_quota_bytes" > 0
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-carol_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+carol_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
 Content-Type: application/json
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{carol_token}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.is_external" == true
+jsonpath "$.full.user.is_external" == true
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/calendar.hurl

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 alice_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 bob_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/contacts.hurl

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 [Asserts]
 jsonpath "$.access_token" isString
 jsonpath "$.token_type" == "Bearer"
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 bob_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # Step 17 — Bob's book listing does NOT include Alice's book.

tests/api/cross_drive_copy.hurl

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 owner_token:   jsonpath "$.access_token"
-owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/cross_drive_move.hurl

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 owner_token:   jsonpath "$.access_token"
-owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/dav_error_mapping.hurl

@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP *
 [Captures]
-alice_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+alice_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login

tests/api/default_caldav_carddav.hurl

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP *
 [Captures]
-fresh_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+fresh_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/drive_policies.hurl

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 owner_token:   jsonpath "$.access_token"
-owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # Provision `dp_intruder` — a second internal user used only to
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 intruder_token:   jsonpath "$.access_token"
-intruder_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+intruder_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/drive_quota.hurl

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 owner_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/drive_read_only.hurl

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 owner_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
-target_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+target_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/drives_foundation.hurl

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 admin_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
 Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 # Alice's first login fires `PersonalDriveLifecycleHook::on_user_login`

tests/api/drives_membership.hurl

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 admin_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
 Content-Type: application/json
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
 Content-Type: application/json
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-carol_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+carol_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 # 24a — Owner grants Carol Owner role (Owner-creates-Owner).
@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-dave_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+dave_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
 Content-Type: application/json

tests/api/external_users.hurl

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 alice_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 GET {{base_url}}/api/folders
 Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
@@ -226,13 +226,16 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{bob_access_token}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
+# `/api/users/{id}` returns the slim `PublicUserDto` (9 fields) —
+# id / email / username / role / image / is_external / given_name /
+# family_name / is_online. Admin-visible fields like
+# `email_verified_at` moved to `FullUserDto` under the three-layer
+# refactor (docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md) and are checked below
+# via `/api/admin/users`.
 jsonpath "$.id" == "{{bob_user_id}}"
 jsonpath "$.is_external" == true
 jsonpath "$.email" == "bob@externalcompany.com"
 jsonpath "$.username" not exists
-# PR 23 — bob redeemed his invitation magic-link in Step 8, so his
-# email_verified_at was stamped at that time and stays set.
-jsonpath "$.email_verified_at" exists
 
 # 11d — bob CAN look up Alice (his granter) — shared-grant relationship
 #        lets the external recipient resolve the sharer's display name +
@@ -244,14 +247,37 @@ HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
 jsonpath "$.id" == "{{alice_user_id}}"
 jsonpath "$.is_external" == false
-# Setup admin is auto-verified at creation. `setup_create_admin` stamps
+
+# 11c/d/verify — admin (alice) observes email_verified_at on both
+# users via `GET /api/admin/users/{id}` — returns `FullUserDto`
+# (public identity in `.user` + admin-visible extras at top level).
+#
+# `email_verified_at` lives on `FullUserDto` (admin+self-visible),
+# not on `PublicUserDto` — peer views via `/api/users/{id}` never
+# expose it. The admin single-user endpoint is the correct
+# observation surface. See `docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md` for the
+# three-layer split.
+#
+# Setup admin auto-verified rationale: `setup_create_admin` stamps
 # `email_verified_at = NOW()` — admin fiat counts as verification,
-# matching the OIDC-JIT convention. Rationale: an operator running the
+# matching the OIDC-JIT convention. An operator running the first-run
-# first-run wizard is authoritative by construction (they set the
+# wizard is authoritative by construction. Without this, flipping
-# password at the console on a fresh install). Without this, flipping
 # `OXICLOUD_REQUIRE_VERIFIED_EMAIL=true` on an existing deployment
-# would lock the sole admin out of their own instance. The admin login
+# would lock the sole admin out of their own instance.
-# exemption is a second layer of defense; this stamp is the primary.
+GET {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{bob_user_id}}
+Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
+
+HTTP 200
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.user.id" == "{{bob_user_id}}"
+jsonpath "$.email_verified_at" exists
+
+GET {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{alice_user_id}}
+Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
+
+HTTP 200
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.user.id" == "{{alice_user_id}}"
 jsonpath "$.email_verified_at" exists
 
 # 11e — bob CANNOT enumerate unrelated users. A random UUID returns 404

tests/api/files-folders.hurl

@@ -19,11 +19,11 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 [Asserts]
 jsonpath "$.access_token" isString
 jsonpath "$.token_type" == "Bearer"
-jsonpath "$.user.id" isString
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id" isString
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/grant_cleanup.hurl

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 alice_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 GET {{base_url}}/api/folders
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-mallory_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+mallory_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/grants.hurl

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 alice_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 GET {{base_url}}/api/folders
 Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-dave_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+dave_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
 Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-eve_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+eve_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-adam_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+adam_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
 Content-Type: application/json
@@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-frank_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+frank_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
 Content-Type: application/json

tests/api/grants_nested_groups.hurl

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-henry_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+henry_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
 Content-Type: application/json

tests/api/groups_effective_members.hurl

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-dora_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+dora_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/nc_login_flow_v2_drive_picker.hurl

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 admin_token:   jsonpath "$.access_token"
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/nc_multidrive_move_regression.hurl

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 jwt:           jsonpath "$.access_token"
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/nc_second_user_setup.hurl

@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
 jsonpath "$.access_token" exists
-jsonpath "$.user.username" == "bob"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.username" == "bob"
-jsonpath "$.user.email"    == "bob@example.com"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.email"    == "bob@example.com"

tests/api/nc_webdav_patch_consistency.hurl

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 admin_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-editor_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+editor_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
 Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-viewer_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+viewer_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
 Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-outsider_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+outsider_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-quota_owner_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+quota_owner_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 PUT {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{quota_owner_id}}/quota

tests/api/nc_webdav_put_gaps.hurl

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 admin_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-editor_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+editor_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
 Authorization: Bearer {{admin_jwt}}
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-viewer_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+viewer_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-quota_owner_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+quota_owner_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 PUT {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{quota_owner_id}}/quota

tests/api/nc_webdav_quota_properties.hurl

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 ncq_owner_jwt: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-ncq_owner_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+ncq_owner_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
 Authorization: Bearer {{ncq_owner_jwt}}

tests/api/playlists.hurl

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 alice_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 bob_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/registration.hurl

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 charlie_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-charlie_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+charlie_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -139,16 +139,16 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{pr18_access_token}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.email" == "pr18-emailonly@example.com"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.email" == "pr18-emailonly@example.com"
-jsonpath "$.is_external" == false
+jsonpath "$.full.user.is_external" == false
-jsonpath "$.username" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" not exists
 # PR 23 — the user redeemed the welcome magic-link in Step 5b, so
 # email_verified_at is stamped (the click IS the proof of inbox
 # control, regardless of whether the redemption went through the
 # direct or cross-browser-confirm path).
-jsonpath "$.email_verified_at" exists
+jsonpath "$.full.email_verified_at" exists
 [Captures]
-pr18_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+pr18_user_id: jsonpath "$.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -162,9 +162,9 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.id" == "{{pr18_user_id}}"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.id" == "{{pr18_user_id}}"
-jsonpath "$.username" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" not exists
-jsonpath "$.given_name" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.user.given_name" not exists
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -178,9 +178,9 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.given_name" == "Pee Are"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.given_name" == "Pee Are"
-jsonpath "$.family_name" == "Eighteen"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.family_name" == "Eighteen"
-jsonpath "$.username" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" not exists
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.username" == "pr18handle"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" == "pr18handle"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.given_name" == "Pr18@Handle"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.given_name" == "Pr18@Handle"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -276,10 +276,10 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{pr18_access_token}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.username" == "pr18handle"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" == "pr18handle"
-jsonpath "$.given_name" == "Pr18@Handle"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.given_name" == "Pr18@Handle"
-jsonpath "$.family_name" == "Eighteen"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.family_name" == "Eighteen"
-jsonpath "$.email_verified_at" exists
+jsonpath "$.full.email_verified_at" exists
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/regression_595_unlimited_user_quota.hurl

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 user_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-user_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+user_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/role_grants.hurl

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 admin_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 GET {{base_url}}/api/folders
 Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-renee_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+renee_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-sam_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+sam_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login

tests/api/storage_cleanup_check.sh

@@ -75,15 +75,18 @@ log "Probe blob and thumbnail confirmed present on disk."
 # subsequent trash-empty triggers garbage_collect() to remove the
 # now-orphaned blob files from disk.
 
-# /api/admin/users returns { users: [...], total, limit, offset }
+# /api/admin/users returns { users: [FullUserDto…], total, limit, offset }
+# — public identity nests under `.user`; admin-visible extras
+# (`storage_used_bytes`, `last_login_at`, …) sit at the top level of
+# each row. See `docs/plan/userdto-refactor.md`.
 USERS_JSON=$(curl -sf -H "$AUTH" "$base_url/api/admin/users?limit=500")
 
 ADMIN_USER_ID=$(echo "$USERS_JSON" \
-    | jq -r --arg u "$username" '.users[] | select(.username == $u) | .id')
+    | jq -r --arg u "$username" '.users[] | select(.user.username == $u) | .user.id')
 [[ -z "$ADMIN_USER_ID" || "$ADMIN_USER_ID" == "null" ]] && fail "could not resolve admin user id"
 
 OTHER_USER_IDS=$(echo "$USERS_JSON" \
-    | jq -r --arg admin_id "$ADMIN_USER_ID" '.users[] | select(.id != $admin_id) | .id')
+    | jq -r --arg admin_id "$ADMIN_USER_ID" '.users[] | select(.user.id != $admin_id) | .user.id')
 
 OTHER_USER_COUNT=0
 while IFS= read -r uid; do

tests/api/subject_groups.hurl

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-grace_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+grace_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
 Content-Type: application/json
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-helper_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+helper_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/groups/{{engineers_id}}/members

tests/api/trash_per_drive.hurl

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
 Content-Type: application/json
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-viewer_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+viewer_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
 Content-Type: application/json

tests/api/user_envelope_quota.hurl

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 owner_token:   jsonpath "$.access_token"
-owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+owner_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{owner_token}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.storage_used_bytes" == 0
+jsonpath "$.full.storage_used_bytes" == 0
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{owner_token}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.storage_used_bytes" == 0
+jsonpath "$.full.storage_used_bytes" == 0
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ retry-interval: 200ms
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.storage_used_bytes" == 32
+jsonpath "$.full.storage_used_bytes" == 32
 
 
 # Confirm the sweep agrees with the delta — both code paths must
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{owner_token}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.storage_used_bytes" == 32
+jsonpath "$.full.storage_used_bytes" == 32
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{owner_token}}
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.storage_used_bytes" == 0
+jsonpath "$.full.storage_used_bytes" == 0
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/api/webdav_patch_consistency.hurl

@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-quota_owner_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+quota_owner_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 PUT {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{quota_owner_id}}/quota

tests/api/webdav_permissions.hurl

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 admin_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login

tests/api/webdav_quota_properties.hurl

@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 wq_owner_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-wq_owner_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+wq_owner_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/drives

tests/api/wopi_authz.hurl

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 alice_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
-alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 GET {{base_url}}/api/folders
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login

tests/api/wopi_shared_drive.hurl

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
 admin_token:   jsonpath "$.access_token"
-admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/e2e/spa/files.spec.ts

@@ -74,7 +74,16 @@ test('upload a file via the hidden file input', async ({ page }) => {
   // Navigate straight into the (empty) folder by ID (the route keys on folder
   // id, not name) — avoids the crowded root listing and click ambiguity.
   await page.goto(`/files/${created.id}`);
-  await expect(page.getByTestId('files-upload-file-input')).toBeAttached({ timeout: 15_000 });
+  // The hidden file input renders unconditionally on mount, so waiting on
+  // `toBeAttached` fires BEFORE the page's `load()` populates `currentId`
+  // from the URL. Firing `setInputFiles` in that window used to race
+  // `load()` and post the upload with `folderId: null`, silently landing
+  // the file in the caller's home root — the guard in
+  // `guardUploadFolderReady` now refuses that upload with a toast. Wait
+  // for the empty-state hook instead — `ResourceList` only renders
+  // `EmptyState` once `load()` has definitively completed with zero
+  // items, so it doubles as a "folder is ready to accept uploads" signal.
+  await expect(page.getByTestId('empty-state')).toBeVisible({ timeout: 15_000 });
   // Now inside the folder; upload a text file by setting the hidden input.
   const f = SAMPLE_FILES.text();
   await page.getByTestId('files-upload-file-input').setInputFiles({

tests/oidc/link_unlink.hurl

@@ -98,11 +98,11 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.username" == "{{username}}"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" == "{{username}}"
 # federation_kind is skip_serializing_if=Option::is_none, so a
 # local user's response OMITS the field entirely.
-jsonpath "$.federation_kind" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_kind" not exists
-jsonpath "$.federation_issuer" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_issuer" not exists
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.federation_kind" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_kind" not exists
-jsonpath "$.federation_issuer" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_issuer" not exists
 
 
 # ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -252,8 +252,8 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.federation_kind" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_kind" not exists
-jsonpath "$.federation_issuer" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_issuer" not exists
 
 
 # ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.username" == "{{username}}"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" == "{{username}}"
-jsonpath "$.federation_kind" == "oidc"
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_kind" == "oidc"
-jsonpath "$.federation_issuer" == "{{oidc_issuer}}"
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_issuer" == "{{oidc_issuer}}"
 
 
 # Scenario 9 — unlink success (admin has a password, so the
@@ -326,8 +326,8 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.federation_kind" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_kind" not exists
-jsonpath "$.federation_issuer" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_issuer" not exists
 
 
 # ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.federation_kind" == "oidc"
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_kind" == "oidc"
 
 
 # Unlink to reset state before the auto-link scenarios.
@@ -447,9 +447,9 @@ HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
 # Auto-link resolved to the pre-existing admin, NOT a fresh
 # JIT-provisioned user. The load-bearing assertion.
-jsonpath "$.user.username" == "{{username}}"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.username" == "{{username}}"
-jsonpath "$.user.federation_kind" == "oidc"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.federation_kind" == "oidc"
-jsonpath "$.user.federation_issuer" == "{{oidc_issuer}}"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.federation_issuer" == "{{oidc_issuer}}"
 [Captures]
 # Fresh cookies replace the password session's; capture the
 # new CSRF for the unlink below.
@@ -463,9 +463,9 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.username" == "{{username}}"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" == "{{username}}"
-jsonpath "$.federation_kind" == "oidc"
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_kind" == "oidc"
-jsonpath "$.federation_issuer" == "{{oidc_issuer}}"
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_issuer" == "{{oidc_issuer}}"
 
 
 # Reset admin state before the next scenario (auto-link would
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.federation_kind" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_kind" not exists
 
 
 # Reset fake IdP state (email_verified back to true, sub back
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ X-CSRF-Token: {{autolink_csrf_token}}
 
 HTTP 201
 [Captures]
-alias_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+alias_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
 
 
 # Point the fake IdP at a fresh sub with admin's email. Both
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.federation_kind" not exists
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_kind" not exists
 
 
 # Cleanup — delete the collider so later scenarios see the same
@@ -701,8 +701,8 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.user.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.username" == "oidc_user"
-jsonpath "$.user.federation_kind" == "oidc"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.federation_kind" == "oidc"
 [Captures]
 # Fresh CSRF from the OIDC session cookies — the admin CSRFs
 # won't validate against these new cookies.
@@ -730,5 +730,5 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.federation_kind" == "oidc"
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_kind" == "oidc"
-jsonpath "$.federation_issuer" == "{{oidc_issuer}}"
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_issuer" == "{{oidc_issuer}}"

tests/oidc/oidc.hurl

@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 200
 [Captures]
-oidc_session_user: jsonpath "$.user.username"
+oidc_session_user: jsonpath "$.user.full.user.username"
 # Snapshotted so Step 7's refresh can prove the tokens rotated
 # rather than being re-issued unchanged. The refresh handler in
 # auth_handler.rs always rotates all three cookies (access JWT,
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ initial_access_token:  jsonpath "$.access_token"
 initial_refresh_token: jsonpath "$.refresh_token"
 initial_csrf_token:    cookie "oxicloud_csrf"
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.user.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.username" == "oidc_user"
-jsonpath "$.user.email"    == "oidc@example.com"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.email"    == "oidc@example.com"
 jsonpath "$.access_token"  isString
 # Multiple Set-Cookie headers come back as a list of values, so
 # `contains` only matches whole-element strings. Each cookie shows up
@@ -211,10 +211,10 @@ HTTP 200
 # Stash the user id for the re-login check in Step 10 below — a
 # second OIDC flow with the same `sub` must resolve back to this
 # exact user, not silently create a duplicate.
-oidc_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+oidc_user_id: jsonpath "$.full.user.id"
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" == "oidc_user"
-jsonpath "$.email"    == "oidc@example.com"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.email"    == "oidc@example.com"
 # Post the federation-identity rename (docs/plan/ocm.md § Schema
 # rename) UserDto exposes federation_kind + federation_issuer as
 # separate nullable fields. Local users have both null; OIDC users
@@ -222,24 +222,24 @@ jsonpath "$.email"    == "oidc@example.com"
 # the fake IdP (tests/oidc/fake_idp/server.js) that URL is the
 # issuer published in its discovery document, which matches
 # `oidc_issuer` from test.env.
-jsonpath "$.federation_kind"   == "oidc"
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_kind"   == "oidc"
-jsonpath "$.federation_issuer" == "{{oidc_issuer}}"
+jsonpath "$.full.federation_issuer" == "{{oidc_issuer}}"
 # Full claim round-trip — the fake IdP (tests/oidc/fake_idp/server.js)
 # pins these values and OxiCloud must persist each one verbatim during
 # JIT provisioning (see auth_application_service.rs around line 2257).
 # A regression that drops, swaps, or truncates a claim trips here.
 # Note the field name flip on the API side: OIDC `picture` becomes
 # UserDto.image (a URL or data URI).
-jsonpath "$.given_name"  == "OIDC"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.given_name"  == "OIDC"
-jsonpath "$.family_name" == "Test"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.family_name" == "Test"
-jsonpath "$.image"       == "https://example.com/oidc-test-user.png"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.image"       == "https://example.com/oidc-test-user.png"
 # Group-to-role mapping. server-with-oidc.env sets
 # OXICLOUD_OIDC_ADMIN_GROUPS=admin-users; the fake IdP's claims include
 # `groups: ["admin-users"]`. The JIT path intersects the claim against
 # the env and promotes the new user from `user` to `admin`. A
 # regression here would silently strip (or wrongly grant) admin rights
 # for every SSO deployment that uses group-based role mapping.
-jsonpath "$.role" == "admin"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.role" == "admin"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ refreshed_refresh_token: jsonpath "$.refresh_token"
 # the (freshly-rotated) `oxicloud_csrf` cookie on the browser.
 refreshed_csrf_token:    cookie "oxicloud_csrf"
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.user.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.username" == "oidc_user"
 jsonpath "$.access_token"  isString
 jsonpath "$.refresh_token" isString
 # All three cookies must rotate. If any value were re-used, a
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" == "oidc_user"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -412,8 +412,8 @@ HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
 # Same local id — proves the existing-user resolver matched on `sub`
 # (or `oidc_provider + oidc_subject`) instead of minting a new row.
-jsonpath "$.user.id" == "{{oidc_user_id}}"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.id" == "{{oidc_user_id}}"
-jsonpath "$.user.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.username" == "oidc_user"
 # Role from the prior JIT-provisioned admin survives the re-login.
 # Two regressions this catches: (a) the existing-user branch wiping
 # the role to a default `user`; (b) the existing-user branch
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ jsonpath "$.user.username" == "oidc_user"
 # IdP still emits `groups: ["admin-users"]`, OXICLOUD_OIDC_ADMIN_GROUPS
 # still resolves to "admin"). Either way, the role should remain
 # `admin` — otherwise we have a silent admin demotion on every login.
-jsonpath "$.user.role" == "admin"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.role" == "admin"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.user.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.username" == "oidc_user"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" == "oidc_user"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/oidc/sso-only.hurl

@@ -123,10 +123,10 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.user.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.username" == "oidc_user"
 # Group-to-role mapping worked — this is now the admin (and the only
 # user).
-jsonpath "$.user.role" == "admin"
+jsonpath "$.user.full.user.role" == "admin"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
 
 HTTP 200
 [Asserts]
-jsonpath "$.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.full.user.username" == "oidc_user"
 
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

tests/webdav/test_nextcloud_chunked_upload_cap.sh

@@ -132,9 +132,9 @@ echo "  app password minted (id=$APP_PASSWORD_ID)"
 # failure path. `storage_quota_bytes == 0` is the unlimited
 # sentinel (see `check_storage_quota`); we read it back here in
 # case a prior test set a real value.
-ADMIN_ID=$(rest_get "/api/auth/me" | jq -r '.id')
+ADMIN_ID=$(rest_get "/api/auth/me" | jq -r '.full.user.id')
 [[ -n "$ADMIN_ID" && "$ADMIN_ID" != "null" ]] || fail "Failed to read admin user id"
-ORIGINAL_ADMIN_QUOTA=$(rest_get "/api/auth/me" | jq -r '.storage_quota_bytes // 0')
+ORIGINAL_ADMIN_QUOTA=$(rest_get "/api/auth/me" | jq -r '.full.storage_quota_bytes // 0')
 
 # Single cleanup on exit:
 #   - restore admin's original storage envelope (in case Case 3
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ echo "[3/3] QUOTA REJECTION — envelope tightened to (used + 100 B), PUT 200 B
 #     `current + 100` — leaves enough headroom that MKCOL passes
 #     (`used + 0 = used < used + 100`) while a 200 B chunk PUT
 #     overflows by exactly 100 (`used + 0 + 200 > used + 100`).
-CURRENT_USED=$(rest_get "/api/auth/me" | jq -r '.storage_used_bytes')
+CURRENT_USED=$(rest_get "/api/auth/me" | jq -r '.full.storage_used_bytes')
 [[ -n "$CURRENT_USED" && "$CURRENT_USED" != "null" ]] || fail "Failed to read current used_bytes"
 TIGHT_QUOTA=$(( CURRENT_USED + 100 ))