feat(drive): NC chunked upload respect drive's quota

personal drive are based on user's quota
This commit is contained in:
Edouard Vanbelle
2026-06-29 22:39:52 +02:00
parent 583af517c2
commit 934d6b4af0
2 changed files with 227 additions and 4 deletions
+112
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,10 @@ use axum::{
response::Response,
};
use std::sync::Arc;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::application::ports::file_ports::{FileRetrievalUseCase, FileUploadUseCase};
use crate::application::ports::storage_ports::StorageUsagePort;
use crate::common::di::AppState;
use crate::common::mime_detect::filename_from_path;
use crate::interfaces::errors::AppError;
@@ -13,6 +15,79 @@ use crate::interfaces::upload_ingest::{
discard_ingested, ingest_stream_to_cas, stream_body_to_path, stream_from_files,
};
/// Per-chunk quota gate (D4 / project_drive_quota_timing).
///
/// Pre-D4 the NC chunked path never declared a total size up front, so
/// quota only fired at the final MOVE — meaning a client could waste GB
/// of upload bandwidth before learning it was over. The drive is known
/// from the session's chroot and the user is on the session, so we can
/// gate at every wire moment now:
///
/// - MKCOL: refuse if either the drive or the user envelope is
/// already at quota (call with `additional = 0`).
/// - PUT : refuse if `used + already_uploaded_for_session +
/// content-length` would breach either cap.
/// `already_uploaded_for_session` is the sum of chunk sizes the
/// session already holds on disk.
/// - MOVE : defence in depth via `file_upload_service`'s own gates.
///
/// Both checks run because the two caps cover different cases:
/// `check_drive_quota` is the per-drive `drives.quota_bytes` cap
/// (shared drives carry a value; personal drives are `NULL` and
/// short-circuit to OK). `check_storage_quota` is the user envelope
/// `users.storage_quota_bytes` that caps the SUM across the caller's
/// personal drives (shared-drive uploads short-circuit because the
/// envelope only sums personal drives — see
/// `project_user_envelope_quota_model`). Mirrors what every other
/// upload entry point (multipart, native chunked, delta, instant)
/// already does.
async fn refuse_if_over_quota(
state: &AppState,
user_id: Uuid,
drive_id: Uuid,
additional: u64,
) -> Result<(), AppError> {
let Some(svc) = state.storage_usage_service.as_ref() else {
// Quota tracking disabled in this config; MOVE-time gate
// remains authoritative.
return Ok(());
};
svc.check_storage_quota(user_id, additional)
.await
.map_err(AppError::from)?;
svc.check_drive_quota(drive_id, additional)
.await
.map_err(AppError::from)
}
/// Sum of bytes already accepted into a chunked-upload session.
///
/// Reads the session directory once via `list_chunks` and totals every
/// chunk's on-disk size. O(N) stat calls per check, but N is the chunk
/// count (NC clients use 10 MB chunks by default — a 10 GB upload sits
/// around 1000 entries; PUT throughput dominates the cost). A
/// per-session counter file would amortise it to O(1) but adds a
/// separate write-and-sync path with its own crash semantics — defer
/// until profiling actually demands it.
async fn session_bytes_so_far(
nc: &crate::common::di::NextcloudServices,
username: &str,
upload_id: &str,
) -> Result<u64, AppError> {
let listing = nc
.chunked_uploads
.list_chunks(username, upload_id)
.await
.map_err(|e| AppError::internal_error(format!("Failed to list chunks: {}", e)))?;
let Some(listing) = listing else {
// Missing session — handler maps this elsewhere; treat as zero
// here so the gate doesn't fire spuriously on the very first
// chunk after MKCOL (race-tolerant).
return Ok(0);
};
Ok(listing.chunks.iter().map(|c| c.size).sum())
}
/// Dispatch Nextcloud chunked upload WebDAV requests.
///
/// Routes:
@@ -145,6 +220,13 @@ fn xml_escape(s: &str) -> String {
}
/// MKCOL — create upload session directory.
///
/// Quota gate (D4): refuse 507 if the bound drive is already at quota,
/// before allocating the session directory. The chunked path doesn't
/// declare a total size up front — `additional = 0` so the gate only
/// fires when the drive is already exactly full (or beyond, after a
/// burst of concurrent writes). Subsequent PUTs run the proper
/// "used + session_so_far + chunk" projection.
async fn handle_mkcol(
state: Arc<AppState>,
session: &crate::interfaces::nextcloud::session::NcSession,
@@ -156,6 +238,9 @@ async fn handle_mkcol(
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::internal_error("Nextcloud services unavailable"))?;
let chroot = session.require_chroot()?;
refuse_if_over_quota(&state, user.id, chroot.drive_id, 0).await?;
nc.chunked_uploads
.create_session(&user.username, upload_id)
.await
@@ -194,6 +279,22 @@ async fn handle_put_chunk(
return Err(AppError::bad_request("Missing chunk name"));
}
// Per-chunk quota gate (D4): refuse 507 BEFORE accepting body
// bytes when `drive.used_bytes + session_so_far + chunk_size`
// would cross the drive cap. Closes the wasted-bandwidth wart
// where over-quota clients only learned at MOVE.
//
// Without a Content-Length we can't project ahead — fall back to
// the assemble-time check. NC desktop / Android / iOS clients
// always send CL on PUT chunks (they read the chunk file into a
// length-known body), so this branch is rare in practice.
let chroot = session.require_chroot()?;
if let Some(chunk_size) = content_length_from(&req) {
let so_far = session_bytes_so_far(nc, &user.username, upload_id).await?;
let projected = so_far.saturating_add(chunk_size);
refuse_if_over_quota(&state, user.id, chroot.drive_id, projected).await?;
}
let chunk_path = nc
.chunked_uploads
.safe_chunk_path(&user.username, upload_id, chunk_name)
@@ -384,6 +485,17 @@ async fn handle_abort(
.unwrap())
}
/// Read `Content-Length` off a request as a `u64`. Returns `None` if
/// the header is absent or malformed — the PUT-chunk quota gate
/// (`handle_put_chunk`) treats that as "skip the early gate, the
/// stream cap + MOVE-time check will still catch over-quota writes".
fn content_length_from(req: &Request<Body>) -> Option<u64> {
req.headers()
.get(header::CONTENT_LENGTH)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<u64>().ok())
}
/// Extract the file subpath from a Destination header pointing to the files DAV namespace.
///
/// For full URLs the host is ignored — only the path component is used.
@@ -19,6 +19,17 @@
# MOVE → verify the assembled file's BLAKE3 over REST.
# 2. CAP REJECTION — MKCOL a fresh session → PUT a 5 MiB chunk →
# 413 Payload Too Large.
# 3. QUOTA REJECTION (D4 / per-chunk gate) — tighten the caller's
# storage envelope to 100 B, MKCOL a fresh session (still under
# cap, used=0), then PUT a 200 B chunk → 507 Insufficient
# Storage. Pre-D4 the chunked path never gated until the final
# MOVE — clients could waste GB of upload before learning they
# were over. Validates `refuse_if_over_quota` in
# `uploads_handler::handle_put_chunk` runs the
# `used + session_so_far + content_length` projection
# ahead of accepting body bytes. Admin's original quota is
# restored on exit so subsequent tests in the suite are
# unaffected.
#
# Prerequisites:
# - Server running at $base_url with admin credentials (test.env).
@@ -88,6 +99,12 @@ EXPECTED_BLAKE3="b2208c5dc33ff951227bd0c139f5eccb04105d6da6a7519ee23f7bc00a17bb5
REMOTE_NAME="nc-chunked-cap-test.txt"
UPLOAD_ID_OK="oxi-cap-ok-$(date +%s)"
UPLOAD_ID_BIG="oxi-cap-big-$(date +%s)"
UPLOAD_ID_QUOTA="oxi-cap-quota-$(date +%s)"
# 200 B fixture for the D4 quota-gate case. Lives in $TMPDIR so it
# never lands in `tests/fixtures/` — generated on the fly, deleted
# by the EXIT trap. mktemp keeps the path race-free across parallel
# runs.
FIXTURE_200B=""
echo
echo "=== NextCloud chunked upload: cap + streaming ==="
@@ -110,8 +127,34 @@ APP_PASSWORD_ID=$(jq -r '.id' <<<"$APP_PASSWORD_RESPONSE")
|| fail "Failed to mint NC app password: $APP_PASSWORD_RESPONSE"
echo " app password minted (id=$APP_PASSWORD_ID)"
# Clean up the app password when the script exits (success or fail).
trap '[[ -n "${APP_PASSWORD_ID:-}" ]] && rest_delete "/api/auth/app-passwords/$APP_PASSWORD_ID" > /dev/null || true' EXIT
# Capture admin's id + current envelope quota up front so Case 3
# can tighten the cap and the EXIT trap can restore it on any
# failure path. `storage_quota_bytes == 0` is the unlimited
# sentinel (see `check_storage_quota`); we read it back here in
# case a prior test set a real value.
ADMIN_ID=$(rest_get "/api/auth/me" | jq -r '.id')
[[ -n "$ADMIN_ID" && "$ADMIN_ID" != "null" ]] || fail "Failed to read admin user id"
ORIGINAL_ADMIN_QUOTA=$(rest_get "/api/auth/me" | jq -r '.storage_quota_bytes // 0')
# Single cleanup on exit:
# - restore admin's original storage envelope (in case Case 3
# fired and we exited before its own restore),
# - revoke the test app password,
# - drop the on-the-fly 200 B fixture.
cleanup_test() {
if [[ -n "${ADMIN_ID:-}" ]]; then
curl -s -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"quota_bytes\":${ORIGINAL_ADMIN_QUOTA}}" \
"$base_url/api/admin/users/$ADMIN_ID/quota" > /dev/null || true
fi
if [[ -n "${APP_PASSWORD_ID:-}" ]]; then
rest_delete "/api/auth/app-passwords/$APP_PASSWORD_ID" > /dev/null || true
fi
[[ -n "${FIXTURE_200B:-}" && -f "$FIXTURE_200B" ]] && rm -f "$FIXTURE_200B"
}
trap cleanup_test EXIT
# Idempotent cleanup of any leftover file from a previous failed run.
HOME_FOLDER_ID=$(rest_get "/api/folders" | jq -r '.[0].id')
@@ -126,7 +169,7 @@ fi
# ── Case 1: SUCCESS path ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo
echo "[1/2] SUCCESS path — MKCOL → PUT → MOVE → verify BLAKE3"
echo "[1/3] SUCCESS path — MKCOL → PUT → MOVE → verify BLAKE3"
# 1a. Create chunked-upload session.
STATUS=$(nc_req MKCOL "/remote.php/dav/uploads/$username/$UPLOAD_ID_OK")
@@ -167,7 +210,7 @@ purge_from_trash "$REMOTE_NAME"
# ── Case 2: CAP REJECTION ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo
echo "[2/2] CAP REJECTION — 5 MiB chunk on a 4 MiB cap → 413"
echo "[2/3] CAP REJECTION — 5 MiB chunk on a 4 MiB cap → 413"
# 2a. Fresh session.
STATUS=$(nc_req MKCOL "/remote.php/dav/uploads/$username/$UPLOAD_ID_BIG")
@@ -192,6 +235,74 @@ STATUS=$(nc_req DELETE "/remote.php/dav/uploads/$username/$UPLOAD_ID_BIG")
[[ "$STATUS" =~ ^(204|404)$ ]] || fail "DELETE abandoned session: got $STATUS"
pass "DELETE abandoned session (status=$STATUS)"
# ── Case 3: QUOTA REJECTION (D4 per-chunk gate) ───────────────────────────────
echo
echo "[3/3] QUOTA REJECTION — envelope tightened to (used + 100 B), PUT 200 B chunk → 507"
# 3a. Compute the tight quota dynamically: admin has accumulated
# `used_bytes` from every earlier test in the suite, so a hard-
# coded "100 B" cap would trip MKCOL (`used + 0 > 100`). Read
# the current cached envelope and set the cap to
# `current + 100` — leaves enough headroom that MKCOL passes
# (`used + 0 = used < used + 100`) while a 200 B chunk PUT
# overflows by exactly 100 (`used + 0 + 200 > used + 100`).
CURRENT_USED=$(rest_get "/api/auth/me" | jq -r '.storage_used_bytes')
[[ -n "$CURRENT_USED" && "$CURRENT_USED" != "null" ]] || fail "Failed to read current used_bytes"
TIGHT_QUOTA=$(( CURRENT_USED + 100 ))
# 3b. Tighten admin's storage envelope. The pre-existing
# `cleanup_test` EXIT trap restores `ORIGINAL_ADMIN_QUOTA` so a
# mid-test failure doesn't leave the suite running under a
# barely-headroom cap.
curl -s -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"quota_bytes\":${TIGHT_QUOTA}}" \
"$base_url/api/admin/users/$ADMIN_ID/quota" > /dev/null
# 3c. Generate the 200 B fixture in $TMPDIR — never lands in
# `tests/fixtures/` (avoids polluting the committed dir + the
# gitignore list).
FIXTURE_200B=$(mktemp -t nc-chunked-quota-200b.XXXXXX.bin)
dd if=/dev/zero of="$FIXTURE_200B" bs=1 count=200 status=none
# 3d. Fresh session. MKCOL gate projects `used + 0` against the
# tight cap; with quota = used + 100 the projection sits 100 B
# under the limit so MKCOL passes. The real gate fires at the
# PUT below.
STATUS=$(nc_req MKCOL "/remote.php/dav/uploads/$username/$UPLOAD_ID_QUOTA")
[[ "$STATUS" =~ ^(201|204)$ ]] || fail "MKCOL quota session: got $STATUS"
pass "MKCOL quota session (status=$STATUS)"
# 3e. PUT a 200 B chunk → expect 507. The handler reads
# Content-Length (200), sums on-disk chunks for this session
# (0), and runs `check_storage_quota(admin_id, 200)`:
# used + 200 > used + 100 → QuotaExceeded → 507.
# Pre-D4 this would have returned 201 and the whole upload
# would have wasted bandwidth until the final MOVE.
STATUS=$(nc_req PUT \
"/remote.php/dav/uploads/$username/$UPLOAD_ID_QUOTA/00001" \
-H "Content-Type: application/octet-stream" \
--data-binary "@$FIXTURE_200B")
[[ "$STATUS" == "507" ]] || fail "PUT over-quota chunk: got $STATUS, expected 507"
pass "PUT over-quota chunk rejected (status=$STATUS)"
# 3e. Abort the leftover session.
STATUS=$(nc_req DELETE "/remote.php/dav/uploads/$username/$UPLOAD_ID_QUOTA")
[[ "$STATUS" =~ ^(204|404)$ ]] || fail "DELETE quota session: got $STATUS"
pass "DELETE quota session (status=$STATUS)"
# 3f. Restore admin's original envelope immediately — keeps the rest
# of the suite running under the right cap. The EXIT trap also
# restores it as belt-and-braces.
curl -s -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"quota_bytes\":${ORIGINAL_ADMIN_QUOTA}}" \
"$base_url/api/admin/users/$ADMIN_ID/quota" > /dev/null
pass "Admin envelope restored to ${ORIGINAL_ADMIN_QUOTA}"
# ── summary ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo