fix(nextcloud): fix chroot + synchronisation

- add better hurl coverage on nextcloud chrooted login
    - fix issue with nextcloud using /{drive name}/~{drive id}/
    - fix trashbin handler

    confusion username vs {username}~{folder id}

src/interfaces/nextcloud/trashbin_handler.rs

@@ -102,8 +102,16 @@ async fn handle_propfind(
     let nc = state.nextcloud.as_ref();
     let file_id_svc = nc.map(|n| &n.file_ids);
 
+    // Emit hrefs with `session.raw_username` (composite `admin~<uuid>` on
+    // non-home drives), NOT `user.username` (bare `admin`). The
+    // `NcSession` extractor cross-checks the URL `{user}` segment
+    // against `raw_username` and 403s on mismatch (see
+    // `session.rs::from_request_parts`). Emitting the bare form here
+    // would make every follow-up MOVE/DELETE from a non-home client
+    // 403 before the handler runs — the composite-credential Hurl
+    // regression caught this (B5 in `nc_multidrive_move_regression`).
     let mut buf = Vec::new();
-    write_trashbin_multistatus(&mut buf, &items, &user.username, chroot, file_id_svc)
+    write_trashbin_multistatus(&mut buf, &items, &session.raw_username, chroot, file_id_svc)
         .await
         .map_err(|e| AppError::internal_error(format!("XML generation failed: {}", e)))?;
 
@@ -139,8 +147,17 @@ async fn handle_restore(
     // with 412 — there is no `Overwrite: T` workflow for trash restore in
     // either Sabre/DAV or the NC desktop client (a live file being
     // silently replaced by an undeleted one would be a footgun).
+    // Use `session.raw_username` (composite `admin~<drive-uuid>` on
+    // non-home drives) to strip the destination prefix, NOT
+    // `user.username` (bare `admin`). NC clients send `Destination:
+    // /remote.php/dav/files/{raw_username}/…`; passing the bare
+    // username would leave the `~<uuid>/` marker glued to the leading
+    // subpath segment and turn the collision-check into a lookup at
+    // a fabricated path. See `uploads_handler::handle_assemble` for
+    // the same fix in the chunked-upload MOVE.
     if let Some(dest_header) = dest_header
-        && let Some(dest_subpath) = extract_nc_subpath_from_dest(&dest_header, &user.username)
+        && let Some(dest_subpath) =
+            extract_nc_subpath_from_dest(&dest_header, &session.raw_username)
     {
         let dest_internal = nc_to_internal_path(chroot, &dest_subpath)?;
         let folder_service = &state.applications.folder_service;

src/interfaces/nextcloud/uploads_handler.rs

@@ -150,7 +150,20 @@ async fn handle_propfind_session(
         .map_err(|e| AppError::internal_error(format!("Failed to list chunks: {}", e)))?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::not_found("Upload session not found"))?;
 
-    let session_href = format!("/remote.php/dav/uploads/{}/{}/", user.username, upload_id);
+    // Href MUST use `session.raw_username` (composite `admin~<uuid>` on
+    // non-home drives), NOT `user.username` (bare `admin`). The
+    // `NcSession` extractor cross-checks the URL `{user}` segment
+    // against `raw_username` and 403s on mismatch — a composite-cred
+    // client that PROPFINDs, then MOVEs a chunk href back to us, would
+    // otherwise 403 at the extractor before any handler runs. Same
+    // fix shape as `trashbin_handler::handle_propfind` and
+    // `handle_assemble`'s destination-URL parsing. Storage-side keying
+    // stays on `user.username` — upload sessions are per-user, not
+    // per-drive.
+    let session_href = format!(
+        "/remote.php/dav/uploads/{}/{}/",
+        session.raw_username, upload_id
+    );
     let session_last_modified =
         chrono::DateTime::<chrono::Utc>::from_timestamp(listing.session_mtime as i64, 0)
             .unwrap_or_else(chrono::Utc::now)
@@ -176,7 +189,7 @@ async fn handle_propfind_session(
     for chunk in &listing.chunks {
         let chunk_href = format!(
             "/remote.php/dav/uploads/{}/{}/{}",
-            user.username, upload_id, chunk.name
+            session.raw_username, upload_id, chunk.name
         );
         let chunk_modified = chrono::DateTime::<chrono::Utc>::from_timestamp(chunk.mtime as i64, 0)
             .unwrap_or_else(chrono::Utc::now)
@@ -342,7 +355,18 @@ async fn handle_assemble(
         .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
         .and_then(|v| v.parse::<i64>().ok());
 
-    let dest_subpath = extract_files_subpath(&destination, &user.username)
+    // Strip the destination URL prefix using the SESSION's raw username
+    // (`admin~<drive-uuid>` on non-home drives), NOT `user.username`
+    // (bare `admin`). NC clients send `Destination: /remote.php/dav/files/
+    // {raw_username}/…` — the URL user-segment mirrors the credential
+    // they authenticated with. Passing bare `admin` here strips only
+    // `admin/` from a `admin~<uuid>/…` destination, leaving the tilde
+    // marker glued to the leading path segment; the write then targets
+    // `<drive-root>/~<uuid>/…` and fails with a parent-folder lookup
+    // error. Matches `webdav_handler::handle_move`'s call to
+    // `extract_nc_subpath_from_dest(&destination, url_user)` where
+    // `url_user = &session.raw_username` (webdav_handler.rs:1177).
+    let dest_subpath = extract_files_subpath(&destination, &session.raw_username)
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::bad_request("Invalid Destination URL"))?;
 
     // Stream the chunk parts, in order, straight into the CDC chunk store —

tests/api/nc_multidrive_move_regression.hurl

@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+# =============================================================
+# OxiCloud — NC multi-drive MOVE destination-prefix regressions
+# =============================================================
+# Regression coverage for two sibling bugs discovered 2026-07-12
+# when the multi-drive `admin~{drive-uuid}` credential shape was
+# rolled through the NC `/remote.php/dav/*` surface but two MOVE
+# handlers were missed:
+#
+#   uploads_handler::handle_assemble (chunked-upload MOVE)
+#   trashbin_handler   (restore MOVE with a Destination header)
+#
+# Both handlers were stripping the destination-URL prefix with
+# `&user.username` (bare `admin`) instead of
+# `&session.raw_username` (composite `admin~{uuid}`). NC clients
+# on a non-home drive send:
+#     Destination: /remote.php/dav/files/admin~{uuid}/<path>
+# The bare-username strip left `~{uuid}/<path>` glued to the
+# leading path segment; downstream lookups then targeted a
+# fabricated `<drive-root>/~{uuid}/…` path and 500'd (assemble
+# path) or silently missed collisions (trash path).
+#
+# webdav_handler::handle_move (the standard `/dav/files/…` MOVE)
+# was ALREADY correct — it uses `url_user = &session.raw_username`.
+# The uploads + trashbin siblings were coverage gaps: no Hurl
+# tests hit them with a composite credential.
+#
+# Hurl gotcha: the `[BasicAuth]` block parses the username as a
+# single token terminated by `:`. A raw composite like
+# `{{nc_username}}~{{drive_id}}` fails to parse because Hurl
+# sees the `~` between two templates and expects a line
+# terminator. Workaround: alias the composite into
+# `nc_basic_user` via `[Options] variable:` on a bootstrap
+# request, then use `{{nc_basic_user}}` in every subsequent
+# BasicAuth block.
+# =============================================================
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Setup 1 — JWT login.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
+Content-Type: application/json
+{ "username": "{{username}}", "password": "{{password}}" }
+
+HTTP 200
+[Captures]
+jwt:           jsonpath "$.access_token"
+admin_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Setup 2 — Fetch admin's home drive root folder id.
+#
+# The composite `{user}~{marker}` shape sends the marker
+# through `basic_auth_middleware.rs`, which resolves it as a
+# **folder id** (not a drive id) via
+# `folder_service.get_folder_with_perms(folder_id, user_id)` —
+# the auth boundary refuses if the caller lacks Read on that
+# folder.
+#
+# For a regression test we don't need a SECONDARY drive —
+# we need any folder id the caller has Read on so the composite
+# credential authenticates cleanly. Admin's own home folder is
+# the trivially-authorized choice; the tilde-parsing bug in
+# `handle_assemble` / trashbin restore fires the same way
+# regardless of which folder id the marker points at.
+#
+# For the real multi-drive scenario Ed hit in production, the
+# marker after `~` was the folder id of a shared drive's root
+# where admin had explicit Read via role_grants. That code path
+# is identical to the one exercised here — the bug is in the
+# destination-URL parsing, not in what the folder id points to.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+GET {{base_url}}/api/folders
+Authorization: Bearer {{jwt}}
+
+HTTP 200
+[Captures]
+home_folder_id: jsonpath "$[0].id"
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Setup 3 — Mint an app password. `username` in the response is
+# just `admin`; we splice the folder id onto it in Setup 4
+# below to get the composite `admin~{uuid}` shape.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords
+Authorization: Bearer {{jwt}}
+Content-Type: application/json
+{ "label": "nc_multidrive_move_regression hurl test" }
+
+HTTP 200
+[Captures]
+nc_username: jsonpath "$.username"
+nc_password: jsonpath "$.password"
+ap_id:       jsonpath "$.id"
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Setup 4 — Bootstrap the composite BasicAuth username.
+#
+# `[Options] variable:` sets a variable whose VALUE is a
+# template expanded against the current bindings, then the
+# result is available to all subsequent requests. `nc_username`
+# and `home_folder_id` are already captured; concatenating them
+# here hides the `~` from the strict `[BasicAuth]` parser
+# (which would otherwise reject `{{nc_username}}~{{home_folder_id}}`
+# mid-username).
+#
+# `/ready` is a cheap unauthenticated 200 that gives us a
+# request to hang the option on. No side effects.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+GET {{base_url}}/ready
+[Options]
+variable: nc_basic_user={{nc_username}}~{{home_folder_id}}
+
+HTTP 200
+
+
+# =============================================================
+# A. Chunked-upload MOVE assemble regression
+# =============================================================
+# `handle_assemble` in `uploads_handler.rs` was calling
+# `extract_files_subpath(&destination, &user.username)`. With a
+# composite Destination it treated `~{drive_uuid}/<path>` as the
+# target subpath, then tried `nc_to_internal_path(chroot, …)`
+# → `<drive-root>/~{drive_uuid}/<path>`. Downstream parent-folder
+# lookup → 500.
+#
+# Fixed by binding on `&session.raw_username`. Test shape:
+#   A1 — MKCOL: create the chunked-upload session directory.
+#   A2 — MOVE `.file` (empty session → zero chunks → assemble
+#        writes an empty file at Destination). Pre-fix: 500 with
+#        "Failed to get folder at path: /<drive-root>/~<uuid>".
+#        Post-fix: 201 + file exists at the real Destination.
+#   A3 — PROPFIND on the destination path to confirm the file
+#        landed under the drive's root (NOT under `~<uuid>/`).
+# =============================================================
+
+# A1 — MKCOL upload session.
+MKCOL {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/uploads/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-upload-session
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+HTTP 201
+
+
+# A2 — MOVE `.file` with a composite Destination header. Empty
+# session, so the assemble step writes a zero-byte file at the
+# destination path — that's fine, we're pinning the destination-
+# parsing behaviour, not the byte-copying.
+#
+# Hurl gotcha: headers MUST come before section blocks like
+# `[BasicAuth]`. `Destination:` after `[BasicAuth]` gets parsed
+# as a new request's method line.
+MOVE {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/uploads/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-upload-session/.file
+Destination: {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-assembled.txt
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+# The regression: pre-fix this returned 500 with a
+# "~<drive-uuid>" fragment in the error message; post-fix it
+# writes the empty file successfully. Any 2xx status proves the
+# destination-parsing path is intact.
+HTTP 201
+
+
+# A3 — Confirm the file exists at the real path inside the
+# chroot. HTTP 207 alone is the load-bearing assertion: pre-fix,
+# MOVE would have 500'd (so we'd never reach here); and even if
+# it had somehow written, the file would have landed at the
+# fabricated `<chroot>/~<folder_id>/…` path rather than
+# `<chroot>/regression-assembled.txt` — this PROPFIND would
+# then 404 rather than 207.
+#
+# `body not contains "~{folder_id}/..."` would be redundant AND
+# wrong here: NC's PROPFIND echoes the client's request URL in
+# `<d:href>`, so the composite `admin~<folder_id>` legitimately
+# appears in the returned href — that's the URL prefix, not a
+# leak. The empty-file-size assertion below is the concrete
+# positive check: MOVE with zero chunks assembles a 0-byte
+# file, so we pin that shape.
+PROPFIND {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-assembled.txt
+Depth: 0
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+HTTP 207
+[Asserts]
+xpath "string(//*[local-name()='getcontentlength'])" == "0"
+
+
+# Cleanup — remove the assembled file so a re-run starts clean.
+DELETE {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-assembled.txt
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+HTTP 204
+
+
+# =============================================================
+# B. Trashbin restore MOVE — sibling handler with the same bug
+# =============================================================
+# `trashbin_handler.rs` line 143 has the same shape:
+#     extract_nc_subpath_from_dest(&dest_header, &user.username)
+# The trash MOVE uses the Destination header for a collision
+# pre-check, not for relocation (restore always lands at the
+# original path). A buggy prefix strip therefore doesn't 500 —
+# it silently miscomputes the collision path (`<drive>/~<uuid>/…`
+# instead of `<drive>/<real-path>`), letting a real collision
+# slip past. The response is 2xx either way.
+#
+# So a "5xx vs 201" assertion won't catch it. What DOES catch it:
+# stage a genuine collision, restore with a Destination that
+# points at it. Pre-fix: no 412 (bug misses the collision).
+# Post-fix: 412 Precondition Failed.
+#
+# Sequence:
+#   B1 — Upload `regression-collision.txt` to the drive.
+#   B2 — DELETE it (soft-trash).
+#   B3 — Re-upload `regression-collision.txt` (new file at the
+#        same path) to stage the collision.
+#   B4 — Enumerate the trashbin to find the trashed item's id.
+#   B5 — MOVE the trash item back with Destination pointing at
+#        the re-created file. Pre-fix: 201/204 (collision missed).
+#        Post-fix: 412 Precondition Failed.
+# =============================================================
+
+# B1 — Stage the file the client will trash.
+PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-collision.txt
+Content-Type: text/plain
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+```
+first version
+```
+
+HTTP 201
+
+
+# B2 — Soft-trash it.
+DELETE {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-collision.txt
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+HTTP 204
+
+
+# B3 — Re-upload at the same path to stage the collision.
+PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-collision.txt
+Content-Type: text/plain
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+```
+second version
+```
+
+HTTP 201
+
+
+# B4 — Enumerate trashbin to find the trashed item's numeric id
+# (NC identifies trash items with `oc:trashbin-filename` etc.).
+# Using PROPFIND at Depth 1 on the trashbin root.
+PROPFIND {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/trashbin/{{nc_basic_user}}/trash
+Depth: 1
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+HTTP 207
+[Captures]
+# Grab the href of the first trashed child. Fragile against
+# multi-item trash but this test creates exactly one before
+# reading — safe here. Local-name xpath so we don't have to
+# thread the DAV namespace prefix.
+trash_item_href: xpath "string((//*[local-name()='response']/*[local-name()='href'])[2])"
+
+
+# B5 — MOVE the trash item back with a composite Destination.
+# Pre-fix: collision check runs against a fake `<drive>/~<uuid>/…`
+# path, misses the real collision, restore succeeds (201/204).
+# Post-fix: collision check hits the real path, request refused
+# with 412.
+MOVE {{base_url}}{{trash_item_href}}
+Destination: {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-collision.txt
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+# Post-fix expectation: 412 (collision detected). If a future
+# change makes trashbin restore honour Destination for
+# relocation, this assertion changes — but the collision-check
+# semantics should stay collision-refusing.
+HTTP 412
+
+
+# Cleanup — permanently delete the trashed item so a re-run
+# starts clean, and drop the live file.
+DELETE {{base_url}}{{trash_item_href}}
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+HTTP 204
+
+
+DELETE {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/files/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-collision.txt
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+HTTP 204
+
+
+# =============================================================
+# C. Chunked-upload PROPFIND href regression
+# =============================================================
+# `handle_propfind_session` in `uploads_handler.rs` was emitting
+# `<d:href>` values with `user.username` (bare `admin`) instead of
+# `session.raw_username` (composite `admin~<uuid>`). Same shape
+# as the trashbin PROPFIND bug: NC clients doing chunked-upload
+# resume PROPFIND the session, then MOVE/DELETE against the
+# returned hrefs. With the bare form, every follow-up 403s at
+# the `NcSession` extractor (URL `{user}` segment mismatches
+# `raw_username`).
+#
+# Positive test: after PROPFIND-ing an upload session with a
+# composite credential, the emitted hrefs MUST contain `~<uuid>`.
+# Pre-fix: `<d:href>/remote.php/dav/uploads/admin/…</d:href>`.
+# Post-fix: `<d:href>/remote.php/dav/uploads/admin~<uuid>/…</d:href>`.
+# =============================================================
+
+# C1 — MKCOL a fresh session.
+MKCOL {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/uploads/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-propfind-session
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+HTTP 201
+
+
+# C2 — PUT one chunk so PROPFIND has something to enumerate
+# alongside the session collection itself.
+PUT {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/uploads/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-propfind-session/00000001
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+```
+chunk-body
+```
+
+HTTP 201
+
+
+# C3 — PROPFIND the session with the composite credential and
+# assert every emitted href carries the composite user segment.
+# `contains "~{{home_folder_id}}/"` is the exact byte marker
+# introduced by the fix — the bug would produce
+# `/dav/uploads/admin/…` with no `~` between the surface and the
+# session id.
+PROPFIND {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/uploads/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-propfind-session
+Depth: 1
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+HTTP 207
+[Asserts]
+# Every href for this upload surface must echo the composite user.
+# Two responses expected: session collection + one chunk. Both
+# hrefs share the same `/remote.php/dav/uploads/<user>/<session>/…`
+# prefix, so one substring check on the body body is sufficient
+# and immune to XML formatting drift.
+body contains "/remote.php/dav/uploads/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-propfind-session/"
+# Belt-and-suspenders: assert the bare form is absent. The
+# composite basic-user is `admin~<uuid>`; the bare form would
+# render as `/dav/uploads/admin/regression-…` (no `~`).
+# `not contains` here would still permit that byte sequence to
+# appear inside the composite, so we anchor on the trailing `/`
+# after the user segment to disambiguate: `/admin/regression-…`
+# is the bug shape; the fix never produces `/admin/regression-…`
+# because the composite always separates admin from the session
+# with `~<uuid>`.
+body not contains "/remote.php/dav/uploads/{{nc_username}}/regression-propfind-session"
+
+
+# C4 — DELETE the session with a composite href. Pre-fix (bare
+# href returned by C3 that the client would have followed) this
+# would have been a wire-level 403 at the extractor; post-fix
+# the composite href works end-to-end.
+DELETE {{base_url}}/remote.php/dav/uploads/{{nc_basic_user}}/regression-propfind-session
+[BasicAuth]
+{{nc_basic_user}}: {{nc_password}}
+
+HTTP 204
+
+
+# =============================================================
+# Teardown — revoke the app password.
+# =============================================================
+DELETE {{base_url}}/api/auth/app-passwords/{{ap_id}}
+Authorization: Bearer {{jwt}}
+
+HTTP 200

tests/api/run.sh

@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ hurl --variables-file "$API_DIR/test.env" --file-root "$REPO_ROOT/tests" --test
   "$API_DIR/drive_policies.hurl" \
   "$API_DIR/cross_drive_move.hurl" \
   "$API_DIR/cross_drive_copy.hurl" \
+  "$API_DIR/nc_multidrive_move_regression.hurl" \
   "$API_DIR/webdav_dead_properties.hurl" \
   "$API_DIR/webdav_drive_root.hurl" \
   "$API_DIR/webdav_permissions.hurl" \