From ae65c8475f8f48ce15ea0d7c9aedcb9b06c3b6e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Edouard Vanbelle <opensource@edouard.vanbelle.fr>
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 06:31:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] test(opaque): add test that coverable by hurl

---
 tests/api/opaque_substrate.hurl | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tests/api/opaque_substrate.hurl b/tests/api/opaque_substrate.hurl
index 7c1d5bed..0f2c847e 100644
--- a/tests/api/opaque_substrate.hurl
+++ b/tests/api/opaque_substrate.hurl
@@ -74,3 +74,72 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 { "exchangeId": "unused-phase-0", "finishLoginRequest": "unused-phase-0" }
 
 HTTP 401
+
+
+# =============================================================
+# Phase 1 — Register endpoints (authenticated wire coverage)
+# =============================================================
+# The register/{start,finish} endpoints are wired behind auth +
+# CSRF middleware. Sending an authenticated request with an
+# intentionally-malformed body proves:
+#
+#   1. Auth middleware unlocks the endpoint (401 → 400).
+#   2. Bearer auth is CSRF-exempt (no 403 CSRF).
+#   3. The handler is REACHABLE and its error-type contract
+#      (`OpaqueMalformedRequest`, `OpaqueCiphersuiteMismatch`)
+#      is stable.
+#
+# The FULL crypto handshake with real opaque-ke messages is
+# proved separately in the Rust integration test at
+# `src/infrastructure/repositories/pg/opaque_pg_repository.rs`
+# (`envelope_persists_across_register_and_serves_a_matching_login`).
+# That test drives the crypto pipeline end-to-end without HTTP —
+# same crypto shape, same PG persistence path the handlers use.
+# =============================================================
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Log in as the seed admin and capture the bearer token. Bearer
+# auth bypasses the CSRF check per the CSRF middleware doc, so
+# subsequent OPAQUE POSTs don't need an X-CSRF-Token header.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
+Content-Type: application/json
+{ "username": "{{username}}", "password": "{{password}}" }
+
+HTTP 200
+[Captures]
+opaque_access_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Case 5 — Authenticated register/start with garbage base64
+#           in `registrationRequest`. Handler reaches the
+#           `B64.decode` path and returns 400 with the
+#           `OpaqueMalformedRequest` error_type.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/opaque/register/start
+Authorization: Bearer {{opaque_access_token}}
+Content-Type: application/json
+{ "registrationRequest": "not-valid-base64!" }
+
+HTTP 400
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.error_type" == "OpaqueMalformedRequest"
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Case 6 — Authenticated register/finish with a ciphersuite
+#           version the server does NOT accept. Proves the
+#           ciphersuite-mismatch guard (server v1, client says
+#           v999) is enforced BEFORE the envelope is decoded,
+#           so a client cached against a rotated suite can't
+#           silently write an unusable envelope.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/opaque/register/finish
+Authorization: Bearer {{opaque_access_token}}
+Content-Type: application/json
+{ "registrationRecord": "AAAA", "ciphersuiteVersion": 999 }
+
+HTTP 400
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.error_type" == "OpaqueCiphersuiteMismatch"