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refactor(role): use grant only

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- remove permission centric mode
    - finalize migration drop all tables with permissions
    - ensure roles are ENUM (owner is always displayed first)
This commit is contained in:
Edouard Vanbelle
2026-06-18 01:42:32 +02:00
parent cc6f53528b
commit 72129af0bd
26 changed files with 800 additions and 744 deletions
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migrations/20260801000000_role_grants_enum.sql
+72
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@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
-- ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
-- Cleanup #1: storage.role_grants.role — TEXT → storage.grant_role ENUM
-- ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
-- D-Prep shipped `role_grants.role` as TEXT + CHECK constraint. Promoting it
-- to a native PostgreSQL ENUM gives us three things at once:
--
-- 1. Index-driven sort by role strength. The ENUM values are declared in
-- strength order — owner first, viewer last. `ORDER BY role ASC` then
-- yields the UX-mandated "strongest first" ordering (Owner → Editor →
-- Contributor → Commenter → Viewer) without a CASE expression. The
-- `idx_role_grants_subject` / `idx_role_grants_resource` indexes can be
-- extended (or composite-augmented) with the role column for index-only
-- ordered scans.
--
-- 2. Type-level safety. The CHECK constraint goes away; invalid roles fail
-- at the column type, not at row insertion. One contract instead of two
-- (column type AND check constraint).
--
-- 3. Cleaner query shape. Every listing query that used the strength CASE
-- becomes a plain `ORDER BY role` after this migration.
--
-- Trade-off accepted: PostgreSQL ENUMs allow ADD VALUE (with BEFORE / AFTER
-- positional anchors) and RENAME VALUE, but not DROP VALUE or arbitrary
-- reorder. The OxiCloud role roster is intentionally stable — new roles get
-- appended, none get reordered or removed. Confirmed with Ed.
--
-- This migration must run BEFORE the access_grants drop, since it's purely
-- about role_grants.role.
-- ── 1. Create the ENUM type ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-- Declaration order = sort order. Strongest first so `ORDER BY role ASC`
-- matches the UX requirement (max permission → least permission).
CREATE TYPE storage.grant_role AS ENUM (
'owner', -- ordinal 0, sorts first
'editor', -- ordinal 1
'contributor', -- ordinal 2
'commenter', -- ordinal 3
'viewer' -- ordinal 4, sorts last
);
COMMENT ON TYPE storage.grant_role IS
'Role-keyed grant strength. Declaration order is sort order: ORDER BY '
'role ASC yields owner → viewer (strongest → weakest), matching the '
'share-dialog and shared-with-me UX. Adding a new role is ALTER TYPE '
'ADD VALUE; renaming is ALTER TYPE RENAME VALUE. Dropping or reordering '
'is not supported — adjust the roster only by append.';
-- ── 2. Drop the redundant CHECK constraint ─────────────────────────────────
-- The inline CHECK on role_grants.role was auto-named
-- `role_grants_role_check` by PostgreSQL. Drop it before the type swap —
-- the ENUM now enforces the same invariant at the column level.
ALTER TABLE storage.role_grants
DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS role_grants_role_check;
-- ── 3. Convert role TEXT → storage.grant_role ──────────────────────────────
-- USING cast: text values are guaranteed to be one of the five valid labels
-- (the dropped CHECK enforced this; the D-Prep backfill only produced these
-- five values). If a stray value slipped through, the cast errors out and
-- the migration aborts — preferable to silently coercing.
ALTER TABLE storage.role_grants
ALTER COLUMN role TYPE storage.grant_role
USING role::storage.grant_role;
COMMENT ON COLUMN storage.role_grants.role IS
'One of owner / editor / contributor / commenter / viewer. Expanded to '
'a Permission bundle by the in-code role_bundle() function at engine '
'read time. Sort order matches declaration order in storage.grant_role.';
migrations/20260801000001_role_grants_cascade_triggers.sql
+122
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@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
-- ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
-- Cleanup #2: cascade triggers for storage.role_grants
-- ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
-- The D-Prep migration created `storage.role_grants` but no cascade triggers.
-- Until now, role_grants stayed consistent because the application-layer
-- lifecycle hooks (`engine.revoke_all_for_resource` / `_subject`) wiped rows
-- on the canonical delete paths, AND the existing `trg_cleanup_grants_*`
-- triggers kept `storage.access_grants` clean as a defence-in-depth net.
--
-- The follow-up cleanup PR drops `access_grants` (and its triggers) entirely.
-- Without this migration that drop would leave `role_grants` without any
-- DB-level safety net — direct SQL, future codepaths that forget to call the
-- engine hooks, and any other bypass route could orphan rows whose subject
-- or resource has already been deleted.
--
-- This migration mirrors the four forward + one reverse triggers from
-- `20260520000000_rebac_access_grants.sql` and `20260612000001_share_grant_
-- reverse_cascade.sql`, retargeted at `storage.role_grants`. Same shape, same
-- AFTER-DELETE semantics, same idempotent CREATE OR REPLACE patterns.
--
-- During the transition window (this migration applied; `access_grants` not
-- yet dropped) both sets of triggers coexist — they target different tables
-- and don't conflict. Once `access_grants` is dropped, the old triggers and
-- their helper functions vanish in the same migration.
-- ── 1. Forward cascade: resource delete → cleanup role_grants ──────────────
-- Fires AFTER DELETE on storage.folders / storage.files; deletes every
-- role_grants row referencing that resource. TG_ARGV[0] discriminates which
-- resource_type the trigger is wired for.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION storage.cleanup_role_grants_on_resource_delete()
RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
DELETE FROM storage.role_grants
WHERE resource_type = TG_ARGV[0]
AND resource_id = OLD.id;
RETURN OLD;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_cleanup_role_grants_folder ON storage.folders;
CREATE TRIGGER trg_cleanup_role_grants_folder
AFTER DELETE ON storage.folders
FOR EACH ROW
EXECUTE FUNCTION storage.cleanup_role_grants_on_resource_delete('folder');
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_cleanup_role_grants_file ON storage.files;
CREATE TRIGGER trg_cleanup_role_grants_file
AFTER DELETE ON storage.files
FOR EACH ROW
EXECUTE FUNCTION storage.cleanup_role_grants_on_resource_delete('file');
-- ── 2. Forward cascade: subject delete → cleanup role_grants ───────────────
-- Fires AFTER DELETE on auth.users / storage.shares; deletes every
-- role_grants row referencing that subject. Groups are NOT wired here —
-- `subject_group_service::delete()` performs that cascade transactionally
-- in application code, mirroring the historical access_grants behaviour.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION storage.cleanup_role_grants_on_subject_delete()
RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
DELETE FROM storage.role_grants
WHERE subject_type = TG_ARGV[0]
AND subject_id = OLD.id;
RETURN OLD;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_cleanup_role_grants_user ON auth.users;
CREATE TRIGGER trg_cleanup_role_grants_user
AFTER DELETE ON auth.users
FOR EACH ROW
EXECUTE FUNCTION storage.cleanup_role_grants_on_subject_delete('user');
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_cleanup_role_grants_token ON storage.shares;
CREATE TRIGGER trg_cleanup_role_grants_token
AFTER DELETE ON storage.shares
FOR EACH ROW
EXECUTE FUNCTION storage.cleanup_role_grants_on_subject_delete('token');
-- ── 3. Reverse cascade: last-token-grant delete → cleanup storage.shares ───
-- A caller hitting DELETE /api/grants/{id} on a token's role grant would
-- otherwise leave the storage.shares row stranded — the token still
-- resolves to "no access" (cascade query finds no rows), but the metadata
-- row accumulates forever.
--
-- With role_grants the UNIQUE (subject, resource) constraint guarantees a
-- token has at most ONE role grant per resource, so "the last grant for a
-- token" collapses to "the only grant for that token". The NOT EXISTS
-- guard still works correctly — it just always evaluates the same way for
-- token subjects.
--
-- The DELETE on storage.shares is a no-op when the share row is already
-- gone (the forward cascade `trg_cleanup_role_grants_token` is in flight
-- and already removed it). Idempotent in both directions.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION storage.cleanup_share_on_last_role_grant_delete()
RETURNS trigger AS $$
BEGIN
IF OLD.subject_type = 'token' THEN
DELETE FROM storage.shares s
WHERE s.id = OLD.subject_id
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM storage.role_grants rg
WHERE rg.subject_type = 'token'
AND rg.subject_id = OLD.subject_id
);
END IF;
RETURN OLD;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_cleanup_share_on_role_grant_delete ON storage.role_grants;
CREATE TRIGGER trg_cleanup_share_on_role_grant_delete
AFTER DELETE ON storage.role_grants
FOR EACH ROW
EXECUTE FUNCTION storage.cleanup_share_on_last_role_grant_delete();
COMMENT ON FUNCTION storage.cleanup_share_on_last_role_grant_delete() IS
'Reverse cascade: deletes storage.shares row when its last token role grant is removed. Pairs with trg_cleanup_role_grants_token (forward direction).';
migrations/20260801000002_drop_access_grants.sql
+63
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@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
-- ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
-- Cleanup #3: drop storage.access_grants (and everything attached to it)
-- ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
-- The final step of the role-keyed ReBAC cleanup. By the time this migration
-- runs:
--
-- * Every read path goes through `storage.role_grants` (cleanup #1 / #2).
-- * The engine no longer has a `grant()` method; `set_role()` /
-- `clear_role()` are the only writes.
-- * The HTTP surface (`POST /api/grants`, `PUT /api/grants/role`) only
-- accepts role-keyed shapes.
-- * `share_service`, `subject_group_service`, `auth_application_service`,
-- `share_pg_repository`, and `integration_test_support` all read
-- `role_grants` exclusively.
-- * `storage.role_grants` has its own cascade triggers
-- (`trg_cleanup_role_grants_*`) and reverse-cascade
-- (`trg_cleanup_share_on_role_grant_delete`), added in cleanup #2.
--
-- So `access_grants` is fully unreferenced — we can drop it together with
-- the helper triggers + functions defined in
-- `20260520000000_rebac_access_grants.sql` and
-- `20260612000001_share_grant_reverse_cascade.sql`.
--
-- Roll-back posture: this is destructive. There is no down migration. The
-- D-Prep backfill is one-way (role-keyed rows are derived from
-- permission-keyed clusters; the reverse reconstruction would need a fixed
-- bundle mapping that may have shifted between releases). Recovering
-- requires restoring from a backup taken before this migration runs.
-- ── 1. Drop the access_grants triggers FROM their source tables ────────────
-- These triggers live on storage.folders / storage.files / auth.users /
-- storage.shares. Dropping access_grants doesn't implicitly remove them
-- (the trigger row points at the source table; the body references the
-- target table, and that body is what breaks once access_grants is gone).
-- Drop them explicitly so subsequent DELETEs on those source tables don't
-- error out.
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_cleanup_grants_folder ON storage.folders;
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_cleanup_grants_file ON storage.files;
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_cleanup_grants_user ON auth.users;
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_cleanup_grants_token ON storage.shares;
-- The reverse-cascade trigger is ON access_grants and goes away with the
-- table — but the IF EXISTS makes this safe regardless of drop order.
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_cleanup_share_on_grant_delete ON storage.access_grants;
-- ── 2. Drop the trigger helper functions ────────────────────────────────────
-- No other code references these — the `cleanup_role_grants_*` equivalents
-- defined in cleanup #2 carry the same behaviour against role_grants.
DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS storage.cleanup_grants_on_resource_delete();
DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS storage.cleanup_grants_on_subject_delete();
DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS storage.cleanup_share_on_last_token_grant_delete();
-- ── 3. Drop the table ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-- CASCADE removes any remaining dependent objects (indexes, comments, and
-- the reverse-cascade trigger if it survived step 1). With every Rust code
-- path already routed through role_grants, nothing in the application
-- layer will notice.
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS storage.access_grants CASCADE;
src/application/dtos/grant_dto.rs
+45 -157
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@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::application::dtos::cursor::{CursorListResponse, CursorQuery, PageCursor};
use crate::application::dtos::file_dto::FileDto;
use crate::application::dtos::folder_dto::FolderDto;
use crate::domain::services::authorization::{Grant, Permission, Resource, Subject};
use crate::domain::services::authorization::{Grant, Permission, Resource, Role, Subject};
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Subject / Resource / Permission DTOs
@@ -130,166 +130,50 @@ impl From<Permission> for PermissionDto {
// Roles — the load-bearing model for ReBAC grants
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
//
// Today a role is "DTO-layer sugar" — every grant write expands a role into
// N rows in `storage.access_grants`. The D-Prep refactor (see
// `docs/plan/drive.md` §Prerequisite + migration `20260730000000_role_grants.sql`)
// pushes the role down to storage (`storage.role_grants.role TEXT`); the
// engine reads the role and expands the bundle at query time via this same
// `expand()` function. Adding a role is now schema-free — one variant + one
// match arm here.
// One row per role assignment in `storage.role_grants.role` (a
// `storage.grant_role` ENUM). The engine expands the bundle at query time
// via `Role::expand()` on the domain enum. Adding a role is two edits:
// the variant + match arm on `Role`, and an `ALTER TYPE
// storage.grant_role ADD VALUE 'name'` migration.
/// Wire-format wrapper around the domain `Role` enum. Carries the
/// serde/utoipa derives. Maps 1:1 to/from `Role` via `From`.
///
/// The historical `"admin"` alias for `Owner` (used during the D-Prep
/// dual-write window for cached clients) has been retired in the cleanup
/// PR — the OxiCloud UI emits `"owner"` exclusively. Stragglers receive
/// a 422 on POST/PUT, which surfaces the upgrade cleanly.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum Role {
/// Read access only. The default "anyone can look but not touch".
pub enum RoleDto {
Viewer,
/// Read + comment. Useful for review-only stakeholders.
Commenter,
/// Read + create. The "drop-zone" role — uploads allowed, existing
/// content untouchable. Common for support-ticket attachments and
/// photo-submission folders.
Contributor,
/// Read + create + update + comment. The standard collaboration role.
Editor,
/// Full bundle: read, create, update, comment, delete, share — and
/// `Manage` for resource types that support it (drives, groups). This
/// is the highest user-grantable role; renamed from the historical
/// `Admin` to disambiguate from `UserRole::Admin` (the user-account
/// privilege) and to match Drive plan terminology.
///
/// **Wire-format compat shim** (one release): also deserialises from
/// the legacy `"admin"` string so cached frontend clients keep
/// working until they refresh. Serialisation always emits `"owner"`.
/// Drop the alias in the cleanup PR.
#[serde(alias = "admin")]
Owner,
}
impl Role {
/// Expand the role into its permission bundle. Single source of truth —
/// any code that needs "does this role include Permission X?" routes
/// through here (or its inverse, `roles_implying`).
///
/// After D-Prep this is called at engine read time (1 row → bundle
/// expanded server-side). Pre-D-Prep it was called at API write time
/// (1 role → N rows fanned out).
pub fn expand(self) -> &'static [Permission] {
match self {
Role::Viewer => &[Permission::Read],
Role::Commenter => &[Permission::Read, Permission::Comment],
Role::Contributor => &[Permission::Read, Permission::Create],
Role::Editor => &[
Permission::Read,
Permission::Comment,
Permission::Create,
Permission::Update,
],
Role::Owner => &[
Permission::Read,
Permission::Comment,
Permission::Create,
Permission::Update,
Permission::Share,
Permission::Delete,
Permission::Manage,
],
impl From<RoleDto> for Role {
fn from(r: RoleDto) -> Self {
match r {
RoleDto::Viewer => Role::Viewer,
RoleDto::Commenter => Role::Commenter,
RoleDto::Contributor => Role::Contributor,
RoleDto::Editor => Role::Editor,
RoleDto::Owner => Role::Owner,
}
}
/// Lowercase string discriminator — matches the SQL `role` column values
/// in `storage.role_grants` and the JSON wire format.
pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Role::Viewer => "viewer",
Role::Commenter => "commenter",
Role::Contributor => "contributor",
Role::Editor => "editor",
Role::Owner => "owner",
}
}
/// Parse a role from its SQL / JSON string discriminator. Returns
/// `None` for unknown values. Accepts the legacy `"admin"` spelling
/// for one release of API compat (clients that cached the old name
/// keep working; new responses always emit `"owner"`).
pub fn parse(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
match s {
"viewer" => Some(Role::Viewer),
"commenter" => Some(Role::Commenter),
"contributor" => Some(Role::Contributor),
"editor" => Some(Role::Editor),
"owner" => Some(Role::Owner),
// Legacy compat: drop after one release once all clients are
// updated. Emits a debug log so we can track stragglers.
"admin" => {
tracing::debug!(
target: "oxicloud::grants",
"Role::parse: accepted legacy 'admin' string as Role::Owner"
);
Some(Role::Owner)
}
_ => None,
}
}
/// Every role, in a stable order. Used by `roles_implying` and exposed
/// to the UI so the share modal can render the full picker without
/// hardcoding the list.
///
/// **UI scope today**: the share dialog renders only `Viewer`,
/// `Editor`, and `Owner` (matches the existing 3-button UX). The
/// `Commenter` and `Contributor` variants are implemented server-
/// side and accepted on the API surface, reserved for future UI
/// exposure when a real use case asks for them. Until then they
/// stay invisible to end users — no picker option, no documentation
/// surface.
///
/// Any role can be granted on any resource type. Permission bundles
/// that include capabilities the resource type doesn't check for
/// (e.g. `Manage` on a folder, `Create` on a file) simply produce
/// harmless no-ops — no separate validation layer is needed.
pub const ALL: [Role; 5] = [
Role::Viewer,
Role::Commenter,
Role::Contributor,
Role::Editor,
Role::Owner,
];
}
/// Inverse of [`Role::expand`]: returns every role whose bundle contains
/// the given permission. Used by the engine to build the SQL
/// `WHERE role IN (...)` filter on hot-path queries like "what drives can
/// this caller read?":
///
/// ```ignore
/// SELECT resource_id FROM role_grants
/// WHERE subject_id = $1
/// AND resource_type = 'drive'
/// AND role IN (roles_implying(Permission::Read));
/// ```
///
/// Precomputed in code rather than stored in the DB — `Role` and
/// `Permission` are both small fixed enums, the table can never grow
/// beyond a handful of rows, and keeping it in-code makes "what changes
/// when I add a Permission?" a single grep target.
pub fn roles_implying(permission: Permission) -> &'static [Role] {
use Permission::*;
match permission {
// Every role grants Read — viewer is the floor.
Read => &[
Role::Viewer,
Role::Commenter,
Role::Contributor,
Role::Editor,
Role::Owner,
],
Comment => &[Role::Commenter, Role::Editor, Role::Owner],
Create => &[Role::Contributor, Role::Editor, Role::Owner],
Update => &[Role::Editor, Role::Owner],
Delete => &[Role::Owner],
Share => &[Role::Owner],
Manage => &[Role::Owner],
impl From<Role> for RoleDto {
fn from(r: Role) -> Self {
match r {
Role::Viewer => RoleDto::Viewer,
Role::Commenter => RoleDto::Commenter,
Role::Contributor => RoleDto::Contributor,
Role::Editor => RoleDto::Editor,
Role::Owner => RoleDto::Owner,
}
}
}
@@ -325,17 +209,18 @@ pub enum SubjectInputDto {
},
}
/// `POST /api/grants` — accepts either `permissions` (explicit) or `role`.
/// Server-side validation requires exactly one of the two to be present.
/// `POST /api/grants` — create or refresh a role assignment.
///
/// Strictly role-keyed since the cleanup PR: callers send exactly one
/// role; the engine writes a single row in `storage.role_grants`. The
/// historical per-permission shape (`permissions: [...]`) was dropped —
/// the OxiCloud UI is the only known caller and it already sends `role`.
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
pub struct CreateGrantDto {
pub subject: SubjectInputDto,
pub resource: ResourceDto,
#[serde(default)]
pub permissions: Option<Vec<PermissionDto>>,
#[serde(default)]
pub role: Option<Role>,
/// Optional expiry for every grant in this request. RFC 3339 / ISO 8601.
pub role: RoleDto,
/// Optional expiry for the grant. RFC 3339 / ISO 8601.
#[serde(default)]
pub expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
}
@@ -345,7 +230,7 @@ pub struct CreateGrantDto {
pub struct UpdateRoleDto {
pub subject: SubjectDto,
pub resource: ResourceDto,
pub role: Role,
pub role: RoleDto,
/// Optional expiry applied to every grant written or updated by this call.
#[serde(default)]
pub expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
@@ -360,7 +245,10 @@ pub struct GrantDto {
pub id: Uuid,
pub subject: SubjectDto,
pub resource: ResourceDto,
pub permission: PermissionDto,
/// Role-keyed since D-Prep cleanup — one row in `storage.role_grants`
/// is one `GrantDto`. The bundle of underlying permissions is implied
/// by the role and recomputed client-side from the same lookup table.
pub role: RoleDto,
pub granted_by: Uuid,
pub granted_at: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
@@ -373,7 +261,7 @@ impl From<Grant> for GrantDto {
id: g.id,
subject: g.subject.into(),
resource: g.resource.into(),
permission: g.permission.into(),
role: g.role.into(),
granted_by: g.granted_by,
granted_at: g.granted_at,
expires_at: g.expires_at,
src/application/ports/authorization_ports.rs
+16 -48
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::common::errors::DomainError;
use crate::domain::services::authorization::{
Grant, GrantCursor, IncomingGrantSummary, OutgoingResourceSummary, Permission, Resource,
ResourceKind, Subject,
ResourceKind, Role, Subject,
};
pub trait AuthorizationEngine: Send + Sync + 'static {
@@ -90,11 +90,7 @@ pub trait AuthorizationEngine: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// Resources explicitly granted to `subject`. Direct grants only — no
/// cascade expansion. Used by `GET /api/grants/incoming`.
async fn list_incoming_grants(
&self,
subject: Subject,
permission_filter: Option<Permission>,
) -> Result<Vec<Grant>, DomainError>;
async fn list_incoming_grants(&self, subject: Subject) -> Result<Vec<Grant>, DomainError>;
/// Cursor-paginated list of resources explicitly granted to `subject`,
/// optionally filtered by resource kind. Multiple permission rows for the
@@ -139,38 +135,20 @@ pub trait AuthorizationEngine: Send + Sync + 'static {
reverse: bool,
) -> Result<(Vec<OutgoingResourceSummary>, Option<GrantCursor>), DomainError>;
/// Create a grant. Idempotent — duplicates are absorbed by the UNIQUE
/// constraint; if the row already exists its `expires_at` is updated.
async fn grant(
&self,
granted_by: Uuid,
subject: Subject,
permission: Permission,
resource: Resource,
expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
) -> Result<Grant, DomainError>;
/// Update `expires_at` on every grant row for the given subject.
/// Used when a share's expiry is changed — one call updates all
/// permission rows for that token in a single UPDATE.
/// Update `expires_at` for every role grant belonging to `subject`.
/// Used by `share_service` when a token-share's expiry is refreshed —
/// the subject (token) maps to a small fixed set of role grants, so a
/// single UPDATE covers them. Resource-scoped expiry changes go through
/// `set_role` (which carries `expires_at` as part of its UPSERT).
async fn set_expiry_for_subject(
&self,
subject: Subject,
expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
) -> Result<(), DomainError>;
/// Update `expires_at` on every grant row for the given `(subject, resource)`
/// pair. Used by `set_role` to sync the expiry of retained grants when the
/// caller changes expiry without changing permissions.
async fn set_expiry_on_resource(
&self,
subject: Subject,
resource: Resource,
expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
) -> Result<(), DomainError>;
/// Revoke a specific grant by its UUID. Returns `Ok(())` whether or not
/// the row existed (idempotent revoke).
/// Revoke a single role grant by its UUID. Idempotent — returns `Ok(())`
/// whether or not the row existed. The id comes from a prior listing
/// or `find_grant_full_by_id` lookup.
async fn revoke(&self, grant_id: Uuid) -> Result<(), DomainError>;
/// Removes every grant whose `resource` matches. Called by lifecycle
@@ -182,20 +160,10 @@ pub trait AuthorizationEngine: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// /group is deleted. Returns the count of rows removed.
async fn revoke_all_for_subject(&self, subject: Subject) -> Result<usize, DomainError>;
// ── Role-keyed grant operations (D-Prep dual-write) ────────────────────
// These manage `storage.role_grants`, the role-keyed table introduced
// by the D-Prep refactor (see `docs/plan/drive.md` §Prerequisite).
//
// During the dual-write window both tables stay populated; the engine
// reads from `access_grants` until the read-path pivot lands. After
// the cleanup PR (which drops `access_grants`), these two methods
// become the ONLY grant write path — the per-permission `grant` /
// `revoke` above are removed at that point.
//
// The handler layer drives these (it knows the Role); lifecycle hook
// bulk-deletes (`revoke_all_for_*` above) wipe role_grants in lockstep
// inside their own implementation, so callers using those paths don't
// need to invoke `clear_role` separately.
// ── Role-keyed grant operations ────────────────────────────────────────
// These are the only grant write path. Lifecycle hook bulk-deletes
// (`revoke_all_for_*` above) wipe matching rows directly, so callers
// using those paths don't need to invoke `clear_role` separately.
/// Set the role for a `(subject, resource)` pair. Idempotent via the
/// UNIQUE `(subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id)`
@@ -207,10 +175,10 @@ pub trait AuthorizationEngine: Send + Sync + 'static {
&self,
granted_by: Uuid,
subject: Subject,
role: crate::application::dtos::grant_dto::Role,
role: Role,
resource: Resource,
expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
) -> Result<(), DomainError>;
) -> Result<Grant, DomainError>;
/// Remove the role for a `(subject, resource)` pair. Idempotent —
/// succeeds whether or not the row existed. Called after `revoke`
src/application/services/auth_application_service.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
/// Visibility rule, evaluated top-to-bottom:
/// 1. **Self lookup** — `caller_id == target_id` always succeeds.
/// 2. **Shared-grant relationship** — caller and target appear
/// together on at least one row of `storage.access_grants`,
/// together on at least one row of `storage.role_grants`,
/// either direction (caller-as-granter / target-as-subject,
/// or target-as-granter / caller-as-subject). Applies to both
/// internal and external callers. This is what lets an
@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
let related: Option<i32> = sqlx::query_scalar(
r#"
SELECT 1
FROM storage.access_grants
FROM storage.role_grants
WHERE (granted_by = $1 AND subject_type = 'user' AND subject_id = $2)
OR (granted_by = $2 AND subject_type = 'user' AND subject_id = $1)
LIMIT 1
src/application/services/share_service.rs
+6 -6
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use tokio::sync::Semaphore;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::domain::repositories::folder_repository::FolderRepository;
use crate::domain::services::authorization::{Permission, Resource, Subject};
use crate::domain::services::authorization::{Resource, Role, Subject};
use crate::infrastructure::repositories::pg::SharePgRepository;
use crate::infrastructure::repositories::pg::file_blob_read_repository::FileBlobReadRepository;
use crate::infrastructure::repositories::pg::folder_db_repository::FolderDbRepository;
@@ -254,9 +254,9 @@ impl ShareUseCase for ShareService {
.await
.map_err(|e| ShareServiceError::Repository(e.to_string()))?;
// Create one Read-only grant for the token subject, carrying expires_at.
// Tokens are always read-only. The DELETE trigger `trg_cleanup_grants_token`
// cleans up this grant when the share is later deleted.
// Anonymous link tokens always get the Viewer role (read-only).
// The `trg_cleanup_grants_token` trigger cleans up this grant when
// the share row is later deleted.
let item_id_uuid = Uuid::parse_str(saved_share.item_id())
.map_err(|_| ShareServiceError::Validation("Invalid item UUID".to_string()))?;
let resource = match saved_share.item_type() {
@@ -267,10 +267,10 @@ impl ShareUseCase for ShareService {
.expires_at
.and_then(|ts| chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(ts as i64, 0));
self.authorization
.grant(
.set_role(
user_id,
Subject::Token(saved_share.id()),
Permission::Read,
Role::Viewer,
resource,
expires_dt,
)
src/application/services/subject_group_service.rs
+13 -13
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
//! - Name validation runs (defence-in-depth alongside the DB CHECK).
//! - Virtual groups (e.g. `Internal`) are protected from mutation.
//! - Audit events are emitted via `tracing::info!(target = "audit", ...)`.
//! - Cascading delete of `storage.access_grants` rows referencing this
//! - Cascading delete of `storage.role_grants` rows referencing this
//! group runs in the same transaction as the group delete.
//!
//! See `migrations/20260612000000_subject_groups.sql` for the schema.
@@ -172,9 +172,9 @@ impl SubjectGroupService {
/// Delete the group; cascades to:
/// - `auth.subject_group_members` rows (FK CASCADE).
/// - `storage.access_grants` rows where `subject_type='group'` and
/// - `storage.role_grants` rows where `subject_type='group'` and
/// `subject_id = id` (handled here, no FK exists between
/// `access_grants` and `subject_groups`).
/// `role_grants` and `subject_groups`).
pub async fn delete(&self, id: Uuid, caller_id: Uuid) -> Result<(), DomainError> {
let existing = self.get_by_id(id).await?;
if existing.is_virtual {
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ impl SubjectGroupService {
})?;
let grants_deleted = sqlx::query(
"DELETE FROM storage.access_grants
"DELETE FROM storage.role_grants
WHERE subject_type = 'group' AND subject_id = $1",
)
.bind(id)
@@ -519,9 +519,9 @@ mod integration_tests {
// ── 13. Grants are revoked atomically when a group is deleted ──────────
//
// The plan said "FK CASCADE", but there's no FK between `access_grants`
// and `subject_groups` (different schemas; the cascade is handled by the
// service's transactional DELETE). This test pins that behaviour.
// There is no FK between `storage.role_grants` and `auth.subject_groups`
// (different schemas); the cascade is handled by the service's
// transactional DELETE. This test pins that behaviour.
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_grants_revoked_when_group_deleted() {
let svc = make_service().await;
@@ -534,21 +534,21 @@ mod integration_tests {
.unwrap();
let resource_id = Uuid::new_v4();
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO storage.access_grants \
"INSERT INTO storage.role_grants \
(subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id, \
permission, granted_by) \
VALUES ('group', $1, 'folder', $2, 'read', $3)",
role, granted_by) \
VALUES ('group', $1, 'folder', $2, 'viewer', $3)",
)
.bind(group.id)
.bind(resource_id)
.bind(admin)
.execute(svc.pool.as_ref())
.await
.expect("insert grant row");
.expect("insert role_grants row");
// Sanity: the grant exists.
let pre: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM storage.access_grants \
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM storage.role_grants \
WHERE subject_type = 'group' AND subject_id = $1",
)
.bind(group.id)
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ mod integration_tests {
svc.delete(group.id, admin).await.unwrap();
let post: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM storage.access_grants \
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM storage.role_grants \
WHERE subject_type = 'group' AND subject_id = $1",
)
.bind(group.id)
src/domain/entities/share.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ pub struct Share {
item_type: ShareItemType,
token: String,
password_hash: Option<String>,
/// Derived from `storage.access_grants.expires_at` — not stored on the share row.
/// Derived from `storage.role_grants.expires_at` — not stored on the share row.
expires_at: Option<u64>,
created_at: u64,
created_by: Uuid,
src/domain/entities/subject_group.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
//!
//! Subject groups are root-owned (no `owner_id`), globally named with an
//! RFC 5321 local-part shape, and able to contain users *or* other groups.
//! Grants in `storage.access_grants` with `subject_type = 'group'` reference
//! Grants in `storage.role_grants` with `subject_type = 'group'` reference
//! a row in `auth.subject_groups`.
//!
//! Cycle prevention and depth-cap (`MAX_GROUP_DEPTH`) are enforced at the
src/domain/repositories/subject_group_repository.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ pub trait SubjectGroupRepository: Send + Sync + 'static {
) -> Result<SubjectGroup, SubjectGroupRepositoryError>;
/// Delete the group. Cascades to `subject_group_members` and to
/// `storage.access_grants` rows referencing this group as subject (via
/// the application service — there is no FK between `access_grants` and
/// `storage.role_grants` rows referencing this group as subject (via
/// the application service — there is no FK between `role_grants` and
/// `subject_groups`, so the service performs the cascade explicitly in
/// the same transaction).
async fn delete(&self, id: Uuid) -> Result<(), SubjectGroupRepositoryError>;
src/domain/services/authorization.rs
+125 -5
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
//! These types are storage-agnostic — they describe the relationship between
//! a subject (who), a resource (what), and a permission (action). The
//! `AuthorizationEngine` port consumes them and the `PgAclEngine` implementation
//! maps them to / from `storage.access_grants` rows.
//! maps them to / from `storage.role_grants` rows.
use crate::application::dtos::cursor::PageCursor;
use std::fmt;
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ impl Subject {
/// `"external"` is no longer accepted: PR-2 of the external-users
/// work folded the federated-identity case into `Subject::User(uuid)`
/// with `auth.users.is_external = TRUE`. The DB CHECK constraint
/// on `storage.access_grants.subject_type` was narrowed to match.
/// on `storage.role_grants.subject_type` was narrowed to match.
pub fn from_parts(subject_type: &str, id: Uuid) -> Option<Self> {
match subject_type {
"user" => Some(Subject::User(id)),
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ impl fmt::Display for Permission {
}
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Grant — a row in storage.access_grants
// Grant — a row in storage.role_grants
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
@@ -208,12 +208,132 @@ pub struct Grant {
pub id: Uuid,
pub subject: Subject,
pub resource: Resource,
pub permission: Permission,
/// Role-keyed since D-Prep cleanup: one `Grant` represents the role
/// row in `storage.role_grants` rather than a single permission. The
/// engine and HTTP surface no longer carry per-permission rows;
/// callers that need permissions use `role.expand()`.
pub role: Role,
pub granted_by: Uuid,
pub granted_at: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
pub expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
}
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Role — a named bundle of permissions
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
//
// Roles are the load-bearing model for ReBAC grants since D-Prep. Each
// `storage.role_grants` row stores one role; the engine expands the bundle
// at read time via `Role::expand()`. Adding a role is two edits:
// 1. a variant here + match arm in `expand()` / `as_str()` / `parse()`
// 2. an `ALTER TYPE storage.grant_role ADD VALUE 'name'` migration
//
// `RoleDto` (DTO layer) carries the wire-format derives + the legacy
// `"admin"` alias for backwards compat.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Debug)]
pub enum Role {
Viewer,
Commenter,
Contributor,
Editor,
Owner,
}
impl Role {
/// Expand the role into its permission bundle. Single source of truth —
/// any code that needs "does this role include Permission X?" routes
/// through here (or its inverse, `roles_implying`).
pub fn expand(self) -> &'static [Permission] {
match self {
Role::Viewer => &[Permission::Read],
Role::Commenter => &[Permission::Read, Permission::Comment],
Role::Contributor => &[Permission::Read, Permission::Create],
Role::Editor => &[
Permission::Read,
Permission::Comment,
Permission::Create,
Permission::Update,
],
Role::Owner => &[
Permission::Read,
Permission::Comment,
Permission::Create,
Permission::Update,
Permission::Share,
Permission::Delete,
Permission::Manage,
],
}
}
/// Lowercase discriminator — matches the SQL `role` ENUM values in
/// `storage.role_grants` (after the `::text` cast).
pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Role::Viewer => "viewer",
Role::Commenter => "commenter",
Role::Contributor => "contributor",
Role::Editor => "editor",
Role::Owner => "owner",
}
}
/// Parse a role from its SQL discriminator. Returns `None` for unknown
/// values. The `"admin"` legacy alias is handled by `RoleDto` at the
/// wire boundary — the database only ever stores the canonical names.
pub fn parse(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
match s {
"viewer" => Some(Role::Viewer),
"commenter" => Some(Role::Commenter),
"contributor" => Some(Role::Contributor),
"editor" => Some(Role::Editor),
"owner" => Some(Role::Owner),
_ => None,
}
}
/// Every role, in declaration order. Mirrors the `storage.grant_role`
/// ENUM order in PG, which is weakest-to-strongest as written here for
/// historical reasons (`storage.grant_role` declares strongest first).
pub const ALL: [Role; 5] = [
Role::Viewer,
Role::Commenter,
Role::Contributor,
Role::Editor,
Role::Owner,
];
}
impl fmt::Display for Role {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "{}", self.as_str())
}
}
/// Inverse of [`Role::expand`]: returns every role whose bundle contains
/// the given permission. Used by the engine to build the SQL
/// `WHERE role IN (...)` filter on hot-path queries like "what drives can
/// this caller read?".
pub fn roles_implying(permission: Permission) -> &'static [Role] {
use Permission::*;
match permission {
Read => &[
Role::Viewer,
Role::Commenter,
Role::Contributor,
Role::Editor,
Role::Owner,
],
Comment => &[Role::Commenter, Role::Editor, Role::Owner],
Create => &[Role::Contributor, Role::Editor, Role::Owner],
Update => &[Role::Editor, Role::Owner],
Delete => &[Role::Owner],
Share => &[Role::Owner],
Manage => &[Role::Owner],
}
}
impl Grant {
pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool {
self.expires_at.is_some_and(|exp| exp < chrono::Utc::now())
@@ -225,7 +345,7 @@ impl Grant {
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/// Resource type without an id — used to filter paginated grant queries by
/// type. Mirrors the `resource_type` column values in `storage.access_grants`.
/// type. Mirrors the `resource_type` column values in `storage.role_grants`.
/// Add new variants here when new resource types are supported.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub enum ResourceKind {
src/infrastructure/repositories/pg/share_pg_repository.rs
+8 -8
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ impl SharePgRepository {
/// Maps a [`sqlx::postgres::PgRow`] to the domain [`Share`] entity.
/// Expects columns: id, item_id, item_name, item_type, token, password_hash,
/// expires_at (derived from access_grants subquery), created_at, created_by, access_count.
/// expires_at (derived from role_grants subquery), created_at, created_by, access_count.
fn row_to_entity(row: &sqlx::postgres::PgRow) -> Result<Share, DomainError> {
let id: Uuid = row
.try_get("id")
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ impl SharePgRepository {
DomainError::internal_error("Share", format!("Failed to read token: {e}"))
})?;
let password_hash: Option<String> = row.try_get("password_hash").unwrap_or(None);
// expires_at derived from access_grants subquery (unix seconds as i64)
// expires_at derived from role_grants subquery (unix seconds as i64)
let expires_at: Option<i64> = row.try_get("expires_at").unwrap_or(None);
let created_at: i64 = row.try_get("created_at").map_err(|e| {
DomainError::internal_error("Share", format!("Failed to read created_at: {e}"))
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ impl ShareStoragePort for SharePgRepository {
RETURNING
id, item_id, item_name, item_type, token, password_hash,
(SELECT MIN(EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM ag.expires_at)::BIGINT)
FROM storage.access_grants ag
FROM storage.role_grants ag
WHERE ag.subject_type = 'token' AND ag.subject_id = id) AS expires_at,
created_at, created_by, access_count
"#,
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ impl ShareStoragePort for SharePgRepository {
r#"
SELECT s.id, s.item_id, s.item_name, s.item_type, s.token, s.password_hash,
(SELECT MIN(EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM ag.expires_at)::BIGINT)
FROM storage.access_grants ag
FROM storage.role_grants ag
WHERE ag.subject_type = 'token' AND ag.subject_id = s.id) AS expires_at,
s.created_at, s.created_by, s.access_count
FROM storage.shares s
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ impl ShareStoragePort for SharePgRepository {
r#"
SELECT s.id, s.item_id, s.item_name, s.item_type, s.token, s.password_hash,
(SELECT MIN(EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM ag.expires_at)::BIGINT)
FROM storage.access_grants ag
FROM storage.role_grants ag
WHERE ag.subject_type = 'token' AND ag.subject_id = s.id) AS expires_at,
s.created_at, s.created_by, s.access_count
FROM storage.shares s
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ impl ShareStoragePort for SharePgRepository {
r#"
SELECT s.id, s.item_id, s.item_name, s.item_type, s.token, s.password_hash,
(SELECT MIN(EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM ag.expires_at)::BIGINT)
FROM storage.access_grants ag
FROM storage.role_grants ag
WHERE ag.subject_type = 'token' AND ag.subject_id = s.id) AS expires_at,
s.created_at, s.created_by, s.access_count
FROM storage.shares s
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ impl ShareStoragePort for SharePgRepository {
RETURNING
id, item_id, item_name, item_type, token, password_hash,
(SELECT MIN(EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM ag.expires_at)::BIGINT)
FROM storage.access_grants ag
FROM storage.role_grants ag
WHERE ag.subject_type = 'token' AND ag.subject_id = storage.shares.id) AS expires_at,
created_at, created_by, access_count
"#,
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ impl ShareStoragePort for SharePgRepository {
r#"
SELECT s.id, s.item_id, s.item_name, s.item_type, s.token, s.password_hash,
(SELECT MIN(EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM ag.expires_at)::BIGINT)
FROM storage.access_grants ag
FROM storage.role_grants ag
WHERE ag.subject_type = 'token' AND ag.subject_id = s.id) AS expires_at,
s.created_at, s.created_by, s.access_count,
COUNT(*) OVER() AS total_count
src/infrastructure/repositories/pg/subject_group_pg_repository.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -272,8 +272,8 @@ impl SubjectGroupRepository for SubjectGroupPgRepository {
async fn delete(&self, id: Uuid) -> Result<(), SubjectGroupRepositoryError> {
// The application service is responsible for clearing related
// `storage.access_grants` rows in the same transaction (there's no
// FK between access_grants and subject_groups). The subject_group_members
// `storage.role_grants` rows in the same transaction (there's no
// FK between role_grants and subject_groups). The subject_group_members
// rows cascade automatically via FK.
let result = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM auth.subject_groups WHERE id = $1")
.bind(id)
src/infrastructure/services/pg_acl_engine.rs
+199 -247
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
//! PostgreSQL-backed implementation of `AuthorizationEngine`.
//!
//! Stores grants in `storage.access_grants` (see migration
//! `20260520000000_rebac_access_grants.sql`). Cascading is resolved at check
//! time via PostgreSQL `ltree` `@>` (ancestor-of) on `storage.folders.lpath`,
//! using the existing GiST index for O(log N) traversal.
//! Stores grants in `storage.role_grants` (one role per (subject, resource)
//! pair; the role's permission bundle is expanded in code via
//! `Role::expand()`). Cascading is resolved at check time via PostgreSQL
//! `ltree` `@>` (ancestor-of) on `storage.folders.lpath`, using the
//! existing GiST index for O(log N) traversal.
//!
//! Owner is implicit — `storage.folders.user_id` / `storage.files.user_id`
//! are checked first via dedicated helpers; if the caller is the owner, no
//! SQL against `access_grants` happens.
//! SQL against `role_grants` happens.
//!
//! ## Lifecycle cleanup
//!
@@ -37,14 +38,13 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
use moka::future::Cache;
use sqlx::PgPool;
use crate::application::dtos::grant_dto::roles_implying;
use crate::application::ports::authorization_ports::AuthorizationEngine;
use crate::common::errors::DomainError;
use crate::domain::entities::subject_group::INTERNAL_GROUP_ID;
use crate::domain::repositories::subject_group_repository::SubjectGroupRepository;
use crate::domain::services::authorization::{
Grant, GrantCursor, IncomingGrantSummary, OutgoingGrantEntry, OutgoingResourceSummary,
Permission, Resource, ResourceKind, Subject,
Permission, Resource, ResourceKind, Role, Subject, roles_implying,
};
use crate::infrastructure::repositories::pg::SubjectGroupPgRepository;
use crate::infrastructure::repositories::pg::file_blob_read_repository::FileBlobReadRepository;
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ impl PgAclEngine {
}
/// Expand a caller's `Subject` into the `(subject_types, subject_ids)`
/// pair that should be matched in `storage.access_grants`. For User
/// pair that should be matched in `storage.role_grants`. For User
/// callers this is `(["user","group"], [uid, …transitive groups, INTERNAL])`;
/// for any non-user subject (Token / External / Group as direct caller)
/// it's a single-element pair with no cascade.
@@ -239,8 +239,8 @@ impl PgAclEngine {
}
/// Convert a `Permission` into the array of role strings whose bundle
/// includes it — used to bind the `g.role = ANY($N::text[])` filter on
/// every cascade / lookup query that reads `storage.role_grants`.
/// includes it — bound as `ANY($N::storage.grant_role[])` so the
/// ENUM-typed `role` column compares without an implicit text cast.
///
/// This is the inverse of `Role::expand()`, precomputed via
/// `grant_dto::roles_implying()`. The mapping is small and static (≤5
@@ -264,11 +264,10 @@ impl PgAclEngine {
/// `subject_ids` is the expanded set returned by `expand_user` (or a
/// single-element vec for non-user callers).
///
/// **D-Prep**: now reads `storage.role_grants` (1 row per role
/// assignment) instead of `storage.access_grants` (N rows per role).
/// The permission filter `g.permission = $3` becomes
/// `g.role = ANY($3::text[])` where the array is the set of roles whose
/// bundle includes the requested permission — see `roles_implying()`.
/// Reads `storage.role_grants` (1 row per role assignment); a permission
/// filter `g.permission = $3` becomes `g.role = ANY($3::storage.grant_role[])` where
/// the array is the set of roles whose bundle includes the requested
/// permission — see `roles_implying()`.
///
/// Uses the GiST index on `storage.folders.lpath` for O(log N) cascade.
async fn folder_cascade_grant_exists(
@@ -288,7 +287,7 @@ impl PgAclEngine {
JOIN storage.folders gf ON gf.id = g.resource_id
WHERE g.subject_type = ANY($1)
AND g.subject_id = ANY($2)
AND g.role = ANY($3::text[])
AND g.role = ANY($3::storage.grant_role[])
AND g.resource_type = 'folder'
AND (g.expires_at IS NULL OR g.expires_at > NOW())
AND gf.lpath @> (SELECT lpath FROM storage.folders WHERE id = $4)
@@ -329,7 +328,7 @@ impl PgAclEngine {
FROM storage.role_grants
WHERE subject_type = ANY($1)
AND subject_id = ANY($2)
AND role = ANY($3::text[])
AND role = ANY($3::storage.grant_role[])
AND resource_type = 'file' AND resource_id = $4
AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())
UNION ALL
@@ -340,7 +339,7 @@ impl PgAclEngine {
JOIN storage.files target_f ON target_f.id = $4
WHERE g.subject_type = ANY($1)
AND g.subject_id = ANY($2)
AND g.role = ANY($3::text[])
AND g.role = ANY($3::storage.grant_role[])
AND g.resource_type = 'folder'
AND (g.expires_at IS NULL OR g.expires_at > NOW())
AND target_f.folder_id IS NOT NULL
@@ -361,39 +360,16 @@ impl PgAclEngine {
Ok(exists.is_some())
}
/// Look up a single grant by id. Returns `(resource, granted_by)` so
/// the REST `DELETE /api/grants/{id}` handler can decide authorization
/// without a second round-trip. Returns `Ok(None)` if no such grant.
pub async fn find_grant_by_id(
&self,
grant_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<(Resource, Uuid)>, DomainError> {
let row: Option<(String, Uuid, Uuid)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT resource_type, resource_id, granted_by FROM storage.access_grants WHERE id = $1",
)
.bind(grant_id)
.fetch_optional(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("find_grant_by_id: {e}")))?;
let Some((rt, rid, granter)) = row else {
return Ok(None);
};
let res = Resource::from_parts(&rt, rid)
.ok_or_else(|| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", "unknown resource_type"))?;
Ok(Some((res, granter)))
}
/// Variant of `find_grant_by_id` that also returns the subject —
/// needed by `POST /api/grants/{id}/notify` to resolve who to email.
/// Returns `(subject, resource, granted_by)` or `None`.
/// Look up a single role grant by id, returning the actors a revoke /
/// notify handler needs to make a decision without a second round-trip.
/// Returns `(subject, resource, granted_by)` or `None` if no such row.
pub async fn find_grant_full_by_id(
&self,
grant_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<(Subject, Resource, Uuid)>, DomainError> {
let row: Option<(String, Uuid, String, Uuid, Uuid)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id, granted_by \
FROM storage.access_grants WHERE id = $1",
FROM storage.role_grants WHERE id = $1",
)
.bind(grant_id)
.fetch_optional(self.pool.as_ref())
@@ -410,8 +386,14 @@ impl PgAclEngine {
Ok(Some((subject, resource, granter)))
}
/// Row type for all full-grant SELECT queries:
/// (id, subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id, permission, granted_by, granted_at, expires_at)
/// Row type for `storage.role_grants` SELECTs:
/// (id, subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id, role, granted_by, granted_at, expires_at).
///
/// Builds a single role-keyed `Grant` per row. `Grant` is role-keyed
/// since the D-Prep cleanup PR — every listing method returns role
/// rows directly; bundle expansion to per-permission Grants no longer
/// happens here. Callers that need the permission set use
/// `grant.role.expand()` at the call site.
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
fn row_to_grant(
row: (
@@ -430,13 +412,13 @@ impl PgAclEngine {
.ok_or_else(|| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", "unknown subject_type"))?;
let resource = Resource::from_parts(&row.3, row.4)
.ok_or_else(|| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", "unknown resource_type"))?;
let permission = Permission::parse(&row.5)
.ok_or_else(|| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", "unknown permission"))?;
let role = Role::parse(&row.5)
.ok_or_else(|| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", "unknown role"))?;
Ok(Grant {
id: row.0,
subject,
resource,
permission,
role,
granted_by: row.6,
granted_at: row.7,
expires_at: row.8,
@@ -554,15 +536,14 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
result
}
async fn list_incoming_grants(
&self,
subject: Subject,
permission_filter: Option<Permission>,
) -> Result<Vec<Grant>, DomainError> {
let perm_str = permission_filter.map(|p| p.as_str().to_string());
async fn list_incoming_grants(&self, subject: Subject) -> Result<Vec<Grant>, DomainError> {
let counters = QueryCounters::default();
let (subject_types, subject_ids) = self.subject_match_set(subject, &counters).await?;
// `ORDER BY role ASC` exploits the `storage.grant_role` ENUM
// declared as `(owner, editor, contributor, commenter, viewer)`,
// so the sort order matches the UX requirement ("Owner > Editor
// > Contributor > Commenter > Viewer") without a per-row CASE.
let rows = sqlx::query_as::<
_,
(
@@ -579,18 +560,16 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
>(
r#"
SELECT id, subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id,
permission, granted_by, granted_at, expires_at
FROM storage.access_grants
role::text, granted_by, granted_at, expires_at
FROM storage.role_grants
WHERE subject_type = ANY($1)
AND subject_id = ANY($2)
AND ($3::text IS NULL OR permission = $3)
ORDER BY granted_at DESC
LIMIT $4
ORDER BY role ASC, granted_at DESC
LIMIT $3
"#,
)
.bind(&subject_types)
.bind(&subject_ids)
.bind(perm_str)
.bind(MAX_GRANT_ROWS + 1)
.fetch_all(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
@@ -621,7 +600,12 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
// NULL otherwise. This lets every sort mode share a single query_as call.
// 0 resource_type String
// 1 resource_id Uuid
// 2 permissions Vec<String>
// 2 roles Vec<String> — every distinct role granting access to this
// resource (post-D-Prep). Expanded to permissions
// in `IncomingGrantSummary` via `Role::expand()`.
// Multiple entries possible when a user has both
// a direct grant and a group-mediated grant on
// the same resource.
// 3 granted_at DateTime<Utc>
// 4 granted_by Uuid
// 5 sort_str Option<String> — resource_name (name/type) or owner_name (granted_by)
@@ -653,14 +637,20 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
// is `(["user","group"], [uid, …transitive groups, INTERNAL])` so the
// listing includes every resource the user can reach via a group
// grant (matching what `check()` allows). See `subject_match_set`.
//
// Post-D-Prep this reads `storage.role_grants` and aggregates the
// ENUM-typed `role` column into a text array. Multiple roles can
// appear per resource when the caller reaches it via both a direct
// grant and a group-mediated grant — the union of role bundles
// produces the displayed permission set in Rust below.
const AGG: &str = r#"agg AS (
SELECT
resource_type,
resource_id,
array_agg(DISTINCT permission ORDER BY permission) AS permissions,
array_agg(DISTINCT role::text ORDER BY role::text) AS roles,
MIN(granted_at) AS granted_at,
(array_agg(granted_by ORDER BY granted_at))[1] AS granted_by
FROM storage.access_grants
FROM storage.role_grants
WHERE subject_type = ANY($1)
AND subject_id = ANY($2)
AND ($3::text[] IS NULL OR resource_type = ANY($3))
@@ -725,7 +715,7 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
LEFT JOIN storage.folders f ON f.id = agg.resource_id AND agg.resource_type = 'folder'
LEFT JOIN storage.files fi ON fi.id = agg.resource_id AND agg.resource_type = 'file'
)
SELECT resource_type, resource_id, permissions, granted_at, granted_by, sort_str, sort_int
SELECT resource_type, resource_id, roles, granted_at, granted_by, sort_str, sort_int
FROM named
WHERE {where_clause}
ORDER BY {order_clause}
@@ -765,7 +755,7 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
FROM agg
LEFT JOIN auth.users u ON u.id = agg.granted_by
)
SELECT resource_type, resource_id, permissions, granted_at, granted_by, sort_str, sort_int
SELECT resource_type, resource_id, roles, granted_at, granted_by, sort_str, sort_int
FROM owner_named
WHERE {where_clause}
ORDER BY {order_clause}
@@ -793,7 +783,7 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
};
format!(
r#"WITH {AGG}
SELECT resource_type, resource_id, permissions, granted_at, granted_by,
SELECT resource_type, resource_id, roles, granted_at, granted_by,
NULL::text AS sort_str,
NULL::bigint AS sort_int
FROM agg
@@ -875,14 +865,21 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
};
// ── Convert rows to domain summaries ──────────────────────────────────
// Post-D-Prep: the SQL aggregate produces a `roles` text array. We
// expand each role's bundle and union them — direct grants and
// group-mediated grants on the same resource collapse to a single
// deduplicated permission set, matching the pre-pivot behaviour.
let summaries = rows
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|(rt, rid, perms_str, granted_at, granted_by, _, _)| {
.filter_map(|(rt, rid, roles_str, granted_at, granted_by, _, _)| {
let resource_type = ResourceKind::parse(&rt)?;
let permissions = perms_str
let mut permissions: Vec<Permission> = roles_str
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|s| Permission::parse(&s))
.filter_map(|s| Role::parse(&s))
.flat_map(|r| r.expand().iter().copied())
.collect();
permissions.sort_by_key(|p| p.as_str());
permissions.dedup();
Some(IncomingGrantSummary {
resource_type,
resource_id: rid,
@@ -897,6 +894,14 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
}
async fn list_grants_on_resource(&self, resource: Resource) -> Result<Vec<Grant>, DomainError> {
// Pivoted to `storage.role_grants` (see `list_incoming_grants`).
// Each role row expands to N permission-keyed `Grant` rows via
// `role_row_to_grants` until the public `Grant` shape becomes
// role-keyed.
//
// `ORDER BY role ASC` exploits the `storage.grant_role` ENUM's
// declaration order (owner first → viewer last) so the share
// dialog's "who has access" list shows strongest grants on top.
let rows = sqlx::query_as::<
_,
(
@@ -913,11 +918,11 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
>(
r#"
SELECT id, subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id,
permission, granted_by, granted_at, expires_at
FROM storage.access_grants
role::text, granted_by, granted_at, expires_at
FROM storage.role_grants
WHERE resource_type = $1
AND resource_id = $2
ORDER BY granted_at DESC
ORDER BY role ASC, granted_at DESC
LIMIT $3
"#,
)
@@ -942,7 +947,10 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
) -> Result<(Vec<OutgoingResourceSummary>, Option<GrantCursor>), DomainError> {
let fetch_limit = (limit as i64) + 1;
// Row shape — one row per (resource, subject, permission).
// Row shape — post-D-Prep, one row per (resource, subject) since
// `storage.role_grants` carries exactly one role per pair (UNIQUE
// constraint). Permission bundles are expanded in the row consumer
// via `Role::expand()`.
// Columns:
// 0 resource_type String
// 1 resource_id Uuid
@@ -951,9 +959,9 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
// 4 subject_id Uuid
// 5 subject_display String — username or share item_name
// 6 grant_id Uuid
// 7 granted_at DateTime<Utc> — this (subject, perm) row
// 7 granted_at DateTime<Utc> — this (subject, role) row
// 8 expires_at Option<DateTime<Utc>>
// 9 permission String
// 9 role String — `grant_role` ENUM as text
// 10 sort_str Option<String>
// 11 sort_int Option<i64>
// 12 has_password bool — token: shares.password_hash IS NOT NULL
@@ -1040,7 +1048,7 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
CASE WHEN ag.resource_type = 'file' THEN fi.name END
) AS sort_str,
{sort_int_expr} AS sort_int
FROM storage.access_grants ag
FROM storage.role_grants ag
LEFT JOIN storage.folders f ON f.id = ag.resource_id AND ag.resource_type = 'folder'
LEFT JOIN storage.files fi ON fi.id = ag.resource_id AND ag.resource_type = 'file'
WHERE ag.granted_by = $1
@@ -1055,12 +1063,12 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
SELECT ag.resource_type, ag.resource_id, rp.first_shared_at,
ag.subject_type, ag.subject_id,
COALESCE(u.username, u.email, sg.name::text, sh.item_name, fi.name, fld.name, ag.subject_id::text) AS subject_display,
ag.id AS grant_id, ag.granted_at, ag.expires_at, ag.permission,
ag.id AS grant_id, ag.granted_at, ag.expires_at, ag.role::text AS role,
rp.sort_str, rp.sort_int,
(sh.password_hash IS NOT NULL) AS has_password,
COALESCE(u.is_external, FALSE) AS is_external
FROM rp
JOIN storage.access_grants ag
JOIN storage.role_grants ag
ON ag.resource_type = rp.resource_type AND ag.resource_id = rp.resource_id
AND ag.granted_by = $1
LEFT JOIN auth.users u ON ag.subject_type = 'user' AND u.id = ag.subject_id
@@ -1129,7 +1137,7 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
ELSE 3
END)::bigint AS sort_int,
MIN(ag.granted_at) AS first_granted_at
FROM storage.access_grants ag
FROM storage.role_grants ag
LEFT JOIN auth.users u
ON ag.subject_type = 'user' AND u.id = ag.subject_id
LEFT JOIN auth.subject_groups sg
@@ -1160,13 +1168,13 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
ag.id AS grant_id,
ag.granted_at,
ag.expires_at,
ag.permission,
ag.role::text AS role,
LOWER(rp.subject_display) AS sort_str,
rp.sort_int,
rp.has_password,
rp.is_external
FROM rp
JOIN storage.access_grants ag
JOIN storage.role_grants ag
ON ag.resource_type = rp.resource_type
AND ag.resource_id = rp.resource_id
AND ag.subject_type = rp.subject_type
@@ -1180,7 +1188,12 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
// Page on (role_order, subject_display, resource_id) triples so that all
// of one person's grants within a role are contiguous — enabling aggregation
// ("Bob on Folder A, Folder B") to work correctly across cursor pages.
// role_order: 0 = admin (has delete+share), 1 = editor (has create or update), 2 = viewer
//
// role_order matches the `storage.grant_role` ENUM declaration
// order (strongest first) via `array_position`, so
// `sort_int ASC` matches the UX requirement: 1 = owner,
// 2 = editor, 3 = contributor, 4 = commenter, 5 = viewer.
// 1-based because `array_position` is.
// Cursor: sort_int=role_order, resource_name=LOWER(subject_display), resource_id
let (page_where, page_order) = if reverse {
(
@@ -1209,15 +1222,20 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
MAX(COALESCE(u.username, u.email, sh.item_name, ag.subject_id::text)) AS subject_display,
BOOL_OR(sh.password_hash IS NOT NULL) AS has_password,
COALESCE(BOOL_OR(u.is_external), FALSE) AS is_external,
CASE
WHEN BOOL_OR(ag.permission = 'delete')
AND BOOL_OR(ag.permission = 'share') THEN 0
WHEN BOOL_OR(ag.permission = 'create')
OR BOOL_OR(ag.permission = 'update') THEN 1
ELSE 2
END::bigint AS sort_int,
-- One role per (resource, subject) post-D-Prep
-- (UNIQUE constraint on role_grants), so MAX
-- returns that single row's role. `array_position`
-- against the ENUM's declaration order produces a
-- 1-based rank: owner=1 → viewer=5. Strength
-- ordering tracks the ENUM declaration — adding
-- a new role between owner and viewer doesn't
-- need a parallel CASE update here.
array_position(
enum_range(NULL::storage.grant_role),
MAX(ag.role)
)::bigint AS sort_int,
MIN(ag.granted_at) AS first_granted_at
FROM storage.access_grants ag
FROM storage.role_grants ag
LEFT JOIN auth.users u
ON ag.subject_type = 'user' AND u.id = ag.subject_id
LEFT JOIN storage.shares sh
@@ -1246,13 +1264,13 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
ag.id AS grant_id,
ag.granted_at,
ag.expires_at,
ag.permission,
ag.role::text AS role,
LOWER(rp.subject_display) AS sort_str,
rp.sort_int,
rp.has_password,
rp.is_external
FROM rp
JOIN storage.access_grants ag
JOIN storage.role_grants ag
ON ag.resource_type = rp.resource_type
AND ag.resource_id = rp.resource_id
AND ag.subject_type = rp.subject_type
@@ -1284,7 +1302,7 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
SELECT resource_type, resource_id, MIN(granted_at) AS first_shared_at,
NULL::text AS sort_str,
NULL::bigint AS sort_int
FROM storage.access_grants
FROM storage.role_grants
WHERE granted_by = $1
GROUP BY resource_type, resource_id
),
@@ -1297,12 +1315,12 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
SELECT ag.resource_type, ag.resource_id, rp.first_shared_at,
ag.subject_type, ag.subject_id,
COALESCE(u.username, u.email, sh.item_name, fi.name, fld.name, ag.subject_id::text) AS subject_display,
ag.id AS grant_id, ag.granted_at, ag.expires_at, ag.permission,
ag.id AS grant_id, ag.granted_at, ag.expires_at, ag.role::text AS role,
NULL::text AS sort_str, NULL::bigint AS sort_int,
(sh.password_hash IS NOT NULL) AS has_password,
COALESCE(u.is_external, FALSE) AS is_external
FROM rp
JOIN storage.access_grants ag
JOIN storage.role_grants ag
ON ag.resource_type = rp.resource_type AND ag.resource_id = rp.resource_id
AND ag.granted_by = $1
LEFT JOIN auth.users u ON ag.subject_type = 'user' AND u.id = ag.subject_id
@@ -1380,7 +1398,7 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
grant_id,
granted_at,
expires_at,
perm_str,
role_str,
_,
_,
has_password,
@@ -1389,7 +1407,7 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
let Some(resource_type) = ResourceKind::parse(&rt_str) else {
continue;
};
let Some(perm) = Permission::parse(&perm_str) else {
let Some(role) = Role::parse(&role_str) else {
continue;
};
let key = (resource_id, subj_id);
@@ -1409,8 +1427,10 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
},
)
});
if !entry.permissions.contains(&perm) {
entry.permissions.push(perm);
for &perm in role.expand() {
if !entry.permissions.contains(&perm) {
entry.permissions.push(perm);
}
}
}
@@ -1498,7 +1518,7 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
grant_id,
granted_at,
expires_at,
perm_str,
role_str,
_,
_,
has_password,
@@ -1507,7 +1527,7 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
let Some(resource_type) = ResourceKind::parse(&rt_str) else {
continue;
};
let Some(perm) = Permission::parse(&perm_str) else {
let Some(role) = Role::parse(&role_str) else {
continue;
};
@@ -1531,8 +1551,10 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
has_password,
is_external,
});
if !entry.permissions.contains(&perm) {
entry.permissions.push(perm);
for &perm in role.expand() {
if !entry.permissions.contains(&perm) {
entry.permissions.push(perm);
}
}
}
@@ -1578,6 +1600,11 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
}
async fn list_outgoing_grants(&self, granted_by: Uuid) -> Result<Vec<Grant>, DomainError> {
// Pivoted to `storage.role_grants` (see `list_incoming_grants`).
// Group membership doesn't apply on the outgoing side — we
// filter by `granted_by` directly. Bundle expansion still
// happens at read time via `role_row_to_grants` until the
// public `Grant` shape becomes role-keyed.
let rows = sqlx::query_as::<
_,
(
@@ -1594,10 +1621,10 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
>(
r#"
SELECT id, subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id,
permission, granted_by, granted_at, expires_at
FROM storage.access_grants
role::text, granted_by, granted_at, expires_at
FROM storage.role_grants
WHERE granted_by = $1
ORDER BY granted_at DESC
ORDER BY role ASC, granted_at DESC
"#,
)
.bind(granted_by)
@@ -1608,11 +1635,68 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
rows.into_iter().map(Self::row_to_grant).collect()
}
async fn grant(
async fn set_expiry_for_subject(
&self,
subject: Subject,
expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
) -> Result<(), DomainError> {
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE storage.role_grants SET expires_at = $3 \
WHERE subject_type = $1 AND subject_id = $2",
)
.bind(subject.type_str())
.bind(subject.id())
.bind(expires_at)
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| {
DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("set_expiry_for_subject: {e}"))
})?;
Ok(())
}
async fn revoke(&self, grant_id: Uuid) -> Result<(), DomainError> {
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM storage.role_grants WHERE id = $1")
.bind(grant_id)
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("revoke: {e}")))?;
Ok(())
}
async fn revoke_all_for_resource(&self, resource: Resource) -> Result<usize, DomainError> {
let result = sqlx::query(
"DELETE FROM storage.role_grants WHERE resource_type = $1 AND resource_id = $2",
)
.bind(resource.type_str())
.bind(resource.id())
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("revoke for resource: {e}")))?;
Ok(result.rows_affected() as usize)
}
async fn revoke_all_for_subject(&self, subject: Subject) -> Result<usize, DomainError> {
let result = sqlx::query(
"DELETE FROM storage.role_grants WHERE subject_type = $1 AND subject_id = $2",
)
.bind(subject.type_str())
.bind(subject.id())
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("revoke for subject: {e}")))?;
Ok(result.rows_affected() as usize)
}
// ── D-Prep role_grants writes ──────────────────────────────────────────
async fn set_role(
&self,
granted_by: Uuid,
subject: Subject,
permission: Permission,
role: Role,
resource: Resource,
expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
) -> Result<Grant, DomainError> {
@@ -1630,149 +1714,17 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
),
>(
r#"
INSERT INTO storage.access_grants
(subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id, permission, granted_by, expires_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7)
ON CONFLICT (subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id, permission)
DO UPDATE SET expires_at = EXCLUDED.expires_at
RETURNING id, subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id,
permission, granted_by, granted_at, expires_at
"#,
)
.bind(subject.type_str())
.bind(subject.id())
.bind(resource.type_str())
.bind(resource.id())
.bind(permission.as_str())
.bind(granted_by)
.bind(expires_at)
.fetch_one(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("insert grant: {e}")))?;
Self::row_to_grant(row)
}
async fn set_expiry_for_subject(
&self,
subject: Subject,
expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
) -> Result<(), DomainError> {
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE storage.access_grants SET expires_at = $3 WHERE subject_type = $1 AND subject_id = $2",
)
.bind(subject.type_str())
.bind(subject.id())
.bind(expires_at)
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("set_expiry_for_subject: {e}")))?;
Ok(())
}
async fn set_expiry_on_resource(
&self,
subject: Subject,
resource: Resource,
expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
) -> Result<(), DomainError> {
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE storage.access_grants SET expires_at = $3 \
WHERE subject_type = $1 AND subject_id = $2 \
AND resource_type = $4 AND resource_id = $5",
)
.bind(subject.type_str())
.bind(subject.id())
.bind(expires_at)
.bind(resource.type_str())
.bind(resource.id())
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| {
DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("set_expiry_on_resource: {e}"))
})?;
Ok(())
}
async fn revoke(&self, grant_id: Uuid) -> Result<(), DomainError> {
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM storage.access_grants WHERE id = $1")
.bind(grant_id)
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("revoke: {e}")))?;
Ok(())
}
async fn revoke_all_for_resource(&self, resource: Resource) -> Result<usize, DomainError> {
// D-Prep dual-write: wipe role_grants for this resource too.
// Idempotent — succeeds whether or not any row existed.
sqlx::query(
"DELETE FROM storage.role_grants WHERE resource_type = $1 AND resource_id = $2",
)
.bind(resource.type_str())
.bind(resource.id())
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| {
DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("revoke role_grants for resource: {e}"))
})?;
let result = sqlx::query(
"DELETE FROM storage.access_grants WHERE resource_type = $1 AND resource_id = $2",
)
.bind(resource.type_str())
.bind(resource.id())
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("revoke for resource: {e}")))?;
Ok(result.rows_affected() as usize)
}
async fn revoke_all_for_subject(&self, subject: Subject) -> Result<usize, DomainError> {
// D-Prep dual-write: wipe role_grants for this subject too.
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM storage.role_grants WHERE subject_type = $1 AND subject_id = $2")
.bind(subject.type_str())
.bind(subject.id())
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| {
DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("revoke role_grants for subject: {e}"))
})?;
let result = sqlx::query(
"DELETE FROM storage.access_grants WHERE subject_type = $1 AND subject_id = $2",
)
.bind(subject.type_str())
.bind(subject.id())
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("revoke for subject: {e}")))?;
Ok(result.rows_affected() as usize)
}
// ── D-Prep role_grants writes ──────────────────────────────────────────
async fn set_role(
&self,
granted_by: Uuid,
subject: Subject,
role: crate::application::dtos::grant_dto::Role,
resource: Resource,
expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
) -> Result<(), DomainError> {
sqlx::query(
r#"
INSERT INTO storage.role_grants
(subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id,
role, granted_by, expires_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5::storage.grant_role, $6, $7)
ON CONFLICT (subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id)
DO UPDATE SET role = EXCLUDED.role,
expires_at = EXCLUDED.expires_at,
granted_by = EXCLUDED.granted_by
RETURNING id, subject_type, subject_id, resource_type, resource_id,
role::text, granted_by, granted_at, expires_at
"#,
)
.bind(subject.type_str())
@@ -1782,11 +1734,11 @@ impl AuthorizationEngine for PgAclEngine {
.bind(role.as_str())
.bind(granted_by)
.bind(expires_at)
.execute(self.pool.as_ref())
.fetch_one(self.pool.as_ref())
.await
.map_err(|e| DomainError::internal_error("PgAcl", format!("set_role: {e}")))?;
Ok(())
Self::row_to_grant(row)
}
async fn clear_role(&self, subject: Subject, resource: Resource) -> Result<(), DomainError> {
src/integration_test_support.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ pub fn test_db_url() -> String {
/// OnceCell so concurrent test threads block until the first caller
/// finishes; subsequent calls are zero-cost.
///
/// Order matters: `storage.access_grants` rows go first because there's
/// Order matters: `storage.role_grants` rows go first because there's
/// no FK from there to `auth.subject_groups` (the service's `delete`
/// path does this transactionally; here we bypass the service).
static CLEANUP_ONCE: tokio::sync::OnceCell<()> = tokio::sync::OnceCell::const_new();
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ pub async fn ensure_clean_test_db(pool: &PgPool) {
CLEANUP_ONCE
.get_or_init(|| async {
let _ = sqlx::query(
"DELETE FROM storage.access_grants
"DELETE FROM storage.role_grants
WHERE subject_type = 'group'
AND subject_id IN (
SELECT id FROM auth.subject_groups WHERE name LIKE 'rust-test-%'
src/interfaces/api/handlers/grant_handler.rs
+30 -170
View File
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::application::dtos::cursor::PageCursor;
use crate::application::dtos::grant_dto::{
CreateGrantDto, CreateGrantResponseDto, GrantDto, MySharesDto, NotifyOutcomeSetDto,
OutgoingResourceGrantDto, OutgoingResourceItemDto, PermissionDto, ResourceContentDto,
ResourceDto, ResourceTypeDto, Role, SharedWithMeDto, SharedWithMeItemDto, SharedWithMeQuery,
SubjectDto, SubjectInputDto, UpdateRoleDto, role_from_permissions,
OutgoingResourceGrantDto, OutgoingResourceItemDto, ResourceContentDto, ResourceDto,
ResourceTypeDto, SharedWithMeDto, SharedWithMeItemDto, SharedWithMeQuery, SubjectDto,
SubjectInputDto, UpdateRoleDto, role_from_permissions,
};
use crate::application::ports::authorization_ports::AuthorizationEngine;
use crate::application::ports::file_ports::FileRetrievalUseCase;
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ use crate::common::errors::DomainError;
use crate::domain::errors::ErrorKind;
use crate::domain::services::authorization::{
GrantCursor, IncomingGrantSummary, OutgoingResourceSummary, Permission, Resource, ResourceKind,
Subject,
Role, Subject,
};
use crate::interfaces::errors::AppError;
use crate::interfaces::middleware::auth::AuthUser;
@@ -66,41 +66,7 @@ pub async fn create_grant(
let authz = &state.authorization;
let caller_id = auth_user.id;
// Validate: exactly one of permissions/role. Capture BOTH the
// permission list (for the per-permission access_grants writes that
// keep the old engine read path working) AND the role (for the new
// role_grants `set_role` dual-write that lands after the per-
// permission loop).
let (permissions, role): (Vec<Permission>, Role) = match (dto.permissions, dto.role) {
(Some(perms), None) if !perms.is_empty() => {
let perms: Vec<Permission> = perms.into_iter().map(Into::into).collect();
// Derive the closest matching role from the raw permission set
// so we have ONE role to mirror into role_grants. `Role::parse`
// always succeeds here because `role_from_permissions` only
// emits known role strings.
let role = Role::parse(role_from_permissions(&perms))
.expect("role_from_permissions returns a known role string");
(perms, role)
}
(None, Some(role)) => (role.expand().to_vec(), role),
(Some(_), Some(_)) => {
return AppError::new(
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
"Provide either 'permissions' or 'role', not both",
"InvalidInput",
)
.into_response();
}
_ => {
return AppError::new(
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
"Either 'permissions' (non-empty) or 'role' is required",
"InvalidInput",
)
.into_response();
}
};
let role: Role = dto.role.into();
let resource: Resource = dto.resource.into();
let expires_at = dto.expires_at;
@@ -165,41 +131,20 @@ pub async fn create_grant(
}
};
let mut results: Vec<GrantDto> = Vec::with_capacity(permissions.len());
for perm in permissions {
// `storage.access_grants.permission` CHECK constraint predates
// `Permission::Manage`; it accepts only the original 6 values.
// Manage exists in the Owner bundle for engine read-path use
// (via `roles_implying`) and gets persisted via the role_grants
// dual-write below. Skipping it here keeps the access_grants
// safety net populated without tripping the CHECK; the cleanup
// PR that drops access_grants also drops this skip.
if perm == Permission::Manage {
continue;
}
match authz
.grant(caller_id, subject, perm, resource, expires_at)
.await
{
Ok(grant) => results.push(grant.into()),
Err(err) => {
error!("grant insert failed for {perm:?}: {err}");
return AppError::from(err).into_response();
}
}
}
// D-Prep dual-write: mirror the role assignment into storage.role_grants.
// ON CONFLICT UPDATE makes this idempotent — repeated POSTs with the
// same (subject, resource) update the role in place, matching the
// PATCH-style semantics callers will get after the engine read pivot.
if let Err(err) = authz
// Single role row in `storage.role_grants`. `ON CONFLICT UPDATE` in
// the engine makes repeated POSTs with the same (subject, resource)
// a role refresh, matching the PATCH-style semantics callers expect.
let grant = match authz
.set_role(caller_id, subject, role, resource, expires_at)
.await
{
error!("set_role dual-write failed: {err}");
return AppError::from(err).into_response();
}
Ok(g) => g,
Err(err) => {
error!("set_role write failed: {err}");
return AppError::from(err).into_response();
}
};
let grants = vec![GrantDto::from(grant)];
tracing::info!(
target: "audit",
@@ -210,7 +155,6 @@ pub async fn create_grant(
resource_type = resource.type_str(),
resource_id = %resource.id(),
role = role.as_str(),
permission_count = results.len(),
expires_at = ?expires_at,
"🤝 grant created with role '{}'", role.as_str(),
);
@@ -282,7 +226,7 @@ pub async fn create_grant(
(
StatusCode::CREATED,
Json(CreateGrantResponseDto {
grants: results,
grants,
notification,
}),
)
@@ -560,9 +504,8 @@ pub async fn set_role(
let caller_id = auth_user.id;
let subject: Subject = dto.subject.into();
let resource: Resource = dto.resource.into();
let role: Role = dto.role.into();
let expires_at = dto.expires_at;
let target_perms: std::collections::HashSet<Permission> =
dto.role.expand().iter().copied().collect();
// Caller must have Share on the resource.
if let Err(e) = authz
@@ -572,86 +515,16 @@ pub async fn set_role(
return AppError::from(e).into_response();
}
// Fetch current grants on the resource for this subject.
let current = match authz.list_grants_on_resource(resource).await {
// Atomic role refresh. UNIQUE on (subject, resource) + ON CONFLICT
// UPDATE in `set_role` turns this into a single UPSERT — no diff,
// no race window. Returns the resulting role row.
let grant = match authz
.set_role(caller_id, subject, role, resource, expires_at)
.await
{
Ok(g) => g,
Err(e) => return AppError::from(e).into_response(),
};
let current_perms: std::collections::HashSet<Permission> = current
.iter()
.filter(|g| g.subject == subject)
.map(|g| g.permission)
.collect();
// Diff and apply. `Permission::Manage` is excluded from both sides
// because the historical `access_grants.permission` CHECK doesn't
// accept it — see the matching skip in `create_grant`. The role
// assignment captures Manage via the role_grants `set_role` call
// further down; the engine's read-path uses `roles_implying(Manage)`
// → `[Owner]` and never goes through per-permission rows.
let to_add: Vec<Permission> = target_perms
.difference(&current_perms)
.copied()
.filter(|p| *p != Permission::Manage)
.collect();
let to_remove: Vec<Permission> = current_perms
.difference(&target_perms)
.copied()
.filter(|p| *p != Permission::Manage)
.collect();
for perm in &to_remove {
if let Some(g) = current
.iter()
.find(|g| g.subject == subject && g.permission == *perm)
&& let Err(e) = authz.revoke(g.id).await
{
return AppError::from(e).into_response();
}
}
for perm in &to_add {
if let Err(e) = authz
.grant(caller_id, subject, *perm, resource, expires_at)
.await
{
return AppError::from(e).into_response();
}
}
// Sync expiry on all remaining grants for this (subject, resource) pair —
// includes newly added ones and any that were already present (retained).
// Callers that omit expires_at will clear any existing expiry; this is
// intentional: it keeps all permission rows for the pair consistent.
if let Err(e) = authz
.set_expiry_on_resource(subject, resource, expires_at)
.await
{
return AppError::from(e).into_response();
}
// D-Prep dual-write: mirror the resulting role into storage.role_grants.
// The per-permission diff above keeps access_grants converged; this
// single UPSERT keeps role_grants in sync with the OVERALL outcome
// (one row carrying the role + expiry). After the engine read pivot
// and the access_grants drop, the per-permission diff above goes
// away and this call becomes the only mutation the handler performs.
if let Err(e) = authz
.set_role(caller_id, subject, dto.role, resource, expires_at)
.await
{
return AppError::from(e).into_response();
}
// Return the new full set.
let after = match authz.list_grants_on_resource(resource).await {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(e) => return AppError::from(e).into_response(),
};
let mine: Vec<GrantDto> = after
.into_iter()
.filter(|g| g.subject == subject)
.map(Into::into)
.collect();
tracing::info!(
target: "audit",
@@ -661,34 +534,22 @@ pub async fn set_role(
subject_id = %subject.id(),
resource_type = resource.type_str(),
resource_id = %resource.id(),
role = dto.role.as_str(),
permissions_added = to_add.len(),
permissions_removed = to_remove.len(),
role = role.as_str(),
expires_at = ?expires_at,
"🔁 role set to '{}' (+{} -{})",
dto.role.as_str(),
to_add.len(),
to_remove.len(),
"🔁 role set to '{}'", role.as_str(),
);
(StatusCode::OK, Json(mine)).into_response()
(StatusCode::OK, Json(vec![GrantDto::from(grant)])).into_response()
}
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// GET /api/grants/incoming
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, IntoParams)]
pub struct IncomingQuery {
#[serde(default)]
pub permission: Option<PermissionDto>,
}
#[utoipa::path(
get,
path = "/api/grants/incoming",
params(IncomingQuery),
responses(
(status = 200, description = "Direct grants targeting the caller", body = Vec<GrantDto>),
(status = 200, description = "Direct role grants targeting the caller", body = Vec<GrantDto>),
),
security(("bearerAuth" = [])),
tag = "grants"
@@ -696,12 +557,11 @@ pub struct IncomingQuery {
pub async fn list_incoming(
State(state): State<AppStateRef>,
auth_user: AuthUser,
Query(q): Query<IncomingQuery>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let caller_id = auth_user.id;
match state
.authorization
.list_incoming_grants(Subject::User(caller_id), q.permission.map(Into::into))
.list_incoming_grants(Subject::User(caller_id))
.await
{
Ok(grants) => {
src/interfaces/api/mod.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use crate::application::dtos::folder_dto::{
use crate::application::dtos::folder_listing_dto::FolderListingDto;
use crate::application::dtos::grant_dto::{
CreateGrantDto, GrantDto, OutgoingResourceItemDto, PermissionDto, ResourceContentDto,
ResourceDto, ResourceTypeDto, Role, SharedWithMeDto, SharedWithMeItemDto, SubjectDto,
ResourceDto, ResourceTypeDto, RoleDto, SharedWithMeDto, SharedWithMeItemDto, SubjectDto,
SubjectTypeDto, UpdateRoleDto,
};
use crate::application::dtos::i18n_dto::{
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ use crate::interfaces::api::handlers::file_handler::MoveFilePayload;
ResourceTypeDto,
ResourceDto,
PermissionDto,
Role,
RoleDto,
CreateGrantDto,
UpdateRoleDto,
GrantDto,
static/js/components/shareModal.js
+11 -22
View File
@@ -73,23 +73,6 @@ function _looksLikeEmail(q) {
return /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/.test(q);
}
/**
* Permissions that belong to each role (mirrors `Role::expand()` in
* `src/application/dtos/grant_dto.rs`). The share modal only renders
* Viewer/Editor/Owner as picker buttons today; `commenter` and
* `contributor` are kept here for fidelity with the server-side enum so
* a future UI exposure doesn't need a mirror-table update. The `manage`
* permission in the owner bundle is reserved for Drive- and Group-level
* admin actions (no-op on file/folder resources).
*/
const ROLE_PERMISSIONS = {
viewer: ['read'],
commenter: ['read', 'comment'],
contributor: ['read', 'create'],
editor: ['read', 'comment', 'create', 'update'],
owner: ['read', 'comment', 'create', 'update', 'share', 'delete', 'manage']
};
/**
* Fetch up to ~8 ReBAC subject groups whose name matches `q`. Authenticated
* endpoint; returns `[]` on any failure so the autocomplete degrades to
@@ -117,14 +100,20 @@ async function _searchGroups(q) {
}
/**
* Derive the highest role a set of grants represents for one subject.
* Pick the displayed role for a member row. Server-side every Grant
* carries an explicit role since the cleanup PR, so this just reads it.
* The server may emit `commenter` or `contributor` (full enum), but the
* picker only exposes Viewer/Editor/Owner — collapse the two unexposed
* roles to the closest neighbour so the UI never renders an unknown
* option.
* @param {Grant[]} subjectGrants
* @returns {ShareRoleEnum}
*/
function _roleFromGrants(subjectGrants) {
const perms = new Set(subjectGrants.map((g) => g.permission));
if (perms.has('delete') || perms.has('share')) return 'owner';
if (perms.has('create') || perms.has('update')) return 'editor';
const role = subjectGrants[0]?.role;
if (role === 'owner' || role === 'editor' || role === 'viewer') return role;
if (role === 'commenter') return 'viewer';
if (role === 'contributor') return 'editor';
return 'viewer';
}
@@ -616,7 +605,7 @@ const shareModal = {
granted_at: '',
granted_by: '',
subject: { type: subjectType, id: contact.id },
permission: /** @type {import('../core/types.js').PermissionTypeEnum} */ (ROLE_PERMISSIONS[this._stagedRole][0]),
role: this._stagedRole,
resource: { type: this._itemType, id: this._item?.id ?? '' }
};
this._localMembers.push({
static/js/core/types.js
+17 -7
View File
@@ -302,21 +302,27 @@
* @property {String} id
*/
/**
* Server-side role enum — every grantable role the backend recognises.
* The share modal's UI picker only exposes a subset (see `ShareRoleEnum`);
* the wire format may carry any of these values on a Grant.
* @typedef {'viewer'|'commenter'|'contributor'|'editor'|'owner'} GrantRoleEnum
*/
/**
* @typedef {Object} Grant
* @property {string} id
* @property {string} granted_at - ISO-8601 datetime string.
* @property {string} granted_by
* @property {Subject} subject
* @property {PermissionTypeEnum} permission
* @property {GrantRoleEnum} role - Role-keyed grant. One Grant = one role
* assignment in `storage.role_grants`. The implied permission bundle
* is derived client-side from the same lookup table used by
* `Role::expand()` on the server (see `ROLE_PERMISSIONS` in shareModal).
* @property {Resource} resource
* @property {string|null} [expires_at] - ISO-8601 datetime string, or absent/null for no expiry.
*/
/**
* Roles: `viewer`, `commenter`, `editor`, `manager`, `admin`
*/
/**
* Configuration for `ResourceListComponent`.
* @typedef {Object} ResourceListConfig
@@ -367,7 +373,7 @@
* @property {'user'|'group'|'token'|'external'} subject_type
* @property {string} subject_id
* @property {string} subject_display - Username (users) or share name (tokens).
* @property {'viewer'|'commenter'|'contributor'|'editor'|'owner'} role - Server-emitted role string. `commenter` and `contributor` are reserved for future UI exposure; today the share modal only renders `viewer`/`editor`/`owner` (see `ShareRoleEnum`).
* @property {GrantRoleEnum} role - Server-emitted role string. `commenter` and `contributor` are reserved for future UI exposure; today the share modal only renders `viewer`/`editor`/`owner` (see `ShareRoleEnum`).
* @property {string} granted_at - ISO-8601
* @property {string|null} [expires_at] - ISO-8601 or absent.
* @property {boolean} has_password - True when a token subject has a password set.
@@ -464,7 +470,11 @@
* One collaborator row in the share modal's People section.
* @typedef {Object} MemberEntry
* @property {Grant} grant - Representative grant (used for subject/resource info).
* @property {Grant[]} _grants - All grants for this subject on the resource (may be > 1).
* @property {Grant[]} _grants - All grants for this subject on the resource. Post-pivot
* this is at most one entry (`storage.role_grants` UNIQUE on
* `(subject, resource)`); the array shape is preserved so the existing
* "revoke every grant on remove" loop in `_applyAll` still works
* without a special-case for empty / new entries.
* @property {ShareRoleEnum} role - Derived role label shown in the UI.
* @property {'keep'|'remove'|'change'|'new'} _op - Pending local operation.
* @property {string|null} [expires_at] - YYYY-MM-DD expiry date string, or null for no expiry.
static/js/model/grants.js
+3 -1
View File
@@ -164,7 +164,9 @@ const grants = {
/**
* Create a new grant.
* Body mirrors `CreateGrantDto`: `{ subject, resource, role }` OR `{ subject, resource, permissions }`.
* Body mirrors `CreateGrantDto`: `{ subject, resource, role, expires_at? }`.
* Strictly role-keyed since the cleanup PR — the per-permission shape
* is no longer accepted.
*
* Response shape (PR N1 — `CreateGrantResponseDto`):
*
static/sw.js
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// OxiCloud Service Worker
// FIXME: generate cache name according build ?
const CACHE_NAME = 'oxicloud-cache-v27';
const CACHE_NAME = 'oxicloud-cache-v28';
// Only cache static assets — NOT HTML files.
// HTML files are served network-first so browsers always get the latest
tests/api/grants.hurl
+22 -19
View File
@@ -122,11 +122,11 @@ Content-Type: application/json
}
HTTP 201
# PR N1: POST /api/grants now wraps results in
# `CreateGrantResponseDto { grants, notification }`.
# Cleanup PR: one role row per (subject, resource). `CreateGrantResponseDto`
# wraps a single role-keyed Grant in `.grants[0]`.
[Asserts]
jsonpath "$.grants" count == 1
jsonpath "$.grants[0].permission" == "read"
jsonpath "$.grants[0].role" == "viewer"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -148,12 +148,13 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{dave_token}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
jsonpath "$[?(@.resource.id=='{{shared_folder_id}}')].permission" == "read"
jsonpath "$[?(@.resource.id=='{{shared_folder_id}}')].role" == "viewer"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 9 — Promote Bob to Admin (adds comment, create, update, share, delete).
# PUT /api/grants/role reconciles the row set in one call.
# Step 9 — Promote Bob to Owner (covers comment, create, update, share,
# delete, manage). PUT /api/grants/role replaces the role in one
# UPSERT against `storage.role_grants`.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/api/grants/role
Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
@@ -161,16 +162,17 @@ Content-Type: application/json
{
"subject": { "type": "user", "id": "{{dave_user_id}}" },
"resource": { "type": "folder", "id": "{{shared_folder_id}}" },
"role": "admin"
"role": "owner"
}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
jsonpath "$" count == 6
jsonpath "$" count == 1
jsonpath "$[0].role" == "owner"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 10 — Bob can now rename (Manager includes update).
# Step 10 — Bob can now rename (Owner includes update).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PUT {{base_url}}/api/folders/{{shared_folder_id}}/rename
Authorization: Bearer {{dave_token}}
@@ -194,7 +196,7 @@ HTTP 200
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 12 — Bob re-shares to Carol (he has Share via Admin).
# Step 12 — Bob re-shares to Carol (he has Share via Owner).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/grants
Authorization: Bearer {{dave_token}}
@@ -218,7 +220,7 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{eve_token}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
jsonpath "$[?(@.resource.id=='{{shared_folder_id}}')].permission" == "read"
jsonpath "$[?(@.resource.id=='{{shared_folder_id}}')].role" == "viewer"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -247,7 +249,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
jsonpath "$" count == 1
jsonpath "$[0].permission" == "read"
jsonpath "$[0].role" == "viewer"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -263,8 +265,9 @@ HTTP 404
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 17 — Lifecycle: Alice deletes the folder. The DB trigger
# trg_cleanup_grants_folder removes both bob's and carol's
# grants automatically (also for the cascade-deleted child).
# trg_cleanup_role_grants_folder removes both bob's and
# carol's grants automatically (also for the cascade-deleted
# child).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/folders/{{child_folder_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
@@ -767,7 +770,7 @@ HTTP 404
# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Phase 2D — Promote adam to Admin (all 6 permissions). Delete OK.
# Phase 2D — Promote adam to Owner (full bundle, incl. delete). Delete OK.
# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
PUT {{base_url}}/api/grants/role
Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
@@ -775,7 +778,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
{
"subject": { "type": "user", "id": "{{adam_user_id}}" },
"resource": { "type": "folder", "id": "{{perm_folder_id}}" },
"role": "admin"
"role": "owner"
}
HTTP 200
@@ -788,7 +791,7 @@ HTTP 204
# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Phase 2E — Lifecycle cleanup. Alice (still the owner) trashes &
# empties; the trigger removes all access_grants rows.
# empties; the trigger removes all role_grants rows.
# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/folders/{{perm_folder_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
@@ -1176,12 +1179,12 @@ Content-Type: application/json
{
"subject": { "type": "user", "id": "{{frank_user_id}}" },
"resource": { "type": "folder", "id": "{{batch_root_id}}" },
"role": "admin"
"role": "owner"
}
HTTP 200
# Frank (Admin grant = Delete) trashes batch_file_2 — item goes to
# Frank (Owner role includes Delete) trashes batch_file_2 — item goes to
# Alice's trash because file.user_id is unchanged (Alice is still owner).
POST {{base_url}}/api/batch/trash
Authorization: Bearer {{frank_token}}
tests/api/grants_nested_groups.hurl
+4 -4
View File
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ HTTP 201
# `CreateGrantResponseDto { grants, notification }`.
[Asserts]
jsonpath "$.grants" count == 1
jsonpath "$.grants[0].permission" == "read"
jsonpath "$.grants[0].role" == "viewer"
jsonpath "$.grants[0].subject.type" == "group"
jsonpath "$.grants[0].subject.id" == "{{group_a_id}}"
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ Authorization: Bearer {{henry_token}}
HTTP 200
[Asserts]
jsonpath "$[?(@.resource.id=='{{perm_folder_id}}')].permission" == "read"
jsonpath "$[?(@.resource.id=='{{perm_folder_id}}')].role" == "viewer"
jsonpath "$[?(@.resource.id=='{{perm_folder_id}}')].subject.type" == "group"
jsonpath "$[?(@.resource.id=='{{perm_folder_id}}')].subject.id" == "{{group_a_id}}"
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ HTTP 404
# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
# Phase D — Promote group A's grant to Admin (all 6 permissions).
# Phase D — Promote group A's grant to Owner (full bundle).
# Delete now succeeds for henry, still flowing through B → A.
# ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
PUT {{base_url}}/api/grants/role
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
{
"subject": { "type": "group", "id": "{{group_a_id}}" },
"resource": { "type": "folder", "id": "{{perm_folder_id}}" },
"role": "admin"
"role": "owner"
}
HTTP 200
tests/api/role_grants.hurl
+30 -23
View File
@@ -4,17 +4,15 @@
# Pins the D-Prep refactor behaviours that don't fit naturally into
# the existing `grants.hurl` (which is API-shape-focused). Specifically:
#
# 1. New wire-format role names:
# 1. Wire-format role names:
# - "owner" is accepted on POST and emitted on response
# - "admin" still accepted on POST for one release (compat shim
# in `Role::parse`); the server normalises it to Owner
# - "admin" is REJECTED with 422 (compat alias retired in the
# cleanup PR — see Step 6a)
#
# 2. Dual-write proof: granting a role and then exercising a
# 2. Role-keyed write proof: granting a role and then exercising a
# permission from its bundle works → proves the row landed in
# `storage.role_grants` because the engine now reads from there
# for authz decisions (see `folder_cascade_grant_exists` post-
# D-Prep). If dual-write failed, the engine would see no row and
# reject the check.
# `storage.role_grants` and the engine read path expands the
# bundle correctly (see `folder_cascade_grant_exists`).
#
# 3. Atomic role updates via PUT /api/grants/role — the role flips
# in a single SQL update (no DELETE+INSERT race window).
@@ -177,10 +175,9 @@ HTTP 204
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 6 — Legacy "admin" string compat. The server's Role::parse
# accepts "admin" and normalises to Owner during the D-Prep
# dual-write window (one release). Verify by granting sam
# with role="admin" — sam should then be able to Delete too.
# Step 6a — Reject the legacy "admin" string. The cleanup PR
# retired the `#[serde(alias = "admin")]` compat shim on
# `RoleDto::Owner`; the deserialiser now refuses it with 422.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/grants
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
@@ -191,15 +188,26 @@ Content-Type: application/json
"role": "admin"
}
HTTP 422
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 6b — Grant sam Owner with the canonical role string.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
POST {{base_url}}/api/grants
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
Content-Type: application/json
{
"subject": { "type": "user", "id": "{{sam_user_id}}" },
"resource": { "type": "folder", "id": "{{test_folder_id}}" },
"role": "owner"
}
HTTP 201
[Captures]
# Capture the first per-permission grant id from the response so
# Step 10's revoke doesn't have to query the My Shares endpoint
# with awkward JSONPath filtering. Any single grant_id works:
# the revoke handler calls `clear_role` which wipes the entire
# role_grants row for (sam, test_folder), so the engine reads
# return false for sam afterwards regardless of how many
# access_grants rows still exist.
# The single role-keyed Grant returned in `.grants[0]` is the
# `storage.role_grants` row id. Step 10's revoke uses it to
# `clear_role` and wipe the row.
sam_grant_id: jsonpath "$.grants[0].id"
@@ -326,9 +334,8 @@ body not contains "\"role\":\"admin\""
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Step 10 — Revoke: removing sam's grant. The handler clears the
# access_grants rows AND calls clear_role to wipe the
# role_grants row in the same flow.
# Step 10 — Revoke: removing sam's grant. `engine.revoke()` DELETEs
# the single `storage.role_grants` row by id.
#
# After: sam's Delete attempt should be refused (proof
# the role_grants row is gone — the cascade query for
@@ -336,7 +343,7 @@ body not contains "\"role\":\"admin\""
# at this folder).
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# sam_grant_id was captured at Step 6 from the create response.
# sam_grant_id was captured at Step 6b from the create response.
DELETE {{base_url}}/api/grants/{{sam_grant_id}}
Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
tests/api/subject_groups.hurl
+1 -1
View File
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
{
"subject": { "type": "group", "id": "{{engineers_id}}" },
"resource": { "type": "folder", "id": "{{shared_folder_id}}" },
"permissions": ["read"]
"role": "viewer"
}
HTTP 201