test(oidc): test OIDC login and refresh flow

- ensure Oxicloud s correctly functional with OIDC login - refresh token works - givenname, familyname, picture are imported in users' informations - test relogin (server is not using same path) - test email verified - test admin group provided from IdP
2026-06-28 22:40:06 +02:00
parent 324fcd486f
commit ada4b021bf
10 changed files with 2044 additions and 3 deletions
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+# =============================================================
+# OxiCloud — OIDC happy-path integration test
+# =============================================================
+# Drives the full SSO flow against the fake IdP under
+# tests/oidc/fake_idp/ (panva/node-oidc-provider with an auto-approve
+# interaction handler) and asserts every contract the SPA depends on.
+# Pinned regression: commit d1bbe8ba changed the callback's frontend
+# redirect from `/?oidc_code=…` to `/login?oidc_code=…` — Step 5's
+# `Location matches "^…/login\?oidc_code=…"` is the assertion that
+# would have caught that bug before users hit it.
+#
+# Flow walked manually (no auto-follow) so each handler is asserted
+# independently:
+#
+#   1. Bootstrap: create the local admin (provider list works
+#      regardless of admin presence, but the rest of the test
+#      lives more comfortably with a fully-initialised server).
+#   2. GET /api/auth/oidc/providers — SPA reads this to render
+#      the SSO button.
+#   3. GET /api/auth/oidc/authorize — server mints state + PKCE,
+#      redirects to the IdP.
+#   4. GET <IdP>/auth (+ full redirect chain) — fake-idp
+#      auto-approves login + consent, OxiCloud's callback
+#      JIT-provisions the user and redirects to
+#      {frontend_url}/login?oidc_code=… The final 404 (no SPA
+#      shell in test config) IS the test signal: we assert on
+#      the URL we landed at, which is the d1bbe8ba contract.
+#   5. POST /api/auth/oidc/exchange — SPA swaps the one-time
+#      code for tokens + cookies.
+#   6. GET /api/auth/me — proves the cookie session is live AND
+#      that every OIDC profile claim (name → username, given_name,
+#      family_name, picture → image, email, groups → admin role)
+#      was JIT-provisioned correctly into the local user record.
+#   7. POST /api/auth/refresh — rotation of all three cookies;
+#      proves the SPA's session-renewal path works on top of
+#      an OIDC-provisioned account.
+#   8. GET /api/auth/me — the refreshed cookies authenticate too.
+#   9. Existing-user re-login — a second OIDC flow with the same
+#      `sub` resolves to the same local user, not a duplicate.
+#  10. Anti-takeover — an unverified-email callback is rejected.
+#  11. POST /api/auth/oidc/exchange — replay-protection: the
+#      one-time code is single-use, second exchange returns 401.
+# =============================================================
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 1 — Create the local admin
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/setup
+Content-Type: application/json
+{
+  "username": "{{username}}",
+  "email":    "{{email}}",
+  "password": "{{password}}"
+}
+
+HTTP 201
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 2 — Provider discovery for the SPA
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/oidc/providers
+
+HTTP 200
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.enabled" == true
+# tests/common/server-with-oidc.env sets OXICLOUD_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME=MockSSO.
+jsonpath "$.provider_name" == "MockSSO"
+jsonpath "$.authorize_endpoint" == "/api/auth/oidc/authorize"
+jsonpath "$.password_login_enabled" == true
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 3 — SPA-initiated authorize. Server returns a 302 with
+#          state + PKCE challenge in the Location URL.
+#          [Options] location: false keeps Hurl from following
+#          the redirect so we can capture the target intact.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/oidc/authorize
+[Options]
+location: false
+
+# 307 (not 302): handler uses axum Redirect::temporary, which preserves
+# the request method on follow. For a GET-initiated SSO flow it makes
+# no practical difference, but the assertion has to match what's emitted.
+HTTP 307
+[Captures]
+idp_url: header "Location"
+[Asserts]
+# panva/node-oidc-provider publishes authorize at /auth (not
+# /authorize). The OXICLOUD_OIDC_ISSUER_URL points at the issuer
+# root; the discovery doc tells OxiCloud the actual endpoint.
+header "Location" matches "^{{oidc_authorize_endpoint}}\\?"
+header "Location" contains "state="
+header "Location" contains "code_challenge="
+header "Location" contains "code_challenge_method=S256"
+header "Location" contains "client_id=oxicloud-test"
+header "Location" contains "redirect_uri="
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 4 — Walk the entire IdP + OxiCloud redirect chain.
+#
+#          The fake IdP's auto-approve handler resolves login +
+#          consent silently and 302s back to OxiCloud's callback;
+#          the callback validates state + exchanges code with the
+#          IdP, JIT-provisions the user, then 307s the browser to
+#          {frontend_url}/login?oidc_code=…
+#
+#          With `location: true` Hurl follows the whole chain and
+#          lands on the SPA login URL. The test server config
+#          (server-with-oidc.env) points `OXICLOUD_STATIC_PATH`
+#          at ./static — which is the legacy vanilla frontend, NOT
+#          static-dist/ — so /login returns 404. That 404 is the
+#          test signal: it proves we landed AT /login (i.e. the
+#          d1bbe8ba contract held). The URL we end at is the
+#          actual assertion.
+#
+#          A pre-d1bbe8ba server would have redirected to
+#          `http://localhost:8087/?oidc_code=…` instead — same
+#          404, but the `landed_at` assertion would catch it.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+GET {{idp_url}}
+[Options]
+location: true
+location-trusted: true
+
+HTTP 404
+[Captures]
+landed_at: url
+oidc_code: url regex "oidc_code=([a-f0-9]+)"
+[Asserts]
+# The d1bbe8ba regression guard. The exact contract the SvelteKit
+# SPA depends on — `/login`, not `/`.
+variable "landed_at" matches "^http://localhost:8087/login\\?oidc_code=[a-f0-9]+$"
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 5 — Swap the one-time code for a session.
+#          Response sets the HttpOnly auth cookies + the
+#          double-submit CSRF cookie the SPA reads to populate
+#          X-CSRF-Token on subsequent mutating requests.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/oidc/exchange
+Content-Type: application/json
+{ "code": "{{oidc_code}}" }
+
+HTTP 200
+[Captures]
+oidc_session_user: jsonpath "$.user.username"
+# Snapshotted so Step 7's refresh can prove the tokens rotated
+# rather than being re-issued unchanged. The refresh handler in
+# auth_handler.rs always rotates all three cookies (access JWT,
+# refresh UUID, CSRF UUID); a regression that silently keeps the
+# old refresh token would let a leaked refresh credential live
+# forever — exactly the kind of issue token-family rotation exists
+# to prevent.
+initial_access_token:  jsonpath "$.access_token"
+initial_refresh_token: jsonpath "$.refresh_token"
+initial_csrf_token:    cookie "oxicloud_csrf"
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.user.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.user.email"    == "oidc@example.com"
+jsonpath "$.access_token"  isString
+# Multiple Set-Cookie headers come back as a list of values, so
+# `contains` only matches whole-element strings. Each cookie shows up
+# as its own list entry; we use `cookie "<name>"` (Hurl's dedicated
+# helper) which finds the cookie by name across all Set-Cookie headers.
+cookie "oxicloud_access"   exists
+cookie "oxicloud_refresh"  exists
+cookie "oxicloud_csrf"     exists
+cookie "oxicloud_access[HttpOnly]"  exists
+cookie "oxicloud_refresh[HttpOnly]" exists
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 6 — Same-jar follow-up GET proves the cookie session
+#          actually authenticates. Hurl reuses the cookie jar
+#          across requests in one file by default, so the
+#          Set-Cookie from Step 5 carries forward.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
+
+HTTP 200
+[Captures]
+# Stash the user id for the re-login check in Step 10 below — a
+# second OIDC flow with the same `sub` must resolve back to this
+# exact user, not silently create a duplicate.
+oidc_user_id: jsonpath "$.id"
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.email"    == "oidc@example.com"
+# `auth_provider` stores the OIDC provider's display name (set via
+# OXICLOUD_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME in tests/common/server-with-oidc.env),
+# NOT a generic "oidc" tag. A locally registered admin would have
+# this field as something like "local". The distinct value here is
+# what proves JIT provisioning landed via OIDC, not setup.hurl.
+jsonpath "$.auth_provider" == "MockSSO"
+# Full claim round-trip — the fake IdP (tests/oidc/fake_idp/server.js)
+# pins these values and OxiCloud must persist each one verbatim during
+# JIT provisioning (see auth_application_service.rs around line 2257).
+# A regression that drops, swaps, or truncates a claim trips here.
+# Note the field name flip on the API side: OIDC `picture` becomes
+# UserDto.image (a URL or data URI).
+jsonpath "$.given_name"  == "OIDC"
+jsonpath "$.family_name" == "Test"
+jsonpath "$.image"       == "https://example.com/oidc-test-user.png"
+# Group-to-role mapping. server-with-oidc.env sets
+# OXICLOUD_OIDC_ADMIN_GROUPS=admin-users; the fake IdP's claims include
+# `groups: ["admin-users"]`. The JIT path intersects the claim against
+# the env and promotes the new user from `user` to `admin`. A
+# regression here would silently strip (or wrongly grant) admin rights
+# for every SSO deployment that uses group-based role mapping.
+jsonpath "$.role" == "admin"
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 7 — Refresh-token rotation.
+#
+#          POST /api/auth/refresh reads the refresh token from
+#          the HttpOnly oxicloud_refresh cookie (the browser flow
+#          OxiCloud's SPA uses; the JSON body shape is only a
+#          backwards-compat path for non-browser clients) and
+#          re-issues all three cookies. Token-family rotation:
+#          the prior refresh token is invalidated server-side
+#          and a reuse attempt would be caught as a theft signal.
+#
+#          CSRF middleware fires here because we have a cookie
+#          session — we pass the captured oxicloud_csrf value as
+#          the double-submit X-CSRF-Token header, matching what
+#          the SvelteKit SPA does via getCsrfHeaders().
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/refresh
+X-CSRF-Token: {{initial_csrf_token}}
+Content-Type: application/json
+{}
+
+HTTP 200
+[Captures]
+refreshed_access_token:  jsonpath "$.access_token"
+refreshed_refresh_token: jsonpath "$.refresh_token"
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.user.username" == "oidc_user"
+jsonpath "$.access_token"  isString
+jsonpath "$.refresh_token" isString
+# All three cookies must rotate. If any value were re-used, a
+# regression in cookie_auth::append_auth_cookies (or in the
+# RefreshToken use case) would silently leave the old credential
+# live — exactly the kind of bug that motivates rotation.
+variable "refreshed_access_token"  != "{{initial_access_token}}"
+variable "refreshed_refresh_token" != "{{initial_refresh_token}}"
+cookie "oxicloud_access"   exists
+cookie "oxicloud_refresh"  exists
+cookie "oxicloud_csrf"     exists
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 8 — The refreshed cookies authenticate too. Belt-and-braces:
+#          rotation is only useful if the new tokens actually work.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me
+
+HTTP 200
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.username" == "oidc_user"
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 9 — Existing-user re-login. A second pass through the same
+#          OIDC `sub` MUST resolve back to the SAME local user
+#          (`oidc_user_id` captured in Step 6) — silently creating
+#          a duplicate account on every login would be the
+#          regression. Exercises the existing-user branch in
+#          auth_application_service.rs around line 2157, distinct
+#          from the JIT-provisioning branch the earlier steps hit.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/oidc/authorize
+[Options]
+location: false
+
+HTTP 307
+[Captures]
+relogin_idp_url: header "Location"
+
+
+GET {{relogin_idp_url}}
+[Options]
+location: true
+location-trusted: true
+
+HTTP 404
+[Captures]
+relogin_oidc_code: url regex "oidc_code=([a-f0-9]+)"
+[Asserts]
+variable "landed_at" matches "^http://localhost:8087/login\\?oidc_code=[a-f0-9]+$"
+
+
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/oidc/exchange
+Content-Type: application/json
+{ "code": "{{relogin_oidc_code}}" }
+
+HTTP 200
+[Asserts]
+# Same local id — proves the existing-user resolver matched on `sub`
+# (or `oidc_provider + oidc_subject`) instead of minting a new row.
+jsonpath "$.user.id" == "{{oidc_user_id}}"
+jsonpath "$.user.username" == "oidc_user"
+# Role from the prior JIT-provisioned admin survives the re-login.
+# Two regressions this catches: (a) the existing-user branch wiping
+# the role to a default `user`; (b) the existing-user branch
+# re-evaluating groups but missing the admin-group claim (the fake
+# IdP still emits `groups: ["admin-users"]`, OXICLOUD_OIDC_ADMIN_GROUPS
+# still resolves to "admin"). Either way, the role should remain
+# `admin` — otherwise we have a silent admin demotion on every login.
+jsonpath "$.user.role" == "admin"
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 10 — Anti-takeover: an OIDC callback whose `email_verified`
+#           claim is `false` MUST be rejected. Without this guard
+#           an attacker who can set `email` to a victim's address
+#           in their own IdP account (some IdPs allow unverified
+#           emails through the consent screen) gets the victim's
+#           OxiCloud account on first login.
+#
+#           We flip the fake IdP into the unverified-email mode
+#           via the `/control/email-verified/false` test hook,
+#           drive a fresh authorize, expect the OxiCloud callback
+#           to fail, then reset the IdP for any future steps.
+#
+#           This SHOULD use a different `sub` than the existing
+#           verified user to exercise the JIT path (the
+#           anti-takeover check fires there), but the auto-approve
+#           handler resolves one fixed `sub`. The check still
+#           fires on the existing user path too because the
+#           verified-email requirement is evaluated on every
+#           callback — that's what we exercise here.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST http://localhost:1080/control/email-verified/false
+
+HTTP 200
+
+
+GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/oidc/authorize
+[Options]
+location: false
+
+HTTP 307
+[Captures]
+unverified_idp_url: header "Location"
+
+
+GET {{unverified_idp_url}}
+[Options]
+location: true
+location-trusted: true
+
+# OxiCloud's callback returns 403 (or 401, depending on which
+# branch fires). What matters is the final URL is NOT
+# /login?oidc_code= — a successful login would have landed there
+# regardless of status, so a status-code-only assertion would
+# miss a "we accidentally provisioned the unverified user"
+# regression. We assert on BOTH the status AND the negation of
+# the success URL via Hurl's built-in `url` query (NOT the
+# `landed_at` capture from Step 4 — that variable is stale here).
+HTTP *
+[Asserts]
+status >= 400
+status <  500
+url not matches "^http://localhost:8087/login\\?oidc_code="
+
+
+# Reset the IdP so this test doesn't poison anything that runs
+# after it (defensive — there's nothing after right now, but a
+# future test would silently fail with "all my users get
+# rejected" if we forgot this).
+POST http://localhost:1080/control/email-verified/true
+
+HTTP 200
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Step 11 — Replay protection: the one-time code is rejected on a
+#          second attempt. Defense-in-depth check.
+#
+#          Hurl 4.x has no per-request cookie-jar clear, so this
+#          request still carries the session cookies set in Step 5.
+#          That means CSRF middleware rejects the unauthenticated
+#          (no X-CSRF-Token header) POST with 403 BEFORE the OIDC
+#          single-use-code check runs. Both are valid replay
+#          defenses; in a real attack the attacker has the code but
+#          not the session cookie, in which case the rejection
+#          would come from the OIDC layer as 401.
+#
+#          The single-use-code path itself is covered by unit
+#          tests in auth_application_service.rs (the
+#          completed_oidc_logins moka cache + remove-on-use).
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/oidc/exchange
+Content-Type: application/json
+{ "code": "{{oidc_code}}" }
+
+HTTP 403