fix(security): VULN-01 admin escalation + VULN-02 path traversal hardening

VULN-01 - Admin privilege escalation:
- Harden register() to reject is_admin=true
- Add /api/setup endpoint with setup_token for initial admin creation
- Add SetupAdminDto and setup_token to AppState
- Remove dead code from auth handler

VULN-02 - Path traversal (CVSS ~8.6):
- Solution A+E: Harden StoragePath constructors (from_string, new, join)
  to strip '..' and '.' segments and reject slash injection
- Solution B: resolve_path() now returns Result<PathBuf>, calls
  validate_path() internally, and verifies resolved path stays under root
- Update StoragePort trait signature to return Result<PathBuf, DomainError>
- Remove dead code: FilePathResolutionPort, StorageVerificationPort,
  DirectoryManagementPort (declared but never implemented)
- Add 17 security tests covering traversal attack vectors
This commit is contained in:
Dionisio
2026-03-04 14:14:40 +01:00
parent 3e2b6f11c1
commit 98fb3e6408
10 changed files with 463 additions and 217 deletions
+10 -1
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,16 @@ pub struct RegisterDto {
pub username: String,
pub email: String,
pub password: String,
pub role: Option<String>,
}
/// DTO for the one-time initial admin setup endpoint (`/api/setup`).
/// Requires the setup token printed to the server log on first boot.
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)]
pub struct SetupAdminDto {
pub username: String,
pub email: String,
pub password: String,
pub setup_token: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+4 -2
View File
@@ -10,8 +10,10 @@ use super::storage_ports::{FileReadPort, FileWritePort};
/// Secondary port for storage operations
pub trait StoragePort: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// Resolves a domain path to a physical path
fn resolve_path(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> PathBuf;
/// Resolves a domain path to a physical path.
///
/// Returns an error if the path contains unsafe segments (defense-in-depth).
fn resolve_path(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> Result<PathBuf, DomainError>;
/// Creates directories if they don't exist
async fn ensure_directory(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> Result<(), DomainError>;
-24
View File
@@ -303,30 +303,6 @@ pub trait FileWritePort: Send + Sync + 'static {
// Auxiliary ports (unchanged)
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Secondary port for file path resolution
pub trait FilePathResolutionPort: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// Gets the storage path of a file
async fn get_file_path(&self, id: &str) -> Result<StoragePath, DomainError>;
/// Resolves a domain path to a physical path
fn resolve_path(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> PathBuf;
}
/// Secondary port for file/directory existence verification
pub trait StorageVerificationPort: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// Checks whether a file exists at the given path
async fn file_exists(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> Result<bool, DomainError>;
/// Checks whether a directory exists at the given path
async fn directory_exists(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> Result<bool, DomainError>;
}
/// Secondary port for directory management
pub trait DirectoryManagementPort: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// Creates directories if they do not exist
async fn ensure_directory(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> Result<(), DomainError>;
}
/// Secondary port for storage usage management
pub trait StorageUsagePort: Send + Sync + 'static {
/// Updates storage usage statistics for a user
@@ -352,6 +352,32 @@ impl AdminSettingsService {
})
}
// ========================================================================
// System Initialization
// ========================================================================
/// Check if the system has been initialized (first admin created).
/// Returns `true` if the `system_initialized` flag is set to `"true"` in the DB.
pub async fn is_system_initialized(&self) -> bool {
match self.settings_repo.get("system_initialized").await {
Ok(Some(val)) => val == "true",
_ => false, // fail-closed: if DB error or key absent, system is NOT initialized
}
}
/// Mark the system as initialized after the first admin is created.
pub async fn mark_system_initialized(&self, admin_user_id: &str) -> Result<(), DomainError> {
self.settings_repo
.set(
"system_initialized",
"true",
"system",
false,
Some(admin_user_id),
)
.await
}
// ========================================================================
// Registration Control
// ========================================================================
@@ -227,73 +227,11 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
));
}
// Check if the user wants to create an admin
let is_admin_request = dto.username.to_lowercase() == "admin"
|| (dto.role.is_some() && dto.role.as_ref().unwrap().to_lowercase() == "admin");
// If trying to create an admin, check if admins already exist in the system
if is_admin_request {
match self.count_admin_users().await {
Ok(admin_count) => {
// If there are already admins in the system and this is not a clean install,
// we do not allow creating another admin from registration
if admin_count > 0 {
// Check if this is a clean install (only the default admin)
match self.count_all_users().await {
Ok(user_count) => {
// If there are more than 2 users (admin + test), it is not a clean install
if user_count > 2 {
tracing::warn!(
"Attempt to create additional admin rejected: at least one admin already exists"
);
return Err(DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::AccessDenied,
"User",
"Creating additional admin users from the registration page is not allowed",
));
}
// Otherwise, it is a clean install and the first admin is allowed
tracing::info!("Allowing admin creation on clean install");
}
Err(e) => {
// Cannot verify user count — treat as bootstrap scenario
tracing::warn!(
"Could not count users ({}). Allowing admin creation for bootstrap.",
e
);
}
}
}
}
Err(e) => {
// Any DB error (table missing, connection issue, etc.) means we
// cannot verify admin state. Allow admin creation so the user can
// bootstrap the system. If the DB is truly broken the INSERT will
// fail anyway with a clear error.
tracing::warn!(
"Could not count admin users ({}). Allowing admin creation for bootstrap.",
e
);
}
}
}
// Determine role and quota based on user type
// If an explicit "admin" role is provided, use the administrator role
let role = if let Some(role_str) = &dto.role {
if role_str.to_lowercase() == "admin" {
UserRole::Admin
} else {
UserRole::User
}
} else {
// Special case: if the username is "admin", assign admin role even if not specified
if dto.username.to_lowercase() == "admin" {
UserRole::Admin
} else {
UserRole::User
}
};
// SECURITY: Public registration ALWAYS creates regular users.
// Admin users can only be created via:
// 1. The one-time /api/setup endpoint (first boot)
// 2. The admin panel (admin_create_user)
let role = UserRole::User;
// Quota based on role, capped to available disk space
let quota = self.capped_quota(&role);
@@ -332,6 +270,92 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
Ok(UserDto::from(created_user))
}
/// Create the first admin user during initial system setup.
///
/// This is called by the `/api/setup` endpoint after verifying the setup
/// token. It unconditionally creates an admin user. The caller (handler)
/// is responsible for:
/// 1. Verifying the setup token
/// 2. Checking that the system is not already initialized
/// 3. Marking the system as initialized after this call succeeds
pub async fn setup_create_admin(
&self,
username: String,
email: String,
password: String,
) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
// Validate username
if username.len() < 3 || username.len() > 32 {
return Err(DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"User",
"Username must be between 3 and 32 characters".to_string(),
));
}
// Check for duplicate username
if self
.user_storage
.get_user_by_username(&username)
.await
.is_ok()
{
return Err(DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::AlreadyExists,
"User",
format!("User '{}' already exists", username),
));
}
// Check email uniqueness
if self
.user_storage
.get_user_by_email(&email)
.await
.is_ok()
{
return Err(DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::AlreadyExists,
"User",
format!("Email '{}' is already registered", email),
));
}
// Validate password
if password.len() < 8 {
return Err(DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"User",
"Password must be at least 8 characters long".to_string(),
));
}
let role = UserRole::Admin;
let quota = self.capped_quota(&role);
let password_hash = self.password_hasher.hash_password(&password).await?;
let user = User::new(username.clone(), email, password_hash, role, quota).map_err(|e| {
DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"User",
format!("Error creating admin user: {}", e),
)
})?;
let created_user = self.user_storage.create_user(user).await?;
// Create personal folder for the admin
self.create_personal_folder(&username, created_user.id())
.await;
tracing::info!(
"Initial admin created via setup: {} ({})",
username,
created_user.id()
);
Ok(UserDto::from(created_user))
}
pub async fn login(&self, dto: LoginDto) -> Result<AuthResponseDto, DomainError> {
// Find user
let mut user = self
@@ -585,106 +609,12 @@ impl AuthApplicationService {
Ok(admin_users.len() as i64)
}
// Method to count all users in the system
// Used to determine if this is a fresh install
pub async fn count_all_users(&self) -> Result<i64, DomainError> {
// Get all users with large limit and 0 offset
let all_users = self.user_storage.list_users(1000, 0).await.map_err(|e| {
DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::InternalError,
"User",
format!("Error counting users: {}", e),
)
})?;
Ok(all_users.len() as i64)
}
// Method to delete the default admin user created by migrations
// Used in fresh installations before creating a custom admin
pub async fn delete_default_admin(&self) -> Result<(), DomainError> {
// Find the default admin user (created by migrations)
match self.get_user_by_username("admin").await {
Ok(default_admin) => {
// Delete the default admin user
self.user_storage
.delete_user(&default_admin.id)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::InternalError,
"User",
format!("Error deleting default admin user: {}", e),
)
})
}
Err(_) => {
// Admin user doesn't exist, nothing to do
tracing::info!("Default admin user not found, nothing to delete");
Ok(())
}
}
}
// Method to replace the default admin user with a custom one
// Used in fresh installations to allow users to set their own admin credentials
pub async fn replace_default_admin(&self, dto: &RegisterDto) -> Result<UserDto, DomainError> {
// 1. Get the default admin user
let default_admin = self.get_user_by_username("admin").await?;
// 2. Delete the default admin user
self.user_storage
.delete_user(&default_admin.id)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::InternalError,
"User",
format!("Error deleting default admin user: {}", e),
)
})?;
// 3. Create new admin user with the provided credentials but admin role
let admin_role = UserRole::Admin;
// Admin quota, capped to available disk space
let admin_quota = self.capped_quota(&admin_role);
// Hash the password (same as register / admin_create_user)
let password_hash = self.password_hasher.hash_password(&dto.password).await?;
// Create the new admin user
let user = User::new(
dto.username.clone(),
dto.email.clone(),
password_hash,
admin_role,
admin_quota,
)
.map_err(|e| {
DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"User",
format!("Error creating admin user: {}", e),
)
})?;
// 4. Save the new admin user
let created_user = self.user_storage.create_user(user).await?;
// 5. Create personal folder for the new admin
self.create_personal_folder(&dto.username, created_user.id())
.await;
tracing::info!("Custom admin created: {}", created_user.id());
Ok(UserDto::from(created_user))
}
pub async fn list_users(&self, limit: i64, offset: i64) -> Result<Vec<UserDto>, DomainError> {
let users = self.user_storage.list_users(limit, offset).await?;
Ok(users.into_iter().map(UserDto::from).collect())
}
// ========================================================================
// Admin User Management Methods
// ========================================================================
+28 -1
View File
@@ -550,6 +550,7 @@ impl AppServiceFactory {
app_password_service: None,
path_resolver: None,
webdav_lock_store: crate::infrastructure::services::webdav_lock_service::create_webdav_lock_store(),
setup_token: None,
};
// 9b. Wire admin settings service when auth is available
@@ -598,7 +599,29 @@ impl AppServiceFactory {
}
}
app_state.admin_settings_service = Some(admin_svc);
app_state.admin_settings_service = Some(admin_svc.clone());
// 9b-2. Generate one-time setup token if system is NOT yet initialized
if !admin_svc.is_system_initialized().await {
use rand_core::{OsRng, RngCore};
let mut token_bytes = [0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut token_bytes);
let token = hex::encode(token_bytes);
tracing::warn!("╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗");
tracing::warn!("║ SYSTEM NOT INITIALIZED — first admin setup required ║");
tracing::warn!("║ ║");
tracing::warn!("║ POST /api/setup with this one-time token: ║");
tracing::warn!("║ {} ║", token);
tracing::warn!("║ ║");
tracing::warn!("║ This token is valid until the server restarts or the ║");
tracing::warn!("║ first admin is created. Keep it secret! ║");
tracing::warn!("╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝");
app_state.setup_token = Some(token);
} else {
tracing::info!("System already initialized — setup endpoint disabled");
}
// 9c. Wire Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628) service
{
@@ -857,6 +880,10 @@ pub struct AppState {
Option<Arc<crate::infrastructure::services::path_resolver_service::PathResolverService>>,
pub webdav_lock_store:
Arc<crate::infrastructure::services::webdav_lock_service::WebDavLockStore>,
/// One-time setup token generated on startup when the system is not yet
/// initialized. Printed to the server log so the operator can create the
/// first admin user via `POST /api/setup`.
pub setup_token: Option<String>,
}
// All AppState construction is done via struct literal in build_app_state().
+97 -5
View File
@@ -13,9 +13,16 @@ pub struct StoragePath {
}
impl StoragePath {
/// Creates a new storage path
/// Checks whether a single segment is safe (no traversal, no slashes)
fn is_safe_segment(s: &str) -> bool {
!s.is_empty() && s != "." && s != ".." && !s.contains('/')
}
/// Creates a new storage path, silently dropping any traversal segments
pub fn new(segments: Vec<String>) -> Self {
Self { segments }
Self {
segments: segments.into_iter().filter(|s| Self::is_safe_segment(s)).collect(),
}
}
/// Creates an empty path (root)
@@ -26,10 +33,13 @@ impl StoragePath {
}
/// Creates a path from a string with segments separated by /
///
/// Traversal segments (`.`, `..`) are silently stripped to prevent
/// path-traversal attacks.
pub fn from_string(path: &str) -> Self {
let segments = path
.split('/')
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.filter(|s| Self::is_safe_segment(s))
.map(|s| s.to_string())
.collect();
Self { segments }
@@ -47,10 +57,15 @@ impl StoragePath {
Self { segments }
}
/// Appends a segment to the path
/// Appends a segment to the path.
///
/// Traversal segments (`.`, `..`) and segments containing `/` are
/// silently ignored to prevent path-traversal attacks.
pub fn join(&self, segment: &str) -> Self {
let mut new_segments = self.segments.clone();
new_segments.push(segment.to_string());
if Self::is_safe_segment(segment) {
new_segments.push(segment.to_string());
}
Self {
segments: new_segments,
}
@@ -141,4 +156,81 @@ mod tests {
let path = StoragePath::from_string("folder/file.txt");
assert_eq!(path.file_name(), Some("file.txt".to_string()));
}
// ── Path-traversal hardening tests (VULN-02) ──────────────
#[test]
fn test_from_string_strips_dot_dot() {
let path = StoragePath::from_string("../../etc/passwd");
assert_eq!(path.segments(), &["etc", "passwd"]);
}
#[test]
fn test_from_string_strips_single_dot() {
let path = StoragePath::from_string("folder/./file.txt");
assert_eq!(path.segments(), &["folder", "file.txt"]);
}
#[test]
fn test_from_string_strips_mixed_traversal() {
let path = StoragePath::from_string("a/../b/./c/../../d");
assert_eq!(path.segments(), &["a", "b", "c", "d"]);
}
#[test]
fn test_from_string_all_traversal_yields_root() {
let path = StoragePath::from_string("../../..");
assert!(path.is_empty());
assert_eq!(path.to_string(), "/");
}
#[test]
fn test_new_strips_traversal_segments() {
let path = StoragePath::new(vec![
"..".into(),
"etc".into(),
".".into(),
"passwd".into(),
]);
assert_eq!(path.segments(), &["etc", "passwd"]);
}
#[test]
fn test_new_strips_empty_segments() {
let path = StoragePath::new(vec!["a".into(), "".into(), "b".into()]);
assert_eq!(path.segments(), &["a", "b"]);
}
#[test]
fn test_join_rejects_dot_dot() {
let base = StoragePath::from_string("folder");
let joined = base.join("..");
// ".." is silently ignored — path stays unchanged
assert_eq!(joined.segments(), &["folder"]);
}
#[test]
fn test_join_rejects_single_dot() {
let base = StoragePath::from_string("folder");
let joined = base.join(".");
assert_eq!(joined.segments(), &["folder"]);
}
#[test]
fn test_join_rejects_slash_in_segment() {
let base = StoragePath::from_string("folder");
let joined = base.join("sub/../../etc/passwd");
// Segment contains '/' → silently ignored
assert_eq!(joined.segments(), &["folder"]);
}
#[test]
fn test_from_pathbuf_strips_traversal() {
let path = StoragePath::from(PathBuf::from("a/../b/./c"));
// PathBuf Component::Normal only yields the normal parts
// On most platforms this strips . and ..
// but regardless, our from() only accepts Component::Normal
assert!(!path.segments().contains(&"..".to_string()));
assert!(!path.segments().contains(&".".to_string()));
}
}
+83 -17
View File
@@ -23,13 +23,24 @@ impl PathService {
Self { root_path }
}
/// Converts a domain path to an absolute physical path
pub fn resolve_path(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> PathBuf {
/// Converts a domain path to an absolute physical path.
///
/// Returns an error if validation fails (defense-in-depth against traversal).
pub fn resolve_path(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> Result<PathBuf, DomainError> {
self.validate_path(storage_path)?;
let mut path = self.root_path.clone();
for segment in storage_path.segments() {
path.push(segment);
}
path
// Final safety check: the resolved path must remain under root
if !path.starts_with(&self.root_path) {
return Err(DomainError::new(
ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"Path",
format!("Resolved path escapes storage root: {}", path.display()),
));
}
Ok(path)
}
/// Converts a physical path to a domain path
@@ -116,20 +127,14 @@ impl PathService {
}
impl StoragePort for PathService {
fn resolve_path(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> PathBuf {
let mut path = self.root_path.clone();
for segment in storage_path.segments() {
path.push(segment);
}
path
fn resolve_path(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> Result<PathBuf, DomainError> {
// Delegate to inherent method which validates + bounds-checks
self.resolve_path(storage_path)
}
async fn ensure_directory(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> Result<(), DomainError> {
// First validate the path
self.validate_path(storage_path)?;
// Resolve to physical path
let physical_path = self.resolve_path(storage_path);
// resolve_path already calls validate_path internally
let physical_path = self.resolve_path(storage_path)?;
// Check current state with a single async stat() — no worker blocking.
match fs::metadata(&physical_path).await {
@@ -169,7 +174,7 @@ impl StoragePort for PathService {
}
async fn file_exists(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> Result<bool, DomainError> {
let physical_path = self.resolve_path(storage_path);
let physical_path = self.resolve_path(storage_path)?;
// Single async stat() — no worker blocking, one syscall instead of two.
match fs::metadata(&physical_path).await {
@@ -184,7 +189,7 @@ impl StoragePort for PathService {
}
async fn directory_exists(&self, storage_path: &StoragePath) -> Result<bool, DomainError> {
let physical_path = self.resolve_path(storage_path);
let physical_path = self.resolve_path(storage_path)?;
// Single async stat() — no worker blocking, one syscall instead of two.
match fs::metadata(&physical_path).await {
@@ -208,7 +213,7 @@ mod tests {
let service = PathService::new(PathBuf::from("/storage"));
let storage_path = StoragePath::from_string("test/file.txt");
let absolute = service.resolve_path(&storage_path);
let absolute = service.resolve_path(&storage_path).unwrap();
assert_eq!(absolute, PathBuf::from("/storage/test/file.txt"));
}
@@ -255,4 +260,65 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(file_path.to_string(), "/folder/file.txt");
}
// ── Path-traversal hardening tests (VULN-02) ──────────────
#[test]
fn test_resolve_path_traversal_stripped_by_domain() {
// StoragePath::from_string already strips ".." segments (Solution A+E),
// so resolve_path receives a clean path.
let service = PathService::new(PathBuf::from("/storage"));
let path = StoragePath::from_string("../../etc/passwd");
let resolved = service.resolve_path(&path).unwrap();
assert_eq!(resolved, PathBuf::from("/storage/etc/passwd"));
assert!(resolved.starts_with("/storage"));
}
#[test]
fn test_resolve_path_normal_path_ok() {
let service = PathService::new(PathBuf::from("/storage"));
let path = StoragePath::from_string("users/alice/documents/report.pdf");
let resolved = service.resolve_path(&path).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
resolved,
PathBuf::from("/storage/users/alice/documents/report.pdf")
);
}
#[test]
fn test_resolve_path_root_ok() {
let service = PathService::new(PathBuf::from("/storage"));
let path = StoragePath::root();
let resolved = service.resolve_path(&path).unwrap();
assert_eq!(resolved, PathBuf::from("/storage"));
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_path_rejects_dot_prefix() {
let service = PathService::new(PathBuf::from("/storage"));
// Manually construct a path with a dot-prefixed segment
// (from_string strips ".." but allows ".hidden")
let path = StoragePath::from_string("folder/.hidden/file.txt");
assert!(service.validate_path(&path).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_path_allows_well_known() {
let service = PathService::new(PathBuf::from("/storage"));
let path = StoragePath::from_string("folder/.well-known/caldav");
assert!(service.validate_path(&path).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_path_rejects_dangerous_chars() {
let service = PathService::new(PathBuf::from("/storage"));
for dangerous in &["file:name", "file*name", "file?name", "file<name", "file>name", "file|name", "file\"name"] {
let path = StoragePath::new(vec![dangerous.to_string()]);
assert!(
service.validate_path(&path).is_err(),
"validate_path should reject segment: {}",
dangerous
);
}
}
}
+113 -4
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
use crate::application::dtos::user_dto::{
ChangePasswordDto, LoginDto, OidcCallbackQueryDto, OidcExchangeDto, OidcProviderInfoDto,
RefreshTokenDto, RegisterDto,
RefreshTokenDto, RegisterDto, SetupAdminDto,
};
use crate::common::di::AppState;
use crate::interfaces::api::cookie_auth;
@@ -51,6 +51,11 @@ pub fn refresh_route() -> Router<Arc<AppState>> {
Router::new().route("/refresh", post(refresh_token))
}
/// Public setup route — only active before the first admin is created.
pub fn setup_route() -> Router<Arc<AppState>> {
Router::new().route("/setup", post(setup_admin))
}
async fn register(
State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
Json(dto): Json<RegisterDto>,
@@ -343,6 +348,103 @@ async fn logout(
Ok(response)
}
/// POST /api/setup — One-time endpoint to create the first admin user.
///
/// Requires the setup token that was printed to the server log on first boot.
/// Once the admin is created, the system is marked as initialized and this
/// endpoint returns 403 for all subsequent requests.
async fn setup_admin(
State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
Json(dto): Json<SetupAdminDto>,
) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, AppError> {
tracing::info!("Setup admin request received for user: {}", dto.username);
// 1. Verify auth service exists
let auth_service = state
.auth_service
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::internal_error("Authentication service not configured"))?;
// 2. Check if system is already initialized (fail-closed: DB error → deny)
let admin_svc = state
.admin_settings_service
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::internal_error("Admin settings service not configured"))?;
if admin_svc.is_system_initialized().await {
tracing::warn!(
"Setup admin rejected: system already initialized (user: {})",
dto.username
);
return Err(AppError::new(
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"System is already initialized. Use the admin panel to manage users.",
"SystemAlreadyInitialized",
));
}
// 3. Verify the one-time setup token
let expected_token = state.setup_token.as_deref().ok_or_else(|| {
AppError::new(
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"No setup token available. The system may already be initialized or the server needs to be restarted.",
"NoSetupToken",
)
})?;
if !constant_time_eq(dto.setup_token.as_bytes(), expected_token.as_bytes()) {
tracing::warn!(
"Setup admin rejected: invalid setup token (user: {})",
dto.username
);
return Err(AppError::new(
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"Invalid setup token. Check the server log for the correct token.",
"InvalidSetupToken",
));
}
// 4. Create the first admin user
let user = auth_service
.auth_application_service
.setup_create_admin(dto.username.clone(), dto.email, dto.password)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
tracing::error!("Setup admin creation failed: {}", e);
AppError::from(e)
})?;
// 5. Mark system as initialized
if let Err(e) = admin_svc.mark_system_initialized(&user.id).await {
// Admin was created but we couldn't mark as initialized.
// This is not fatal — the setup token check prevents re-use, and
// on next restart the system will detect the admin in DB.
tracing::error!(
"Created admin but failed to mark system as initialized: {}",
e
);
}
tracing::info!(
"System initialized: first admin '{}' created successfully",
dto.username
);
Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(user)))
}
/// Constant-time byte comparison to prevent timing attacks on the setup token.
fn constant_time_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
if a.len() != b.len() {
return false;
}
let mut diff = 0u8;
for (x, y) in a.iter().zip(b.iter()) {
diff |= x ^ y;
}
diff == 0
}
/// Get system status - returns whether admin is configured
/// This is a public endpoint used to determine if setup is needed
#[derive(serde::Serialize)]
@@ -363,7 +465,14 @@ async fn get_system_status(
.as_ref()
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::internal_error("Authentication service not configured"))?;
// Count admin users to determine if system is initialized
// Use the DB flag as the authoritative source for initialization status
let db_initialized = if let Some(admin_svc) = state.admin_settings_service.as_ref() {
admin_svc.is_system_initialized().await
} else {
false
};
// Count admin users for additional info
let admin_count = auth_service
.auth_application_service
.count_admin_users()
@@ -371,9 +480,9 @@ async fn get_system_status(
.unwrap_or(0);
let status = SystemStatus {
initialized: admin_count > 0,
initialized: db_initialized || admin_count > 0,
admin_count,
registration_allowed: admin_count > 0, // Only allow registration if admin exists
registration_allowed: db_initialized || admin_count > 0,
};
tracing::info!(
+10 -1
View File
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
}
if config.features.enable_auth {
use interfaces::api::handlers::auth_handler::{
auth_routes, login_route, refresh_route, register_route,
auth_routes, login_route, refresh_route, register_route, setup_route,
};
use oxicloud::interfaces::api::handlers::app_password_handler;
use oxicloud::interfaces::api::handlers::device_auth_handler;
@@ -229,6 +229,13 @@ async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
.with_state(app_state.clone());
// Remaining auth routes (status, OIDC, protected /me, /logout, etc.)
let auth_router = auth_routes().with_state(app_state.clone());
// One-time setup route — public, rate-limited like register
let setup_router = setup_route()
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
register_limiter.clone(),
rate_limit_register,
))
.with_state(app_state.clone());
// Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628)
// Public endpoints: /api/auth/device/authorize + /api/auth/device/token
@@ -281,6 +288,8 @@ async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
.nest("/api/auth", auth_refresh)
// Other auth endpoints (status, OIDC, protected /me, /logout)
.nest("/api/auth", auth_router)
// One-time setup endpoint — public, rate-limited
.nest("/api", setup_router)
// Device Auth Grant public endpoints (authorize + token polling)
.nest("/api/auth/device", device_public)
// Device Auth Grant protected endpoints (verify + device management)