Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Claude bdbb7ae196 fix(auth): revoke JWT access on deactivation, deletion and role change
JWT access tokens freeze role/identity at login (access 1h, refresh 7d)
and validated tokens are cached for 30s. The Bearer and cookie auth paths
trusted claims.role and never re-checked the account, so demoting an admin,
or disabling/deleting an account, did not revoke access until the token
expired. The app-password path already re-read role/active from the DB;
only the JWT/cookie path had the gap.

Re-validate the caller against the live user record on the token path via
the already-cached get_user_flags (role / is_external / active), bounded by
USER_FLAGS_CACHE_TTL and invalidated eagerly on set_user_active /
change_user_role / delete_user_admin:

- middleware/user.rs: new resolve_live_role helper (+ pure decide_live_role
  core) — returns the *current* role, rejects deleted (NotFound) and
  deactivated accounts, and fails open on transient lookup errors (mirrors
  require_internal_user). Login/refresh remain the canonical active gate.
- middleware/auth.rs: auth_middleware (Bearer + cookie) now populates
  CurrentUser with the live role and rejects revoked accounts (Bearer ->
  401 AccountInactive; cookie -> fall through to 401/login redirect).
  require_admin emits an audit line on denial.
- middleware/admin.rs: require_admin / require_authenticated re-check the
  live record, return the live role, and audit admin denials.

Downstream admin gates (dedup_handler, subject_group_handler, OCS) inherit
the live role automatically via CurrentUser / require_authenticated.

Tests: decide_live_role policy (active / demoted / deactivated / deleted /
transient fail-open) and AccountInactive -> 401.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TAzLEQDaLak3dnrEN3YT35
2026-06-19 11:13:49 +00:00
Claude 8a42b07cbe perf(auth): cached image-free user-flags lookup for per-request guards
Every WebDAV / CalDAV / CardDAV request paid one full-row user fetch in
require_internal_user_layer just to read `is_external` (and the NC Basic
Auth middleware repeated it right after its own cache hit). That SELECT
includes the `image` column — a data URI of up to 512 KiB — so a sync
client issuing hundreds of PROPFINDs per minute dragged hundreds of MB
of avatar bytes out of Postgres to evaluate a boolean.

- New `UserFlags { role, is_external, active }` + a repo query selecting
  only those three columns (inherent method, mirroring `update_image`).
- `AuthApplicationService::get_user_flags`: moka cache, 30 s TTL,
  10k capacity. `change_user_role` / `set_user_active` invalidate
  eagerly, so admin changes still apply immediately; anything else is
  visible within the TTL — preserving the documented "no token rotation
  needed" semantics at a per-request cost of zero DB round-trips when
  warm.
- `require_internal_user`, `require_admin_user` and the NC Basic Auth
  external check now go through the flags lookup.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dp3oWon5GBMVn4j3QXZdgx
2026-06-10 09:27:32 +00:00
Edouard Vanbelle 6d70a7000e security(external_user): protect unnecessary route access to external users 2026-06-03 00:32:00 +02:00
Edouard Vanbelle ec72374651 feat(api): can grant external user (via email)
- add possibility to grant an external user.
    - route /api/users/{id} added (rate limited for security)
    - security: start route limitation for external users
        ex: they must not browse /api/users/{id} nor addressbook
2026-06-03 00:31:59 +02:00