feat(opaque): add lookup identifier (with anti-enum)

frontend/src/lib/api/endpoints/auth.test.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 import { it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
 vi.mock('$lib/api/client', () => ({ apiFetch: vi.fn(), apiJson: vi.fn() }));
 vi.mock('$lib/api/csrf', () => ({ getCsrfHeaders: () => ({}) }));
-// Mock the OPAQUE WASM client so `login()`'s silent-migration hook can
+// Mock the OPAQUE WASM client so `login()`'s Phase 2 silent-migration
-// exercise the wire path (params + register handshake) without touching
+// hook and Phase 3 lookup-then-login flip can exercise the wire path
+// (params + lookup + register or ke1/ke3 handshake) without touching
 // real WASM in jsdom.
 vi.mock('@serenity-kit/opaque', () => ({
 	ready: Promise.resolve(),
@@ -15,6 +16,16 @@ vi.mock('@serenity-kit/opaque', () => ({
 			registrationRecord: 'RECORD-R',
 			exportKey: 'EK',
 			serverStaticPublicKey: 'SPK'
+		})),
+		startLogin: vi.fn(() => ({
+			clientLoginState: 'STATE-L',
+			startLoginRequest: 'REQ-L'
+		})),
+		finishLogin: vi.fn(() => ({
+			finishLoginRequest: 'REQ-F',
+			sessionKey: 'SK',
+			exportKey: 'EK',
+			serverStaticPublicKey: 'SPK'
 		}))
 	}
 }));
@@ -66,38 +77,114 @@ it('tryRefresh returns false when the refresh fails', async () => {
 	await expect(auth.tryRefresh()).resolves.toBe(false);
 });
 
-// ── Phase 2: silent OPAQUE migration on legacy login ─────────────────
+// ── Phase 2 + 3: OPAQUE lookup, silent migration, and login flip ─────
 //
-// `login()` MUST trigger `syncOpaqueEnvelope(password)` after a
+// `login()` MUST first probe the server for an OPAQUE envelope via
-// successful POST /api/auth/login response, so users pick up an OPAQUE
+// `POST /api/auth/opaque/login/lookup`:
-// envelope automatically over time. Verified here by observing the
+//   - if the response says `hasOpaque: true` → dispatch to
-// wire calls made after the login POST — a successful login without
+//     `opaqueLogin` (KE1/KE3) and skip the legacy path entirely
-// a follow-up `/api/auth/opaque/*` fetch is a regression that would
+//     (Phase 3 cutover);
-// silently break Phase 3's cutover assumption ("most active users
+//   - if `false` → fall through to `POST /api/auth/login` (legacy),
-// have an envelope on file by the time the SPA flips to OPAQUE").
+//     then run `syncOpaqueEnvelope(password)` to silently mint the
-it('login triggers OPAQUE silent-migration on success', async () => {
+//     envelope for the NEXT login (Phase 2 silent migration).
-	// Login POST → 200 AuthResponse
+//
-	// Then syncOpaqueEnvelope runs: GET /params → POST register/start → POST register/finish
+// Regression risks these tests guard:
+//   - The lookup POST goes missing (Phase 3 flip never fires — every
+//     login stays on legacy forever, defeats the OPAQUE substrate).
+//   - The silent-migration hook goes missing on the legacy branch
+//     (envelopes never get minted, so the lookup always returns
+//     false — same net effect as above).
+//   - The OPAQUE branch silently falls back to legacy on any WASM
+//     hiccup (would mask a wrong passphrase as a network error).
+it('login flips to OPAQUE when the lookup reports hasOpaque: true', async () => {
+	// Order on the wire, given the current implementation:
+	//   1. GET  /api/auth/opaque/params            (via checkOpaqueAvailable → fetchOpaqueParams)
+	//   2. POST /api/auth/opaque/login/lookup     → { hasOpaque: true }
+	//   3. POST /api/auth/opaque/login/ke1        → { exchangeId, loginResponse }
+	//   4. POST /api/auth/opaque/login/ke3        → AuthResponse
+	// The legacy /api/auth/login POST must NOT fire on this branch.
 	f.mockResolvedValueOnce({
 		ok: true,
 		status: 200,
 		statusText: 'OK',
 		json: async () => ({
-			user: { id: 'u1', email: 'a@x.test' },
+			enabled: true,
-			access_token: 'at',
+			ciphersuiteVersion: 1,
-			refresh_token: 'rt',
+			ksf: { memoryKib: 8, iterations: 1, parallelism: 1 }
-			token_type: 'Bearer',
-			expires_in: 3600
 		})
 	})
+		.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+			ok: true,
+			status: 200,
+			statusText: 'OK',
+			json: async () => ({ hasOpaque: true })
+		})
+		.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+			ok: true,
+			status: 200,
+			statusText: 'OK',
+			json: async () => ({ exchangeId: 'ex-1', loginResponse: 'LR' })
+		})
 		.mockResolvedValueOnce({
 			ok: true,
 			status: 200,
 			statusText: 'OK',
 			json: async () => ({
-				enabled: true,
+				user: { id: 'u1', email: 'a@x.test' },
-				ciphersuiteVersion: 1,
+				access_token: 'at-opaque',
-				ksf: { memoryKib: 8, iterations: 1, parallelism: 1 }
+				refresh_token: 'rt-opaque',
+				token_type: 'Bearer',
+				expires_in: 3600
+			})
+		});
+
+	const authResponse = await auth.login('alice@example.com', 'correct horse battery staple');
+	expect(authResponse.access_token).toBe('at-opaque');
+
+	const urls = f.mock.calls.map((c: unknown[]) => c[0] as string);
+	expect(urls).toEqual([
+		'/api/auth/opaque/params',
+		'/api/auth/opaque/login/lookup',
+		'/api/auth/opaque/login/ke1',
+		'/api/auth/opaque/login/ke3'
+	]);
+	// Legacy MUST NOT run when we took the OPAQUE branch.
+	expect(urls).not.toContain('/api/auth/login');
+});
+
+it('login falls back to legacy + silent-migration when hasOpaque: false', async () => {
+	// Order on the wire:
+	//   1. GET  /api/auth/opaque/params
+	//   2. POST /api/auth/opaque/login/lookup     → { hasOpaque: false }
+	//   3. POST /api/auth/login                   → AuthResponse
+	//   4. POST /api/auth/opaque/register/start   (params is cached — no re-fetch)
+	//   5. POST /api/auth/opaque/register/finish
+	f.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+		ok: true,
+		status: 200,
+		statusText: 'OK',
+		json: async () => ({
+			enabled: true,
+			ciphersuiteVersion: 1,
+			ksf: { memoryKib: 8, iterations: 1, parallelism: 1 }
+		})
+	})
+		.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+			ok: true,
+			status: 200,
+			statusText: 'OK',
+			json: async () => ({ hasOpaque: false })
+		})
+		.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+			ok: true,
+			status: 200,
+			statusText: 'OK',
+			json: async () => ({
+				user: { id: 'u1', email: 'a@x.test' },
+				access_token: 'at',
+				refresh_token: 'rt',
+				token_type: 'Bearer',
+				expires_in: 3600
 			})
 		})
 		.mockResolvedValueOnce({
@@ -111,23 +198,31 @@ it('login triggers OPAQUE silent-migration on success', async () => {
 	const authResponse = await auth.login('alice@example.com', 'correct horse battery staple');
 	expect(authResponse.access_token).toBe('at');
 
-	// 4 apiFetch calls: login + params + register/start + register/finish
 	const urls = f.mock.calls.map((c: unknown[]) => c[0] as string);
-	expect(urls).toContain('/api/auth/login');
+	expect(urls).toEqual([
-	expect(urls).toContain('/api/auth/opaque/params');
+		'/api/auth/opaque/params',
-	expect(urls).toContain('/api/auth/opaque/register/start');
+		'/api/auth/opaque/login/lookup',
-	expect(urls).toContain('/api/auth/opaque/register/finish');
+		'/api/auth/login',
-	// Login POST must come FIRST — silent migration only runs on a
+		'/api/auth/opaque/register/start',
-	// session that's already been established.
+		'/api/auth/opaque/register/finish'
-	expect(urls[0]).toBe('/api/auth/login');
+	]);
 });
 
-it('login returns AuthResponse even when silent-migration fails (non-fatal)', async () => {
+it('login skips the OPAQUE branch entirely when the substrate is disabled', async () => {
-	// Login POST succeeds; the follow-up /params returns 500. Silent
+	// /params replies `enabled: false` (mode=off or misconfig). The
-	// migration swallows the error (console.warn) — the login itself
+	// lookup POST MUST NOT fire (cheap short-circuit inside
-	// still returns success to the caller, so the user reaches their
+	// checkOpaqueAvailable), and the legacy silent-migration hook
-	// session and the envelope gets retried on next login.
+	// MUST also short-circuit — no register/start calls either.
 	f.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+		ok: true,
+		status: 200,
+		statusText: 'OK',
+		json: async () => ({
+			enabled: false,
+			ciphersuiteVersion: 0,
+			ksf: { memoryKib: 0, iterations: 0, parallelism: 0 }
+		})
+	}).mockResolvedValueOnce({
 		ok: true,
 		status: 200,
 		statusText: 'OK',
@@ -138,7 +233,54 @@ it('login returns AuthResponse even when silent-migration fails (non-fatal)', as
 			token_type: 'Bearer',
 			expires_in: 3600
 		})
-	}).mockResolvedValueOnce({ ok: false, status: 500, json: async () => ({}) });
+	});
+
+	const authResponse = await auth.login('alice@example.com', 'pw');
+	expect(authResponse.access_token).toBe('at');
+
+	const urls = f.mock.calls.map((c: unknown[]) => c[0] as string);
+	expect(urls).toEqual(['/api/auth/opaque/params', '/api/auth/login']);
+});
+
+it('login returns AuthResponse even when silent-migration fails (non-fatal)', async () => {
+	// Wire order: /params (enabled=true) → lookup (false) → legacy
+	// login (200) → /params is cached, skip → register/start fails
+	// with 500 → syncOpaqueEnvelope logs a console.warn and returns,
+	// login() still returns the AuthResponse to the caller.
+	f.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+		ok: true,
+		status: 200,
+		statusText: 'OK',
+		json: async () => ({
+			enabled: true,
+			ciphersuiteVersion: 1,
+			ksf: { memoryKib: 8, iterations: 1, parallelism: 1 }
+		})
+	})
+		.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+			ok: true,
+			status: 200,
+			statusText: 'OK',
+			json: async () => ({ hasOpaque: false })
+		})
+		.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+			ok: true,
+			status: 200,
+			statusText: 'OK',
+			json: async () => ({
+				user: { id: 'u1', email: 'a@x.test' },
+				access_token: 'at',
+				refresh_token: 'rt',
+				token_type: 'Bearer',
+				expires_in: 3600
+			})
+		})
+		.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+			ok: false,
+			status: 500,
+			statusText: 'Internal Server Error',
+			json: async () => ({})
+		});
 
 	const consoleSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => {});
 	const authResponse = await auth.login('alice@example.com', 'pw');

frontend/src/lib/api/endpoints/auth.ts

@@ -64,6 +64,34 @@ export async function tryRefresh(): Promise<boolean> {
 }
 
 export async function login(emailOrUsername: string, password: string): Promise<AuthResponse> {
+	// ── OPAQUE lookup (Phase 3) ────────────────────────────────────────
+	// Ask the server whether this identifier already has an OPAQUE
+	// envelope on file. If yes → use OPAQUE login (KE1/KE3). If no →
+	// fall back to legacy `POST /api/auth/login`, which then silently
+	// mints the envelope via the Phase 2 hook.
+	//
+	// Both paths return the SAME `AuthResponse` shape, so downstream
+	// callers don't need to know which branch fired. Dynamic import
+	// keeps the ~200 KiB `@serenity-kit/opaque` WASM bundle out of
+	// pre-login bundles — the module loads only when a login is
+	// actually attempted.
+	//
+	// `checkOpaqueAvailable` and `opaqueLogin` both fall back
+	// gracefully: any wire failure inside the OPAQUE branch (503,
+	// timeout, malformed response) either short-circuits to `false`
+	// (lookup) or throws with an `InvalidCredentials` shape (login).
+	// The lookup fallback lands here as `false` → legacy branch
+	// takes over; a mid-login OPAQUE failure surfaces as a login
+	// error to the user, same shape as a legacy failure — no silent
+	// legacy fallback there because it would mask a wrong passphrase
+	// as a network hiccup.
+	const { checkOpaqueAvailable, opaqueLogin, syncOpaqueEnvelope } =
+		await import('$lib/api/endpoints/opaque');
+	if (await checkOpaqueAvailable(emailOrUsername)) {
+		return await opaqueLogin(emailOrUsername, password, await opaqueKsfForClient());
+	}
+
+	// ── Legacy login (fallback for users without an envelope yet) ─────
 	const res = await apiFetch('/api/auth/login', {
 		method: 'POST',
 		credentials: 'same-origin',
@@ -81,11 +109,8 @@ export async function login(emailOrUsername: string, password: string): Promise<
 
 	// ── OPAQUE silent migration (Phase 2) ──────────────────────────────
 	// After a successful legacy password login, transparently mint an
-	// OPAQUE envelope for the same passphrase. Users pick up the new
+	// OPAQUE envelope for the same passphrase. The NEXT login for this
-	// auth path over time, one login at a time, with zero UX change —
+	// account will take the OPAQUE branch above.
-	// by the time Phase 3 flips the SPA to OPAQUE-first and Phase 4
-	// refuses legacy for migrated users, most active accounts already
-	// have an envelope on file.
 	//
 	// The freshly-issued session cookie is already active in the
 	// browser at this point (Set-Cookie from the POST response), so
@@ -94,16 +119,27 @@ export async function login(emailOrUsername: string, password: string): Promise<
 	// disabled server-side (mode=off) and swallows any error — a
 	// failure here just leaves the envelope stale, and the NEXT
 	// legacy login retries the same hook.
-	//
-	// Dynamic import keeps the ~200 KiB `@serenity-kit/opaque` WASM
-	// bundle out of pre-login-page bundles — it loads only for users
-	// who actually reach a successful login.
-	const { syncOpaqueEnvelope } = await import('$lib/api/endpoints/opaque');
 	await syncOpaqueEnvelope(password);
 
 	return auth;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Fetch the server's OPAQUE KSF config to pass to `opaqueLogin`.
+ * Extracted so `login()` reads more linearly and the module keeps
+ * one `fetchOpaqueParams` call site regardless of which branch
+ * (lookup / login / silent-migration) reaches it first.
+ */
+async function opaqueKsfForClient(): Promise<{
+	memoryKib: number;
+	iterations: number;
+	parallelism: number;
+}> {
+	const { fetchOpaqueParams } = await import('$lib/api/endpoints/opaque');
+	const params = await fetchOpaqueParams();
+	return params.ksf;
+}
+
 export interface OidcProviders {
 	enabled: boolean;
 	provider_name?: string;

frontend/src/lib/api/endpoints/opaque.ts

@@ -112,6 +112,45 @@ export function fetchOpaqueParams(): Promise<OpaqueServerParams> {
 	return opaqueParamsInflight;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Ask the server whether `userIdentifier` resolves to a user with an
+ * OPAQUE envelope on file. The SPA login form calls this before
+ * submit to decide between OPAQUE (KE1/KE3) and legacy password
+ * login. The two paths converge to the same session shape, so the
+ * user never notices the branch.
+ *
+ * Returns `false` on any error — network hiccup, disabled substrate,
+ * malformed response — so callers fall back to legacy login rather
+ * than blocking on the OPAQUE probe. The Phase 2 silent-migration
+ * hook will still run after the legacy login and mint the envelope,
+ * so this transient "false" just delays adoption by one login cycle.
+ *
+ * The server-side shape is anti-enum: same `hasOpaque: false` for
+ * both "unknown user" and "user without envelope." Callers must
+ * never assume `hasOpaque: false` implies the user exists.
+ */
+export async function checkOpaqueAvailable(userIdentifier: string): Promise<boolean> {
+	// Cheap short-circuit: if the substrate isn't enabled server-side,
+	// the endpoint would return 503 anyway. `syncOpaqueEnvelope`
+	// primed the cache after any prior login in this session; this
+	// call reuses it.
+	const params = await fetchOpaqueParams();
+	if (!params.enabled) return false;
+	try {
+		const res = await apiFetch('/api/auth/opaque/login/lookup', {
+			method: 'POST',
+			credentials: 'same-origin',
+			headers: { ...JSON_HEADERS, ...getCsrfHeaders() },
+			body: JSON.stringify({ userIdentifier })
+		});
+		if (!res.ok) return false;
+		const body = (await res.json()) as { hasOpaque?: boolean };
+		return body.hasOpaque === true;
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
 /**
  * Silent OPAQUE registration after a passphrase-touching action
  * (signup completion, change-password, silent migration on legacy

src/interfaces/api/handlers/opaque_auth_handler.rs

@@ -104,8 +104,15 @@ pub fn opaque_register_routes() -> Router<Arc<AppState>> {
 /// layer used on legacy `/api/auth/login` so an attacker can't
 /// halve the per-identity budget by spraying both endpoints. See
 /// [`opaque_register_routes`] on why the prefix must be distinct.
+///
+/// `lookup` lives here (not on the params mount) so it shares the
+/// login rate limiter — without that, an attacker could use it as a
+/// cheaper user-existence probe than legacy login. Anti-enum on the
+/// response shape closes the primary information leak; the rate
+/// limit closes the secondary "how fast can I ask" leak.
 pub fn opaque_login_routes() -> Router<Arc<AppState>> {
     Router::new()
+        .route("/lookup", post(login_lookup))
         .route("/ke1", post(login_ke1))
         .route("/ke3", post(login_ke3))
 }
@@ -302,6 +309,84 @@ pub async fn register_finish(
     Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
 }
 
+// ── Login: lookup (Phase 3) ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/// Client → server on lookup. Same identifier shape as
+/// [`OpaqueLoginKe1Dto::user_identifier`] and legacy
+/// `/api/auth/login`'s `username` field: `@` in the input dispatches
+/// to email lookup, absence → username lookup.
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, ToSchema)]
+pub struct OpaqueLookupDto {
+    #[serde(rename = "userIdentifier")]
+    pub user_identifier: String,
+}
+
+/// Server → client on lookup. The SPA reads `hasOpaque` to decide
+/// whether to run OPAQUE login (KE1/KE3) or fall back to legacy
+/// `/api/auth/login` (which then silently registers via the Phase 2
+/// hook).
+///
+/// **Anti-enum invariant** — this shape MUST be identical whether
+/// the user exists or not:
+///
+///   * unknown user           → `hasOpaque: false`
+///   * user, no envelope      → `hasOpaque: false`
+///   * user with envelope     → `hasOpaque: true`
+///
+/// A probing attacker cannot distinguish "unknown" from "known but
+/// unregistered" from the response body. The only signal an
+/// attacker gets is "known with envelope" vs "everything else,"
+/// which reveals adoption progress but NOT identity existence.
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, ToSchema)]
+pub struct OpaqueLookupResponse {
+    #[serde(rename = "hasOpaque")]
+    pub has_opaque: bool,
+}
+
+/// Resolve `userIdentifier` → envelope-existence check. Used by the
+/// SPA login form to branch between OPAQUE and legacy on submit.
+///
+/// Rate-limited via the shared `login_limiter` (mount layer in
+/// `main.rs`), so lookup can't be used as a cheap enumeration probe.
+#[utoipa::path(
+    post,
+    path = "/api/auth/opaque/login/lookup",
+    request_body = OpaqueLookupDto,
+    responses(
+        (status = 200, description = "Whether the identifier resolves to a user with an OPAQUE envelope", body = OpaqueLookupResponse),
+        (status = 400, description = "Malformed request body"),
+        (status = 503, description = "OPAQUE service not configured"),
+    ),
+    tag = "auth"
+)]
+pub async fn login_lookup(
+    State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
+    Json(dto): Json<OpaqueLookupDto>,
+) -> Result<impl IntoResponse, AppError> {
+    let _svc = require_opaque_service(&state)?;
+    let repo = require_opaque_repo(&state)?;
+    let auth = require_auth_application_service(&state)?;
+
+    let identifier = dto.user_identifier.trim();
+    if identifier.is_empty() {
+        return Err(malformed("userIdentifier is empty"));
+    }
+
+    // Resolve the identifier → user_id → envelope presence. Any miss
+    // (unknown user, user without envelope, DB blip) collapses to
+    // `hasOpaque: false` — the anti-enum contract on the wire shape.
+    // No audit event here: a successful lookup isn't a login attempt,
+    // and logging every miss would flood the channel without adding
+    // signal (rate limiter already caps volume; enumeration attempts
+    // show up in the login-lockout / rate-limit metrics).
+    let has_opaque = match auth.lookup_user_for_login(identifier).await {
+        Ok(user) => matches!(repo.read_registration(user.id()).await, Ok(Some(_))),
+        Err(_) => false,
+    };
+
+    Ok(Json(OpaqueLookupResponse { has_opaque }))
+}
+
 // ── Login: KE1 + KE3 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /// Client → server on KE1. `userIdentifier` is the same string the

tests/api/opaque_substrate.hurl

@@ -209,3 +209,70 @@ jsonpath "$.ciphersuiteVersion" == 1
 jsonpath "$.ksf.memoryKib" == 8
 jsonpath "$.ksf.iterations" == 1
 jsonpath "$.ksf.parallelism" == 1
+
+
+# =============================================================
+# Phase 3 — Login lookup (SPA branch selector)
+# =============================================================
+# `POST /api/auth/opaque/login/lookup` is what the SPA hits on
+# submit to decide between OPAQUE (KE1/KE3) and legacy
+# `/api/auth/login`. It's public (no auth required), rate-limited
+# via the shared login limiter, and its response body is anti-enum:
+# `hasOpaque: false` covers both "user unknown" and "user known but
+# unregistered" so an attacker can't use it as a cheaper user-
+# existence probe than legacy login.
+#
+# The seed admin logged in above (line 93) does NOT have an OPAQUE
+# envelope yet at this point in the suite — the register cases below
+# it sent malformed payloads that were rejected before persistence,
+# so no envelope was ever written. Both "seed admin" and "unknown
+# user" therefore return the SAME `hasOpaque: false` shape here.
+# =============================================================
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Case 10 — Lookup for a KNOWN user with NO envelope → 200
+#            with `hasOpaque: false`. Proves the endpoint is
+#            reachable public, resolves the identifier, and
+#            reports absence honestly.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/opaque/login/lookup
+Content-Type: application/json
+{ "userIdentifier": "{{username}}" }
+
+HTTP 200
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.hasOpaque" == false
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Case 11 — Lookup for an UNKNOWN user → same 200 +
+#            `hasOpaque: false` shape. Anti-enum: an attacker
+#            probing the endpoint cannot tell "user doesn't
+#            exist" from "user exists but no envelope yet" from
+#            this response body.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/opaque/login/lookup
+Content-Type: application/json
+{ "userIdentifier": "definitely-not-a-user-000@example.test" }
+
+HTTP 200
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.hasOpaque" == false
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Case 12 — Lookup with an empty `userIdentifier` → 400
+#            `OpaqueMalformedRequest`. The empty-input guard
+#            fires before user resolution so we don't waste a
+#            DB round-trip on a payload that can't identify
+#            anyone. Response shape reuses the same error_type
+#            as garbage-base64 above (Case 7) so the SPA has
+#            one uniform malformed-body error to render.
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/opaque/login/lookup
+Content-Type: application/json
+{ "userIdentifier": "" }
+
+HTTP 400
+[Asserts]
+jsonpath "$.error_type" == "OpaqueMalformedRequest"