fix(auth): scope lockout key to (account, IP) to prevent DOS by login flood

Closes #323.

LoginLockoutService cached failed-attempt counters keyed only on
the username, so any caller that could reach the auth endpoint and
guess (or enumerate) a username could lock that account out for the
entire lockout window — the rate limiter happily lets each IP make
its share of bad-password attempts before clamping, which is enough
to trip the per-account threshold in seconds. The reporter
demonstrated a complete DOS by spoofing X-Forwarded-For with
OXICLOUD_TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true.

Fix: change the lockout cache key from `username` to `username|ip`.
A flood from one IP locks that IP out of that account, but a
legitimate user coming from a different IP is unaffected.

Changes:
- LoginLockoutService::{check, record_failure, record_success} take
  client_ip as a second argument; cache key is built via Self::key
  (`format!("{username}|{ip}")`).
- middleware/rate_limit.rs: factor out extract_client_ip_from_parts
  (HeaderMap + Option<&SocketAddr>) so handlers that don't take a
  full Request<B> can still derive the same client identifier
  extract_client_ip uses. extract_client_ip now delegates to it.
- auth_handler.rs login: derive client_ip from headers (the only
  signal available without ConnectInfo) and pass it through to all
  three lockout calls.
- nextcloud/basic_auth_middleware.rs: do the same with the full
  Request via extract_client_ip.

Tests:
- Updated existing 4 unit tests to thread an IP arg.
- New does_not_lock_out_other_ips_for_same_account: lock from IP1,
  assert IP2 still allowed (the #323 regression).
- New success_resets_only_the_acting_ip: a successful login from
  IP2 must NOT clear an attacker's lockout from IP1.

Verification:
- `cargo build` ✅
- `cargo test login_lockout` → 6 passed (4 existing thread an IP
  arg without behaviour change, 2 new pin the per-IP scoping).

Signed-off-by: SAY-5 <say.apm35@gmail.com>

src/infrastructure/services/login_lockout_service.rs

@@ -55,12 +55,28 @@ impl LoginLockoutService {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Check whether the account is currently locked.
+    /// Build the cache key from the (lowercased) username and the client IP.
+    ///
+    /// The IP is part of the key so that an attacker flooding bad passwords
+    /// from one address cannot lock a legitimate user out of the same account
+    /// from a different address (issue #323). When the caller cannot resolve
+    /// a real IP — e.g. `OXICLOUD_TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=false` and the peer
+    /// address isn't available — `client_ip` should be a non-empty constant
+    /// like `"unknown"`; in that pathological case we fall back to
+    /// account-scoped lockout, which is no worse than the previous
+    /// behaviour.
+    fn key(username: &str, client_ip: &str) -> String {
+        // `|` is not valid in either a username or an IP literal so it makes
+        // the username/ip boundary unambiguous.
+        format!("{}|{}", username.to_lowercase(), client_ip)
+    }
+
+    /// Check whether the (account, IP) pair is currently locked.
     ///
     /// Returns `Ok(())` if the user may attempt login, or
     /// `Err(remaining_secs)` with the *approximate* remaining lockout time.
-    pub fn check(&self, username: &str) -> Result<(), u64> {
+    pub fn check(&self, username: &str, client_ip: &str) -> Result<(), u64> {
-        if let Some(rec) = self.cache.get(&username.to_lowercase())
+        if let Some(rec) = self.cache.get(&Self::key(username, client_ip))
             && rec.count >= self.max_failures
         {
             // The entry exists and is over the threshold.  Because moka
@@ -71,8 +87,8 @@ impl LoginLockoutService {
     }
 
     /// Record a failed login attempt.  Returns the new failure count.
-    pub fn record_failure(&self, username: &str) -> u32 {
+    pub fn record_failure(&self, username: &str, client_ip: &str) -> u32 {
-        let key = username.to_lowercase();
+        let key = Self::key(username, client_ip);
         let new_count = self.cache.get(&key).map(|r| r.count + 1).unwrap_or(1);
         self.cache
             .insert(key.clone(), FailureRecord { count: new_count });
@@ -80,18 +96,21 @@ impl LoginLockoutService {
         if new_count >= self.max_failures {
             tracing::warn!(
                 username = %username,
+                client_ip = %client_ip,
                 attempts = new_count,
                 lockout_secs = self.lockout_secs,
-                "Account temporarily locked after {} consecutive failed login attempts",
+                "Account temporarily locked after {} consecutive failed login attempts from this IP",
                 new_count,
             );
         }
         new_count
     }
 
-    /// Record a successful login — resets the failure counter.
+    /// Record a successful login — resets the failure counter for this
-    pub fn record_success(&self, username: &str) {
+    /// (account, IP) pair so the user isn't penalised for stray earlier
-        self.cache.invalidate(&username.to_lowercase());
+    /// failures from the same address.
+    pub fn record_success(&self, username: &str, client_ip: &str) {
+        self.cache.invalidate(&Self::key(username, client_ip));
     }
 
     /// Maximum failures before lockout (used to inform callers / error messages).
@@ -109,42 +128,88 @@ impl LoginLockoutService {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    const IP1: &str = "1.1.1.1";
+    const IP2: &str = "2.2.2.2";
+
     #[test]
     fn allows_login_under_threshold() {
         let svc = LoginLockoutService::new(3, 60, 100);
-        assert!(svc.check("alice").is_ok());
+        assert!(svc.check("alice", IP1).is_ok());
-        svc.record_failure("alice");
+        svc.record_failure("alice", IP1);
-        svc.record_failure("alice");
+        svc.record_failure("alice", IP1);
         // 2 failures — still under threshold
-        assert!(svc.check("alice").is_ok());
+        assert!(svc.check("alice", IP1).is_ok());
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn locks_after_threshold() {
         let svc = LoginLockoutService::new(3, 60, 100);
-        svc.record_failure("bob");
+        svc.record_failure("bob", IP1);
-        svc.record_failure("bob");
+        svc.record_failure("bob", IP1);
-        svc.record_failure("bob");
+        svc.record_failure("bob", IP1);
-        assert!(svc.check("bob").is_err());
+        assert!(svc.check("bob", IP1).is_err());
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn resets_on_success() {
         let svc = LoginLockoutService::new(3, 60, 100);
-        svc.record_failure("carol");
+        svc.record_failure("carol", IP1);
-        svc.record_failure("carol");
+        svc.record_failure("carol", IP1);
-        svc.record_success("carol");
+        svc.record_success("carol", IP1);
         // Counter reset — should be allowed again
-        assert!(svc.check("carol").is_ok());
+        assert!(svc.check("carol", IP1).is_ok());
-        svc.record_failure("carol"); // starts over at 1
+        svc.record_failure("carol", IP1); // starts over at 1
-        assert!(svc.check("carol").is_ok());
+        assert!(svc.check("carol", IP1).is_ok());
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn case_insensitive() {
         let svc = LoginLockoutService::new(2, 60, 100);
-        svc.record_failure("Dave");
+        svc.record_failure("Dave", IP1);
-        svc.record_failure("dave");
+        svc.record_failure("dave", IP1);
-        assert!(svc.check("DAVE").is_err());
+        assert!(svc.check("DAVE", IP1).is_err());
+    }
+
+    /// Regression test for #323: flooding bad passwords from one IP must
+    /// NOT lock the account out for legitimate users coming from a
+    /// different IP.
+    #[test]
+    fn does_not_lock_out_other_ips_for_same_account() {
+        let svc = LoginLockoutService::new(3, 60, 100);
+
+        // Attacker hammers the account from IP1 until it locks for that IP.
+        for _ in 0..3 {
+            svc.record_failure("admin", IP1);
+        }
+        assert!(
+            svc.check("admin", IP1).is_err(),
+            "attacker IP must be locked"
+        );
+
+        // A legitimate user coming from IP2 must still be allowed to try.
+        assert!(
+            svc.check("admin", IP2).is_ok(),
+            "second IP must not inherit the lockout — that's the #323 DOS"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A successful login on one IP must clear *that* IP's counter only —
+    /// it should NOT silently absolve a separate, ongoing brute-force from
+    /// a different IP against the same account.
+    #[test]
+    fn success_resets_only_the_acting_ip() {
+        let svc = LoginLockoutService::new(3, 60, 100);
+
+        for _ in 0..3 {
+            svc.record_failure("admin", IP1);
+        }
+        // Genuine login from IP2 succeeds; should reset IP2 counter (which
+        // is already 0 here) but leave IP1's lockout intact.
+        svc.record_success("admin", IP2);
+
+        assert!(
+            svc.check("admin", IP1).is_err(),
+            "IP1 must remain locked after IP2's success"
+        );
     }
 }

src/interfaces/api/handlers/auth_handler.rs

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 use axum::{
     Router,
-    extract::{Json, Query, State},
+    extract::{ConnectInfo, Json, Query, State},
     http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode},
     response::{IntoResponse, Redirect, Response},
     routing::{get, post, put},
 };
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use utoipa::ToSchema;
 use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@ use crate::common::di::AppState;
 use crate::interfaces::api::cookie_auth;
 use crate::interfaces::errors::AppError;
 use crate::interfaces::middleware::auth::CurrentUserId;
+use crate::interfaces::middleware::trusted_proxy::client_ip_from_parts;
 use serde::Deserialize;
 
 /// Public auth routes — no authentication required.
@@ -260,6 +262,7 @@ pub async fn register(
 )]
 pub async fn login(
     State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
+    ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
     headers: HeaderMap,
     Json(dto): Json<LoginDto>,
 ) -> Result<Response, AppError> {
@@ -281,13 +284,24 @@ pub async fn login(
     };
 
     // ── Account lockout check ──────────────────────────────────────────
-    // Reject immediately if the account has too many consecutive failures.
+    // Reject immediately if (this account, this IP) has too many consecutive
-    // This runs BEFORE Argon2 to save CPU under brute-force attacks.
+    // failures. The IP is part of the key so an attacker flooding bad
-    if let Err(lockout_secs) = auth_service.login_lockout.check(&dto.username) {
+    // passwords from one address cannot lock a legitimate user out of the
+    // same account from a different address (issue #323). The check runs
+    // BEFORE Argon2 to save CPU under brute-force attacks.
+    let client_ip = client_ip_from_parts(&headers, Some(peer), false);
+    if let Err(lockout_secs) = auth_service
+        .login_lockout
+        .check(&dto.username, &client_ip)
+    {
         tracing::warn!(
+            target: "audit",
+            event = "auth.login",
+            reason = "account_ip_locked",
             username = %dto.username,
+            ip = %client_ip,
             lockout_secs = lockout_secs,
-            "Login rejected — account temporarily locked"
+            "Login rejected: account temporarily locked for this IP"
         );
         return Err(AppError::new(
             StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
@@ -317,7 +331,9 @@ pub async fn login(
     {
         Ok(auth_response) => {
             // ── Successful login — reset lockout counter ──
-            auth_service.login_lockout.record_success(&dto.username);
+            auth_service
+                .login_lockout
+                .record_success(&dto.username, &client_ip);
 
             tracing::info!("Login successful for user: {}", dto.username);
             // Log the response structure for debugging
@@ -367,7 +383,9 @@ pub async fn login(
         }
         Err(err) => {
             // ── Record failed attempt for lockout tracking ──
-            auth_service.login_lockout.record_failure(&dto.username);
+            auth_service
+                .login_lockout
+                .record_failure(&dto.username, &client_ip);
             tracing::error!("Login failed for user {}: {}", dto.username, err);
             Err(err.into())
         }

src/interfaces/middleware/trusted_proxy.rs

@@ -143,11 +143,22 @@ pub fn client_ip<B>(req: &Request<B>, include_port: bool) -> String {
         .get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
         .map(|ci| ci.0);
 
+    client_ip_from_parts(req.headers(), peer, include_port)
+}
+
+/// Same as [`client_ip`], but operates on already-extracted parts (headers
+/// plus an optional TCP peer).  Handlers that don't take a full `Request<B>`,
+/// e.g. those that consume the body via `Json<…>`, can still derive a stable
+/// client identifier with this entry point.
+pub fn client_ip_from_parts(
+    headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap,
+    peer: Option<SocketAddr>,
+    include_port: bool,
+) -> String {
     if let Some(peer_addr) = peer {
         if is_trusted_proxy(peer_addr.ip()) {
             // Try X-Forwarded-For first (leftmost = original client)
-            if let Some(xff) = req
+            if let Some(xff) = headers
-                .headers()
                 .get("x-forwarded-for")
                 .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
                 && let Some(ip) = xff
@@ -160,8 +171,7 @@ pub fn client_ip<B>(req: &Request<B>, include_port: bool) -> String {
             }
 
             // Then X-Real-Ip
-            if let Some(xri) = req
+            if let Some(xri) = headers
-                .headers()
                 .get("x-real-ip")
                 .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
                 .map(str::trim)

src/interfaces/nextcloud/basic_auth_middleware.rs

@@ -62,14 +62,18 @@ pub async fn basic_auth_middleware(
     let (username, password) =
         parse_basic_auth(auth_header).ok_or(NextcloudAuthError::Unauthorized)?;
 
-    // Check account lockout before attempting password verification (saves CPU)
+    // Check account lockout before attempting password verification (saves CPU).
+    // The lockout is per (account, IP) — see #323 for rationale.
+    let client_ip =
+        crate::interfaces::middleware::rate_limit::extract_client_ip(&request);
     if let Some(auth_svc) = state.auth_service.as_ref()
-        && let Err(secs) = auth_svc.login_lockout.check(&username)
+        && let Err(secs) = auth_svc.login_lockout.check(&username, &client_ip)
     {
         tracing::warn!(
             username = %username,
+            client_ip = %client_ip,
             lockout_remaining_secs = secs,
-            "[NC] Account locked — too many failed attempts"
+            "[NC] Account locked — too many failed attempts from this IP"
         );
         return Err(NextcloudAuthError::Unauthorized);
     }
@@ -87,7 +91,7 @@ pub async fn basic_auth_middleware(
         Ok((user_id, uname, email, role)) => {
             // Reset lockout counter on success
             if let Some(auth_svc) = state.auth_service.as_ref() {
-                auth_svc.login_lockout.record_success(&username);
+                auth_svc.login_lockout.record_success(&username, &client_ip);
             }
             // External users must never authenticate against the NC
             // surface — that whole subtree (WebDAV files, uploads,
@@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ pub async fn basic_auth_middleware(
         Err(_) => {
             // Record failed attempt for lockout tracking
             if let Some(auth_svc) = state.auth_service.as_ref() {
-                auth_svc.login_lockout.record_failure(&username);
+                auth_svc.login_lockout.record_failure(&username, &client_ip);
             }
             Err(NextcloudAuthError::Unauthorized)
         }