security(wopi): add authz to Wopi
This commit is contained in:
Edouard Vanbelle
+19
-1
@@ -38,17 +38,34 @@ wait_for_http() {
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SERVER_PID=""
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WOPI_MOCK_PID=""
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cleanup() {
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if [[ -n "$SERVER_PID" ]]; then
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log "Stopping OxiCloud server (pid $SERVER_PID)..."
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kill "$SERVER_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
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wait "$SERVER_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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if [[ -n "$WOPI_MOCK_PID" ]]; then
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log "Stopping WOPI mock discovery (pid $WOPI_MOCK_PID)..."
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kill "$WOPI_MOCK_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
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wait "$WOPI_MOCK_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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bash "$COMMON/stop-db.sh"
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}
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trap cleanup EXIT
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# ── 0. WOPI mock discovery ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Serves the static discovery.xml `OXICLOUD_WOPI_DISCOVERY_URL`
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# points at (server.env pins port 9100). Started BEFORE OxiCloud so
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# the server's cache-fill on first WOPI request finds it. The mock
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# is stdlib-only Python (no deps) — see the file header for what it
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# returns and why it's cheap.
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log "Starting WOPI mock discovery on port 9100..."
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node "$COMMON/wopi_mock_discovery.js" > /tmp/wopi-mock-discovery.log 2>&1 &
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WOPI_MOCK_PID=$!
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# ── 1. Start postgres ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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bash "$COMMON/spawn-db.sh"
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@@ -168,7 +185,8 @@ hurl --variables-file "$API_DIR/test.env" --file-root "$REPO_ROOT/tests" --test
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"$API_DIR/cross_drive_move.hurl" \
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"$API_DIR/cross_drive_copy.hurl" \
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"$API_DIR/webdav_dead_properties.hurl" \
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"$API_DIR/webdav_nested_move_cascade.hurl"
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"$API_DIR/webdav_nested_move_cascade.hurl" \
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"$API_DIR/wopi_authz.hurl"
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#bash "$API_DIR/dedup_bulk_upload.sh"
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@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
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# =============================================================
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# OxiCloud — WOPI authorization at token redemption
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# =============================================================
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# Regression coverage for the WOPI verb-handler bypass documented in
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# memory note `wopi-authz-bypass`. Two bugs closed:
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#
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# 1. Verb handlers (check_file_info, get_file, put_file,
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# file_operations, host_page) previously did NOT call
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# `AuthorizationEngine::require` at redemption. A grant
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# revoked between mint-time and request-time silently kept
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# working until the token TTL expired.
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#
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# 2. The mint helper decided `can_write` from the client's
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# `requested_action` string (`!= "view"` → write). A Viewer
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# clicking "Edit in Collabora" received a write-capable
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# token because the string was "edit".
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#
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# The fix wires `authz.require` on every verb and derives
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# `can_write` from the caller's actual Update permission. This
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# suite hits both paths through the real HTTP surface.
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#
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# Note on infra:
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# * `OXICLOUD_WOPI_ENABLED=true` in tests/common/server.env
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# * `OXICLOUD_WOPI_SECRET` pinned so the tokens the server mints
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# round-trip verify-able through the suite
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# * WOPI discovery served by `tests/common/wopi_mock_discovery.py`
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# started by run.sh — mock URL points at a black-hole editor
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# so we only assert on OxiCloud's own responses
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# =============================================================
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 1 — Login as admin (owner) and capture home folder id
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
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Content-Type: application/json
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{ "username": "{{username}}", "password": "{{password}}" }
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HTTP 200
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[Captures]
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alice_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
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alice_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id"
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GET {{base_url}}/api/folders
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Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Captures]
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alice_home_id: jsonpath "$[0].id"
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 2 — Create a Bob user (Viewer under test) via admin API
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
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Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"username": "wopi-bob",
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"password": "WopiBobPassword1!",
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"email": "wopi-bob@example.com",
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"role": "user"
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}
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HTTP 201
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[Captures]
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bob_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
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POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
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Content-Type: application/json
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{ "username": "wopi-bob", "password": "WopiBobPassword1!" }
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HTTP 200
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[Captures]
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bob_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 3 — Alice uploads a plain-text file the WOPI verbs will
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# target. `text/plain` is in the mock discovery XML so
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# `/api/wopi/editor-url` resolves to a real (black-hole)
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# editor URL — the endpoint returns 200 with an
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# access_token we can then poke at the verbs.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/api/files/upload
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Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
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[MultipartFormData]
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folder_id: {{alice_home_id}}
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file: file,fixtures/hello.txt; text/plain
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HTTP 201
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[Captures]
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file_id: jsonpath "$.id"
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[Asserts]
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jsonpath "$.mime_type" == "text/plain"
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 4 — Alice mints an editor-URL for her own file with
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# `action=edit`. Owner has Update → can_write=true.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/api/wopi/editor-url?file_id={{file_id}}&action=edit
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Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Captures]
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alice_edit_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
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[Asserts]
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jsonpath "$.access_token" isString
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jsonpath "$.editor_url" contains "edit"
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 5 — CheckFileInfo with the owner's edit token. Verb
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# re-checks Read → allowed. `user_can_write=true`
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# reflects real Update.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}?access_token={{alice_edit_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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jsonpath "$.UserId" == "{{alice_user_id}}"
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jsonpath "$.UserCanWrite" == true
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jsonpath "$.SupportsUpdate" == true
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 6 — GetFile with the owner's edit token. Verb re-checks
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# Read → 200 with body.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}/contents?access_token={{alice_edit_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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body contains "Hello"
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 7 — PutFile with the owner's edit token. Verb re-checks
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# Update → 200. The owner overwrites her own file.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}/contents?access_token={{alice_edit_token}}
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Content-Type: application/octet-stream
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```
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owner overwrite via WOPI PutFile
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```
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HTTP 200
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 8 — Alice explicitly requests view mode. Even the owner
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# gets `can_write=false` — the token respects the
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# client's downgrade so Collabora can open a doc
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# "read-only for co-browsing".
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/api/wopi/editor-url?file_id={{file_id}}&action=view
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Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Captures]
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alice_view_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
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GET {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}?access_token={{alice_view_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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# Owner explicitly requested view — supports_update flips off.
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jsonpath "$.UserCanWrite" == false
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jsonpath "$.SupportsUpdate" == false
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# View token trying to write → 401 (token's can_write bit says no
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# before the authz.require ever runs).
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POST {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}/contents?access_token={{alice_view_token}}
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Content-Type: application/octet-stream
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```
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owner trying to write with view token
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```
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HTTP 401
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 9 — SECURITY: Bob has NO grant on Alice's file. Requests
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# an edit-URL. The mint helper's Read gate fires → 404
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# (anti-enum). This is the pre-fix behaviour holding
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# — mint-time Read was already enforced via
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# get_file_with_perms.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/api/wopi/editor-url?file_id={{file_id}}&action=edit
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Authorization: Bearer {{bob_token}}
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HTTP 404
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 10 — Alice grants Bob the Viewer role on the file.
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# Capture the grant id off the POST response so Step
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# 13's revoke doesn't need to LIST + filter (the LIST
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# endpoint returns a bare JSON array, not
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# `.grants[?...]`, and Hurl's single-match filter
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# capture behaviour is quirky — see memory note
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# `feedback_hurl_jsonpath_filter_empty`).
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/api/grants
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Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"subject": { "type": "user", "id": "{{bob_user_id}}" },
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"resource": { "type": "file", "id": "{{file_id}}" },
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"role": "viewer"
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}
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HTTP 201
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 11 — SECURITY: Bob (Viewer) requests an EDIT token. Fix
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# #12: mint helper derives `can_write` from real
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# Update permission, not from the requested_action
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# string. Bob has Read but not Update → token is
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# minted with `can_write=false` even though he asked
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# for "edit".
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/api/wopi/editor-url?file_id={{file_id}}&action=edit
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Authorization: Bearer {{bob_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Captures]
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bob_forged_edit_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
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# CheckFileInfo with Bob's "edit" token shows UserCanWrite=false
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# because the token's can_write bit was scrubbed at mint. Prior
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# to the fix this was `true` — a Viewer editing Alice's file.
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GET {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}?access_token={{bob_forged_edit_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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jsonpath "$.UserId" == "{{bob_user_id}}"
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jsonpath "$.UserCanWrite" == false
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jsonpath "$.SupportsUpdate" == false
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# Bob attempting PutFile with his "edit" token → 401. The
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# token's own can_write=false is the outer gate; even if the
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# token had somehow been forged with can_write=true, the
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# redemption-time authz.require(Update) would return 404.
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POST {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}/contents?access_token={{bob_forged_edit_token}}
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Content-Type: application/octet-stream
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```
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Bob trying to write as Viewer
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```
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HTTP 401
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# Bob CAN read (his Read grant is real).
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GET {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}/contents?access_token={{bob_forged_edit_token}}
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HTTP 200
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 12 — SECURITY: promote Bob to Editor. Now he legitimately
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# holds Update, so an edit token becomes truly write-
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# capable.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/api/grants
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Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"subject": { "type": "user", "id": "{{bob_user_id}}" },
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"resource": { "type": "file", "id": "{{file_id}}" },
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"role": "editor"
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}
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# The engine's `ON CONFLICT UPDATE` collapses one role row per
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# (subject, resource), so this Editor grant REPLACES the Viewer
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# grant from Step 10 rather than stacking. Bob now holds
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# Editor alone; revoking it in Step 13 leaves him with no
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# grants at all.
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HTTP 201
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[Captures]
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bob_grant_id: jsonpath "$.grants[0].id"
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GET {{base_url}}/api/wopi/editor-url?file_id={{file_id}}&action=edit
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Authorization: Bearer {{bob_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Captures]
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bob_real_edit_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
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GET {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}?access_token={{bob_real_edit_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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# Bob is a real Editor now → can_write flips to true.
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jsonpath "$.UserCanWrite" == true
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jsonpath "$.SupportsUpdate" == true
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POST {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}/contents?access_token={{bob_real_edit_token}}
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Content-Type: application/octet-stream
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```
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Bob as Editor legitimately writes
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```
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HTTP 200
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Step 13 — SECURITY: revoke Bob's grant AFTER his edit token was
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# minted. The token stays cryptographically valid until
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# TTL, but every subsequent verb call must hit the
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# authorization engine and reject.
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#
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# This is the CORE bug the memory note describes: prior
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# to the fix Bob's PutFile still succeeded here because
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# the verb handlers trusted the token in isolation.
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#
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# The Editor grant from Step 12 REPLACED the Viewer
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# grant from Step 10 (engine's ON CONFLICT UPDATE —
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# one role row per subject/resource). So revoking the
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# Editor grant leaves Bob with no grants at all; every
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# verb — Read AND Update — must refuse.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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DELETE {{base_url}}/api/grants/{{bob_grant_id}}
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Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
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HTTP 204
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# CheckFileInfo — no Read → 404. Prior to the fix the verb
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# handler trusted the token and returned 200 with the file's
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# metadata.
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GET {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}?access_token={{bob_real_edit_token}}
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HTTP 404
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# GetFile — no Read → 404. Prior to the fix Bob could still
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# download the file content until the token TTL expired.
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GET {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}/contents?access_token={{bob_real_edit_token}}
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HTTP 404
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# PutFile — no Update → 404 (verb-side require_wopi_perm), OR
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# 401 if the token's own `!claims.can_write` gate happened to
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# fire first. The important assertion is "not 200" — a revoked
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# grant must never let the caller through.
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POST {{base_url}}/wopi/files/{{file_id}}/contents?access_token={{bob_real_edit_token}}
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Content-Type: application/octet-stream
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```
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Bob post-revoke tries to write
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```
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HTTP 404
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Cleanup — delete the test file so subsequent Hurl files don't
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# see it. Bob user stays; other tests may reuse the `wopi-bob`
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# username, but the grants that made this test meaningful are
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# gone.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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DELETE {{base_url}}/api/files/{{file_id}}
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Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}}
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HTTP 204
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+11
-1
@@ -13,7 +13,17 @@ OXICLOUD_ENABLE_SEARCH=true
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OXICLOUD_ENABLE_FILE_SHARING=true
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OXICLOUD_ENABLE_MUSIC=true
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OXICLOUD_EXPOSE_SYSTEM_USERS=true
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OXICLOUD_WOPI_ENABLED=false
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OXICLOUD_WOPI_ENABLED=true
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# Fixed secret so the Hurl WOPI test can hand-craft valid access
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# tokens with a known signing key. Prod deployments MUST override
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# this to a random per-deployment value.
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OXICLOUD_WOPI_SECRET=test-wopi-secret-do-not-use-in-prod-do-not-use-in-prod
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# Discovery URL points at a black hole — VERB endpoints don't need
|
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# discovery, and the WOPI Hurl suite deliberately does NOT touch
|
||||
# `/api/wopi/editor-url` (the only path that would fetch it), so
|
||||
# an unreachable URL keeps startup fast and hermetic.
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OXICLOUD_WOPI_DISCOVERY_URL=http://127.0.0.1:9100/discovery.xml
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OXICLOUD_WOPI_TOKEN_TTL_SECS=3600
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OXICLOUD_OIDC_ENABLED=false
|
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||||
OXICLOUD_NEXTCLOUD_ENABLED=true
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||||
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
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||||
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
||||
// Minimal mock WOPI discovery server for the Hurl WOPI suite.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Serves a valid RFC-shaped discovery XML on `GET /discovery.xml` so
|
||||
// `OXICLOUD_WOPI_DISCOVERY_URL=http://127.0.0.1:<port>/discovery.xml`
|
||||
// resolves to a real editor URL when `/api/wopi/editor-url` fetches it.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The `urlsrc` we hand back points at a black-hole host so no real
|
||||
// editor process needs to be running — the Hurl suite only asserts on
|
||||
// OxiCloud's own responses (token contents, HTTP status codes,
|
||||
// headers). The mock exists purely to let `get_editor_url` succeed
|
||||
// end-to-end so we can exercise the mint-time authz path (Viewer-
|
||||
// clicks-Edit gets a read-only token).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Node stdlib only — matches the tooling used by tests/oidc/fake_idp
|
||||
// (both are stdlib-free apart from `node-oidc-provider` on that side).
|
||||
// No package.json, no npm install, no extra dependency for the api
|
||||
// test suite. Started + reaped by `tests/api/run.sh`. Port comes from
|
||||
// `WOPI_MOCK_PORT` env var (default 9100).
|
||||
|
||||
'use strict';
|
||||
|
||||
const http = require('http');
|
||||
|
||||
const DISCOVERY_XML = `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
|
||||
<wopi-discovery>
|
||||
<net-zone name="external-http">
|
||||
<!-- text/plain lets the txt files the Hurl suite uploads round-trip. -->
|
||||
<app name="text/plain" favIconUrl="http://mock-editor.invalid/favicon.ico">
|
||||
<action name="edit" ext="txt" urlsrc="http://mock-editor.invalid/edit?"/>
|
||||
<action name="view" ext="txt" urlsrc="http://mock-editor.invalid/view?"/>
|
||||
</app>
|
||||
<!-- One office extension so tests can also exercise the docx path
|
||||
if they need to. -->
|
||||
<app name="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document">
|
||||
<action name="edit" ext="docx" urlsrc="http://mock-editor.invalid/edit?"/>
|
||||
<action name="view" ext="docx" urlsrc="http://mock-editor.invalid/view?"/>
|
||||
</app>
|
||||
</net-zone>
|
||||
<proof-key oldvalue="" oldmodulus="" oldexponent=""
|
||||
value="" modulus="" exponent=""/>
|
||||
</wopi-discovery>
|
||||
`;
|
||||
|
||||
const port = Number(process.env.WOPI_MOCK_PORT || 9100);
|
||||
|
||||
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
|
||||
if (req.method === 'GET' && req.url === '/discovery.xml') {
|
||||
res.writeHead(200, {
|
||||
'Content-Type': 'application/xml; charset=utf-8',
|
||||
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(DISCOVERY_XML),
|
||||
});
|
||||
res.end(DISCOVERY_XML);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
res.writeHead(404);
|
||||
res.end();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// SIGTERM from `kill` in run.sh cleanup — exit quietly so the test
|
||||
// runner's tail-of-log stays clean.
|
||||
for (const sig of ['SIGTERM', 'SIGINT']) {
|
||||
process.on(sig, () => server.close(() => process.exit(0)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => {
|
||||
console.log(`wopi-mock-discovery listening on 127.0.0.1:${port}`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user