2a629c4e8b7247d2361d274a594ba0bf2c93b088
599 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Edouard Vanbelle
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2a629c4e8b | fix(blob_consistency): apply same repair logic as manifest_consistency | ||
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Edouard Vanbelle
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8a63663209 | fix(manifest_consistency): add missing derived_blob to repair | ||
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Edouard Vanbelle
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4baee0a1fb |
feat(transcode): key the memory cache by content, not by file
The durable tier has been content-keyed since it was introduced —
`content_derived_blobs(source_hash, kind, variant)` — but the moka cache
in front of it was still `{file_id}:{ext}`, so the layer closest to the
request used the wrong axis while the layer behind it used the right
one. That was legacy shape, and I had defended it in a comment as
"deliberate: per-request-path and short-lived", which was a
rationalisation rather than a reason. Ed asked why, and there is no why.
Transcoding is a pure function of the source bytes. Under file keying,
two files with identical content held two RAM entries for identical
bytes, and the second file was a guaranteed miss that fell through to a
DB lookup plus a blob read to fetch what was already in memory under
another key.
Now keyed by content hash when the caller has one, by file id only when
it does not — the same `content` / `external` split `ThumbnailCacheKey`
already makes, and for the same reason: hash-less callers (external
mounts) have no content identity to key on. Prefixed `c:` / `f:` so the
namespaces stay disjoint; a hash and a UUID cannot collide in practice,
but "in practice" is how a file ends up served another file's bytes.
`invalidate` now clears only the file-keyed entry. Dropping content
entries there would be wrong, not merely wasteful: one file's content
changing says nothing about the other files sharing the old bytes, and
evicting theirs would make one user's edit cost everyone else a
re-transcode. Content entries need no eviction — new content is a new
hash, so the old key is never consulted again.
transcode_cache.hurl updated to match, and its header corrected: the
second file is now a RAM hit rather than a derived-tier read, so that
scenario can no longer isolate the durable tier. It says so, and points
at satellites_consistency and a restart as what covers it instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Edouard Vanbelle
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63820c3c26 |
feat(jobs): the engine binds a run to the flags it started with
`run_or_resume` now records `JobRunArgs` in `params` on a Fresh open and restores them on Resume, passing the restored args to the handler rather than whatever the resuming caller supplied. Two problems, and the engine is the only place both are guaranteed. **A resumed run must not change mode.** Handlers read `args` on every call, so a paused `?repair=true` import resumed by a plain trigger silently continued as import-only: the deletion half never finished and nothing reported it. `?deep=true` had the same hole — a paused bit-rot scan resumed shallow while still presenting as the run that started deep. `blobs_consistency` and `manifests_consistency` had hand-rolled this for their own two flags; the three import jobs had not, and fixing it per-handler means every future job remembering. **The run row should say what it did.** For a destructive job, "did this run delete anything?" is answerable only from `params`, which is what an operator reads afterwards. Before this, a repair run and a discovery run were indistinguishable in the history. Deliberately not overridable on resume: adding `?repair=true` to a resume would apply it to the remaining entries only, producing a run that half-deleted. Cancel and start fresh is the honest way to change your mind. A missing key reads as false/None, so a run paused before this existed resumes under-acting rather than deleting under a flag nobody gave it. Failure to record the flags fails the run instead of guessing — acting under unrecorded flags is the one thing worth refusing for jobs that delete. The flag list is hardcoded here. Letting each job declare its own parameters — name, type, default — is the better shape and is its own change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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67032d9afa |
fix(transcode): transcode_import is on-demand, like its thumbnail twins
It was still registered on a 24h tick while the thumbnail imports moved to on-demand. The same reasoning applies and I missed it: the boot run in repair mode is the migration, nothing writes to that tree any more so the tail cannot grow afterwards, and a tick could not finish the job regardless because ticks never pass `repair`. Once drained it was a `read_dir` returning nothing, daily, forever. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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10c362a94a |
fix(jobs): flush the checkpoint tail, so progress reflects reality
All three import jobs only checkpointed on a full batch, so the remainder after the last one was never counted. A run shorter than BATCH_SIZE never checkpointed at all: `scanned_count` stayed 0 against a known `total_rows`, and the admin progress bar sat at zero for the whole run and finished there. Seen on a transcode_import run over 20 entries — 13 imported, 5 negatives, 2 already present, progress 0/20 throughout. The thumbnail imports had it too, just less visibly: a 105-file run reported `scanned_count: 100`, losing the tail rather than all of it. Cursor-wise the final checkpoint is a no-op — the walk is finished, so nothing resumes from it — but the scanned delta is what the progress display reads, and it has to include the last partial batch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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bf2f0dc2b2 |
fix(transcode): store the derived blob before returning, not after
Fire-and-forget raced its own purpose. A second request for the SAME content arriving before the spawned write landed found no row, re-ran the full decode + encode, and stored the identical blob again. Keying derivations by content exists so identical content is derived once — a write that has not landed yet cannot deliver that, and the window is milliseconds wide exactly when it matters most, a page loading many images at once. Caught by transcode_cache.hurl, which asserts a second distinct file with identical bytes does not re-transcode: `transcodes: 2` where 1 was expected, `disk_hits: 0` where the derived tier should have answered. It had been passing on timing luck. The cost of awaiting is bounded. This path has just spent a full decode and re-encode, so one blob write beside it is marginal, and it only runs on a genuine miss — every subsequent request for that content is served from the row. The negative verdict was already awaited, which is why only the positive half of the scenario failed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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71f227b737 |
feat(transcode): the local cache disables itself, and drains at boot
Completes the pattern the thumbnail migration established, for `.transcoded/`. `initialize` no longer creates the tree. Creating it at boot is exactly what kept `.thumbnails/` alive across restarts — the import removed it, the next boot put it back, and the absence the read path gates on was unreachable by construction. The write path already calls `create_dir_all` on the parent before writing, so eager creation achieved nothing except defeating the drain. It now probes instead: one `stat`, cached for the process lifetime, and the local-cache reads short-circuit on a relaxed atomic load when the tree is gone. Fails open, so a service built without `initialize` behaves as before. One difference from the thumbnail tiers, and it is not a stalled migration: callers with no content hash — external mounts — cannot use the content-keyed tier at all, so they still read and write here. On an install without such mounts the directory drains once and stays gone; on one with them it persists, correctly. `transcode_import?repair=true` joins the startup defaults on the same terms as the thumbnail imports, and with the weakest safety argument needed of the three: a transcode is a pure function of its source, so anything deleted in error is recomputed on the next request. The `default_startup_jobs` test failed on the change rather than being updated silently, which is what it is for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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0e09cb81ff |
feat(transcode): transcode_import drains .transcoded/, re-keying as it goes
The twin of thumb_derived_import, with the difference that shapes the
whole job: the legacy tree is keyed by FILE (`{file_id}.webp`) while the
destination is keyed by CONTENT. Thumbnail sidecars were already named
by blob hash, so importing them was a move; every entry here has to be
resolved through storage.files first.
That re-keying is the point rather than bookkeeping. A sandbox with five
.skip markers had three of them naming the same image, so the file-keyed
tree stored one verdict three times. After the import it is one row, and
any future upload of those bytes inherits it instead of paying for the
decision again.
Both artifact kinds are claimed by one walk: `{id}.webp` becomes a
derived Blob, `{id}.webp.skip` becomes a negative row. They share a
source file and a cursor, so splitting them into two passes would be two
chances for the pair to disagree about what had been handled. `.skip` is
matched BEFORE `.webp` — the shorter suffix matches a marker too, and
getting that backwards would read a zero-byte file and store it as the
transcode of its source, then serve it to clients. There is a test.
Entries whose file is gone cannot be re-keyed at all, so they are
reported and, under repair, deleted: unimportable by definition, and a
run that keeps rediscovering them never reports zero, so the gate for
removing the directory never opens.
Deletion reuses verify_and_unlink, so a cached transcode is removed only
after its stored replacement reads back byte-identical. Directory removal
follows the same rule as .thumbnails/ — delete, and only rename aside if
a non-cache file is in the way.
The batch checkpoint is a shared helper rather than inline at both exits
of the loop body. The first draft duplicated it and dropped the future on
the skip path without awaiting: the entry counted toward the batch, the
cursor never advanced, and a resumed run would have rewalked everything
it had already handled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Edouard Vanbelle
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7705fca3af |
feat(transcode): count the decodes that pay nothing
Writing the hurl scenario surfaced a gap: a transcode that comes out
larger than the original runs a full decode + encode and increments no
counter at all. `transcodes` is bumped only on the success path, beside
`bytes_saved`, so the most expensive failure mode was invisible — a
multi-megapixel image decoded and re-encoded on every request, for
every file sharing that content, producing nothing.
That is precisely the cost the persisted negative verdict exists to
stop paying, and it could not be measured before or after. `not_beneficial`
counts it, kept separate from `transcodes` because conflating "work
done" with "work that paid off" would hide exactly what an operator
needs to see.
It is also what lets the hurl scenario assert the negative half: the
first fetch increments it, the second — a distinct file with identical
content — leaves it untouched, which is the negative row being read
rather than the verdict recomputed.
Assertions are exact equality against captured values throughout, no
`>` or `<`. A "greater than" would pass if a counter moved for the
wrong reason; equality against the prior reading catches any transcode
from any source, including one this scenario did not intend to cause.
Also fixes two URLs the first runs caught: file download is
`GET /api/files/{id}`, not `/content`, and the trash listing is
`/api/trash/resources`. And the duplicate uploads go to a second
folder — re-uploading the same filename into the same folder returns
the EXISTING file id, which would have made both halves of every
"two files, one content" pair the same row and left the scenario
asserting nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Edouard Vanbelle
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8fabbfad9e |
test(transcode): a fixture the WebP encoder cannot shrink
The transcode negative path — "the result came out larger, serve the original and remember that" — had no test because no synthetic image reaches it. Measured against the real encoder: flat colour goes 4780 → 186 bytes, a diagonal gradient 24852 → 102, and uniform RGBA noise still loses by ~242 bytes at every size, a margin constant in absolute terms and so one that never flips. Grayscale does not help either; WebP's subtract-green transform handles R=G=B. Two things have to be true at once and only real content does both. The encoder is the `image` crate's own minimal VP8L writer, not libwebp, so it wins only where redundancy is extreme enough for any encoder to find it. And the original has to be near PNG-optimal, which a screenshot from a real capture tool is: a 2x Retina UI is long identical runs, flat panels and sharp edges — precisely what PNG's scanline filters plus zlib were built for. So the fixture is a real OxiCloud screenshot (emails masked by overtyping rather than block-filling, which would have added back the flat redundancy the property depends on; re-verified negative after masking, 556180 -> 511124 bytes). `fixture_premise` pins both halves of what tests/api/transcode_cache.hurl will assume — this one negative, red-image.png positive. Without the guard a future encoder bump would silently turn the negative half of that scenario into a second positive test: still passing, no longer checking what it was written to check. Worth recording for whenever libwebp replaces this encoder: most of these screenshots would likely flip to positive, which leaves every stored negative row a stale verdict. An encoder change has to purge them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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9c63f9969a |
feat(transcode): write transcodes to the derived tier, with negative rows
Step 7 of docs/plan/derived-blobs.md, write path first — the plan is explicit that fixing it before the import means transcode_import only has to handle history, not a moving target. ImageTranscodeService now reads and writes storage.content_derived_blobs under kind='transcode', keyed by the BLAKE3 of the SOURCE content. The hash is threaded in from file_retrieval_service, which already holds it as dto.content_hash; hashing here would be a BLAKE3 over the whole file on every request. Callers without one (external mounts) keep the local cache untouched, which is what the service did before this tier existed. Negative verdicts become rows rather than zero-byte .skip files. A transcode that came out larger is deterministic in the content, so it is worth remembering; the row survives moka eviction, a restart, and the deletion of .transcoded/, none of which the marker does. Only that verdict is persisted — a timeout or a read error returns Err and is recorded nowhere, because a momentary failure written here would mark a perfectly transcodable image hopeless with nothing to retry it. Representation is a NULL blob_hash, per the plan: a sentinel hash would stop blob_hash naming a real Blob and every consumer would need to learn the exception. A CHECK keeps blob_hash and content_type NULL together — a type without bytes describes nothing, bytes without a type cannot be served. Two consumers had to be corrected for NULLs first, both of which would have broken on the first negative row ever written: * satellites_consistency reported them as derived_dangling_blob at data_loss severity. SQL comparison against NULL is NULL, so EXISTS was false and a row correctly pointing at nothing read as an artifact that had gone missing. * blob_reference_sources::list_referenced_blobs decodes blob_hash into String, so the first NULL would have failed the decode and taken the whole enumeration down. It would also have been wrong if it decoded — a negative row holds no reference, which is why the counting forms (WHERE blob_hash = <hash>) already exclude it for free. lookup_derived returns a three-way answer because Option collapses the two cases a caller deciding whether to spend a decode most needs apart: never attempted, versus attempted and known not worth it. DedupService is attached after construction via a OnceLock. DI builds the transcode service ~240 lines before DedupService exists, and the retrieval path that needs it is wired earlier still, so a constructor argument would mean reordering more than this is worth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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fb0925d10a |
fix(thumbnails): a drained tier is not a teardown failure
Every boot after the migration completes logged `WARN legacy sidecar directory could not be removed / No such file or directory`. The directory being absent IS the end state — it is what success looks like from the second boot onward — so this warned about the migration having worked, forever, on every restart. Returns early when the root is gone, which also skips walking three directories that no longer exist. The remaining `Err` arms keep their warning for the cases that are genuinely failures: a directory that exists and cannot be removed or moved aside. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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ce4354f497 |
fix(thumbnails): neither import job may tear down the shared directory
Found on a sandbox restore. `thumb_derived_import` ran first, imported and deleted its own hash-named sidecars, then found `remove_dir` refused because the `ext-*.jpg` previews were still there — those belong to `thumb_attached_import`. The rename fallback fired, moving the tree to `.thumbnails.migrated`; the attached job then looked in `.thumbnails/`, found nothing, and reported zeros. That stranded the user-uploaded previews, which are the one class of file here with no render path to rebuild them. The rename exists for files NEITHER job claims — a `.DS_Store` blocking removal forever — and it fired for the sibling's work in progress instead. Inverting the job order does not help: once the tree is renamed, both jobs look at `.thumbnails/` and find nothing, whatever order they run in. Teardown is now shared and refuses to act while anything remains that either job would claim. Both jobs call it, so whichever finishes last removes the tree in the same boot rather than leaving an empty directory until the next one. The rename survives for its original purpose, and now only fires when the remaining files are genuinely nobody's. Also drops the daily tick on both imports — they are on-demand now. The boot run in repair mode IS the migration: nothing has written a sidecar since step 10d2, so the tail cannot grow afterwards, and a tick could not finish the job anyway because ticks never pass `repair`. Once drained it was a `read_dir` returning nothing, every day, forever. UX: the "at boot" badge moves from beside the job name into the cadence column. It answers WHEN a job runs, which is what that column is for — next to the name it read as a property of the job, and the row could show "on-demand" beside a badge saying otherwise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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577ecb7cef |
feat(jobs): run the thumbnail migration at startup, by default
A migration nobody triggers never finishes. Scheduled ticks deliberately never pass `repair`, so a deployment whose operator never opens the admin panel re-imported the same sidecars forever and never drained the directory — and relying on operators to edit `.env` has the same failure mode one level up. `OXICLOUD_STARTUP_JOBS` dispatches named jobs once, in the background, after the scheduler is ready. Entries use the syntax operators already type at the trigger URL (`name?repair=true`), so the value is literally the request they would otherwise make by hand. It defaults to both migration jobs in repair mode, so an untouched deployment migrates and drains itself. That is a destructive default and a real exception to no-silent-auto-repair, so the guard it rests on had to get stronger: `verify_and_unlink` now compares CONTENT, not length. A blob of the right size and the wrong bytes used to pass — a key-mapping bug handing back another file's preview at the same length would have deleted the original and kept the impostor, and thumbnails cluster tightly enough in size for that to be a real coincidence. The readback streams from the backend with no cache in front, so it proves durability rather than that a write was acknowledged. Deletion of `.thumbnails/` is attempted first and only falls back to renaming it `.thumbnails.migrated` when `remove_dir` refuses because a non-sidecar file is inside (Finder's `.DS_Store`). Either way the directory stops existing, which lets the read-path probe go back to a single `stat` on the root instead of walking the size directories. Validation is fail-fast: an unknown job name or flag panics at boot. A silently dropped `?repare=true` would leave the job in discovery-only mode while the operator believed the tier was draining, surfacing months later as "the migration never finished" with nothing pointing at the config line. Interrupted runs resume. Boot recovery flips abandoned rows to Paused with their cursor, so `run_or_resume` continues rather than rescanning — a long migration completes across however many restarts it takes. That is a scoped exception to "we do not auto-resume": here somebody did ask, in configuration, and not having to ask again is the point. `StartupJob` holds a `JobRunArgs` rather than re-listing its four fields, so a fifth flag cannot be added to the scheduler and silently ignored in configuration. Jobs named here are ordinary registered jobs — visible in the panel, triggerable by hand, same runs and findings. Their rows now carry a `startup` object so an operator can see that a job deletes on every boot rather than only when someone clicks Run. Adds docs/config/thumbnail-migration.md: what runs on first boot, how to snapshot database and storage together beforehand, and how to verify afterwards with satellites_consistency plus backend_consistency ?deep=true. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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03246305f6 |
feat(thumbnails): the sidecar fallback disables itself
Step 10e was written as a removal release: delete the fallback read path once the directories are empty. That has the same flaw as gating deletion on an empty tail, one level up — sidecars are local disk, so no release can know that every instance has drained. The only removal that can actually be written is "if the tier is gone, return". `initialize` now probes the size directories once at boot; when absent, every fallback read short-circuits on a relaxed atomic load and touches no filesystem. The code stays, costs nothing, and can be deleted whenever — or never. Two things had to change for absence to be reachable at all: * `initialize` no longer creates the directories. It create_dir_all-ed all three at every boot, so the import job removed them and the next restart put them back — the absence this gates on was unreachable by construction. Found on a sandbox where the job had drained the tier and a restart left three empty directories behind. Nothing has written a sidecar since step 10d2, so there was nothing to create them for. * The probe tests the size directories, not the root. On macOS Finder leaves a .DS_Store in the root, which blocks remove_dir there permanently; gating on the root would keep the fallback alive on every developer machine for a reason unrelated to thumbnails. No size directory means no sidecar. Every sidecar read and existence check now goes through `read_sidecar` / `sidecar_exists`, so the guard exists once rather than at each of the twelve sites that built a path and read it — the build-then-read pair was duplicated six times over. The import job's root removal reports its outcome instead of discarding it. It is the one result an operator is waiting for, and "directory not empty" with no sidecars left is a failure worth naming. Falls open: the flag starts true, so a service constructed without `initialize` behaves as before. A drain completing mid-process leaves it stale-true until restart, which costs the same failed opens as today; it never goes false while sidecars remain. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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f1f327a6c4 |
refactor(consistency): blobs_consistency reads only the database
`blobs_consistency` probed `blob_exists` once per row and, under `?deep=true`, read and re-hashed every blob. `backend_consistency` already reports the same `blob_missing_from_backend` from its merge-join — so the probe was duplicated work that found strictly less (a DB walk cannot see backend-only orphans by construction) at N round -trips instead of one enumeration. Every scheduled sweep paid for it. All three physical checks move to `backend_consistency`: * `blob_missing_from_backend` was already there; the duplicate is gone. * `blob_corrupted` / `blob_unreadable` hook the matched arm of the merge-join, which holds exactly the key pairs worth reading. Guarded by `in_range` so a pair past the horizon is not read twice, and `params.deep` is persisted on a fresh run and read back on resume so a paused deep scan does not silently continue shallow. Deep mode belongs there because it is backend work end to end: the only DB input is the hash. Keeping it in `blobs_consistency` forced that tenant to carry a backend for one flag. What remains is the half that needs no backend: `refcount_mismatch` and its repair. The constructor drops from five parameters to two — no backend, no storage_entries, no storage_path_fallback — and `?storage=<name>` / `?deep=true` are now inert there, which the job description says outright. `affected_files` is needed by both tenants, so it moves to a shared `blob_diagnostics` module rather than being copied. `PROBED_STORAGE_PARAM` moves to `backend_consistency`: it was defined in `blobs_consistency` and re-exported, which is backwards once the DB-only tenant has no entry to scope. The create-grace window goes with the probe — it existed to avoid flagging a blob whose bytes had landed before its row, and the refcount comparison reads one consistent snapshot. Known cost: `backend_consistency` returns `backend_unenumerable` on Azure and mid-migration, so on those configs missing bytes now go unreported where the per-row probe caught them. That argues for the Azure enumeration impl, not for keeping the probe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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1ea3826660 |
feat(jobs): jobs describe themselves — description, mutates, repair_description
The admin panel had no repair toggle wired to anything but a hardcoded
name list naming the two refcount tenants, so `thumb_derived_import` and
`thumb_attached_import` could not be run in repair mode from the UI at
all despite supporting it. And nothing in the job list said what any
given job does or whether clicking Run on production writes anything.
Three defaulted methods on `JobHandler` and `RecoverableJobHandler`:
fn description(&self) -> &'static str
fn mutates(&self) -> Mutates // Never | Always | OnRepairOnly
fn repair_description(&self) -> Option<&'static str>
`RecoverableAdapter` forwards them — the registry only holds
`dyn JobHandler`, so a tenant's metadata is invisible otherwise, and
falling back to the defaults would report every recoverable job as
read-only, including the ones that delete files.
Three values rather than a boolean because a job can be read-only by
default and destructive under `?repair=true`; a boolean answers wrongly
for one of its two modes, and `false` on something that unlinks files is
the dangerous direction to be wrong in. `repair_description` returning
`Option` collapses "does it repair" and "what does repair do" into one
method: presence gates the toggle, content is the confirmation text —
which the frontend cannot invent, since correcting a counter and
deleting sidecars are not the same warning.
`OnRepairOnly` with no `repair_description` is rejected at registration:
it claims to mutate only under a flag it does not support.
All 17 registered jobs declare all three. The panel now renders the
description under each name, badges read-only jobs, confirms before a
plain run of a mutating one, and offers the repair variant off the
backend flag instead of the name list.
Descriptions are English in the trait, next to the behaviour: one in
`locales/*.json` rots invisibly the moment a job changes, and a
translator cannot know what `manifests_consistency` reconciles. i18n can
layer on later keyed by job name with these as the fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Edouard Vanbelle
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b485db46fa |
feat(storage): audit every sidecar deletion, and reclaim orphaned uploads
Two changes to the import jobs' destructive path. thumb_attached_import now deletes orphaned sidecars under `repair`, matching the dead-source case on the derived side. An `ext-` file whose owner is gone is unimportable — the FK on file_id would reject the row — so leaving it means it is rediscovered every run, the tail never empties and step 10e's gate never opens. Safe despite these being the non-regenerable bytes: the preview is keyed to a file_id that no longer exists, so nothing can reference it again. Unrecoverable and unreachable are different things, and this is both. And every deletion is now audited. A one-way migration removing user-visible files should leave a trail that outlives the run history: findings are per-run and get purged, whereas target: "audit" is separable and retained. If a preview later turns out to be missing, this is the only record saying the migration removed it and when. `owner` carries the id the file belonged to — source_hash for content-keyed, file_id for uploaded — because that is where an investigation starts, and the raw logs cannot supply it: NEW BLOB names the hash of the STORED BYTES, a different value from the sidecar's own name, which is why grepping one against the other finds nothing. reason is a stable key: `imported` (replaced by a verified blob), `source_gone`, `orphaned`. The first lives inside verify_and_unlink so a verified deletion cannot be logged inconsistently; the other two are explicit, since those paths have nothing to verify against. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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1a3d7d201a |
fix(storage): skip sidecars whose source is gone, before writing anything
Running the import on a real install produced a store-then-discard loop: NEW BLOB (CDC) immediately followed by MANIFEST DELETED, once per sidecar. store_derived_blob wrote the bytes, the source-exists guard refused the row, and `inserted == 0` released the reference again. The refusal is right — `.thumbnails/` outlives years of deleted files, and importing those would recreate exactly the orphan rows e4c78ae0 eliminated. The mistake was deciding it AFTER the write. Now checked before the read and the store, via blob_exists (manifest first, blob as fallback). Two costs it removes: a blob write plus a manifest delete per dead sidecar on EVERY run, and a tail that never empties — unimportable files are rediscovered forever, so the job never reports zero and step 10e's gate never opens. Reported as `sidecar_source_gone` so the scale is visible before anything is removed, and deleted under `repair`. That is the one unlink in this job needing no readback: there is nothing to read back and nothing to regenerate from. Counted separately in the completion log, because "skipped, source gone" and "already present" mean different things to an operator deciding whether the migration has converged. Worth noting for anyone reading the raw logs: NEW BLOB names the hash of the STORED BYTES, while the sidecar filename is the SOURCE hash. They are different values, so grepping the log hash against .thumbnails finds nothing. The new finding carries both. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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b3221e265d |
feat(consistency): satellites_consistency covers both tables, and the sweep covers every job
Extends the derived check to `file_attached_blobs` and renames it, since the two tables are one concept — the content-keyed and file-keyed halves of "things attached to a Blob" — and `storage.copy_file_satellites` already established the vocabulary. The attached half is the one that cannot be recovered. `attached_dangling_blob` is data_loss with `recoverable: false`: those bytes were user-supplied and have no server-side render path, so nothing can regenerate them. Its derived twin carries `recoverable: true`, because a derived artifact is a pure function of its source and re-rendering restores it. Same finding shape, materially different stakes, and the detail says which. No orphan-mapping check on the attached side, deliberately: `file_id` is ON DELETE CASCADE, so a row cannot outlive its file. The database enforces what the derived table cannot, since a content hash has no row to point a foreign key at — which is exactly why only that half could rot. One job walking two tables needs a phase in the cursor, or an attached checkpoint would be replayed against the derived table and silently re-scan or skip. Two things the sweep was missing, found while checking whether every consistency job is actually exercised: drives_consistency and folders_consistency were registered but never run by any test. Now included; the list is exhaustive by intent. An unknown job was a warning-and-skip. That protected feature-gated builds at the cost of something worse: this list said `derived_consistency` for one commit after the rename and would have dropped that coverage without a word, leaving the suite green over a check that no longer ran. It fails now. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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4fef34b230 |
feat(consistency): derived_consistency — the last coverage-matrix gap
Finds derived mappings whose Blob is gone on either side. Nothing else can, and that is the point rather than an oversight: every other job reasons from a Blob outwards, so a row whose SOURCE was reaped breaks none of their invariants — valid reference, exactly correct refcount, bytes present on the backend. Every check agrees the system is healthy while the artifact is pinned forever. A leak that looks like correctness, which is why it took four suite runs to name. Two findings: derived_orphan_mapping (inconsistent) — source_hash has neither a manifest nor a blob row, so purge_derived_blobs can never fire for it. Storage that grows and never reclaims. derived_dangling_blob (data_loss) — blob_hash has no Blob behind it. The mapping promises an artifact that is gone, so a read finds the row and then fails. Existence means EITHER table on both sides, since source_hash and blob_hash each name a Blob: a manifest for CDC content, a bare blob row for legacy whole-file content. Checking one would report every legacy blob as missing. Paged on the full primary key with a row-value comparison rather than source_hash alone — a source has several variants, so a page boundary can fall inside one and advancing by source would skip the rest. Both existence probes fold into the page query, so a page is one round-trip rather than 2xN. Cursor round-trip is tested, including that a malformed one fails loudly: silently restarting would make a paged audit under-report, which is the worst failure available to a job whose purpose is finding what is missing. e4c78ae0 stops new orphans at the write side; this finds the ones already on disk, which that fix cannot reach. Added to the end-of-suite sweep so it runs against real state every time. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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de0f625d4c |
fix(dedup): refuse a derived mapping whose source is already gone
Permanent blob leak, three rows per image. Confirmed green after this. The leftovers named their source, and it had no manifest, no blob row and no files. Nothing will ever reap that hash again, so purge_derived_blobs can never fire for it — meaning the rows were written AFTER the source died, not left behind by a reap that skipped them. Two earlier attempts assumed the latter and fixed the wrong thing. Background thumbnail generation is spawned and unawaited, so an upload deleted promptly — constant in a test suite, occasional for real users — has its render finish after GC reaped the blob and then record three mappings to a corpse. Each pins its own thumbnail blob at ref_count 1, which GC is thereafter CORRECT to refuse: that is why three passes with force=true reclaimed nothing and why the leak was invisible, a healthy system declining to delete referenced data. store_derived_blob now inserts only WHERE the source still exists, checking both tables since source_hash names a Blob — a manifest for CDC content, a bare blob row for legacy whole-file content. A refused insert falls into the existing `inserted == 0` branch and releases the reference, so the thumbnail blob becomes collectible rather than stranded. Closed in both directions: if the source dies before the statement's snapshot the row is refused; if after, that reap's purge finds the row. 034f1050 stays — the bulk manifest reap genuinely lacked the purge that reap_blob had, and two manifest reap paths with only one purging is its own defect. It just was not this one. Still missing, and now clearly worth building: the orphan-mapping check the plan's coverage matrix already lists (content_derived_blobs. source_hash with no Blob behind it). This stops new ones; nothing yet finds the ones already on disk. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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ea5d3003e0 |
fix(dedup): bulk manifest reap orphaned every derived row
Real leak, found by storage_cleanup_check.sh: three blobs surviving a full teardown, all `derived=1`, all naming one `src` whose manifest, blob row and files were already gone. The source had been reaped without its derived rows being purged. `reap_blob` purges correctly for the single-blob path. The BULK manifest reap did not — it iterated the deleted batch only to invalidate the manifest cache, so every manifest reaped that way left its content_derived_blobs rows behind. The predicate is not at fault. It protects a manifest that IS a derived artifact (content_derived_blobs.blob_hash) and deliberately not one that is the SOURCE of them, because counting source_hash as a reference would pin every original for as long as a thumbnail existed. The source is therefore reaped correctly and the purge simply has to follow it. The consequence is permanent, not cosmetic: the orphaned row holds chunk_manifests.ref_count at 1 on the thumbnail's own blob, so GC is thereafter CORRECT to refuse it — which is why three passes with force=true reclaimed nothing. Every deleted image left three behind, one per size, growing forever. Fixed at the reap rather than in any deletion path, which is where all of them converge: folder cascade, drive deletion, user deletion and single-file delete all reach it through the decrement trigger, so one call covers every route. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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1b68ee093e |
feat(storage): both import jobs tick daily instead of manual-only
Registered with interval None, so they ran only when someone remembered to trigger them — which was your objection to gating anything on operator timing. Now daily. Not boot-time: that would delay readiness for a filesystem walk, and both jobs are idempotent and resumable, so periodic is strictly better. The tick deliberately does NOT delete. `repair` defaults false, so scheduled runs import and stop; unlinking stays a deliberate operator action, per no-silent-auto-repair. That splits the two halves the way their risk differs — the backfill is safe to automate, removing files is not. Cost once drained is a read_dir over three directories returning nothing, and after the directory itself is removed, not even that. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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c778b67006 |
feat(thumbnails): stop writing sidecars (step 10d2)
The write paths now persist only to the blob tiers. Until this, dual-write
meant any render or upload recreated .thumbnails/ seconds after the import
job removed it, so step 10e's gate — "the directory no longer exists" —
could never hold.
Rendered thumbnails: the fs::write in persist_rendered is gone. Safe
because the read flip landed first, so nothing depended on that write to
be found, and a failed derived store now costs a re-render rather than
data — regenerable by definition. Existing sidecars are untouched and stay
readable through the fallback until the import drains them.
Uploaded previews needed a change first, and the order was not optional.
upload_thumbnail_impl logged and still returned 201 when store_attached_blob
failed — safe only while ext-{file_id}.jpg was a second copy. These bytes
have NO server-side render path, so removing the sidecar while the store
stayed best-effort would lose a user's upload behind a success response.
The PUT is now fatal, and drops the RAM entry too, or the cache would keep
serving a preview that was never persisted and vanishes on eviction,
contradicting the error the client just received. Only then does the ext-
write go.
thumb_import_check.sh had to change with it: its premise was "upload, then
delete the row, and what remains on disk is legacy state", which no longer
holds now that nothing writes sidecars. It lays them down itself, with the
bytes the API just served, at the exact paths the pre-10d2 code used. The
reconstruction stays faithful — same bytes, same paths — it just no longer
depends on current code to produce a shape current code has stopped
producing. Both sidecars get identical bytes, which is realistic rather
than a shortcut: they dedup to one blob while keeping separate mappings,
which is the property the keying split exists to preserve.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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df619a7ed9 |
feat(storage): thumb_attached_import drains its sidecars too
Completes step 10d. Same `?repair=true` opt-in and the same readback-before-unlink as the derived half, and the check matters more here: these sidecars hold the bytes that CANNOT be regenerated — a client-uploaded PDF preview has no server-side render path — so the read is the only thing between a migration and permanent loss, not belt-and-braces. verify_and_unlink is shared rather than copied. Two versions of "only delete after proving the replacement is readable" would be two chances to weaken one, and it is the rule the whole deletion step rests on. Deletion covers the already-imported branch as well as fresh imports, for the same reason as the derived job: a run without `repair` leaves the sidecar behind, and a later run with it would otherwise see "already imported" and never drain. Import first, enable deletion after, is the expected operator sequence, so that branch is the common path. Orphaned sidecars stay untouched — this job imports, it does not reclaim, and a destructive default on a migration is what no-silent- auto-repair forbids. Unverifiable ones are kept and reported, so the next run retries. With both halves draining, `.thumbnails/` can now actually empty and the directory removal in the derived job can succeed — though not stably until dual-write stops, since any render or upload recreates it. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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ae9ff0d8b3 |
feat(storage): thumb_derived_import drains the sidecars it imports
Step 10d, for the content-keyed half. Opt-in via the existing `repair` flag rather than a new one — the house rule is that a job does not mutate on its default setting, so early runs import only and an operator can inspect before committing. Deleting from the job rather than a later release is what makes the migration self-draining. Sidecars are LOCAL disk, so no release can know whether every instance has finished; each instance draining itself needs no coordination at all. Verification before unlinking is the load-bearing part. store_derived_blob reporting success is not proof the bytes are retrievable — a backend that accepted a write it cannot serve would otherwise have the last copy deleted on top of it. The blob is read back and its length compared against the sidecar's; a failure keeps the file, records a finding, and the next run retries. That read is the difference between a migration and a data-loss bug. Deletion applies to already-imported files too, not just fresh ones. A run without `repair` leaves the sidecar behind, and a later run with it would otherwise classify the file as "already imported" and never drain it — and import-then-enable-deletion is the expected operator sequence, so that is the common path rather than an edge case. Directories are removed once genuinely empty, because ABSENCE is what step 10e gates on, not emptiness: empty is momentary and an on-demand render can repopulate it a second later, while absence is one-way and cheaper to test (one stat, versus opendir/readdir/closedir). remove_dir refuses a non-empty directory, so it needs no emptiness check and cannot race a concurrent write into deleting live files. thumb_attached_import still needs the same treatment; verify_and_unlink should move somewhere shared rather than being copied into it. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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12158ccf59 |
fix(storage): thumb_derived_import claims JPEG sidecars too
The filter was strip_suffix(".webp"), but persist_rendered writes
{hash}.{format.ext()} — so any client not advertising WebP leaves
{hash}.jpg on disk. Correct only while the derived tier was WebP-only;
once variant carried the format (20261022000000) a JPEG sidecar became
ordinary content, and leaving it unclaimed would keep .thumbnails/
permanently non-empty — the very signal step 10e gates on. The migration
could never finish.
Both codecs are now claimed and the format comes from the file's own
extension, so a .jpg imports AS JPEG. Deriving the variant and
content_type from it rather than hardcoding WebP is the point: a
mislabelled row would serve the wrong codec to whoever the read path
then matched it for.
ThumbnailFormat::ALL exists so the claim list and the write path cannot
drift — adding a format without teaching the import about it would
strand that codec silently.
The `ext-` rejection now carries real weight. Previously .jpg was
rejected wholesale, so the two jobs could not overlap by construction;
now they share an extension and only the prefix separates them. Both
directions stay under test.
Caught by the cross-job assertion, which counts every real sidecar being
claimed exactly once — the fixture gained a .jpg and the total moved 3
to 4, which is the test noticing rather than a test to update.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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f4e4b518a9 |
feat(thumbnails): classify render failures as permanent or transient
Prerequisite for persisting negative verdicts, and the reason step 7 cannot start with the storage change. generate_and_persist collapses EVERY error into empty Bytes — timeouts and closed semaphores included. That is survivable only because the sentinel lives in moka, which evicts. Write the same signal to content_derived_blobs and a thumbnail that timed out once under load is unrenderable forever. So the classification lands first, on its own, before anything can persist it. It maps onto the existing variants without restructuring, because timeouts already surface as TaskError: ImageError, UnsupportedFormat -> permanent. The decoder rejected these bytes, or they exceed MAX_DECODE_PIXELS. Facts about the image. TaskError, IoError -> transient. Timeout, closed decode semaphore, join failure, unreadable source. Facts about the moment. The asymmetry sets the default: a wrongly-persisted transient marks a good image unrenderable for good, while a wrongly-omitted permanent merely costs a repeated decode. Anything not clearly a content property is therefore transient. Tested by pinning the mapping rather than trusting variant names to stay put — the timeout case especially, since it is the one that turns a load spike into data loss. Nothing consumes this yet; it exists so the storage change cannot be written without it. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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d202b4b5ca |
fix(storage): the derived import conflated variant with directory
76590160 changed `variant_of` to return `{size}.{ext}`, but that value
was also being used as the on-disk DIRECTORY. Reads became
`.thumbnails/preview.webp/{hash}.webp`, which does not exist, so every
sidecar counted as unreadable and thumb_derived_import restored nothing.
Caught by thumb_import_check.sh on the run after the migration — the
harness earning its keep twice now, since this is the second defect it
has caught that no unit test could.
They are genuinely two strings and are now named as such: `dir_name` for
the path, `variant` for the row key. The cursor keeps using the
directory, so a run paused before the migration resumes at the same
position rather than restarting.
Also stops podman's compose-provider banner from burying the script's
output. Filtered rather than discarded, so genuine psql errors still
surface — swallowing those would turn a broken query into a silently
wrong assertion. Suppressing it at the source needs
`[engine] compose_warning_logs = false` in containers.conf, which is
per-developer config and cannot be relied on in CI.
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Edouard Vanbelle
|
86d0d65583 |
feat(storage): derived variant encodes the output format
`content_derived_blobs.variant` held the size alone, so one source could
hold exactly one artifact per size regardless of codec. That surfaced
when the read order flipped in 10c: a JPEG request matched the WebP row
and would have been served the wrong codec — hidden previously because
the .jpg sidecar won first. The flip had to be gated to WebP, which
meant JPEG clients could never leave the sidecar, which meant the
sidecar could never be deleted.
It blocks transcodes harder: those are multi-format by nature, so two
output codecs of one source collide on the primary key without a format
term.
The axis goes inside the string rather than into a fourth PK column,
per the column's own rule — "new axes go inside this string, never into
new columns". Shape is {size}.{ext}: preview.webp, icon.jpg, later
720p.webp.
The backfill is deterministic, not a guess: store_derived_blob has only
ever written "image/webp" for thumbnails. content_type is checked anyway
rather than assumed — a row that fails the assumption is left alone and
counted in a warning, because the read path then simply misses it and
falls back to the sidecar, whereas guessing a codec would serve wrong
bytes. Idempotent via NOT LIKE '%.%', so a re-apply cannot produce
preview.webp.webp; verified on a scratch PG by applying it twice.
One helper builds the string, because it is a primary-key component:
a writer and reader that disagree do not fail loudly, they just never
find each other's rows and the derived tier silently looks empty. It
lives on the service's ThumbnailSize, not the port's — they are distinct
types, which the compiler pointed out after I put it on the wrong one.
The WebP gate on the read path is now removed: each codec has its own
row, so JPEG can finally reach the derived tier — the prerequisite for
deleting the sidecar for those clients.
file_attached_blobs keeps a bare size: store_external_thumbnail
re-encodes everything to JPEG, so it is single-format by construction
and a format term would cost a migration for nothing.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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c656e684d4 |
feat(consistency): merge-join backend_consistency, both directions
The job walked the backend and probed the DB with WHERE hash = ANY($1) over each page, so it could only ever see backend-only entries. A registry row whose bytes are gone never appears in a backend listing — it was invisible here by construction, and that half was left to blobs_consistency's per-row HEAD probe, which does not survive the row counts this plan produces. Both sides are now ordered by hash — the backend by contract since 5343fdda, the DB by ORDER BY hash — so one pass yields both deltas: orphan_blob for bytes with no row, and blob_missing_from_backend for a row with no bytes. The latter is severity data_loss rather than inconsistent: an orphan wastes space, this loses a file. Three things the merge needs that a probe did not. A horizon. The two pages cover different ranges, so only their overlap can be judged — beyond it, a hash missing from one side may simply be on the next page of the other, and emitting there would invent findings in both directions at once. When a side is exhausted its entries cannot be on a later page, so the other's tail becomes judgeable. One cursor for both sides. They share an ordering, so "resume after H" is start_after(H) on the backend and hash > H in the DB. The cursor advances to the horizon, not the backend's own next_cursor, which would skip the un-judged tail of whichever side reached further. Format is unchanged, so paused runs resume. And an ordering premise worth stating rather than assuming: hashes are lowercase BLAKE3 hex of fixed length, so collation and byte order rank identically over [0-9a-f]. A hash column admitting uppercase or variable length would break this silently. Recorded in the module docs and beside the query. blobs_consistency still emits its own blob_missing_from_backend; the two now overlap. Retiring that probe is the follow-up, not folded in here. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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d7de1c41e7 |
fix(files): missing folder_id is 400, not 500
Uploading without folder_id answered `500 Internal Error: folder_id is required to determine file owner`. A missing required field is the caller's error; as an internal_error it produced `error_type: Internal Error`, which the SPA cannot distinguish from the server breaking — so a malformed request looked like an outage. Both sites become validation_error (ErrorKind::InvalidInput → 400), with messages that say WHY the field is needed rather than restating that it is: the destination folder determines the file's owner and drive. The OpenAPI request body described it as "optional folder_id field", which is how it came to be omitted — hit while writing thumbnail_etag_content_keyed.hurl, where the upload was written from the documented contract and 500'd. Now stated as required. Regression test asserts the status AND that error_type is not "Internal Error", since the contract the SPA switches on is error_type rather than the message. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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260e6bb74f |
feat(thumbnails): read the derived tier ahead of the sidecar
Step 10c. The sidecar is local disk — invisible to other instances, uncarried by a backend migration, uncovered by any consistency job. Reading the derived tier first is what makes that state deletable. Not the cost it appears to be: CachedBlobBackend gives the blob read a local disk cache and moka absorbs the repeats above it. Not a two-line swap, for two reasons. A derived MISS must fall through to the sidecar; the old code terminated the lookup with `?` because it was last. While the imports drain, most content has a sidecar and no row — terminating there would report "no thumbnail" for nearly all of it. And the derived tier is WebP-only. store_derived_blob writes image/webp and keys `variant` on the size alone, with no format term, so a JPEG request matches the WebP row and would be served the wrong codec. The old ordering hid this because the .jpg sidecar won first. So the lookup is gated to WebP, JPEG clients stay on the sidecar — and the sidecar cannot be deleted for them until `variant` encodes format. That is a new prerequisite for step 10e, recorded in the plan rather than discovered later. Also corrects the plan: I had written that this flip removes the derived-hash ETag hazard. It does not. A first render still creates the row as a side effect of producing the body, whatever the read order, so two consecutive reads still straddle its appearance. The real fix is resolving the ETag after generation on the 200 path — a 304 only fires when the client already holds a validator, which implies the row exists. That is a handler restructure, not an ordering change. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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48d9e164d4 |
test(thumbnails): pin get_cached_thumbnail's tier precedence
This function produced four bugs in two days, every one an ordering mistake rather than a logic error, and every one caught only by an end-to-end run comparing bytes against something independent: the content-keyed RAM entry shadowing an uploaded preview so a PUT appeared to do nothing; that precedence being right on disk but wrong in RAM; a validator flipping because a tier was populated as a side effect of producing the body; a decode error reading as "absent". They all violate one sentence — a file-specific override beats anything derived from the content, at every tier — so that is what these pin. Step 10c is entirely a precedence change (derived ahead of sidecar), and it should not be another end-to-end guess. No database needed. With `dedup: None` the two DB tiers are skipped, and what remains — per-file RAM, ext- disk, content RAM, blob-hash sidecar — is exactly where the bugs were. Seven cases: the two override rules, RAM over disk within the content tiers, the sidecar answering alone, the ext- read caching under the PER-FILE key (a content key would leak one user's preview to every file sharing the content), a hashless caller falling through instead of guessing, and moka's empty-bytes negative entry not being served as a thumbnail. Verified by mutation, not just by passing: restoring the old precedence fails exactly the two tests that encode the rule, and no others. Lives in thumbnail_service.rs rather than the sibling test file because seeding tiers needs the private `cache` field. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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2775e6d567 |
docs: the two sidecar-only paths are production-unreachable
Closing out step 10(a). The remaining `None` call sites in persist_rendered looked like an open gap; they are not reachable in production. Both `get_thumbnail` and the path variant of `generate_all_sizes_background` are called only from the `ThumbnailPort` impl, and nothing holds a `dyn ThumbnailPort` — which the existing note in get_cached_thumbnail already recorded and a grep confirms. Live renders go through get_thumbnail_from_blob and generate_all_sizes_background_from_blob, both of which carry a DedupService and dual-write. So threading a DedupService through them would be work with no runtime effect. Recorded at each call site instead, with the condition that matters: gaining a real caller means taking a DedupService first, or the gap persist_rendered exists to close reopens — sidecar-only output the import can never see, so the tail never empties and the deletion gate never opens. Marks 10(a) done in the plan with that caveat stated rather than implied. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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18649eb7b9 |
fix(thumbnails): drop derived-hash ETag until the read-order flip
The ETag is computed BEFORE the body. On a cache miss no content_derived_blobs row exists, so thumbnail_content_id returned the source-keyed form — then rendering created that row, and the next request resolved to the derived hash instead. The validator changed as a side effect of producing the body, making every first render immediately stale. Latent until aaf08532: before the consolidation, the on-demand render path never wrote a derived row, so the flip had nothing to trigger it. Fixing one gap exposed the other. Caught by thumbnail_etag_content_keyed.hurl — two consecutive GETs of an unchanged file stopped revalidating to 304. The plan already said derived-hash keying must land WITH the read-order flip and not before; I brought it forward anyway when the attachment case forced the attached half. This is the evidence for the constraint, so the plan now records the attempt and why it failed rather than leaving the note as untested caution. The attached lookup stays — it has no such window, since an upload writes its row synchronously before any read can observe it, and it fixes a real collision: a copy inherits the source hash, so an original and a copy carrying different uploaded previews would otherwise share one validator while serving different bytes. The flip removes the hazard for the derived half too: once that tier is authoritative it is populated before it is consulted, so no row can appear between two reads. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
|
7ec387003d |
refactor(thumbnails): one persist_rendered for every render path
Step 10(a), the blocker. Four render paths each wrote the sidecar and
exactly one also recorded the content_derived_blobs row, so an on-demand
render — a cache miss, a size never generated, an evicted sidecar —
produced state the migration could never see. That breaks the
migration's premise rather than being untidy: thumb_derived_import would
never reach an empty tail, so the gate for deleting the sidecar would
never open.
Now every rendered thumbnail goes through persist_rendered, which owns
what persisting means. Raw `fs::write(&thumb_path, …)` drops from five
sites to two: the one inside persist_rendered, and
store_external_thumbnail's `ext-{file_id}.jpg`, which is file-keyed and
legitimately a different thing.
The path that matters most already had what it needed:
get_thumbnail_from_blob — the REST handler's fallthrough on a cache miss
— holds `dedup` and simply never used it for persistence. It now
dual-writes at no cost.
render_and_persist_all_webp had its own copy of the dual-write logic;
that copy is gone, so retiring the interim dual-write later is one edit
here rather than a hunt.
Two paths still pass `None` and remain sidecar-only: `get_thumbnail`
(renders from an on-disk original) and `generate_all_sizes_background`
(the path variant; the _from_blob sibling has dedup). Closing those
means threading a DedupService in from their callers. Left visible as an
explicit `None` at the call site rather than an absent write — the gap
is now something a reader trips over instead of something they have to
notice is missing.
Adds ThumbnailFormat::mime() beside ext(), since the derived row needs a
media type and an extension without a matching one is how a WebP ends up
labelled JPEG.
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Edouard Vanbelle
|
395296a7e7 |
fix(storage): file_exists misreported every file as missing
`SELECT 1 FROM storage.files WHERE id = $1` decoded as i64. PostgreSQL types a bare `1` as int4, so the decode always failed — and since `.ok().flatten()` turns a decode error into the same None as "no row", file_exists reported false for every file. thumb_attached_import therefore classified every sidecar as an orphan and imported nothing. Caught by thumb_import_check.sh on its first run: the derived import restored its rows, the attached one restored none. Now `SELECT EXISTS(...)`, which yields a real bool and always returns exactly one row, so absence means absence. A query error still degrades to false — the safe direction, leaving the file on disk as a reported orphan rather than importing it against a row that may not exist. The failure mode is the point, and it is the third of this shape in two days: an error converted into an innocuous-looking outcome. So the check script now dumps a job's findings when an assertion fails. The jobs already recorded exactly why they skipped each file — the attached_sidecar_orphan findings naming the cause were sitting in the run while the script reported only "did not restore the row", which is indistinguishable from the job never having run. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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4ae1531286 |
docs(plan): job-driven sidecar deletion, and the persist-consolidation blocker
Two revisions from working through step 10.
**Deletion moves into the import jobs, not a release.** Sidecars are
local disk, so a release cannot know whether every instance has drained
— gating on "an empty tail" asks an operator to coordinate a fact
nothing reports, and there is no telling when or whether they trigger
the jobs at all. Each job unlinking what it has imported makes every
instance drain itself. Constrained three ways: verify the derived blob
reads back before unlinking (a store that reported success but landed
unreadable would otherwise take the last copy), only after the
read-order flip (or the derived tier takes its first production traffic
by accident), and opt-in, since a migration that deletes by default is
surprising. Scheduled tick rather than boot trigger — idempotent and
resumable, so periodic is safe, while walking .thumbnails/ at startup
delays readiness for nothing.
**Found while checking the dual-write assumption: it does not hold.**
store_derived_blob has ONE call site; fs::write(&thumb_path, …) has
five. get_thumbnail, generate_and_persist and
generate_all_sizes_background all persist sidecar-only. That breaks the
migration's premise rather than being untidy — on-demand renders keep
producing un-migrated state after the import runs, so the tail never
empties and the deletion gate never opens. One persist_thumbnail owning
sidecar + derived + moka is therefore a prerequisite, and it makes "stop
writing sidecars" a later one-line change instead of four edits. Noted
that ThumbnailService holds no DedupService, so it must be threaded
through.
Also corrects a claim I put in thumb_derived_import's own docs:
transcoding is NOT a later step. ImageTranscodeService exists and caches
.transcoded/{ext}/{file_id}.{ext}, so a third import is needed and it
must re-key file→content — legitimate only because a transcode is
derivable. Its .skip markers remain an open question.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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49e7bb15a6 |
test(storage): cover the sidecar walk for both import jobs
Both imports run over ONE directory, where the two legacy shapes sit side by side, so the property worth asserting spans them: together they must claim every real sidecar exactly once, and neither may take the other's. A job that drifted into the other's shape would content-key user-supplied bytes — sharing one user's uploaded preview onto every file with identical content — and no per-job test in isolation would notice. So the fixture is shared. `legacy_tree` builds a directory holding a content-keyed .webp pair, an ext- upload, and a stray README, and both test modules walk it: derived claims exactly the two hashes in sorted order, attached claims exactly the ext- file, the two sets are disjoint, and between them they account for all three real sidecars. `sidecar_names` became an associated function taking the root instead of reading `self`, which is what makes this testable at all — the walk is the half that decides which files a job claims, and it needed no pool to verify. Sorting is asserted rather than assumed, since the cursor resumes by skipping everything at or before it and a stable order is the only thing that makes that correct. A missing size directory is covered too: normal on a fresh install, and it must yield no work rather than abort the walk. Not covered here, and it needs a pooled fixture that does not exist: the round trip itself — store the blob, write the row, and confirm a COPY inherits the preview. That belongs in the API-level harness, where the legacy state can be manufactured through the real write path and then stripped. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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7a2ebe0fdc |
feat(storage): thumb_attached_import — backfill uploaded previews
Twin of thumb_derived_import, for the other sidecar shape:
{thumbnails_root}/{size}/ext-{file_id}.jpg, the previews a user
uploaded — notably the SPA's client-side PDF generator, which has no
server-side render path at all.
Until a row exists, a copy of the file LOSES the preview: the sidecar is
keyed by file_id, no copy path duplicates it, and the server silently
falls back to rendering from the source, or to nothing for a PDF. That
is the bug file_attached_blobs closed for new uploads; this closes it
for everything already on disk.
Separate job rather than an arm of the derived import, because the
keying differs and that difference is the security boundary. These bytes
are not derivable from the file's content, so content-keying them would
share one user's uploaded preview onto every file with identical
content. Each job's name filter rejects the other's shape, and both
directions are under test.
Idempotence needs more care here than in the derived twin.
store_attached_blob is ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE, so calling it for an
existing row releases the previous reference and takes a new one —
harmless once, but a job doing it every run would churn refcounts. The
row is therefore checked first and the store reached only on a genuine
insert.
uploaded_by is the nil sentinel: disk records no uploader, and inventing
one — the file's created_by, say — would fabricate provenance that could
later read as evidence an Editor replaced someone's preview. The column
is NOT NULL with no FK precisely so provenance survives, and a sentinel
says "unknown" honestly.
Orphaned sidecars (no storage.files row) are counted and reported, not
deleted. This job imports; it does not reclaim. Existence is checked
explicitly rather than letting the foreign key reject the insert, so an
orphan is counted as one instead of surfacing as an opaque constraint
error.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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f80a28763e |
feat(storage): thumb_derived_import — backfill the derived tier from sidecars
First half of step 10. Every server-rendered thumbnail written before
content_derived_blobs existed lives only as
{thumbnails_root}/{size}/{hash}.webp — local-disk state that another
instance cannot see, a backend migration does not carry, and no
consistency job covers. This walks those files into the blob store and
records the mapping, so the derived tier can become authoritative and
the sidecar can be deleted.
A registered JobRegistry tenant rather than a script: the volume is
unbounded, so it needs a cursor, resume, cooperative cancel and run
history, and an operator needs somewhere to watch it. Cursor is
{size_dir}/{filename} over a sorted walk, which totally orders the
traversal.
Idempotent by construction — each file is skipped when a row already
exists, and store_derived_blob is ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING with
release-on-conflict beneath it, so re-runs cannot inflate refcounts.
Re-running is the expected operator behaviour, since Phase 3 (deleting
the sidecars) is gated on a run reporting zero imported.
hash_from_sidecar_name deliberately rejects ext-{file_id}.jpg. Those
bytes are user-supplied and file-keyed; importing them here would
content-key them and share one user's uploaded preview onto every file
with identical content. They belong to thumb_attached_import. Both the
accept and the reject set are under test.
Unreadable files and store failures record a finding and continue: a
sidecar removed by a concurrent GC unlink between listing and read is
expected, not fatal, and the file is left in place for the next run.
Registered unconditionally rather than behind a flag — a migration
nobody can find is a migration nobody runs.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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7d9418f63c |
fix(thumbnails): ETag names the blob actually served
fe9c4f49 keyed the ETag on the SOURCE file's content hash. That is wrong
whenever the response comes from a satellite table, and for attachments
it is wrong in two ways.
Uploading a preview does not change the file's content, so a
source-keyed ETag does not change either — and with `immutable` set,
clients never revalidate and keep the previous render for up to a year.
The exact staleness fe9c4f49 set out to fix, re-entering through the
attachment path.
Worse: a copy inherits the source hash, so an original and a copy have
identical ETags. Give either one a different uploaded preview and they
serve different bytes under one validator, which a shared cache may hand
to either request. That is a collision, not just staleness.
thumbnail_content_id resolves the identity through the same tier
precedence the read path uses: an attached blob's own hash, else a
derived blob's own hash, else the source-keyed form. An ETag naming a
different tier than the one answering is worse than a coarse one, so the
two orders must not drift.
Derived-hash keying is strictly better than source-keying and never
worse. The sidecar and the derived row are written from the same bytes;
where they can diverge — a sidecar re-rendered while the derived row
stays pinned by ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING — source-keying is wrong too,
because the renderer is not part of that key. This is the step 10 change
arriving early, forced by the attachment case; the plan note stands for
the read-order flip itself.
Known gap: a legacy ext-{file_id}.jpg with no file_attached_blobs row
yet falls through to the source-keyed form. No worse than today, and it
resolves when the import backfills.
attached_thumbnail_copy.hurl now asserts ETags, which is why this went
unnoticed: it compared bytes only, and thumbnail_etag_content_keyed
covers content replacement rather than preview upload. A fresh GET
returned the right bytes throughout — the same "healthy locally, broken
for anyone caching" shape as the two bugs before it.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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d71dd973e7 |
fix(thumbnails): two defects the copy test exposed
1. Per-file overrides must beat the content tier in RAM as well as on
disk. The content-keyed lookup ran first, so a thumbnail already
rendered from the file's content sat in RAM under content(blob_hash)
and shadowed a preview uploaded afterwards — permanently. Invisible
before the moka rekey, because both lived under one file-id key and
the upload simply overwrote the render. Order is now uniform:
per-file RAM, per-file disk (ext-), per-file DB, then content RAM,
blob-hash disk, derived blob.
2. store_attached_blob never wrote a row. Its RETURNING clause compared
the stored hash against EXCLUDED, and PostgreSQL only permits
EXCLUDED in the SET and WHERE of DO UPDATE — a runtime syntax error
on every call. The superseded hash now comes from a SELECT taken
before the upsert; losing that race leaves one stale reference, which
the manifest recompute reports, rather than anything being lost.
The second hid behind the first for a whole cycle, and behind
`ext-{file_id}.jpg`: the ORIGINAL kept serving its uploaded preview from
local disk, so the feature looked healthy. Only a copy, which has a
different file_id and therefore no ext- file, depends on the row — and
the row was never there. The handler's best-effort warn! completed the
disguise, so it is now error!: a failure there means copies silently
lose the preview, and nothing else signals it.
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Edouard Vanbelle
|
64ff982571 |
feat(thumbnails): uploaded previews survive a copy
Completes step 9. The PUT wrote `ext-{file_id}.jpg` and nothing else —
keyed by file id, on local disk. No copy path duplicates it and no other
instance can see it, so a copied file lost the preview its owner
uploaded. Silently: the server falls back to rendering one from the
source, or to 204 for a PDF, which has no render path at all. A
user-supplied preview is not derivable from the content, so once lost it
is gone.
The PUT now also records a storage.file_attached_blobs row, which
copy_file_satellites already duplicates, so both copy paths carry it.
Best-effort: the sidecar has already succeeded by then and the user can
see their thumbnail, so failing the request would report an error for an
operation that visibly worked.
Read path consults attachments ahead of every content-derived tier: an
uploaded preview is an explicit choice about THIS file and must beat
anything rendered from its content. Cached under the per-file key — a
content key would leak those bytes to every other file sharing the
content, which is the poisoning the file-keyed table exists to prevent.
store_attached_blob is ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE, unlike its derived twin:
re-uploading a preview is a deliberate replacement, where a re-derived
thumbnail is the same bytes again. The superseded blob's reference is
released, or it would be pinned forever with nothing pointing at it.
Deletion goes through a trigger, not a hook. file_id is ON DELETE
CASCADE, and on_file_deleted fires AFTER delete_file — by then the
cascade has run and there is nothing left to enumerate. This matters
most for folder deletion, where PG cascades folders to files to
attachments and Rust never sees the rows at all. storage.decrement_blob_ref
keys off OLD.blob_hash and is otherwise table-agnostic, so it is reused
verbatim rather than transcribed into a second trigger that can drift.
DELETE only: a replacement updates in place and is handled in Rust, so
adding UPDATE would double-decrement.
Extracted read_blob_to_bytes, shared by the attached and derived tiers —
the only difference between them is which table produced the hash.
tests/api/attached_thumbnail_copy.hurl guards it. The file is red and
the uploaded thumbnail is green, so a render could never produce the
uploaded bytes; the pre-upload render is captured first and required to
change, which stops three identical renders from satisfying the
byte-equality. Then both copy paths must serve the upload, and after the
original is purged and GC runs, both copies must still serve it — each
holds its own reference, because the rows are duplicated rather than
shared.
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Edouard Vanbelle
|
fac82fea23 |
feat(storage): add storage.file_attached_blobs, the file-keyed half
Step 9 of docs/plan/derived-blobs.md. content_derived_blobs holds bytes that are a pure function of a file's content, so they are keyed by that content and shared by every file holding it. This table holds the opposite: bytes a user supplied or chose, which must never be shared across files. The key is what enforces it. That difference is a security boundary, not a modelling preference. A content-keyed client preview would let user A upload a file plus a preview that misrepresents it; when user B later uploads the same bytes, dedup matches and B is served A's preview. Content-keying is only safe when the server can derive the bytes — there is nothing to poison, because the same input yields the same output for everyone. Required now rather than deferred: the SPA already generates and PUTs previews for PDFs, and there is no server-side regeneration path for them, so the sidecar migration has nowhere else to put those bytes. uploaded_by is NOT NULL with no foreign key, per the provenance convention rather than the plan's sketch. A FK with ON DELETE SET NULL discards the audit trail exactly when it matters, and without an ON DELETE clause it would block deleting a user outright. Deleting the uploader must not rewrite history. FileAttachedReferenceSource is registered in built_in_registry before anything writes to the table, so dedup_gc's reap predicate already knows it exists — otherwise the first sweep after the first attachment would delete it. Manifest level only, like the derived source: these blobs are almost always single-chunk, so contributing at chunk level would double-count against the aliased hash. copy_file_satellites gains one arm: attachments are DUPLICATED, since the key is file_id and the copy is a different file, with uploaded_by carried over — the person who supplied the bytes did not change because someone copied the file. Each duplicate takes its own reference, so the bytes stay deduplicated while the mapping does not. Both golden SQL tests updated: the new fragment lands inside the reap predicate's NOT(...) group and as a summed term in the manifest recompute. Verified on a scratch PG with every migration applied — the attachment duplicates to 2 rows holding 2 references with provenance intact, while the content-keyed thumbnail stays 1 row reachable from both files. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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cf21ee2f8f |
fix(thumbnails): key the moka tier on content, closing the ETag race
fe9c4f49 made the ETag content-keyed, but the RAM tier was still keyed on
file_id, so the two disagreed about what identifies a thumbnail. Replacing
a file's content preserves its id, so the moka entry stayed reachable while
the ETag had already changed — and invalidation runs from the spawned task
in on_file_updated. A request landing in that window got the NEW ETag over
the OLD bytes, and because the response is immutable with a one-year
max-age, the client cached those stale bytes permanently. The bug fe9c4f49
set out to fix, arriving through a different door.
Keying on the hash removes the window rather than narrowing it: new content
is a different key, so the old entry cannot be hit. Correctness no longer
depends on the invalidation task winning a race against the next request.
This also aligns the RAM tier with what disk already did — sidecars have
always been written to get_thumbnail_path(blob_hash, ...). The tier that
had the bug was the one keyed differently from every other. Two further
consequences: N copies of one photo now share a single entry instead of
occupying N for identical bytes, and delete_thumbnails shrinks to the
external entries, which are the only genuinely per-file artifacts.
Video frames stay file-keyed under an `ext-{file_id}` id — they are
per-file by nature. The namespaces cannot collide: hashes are 64 hex
characters.
get_cached_thumbnail takes blob_hash as an Option, and a caller without one
now skips the RAM tier and falls through to disk rather than consulting a
file-id key. That is correct, not merely tolerable — a file-id key is the
stale entry this change exists to prevent. Both HTTP handlers resolve the
hash to build the ETag, so only internal callers that never had one are
affected.
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Edouard Vanbelle
|
9f8ec141f3 |
feat(storage): single-source the copy fan-out via copy_file_satellites
Step 8 of docs/plan/derived-blobs.md. "What follows a file on copy" was written twice — the copy_file CTE and storage.copy_folder_tree — and had already drifted: the tree path bumped storage.blobs only, missing manifests, which was silent data loss on any multi-chunk file. Fixing it meant writing the same logic a second time. Step 9 adds a file-keyed satellite table, which would mean a third and fourth. Two SQL functions: storage.add_blob_references(TEXT[]) — the manifest-first reference contract for SQL callers, returning hashes that matched no registry row. Set-based so the tree path keeps its single-statement cost; a per-row helper would have made a 10k-file copy 10k calls. storage.copy_file_satellites(UUID[], UUID[]) — dead properties plus the blob reference. The body is the copy-semantics declaration: what is absent (comments, favorites, content-keyed derived rows) is listed with its reason, so the taxonomy is executable rather than documented elsewhere and drifting. Both copy paths now call it. The single-file path becomes a real transaction, which also fixes the reference being best-effort: a failed add_reference used to log a warning and leave a copy holding no reference at all — the exact shape that gets its content reaped. It cannot be a CTE arm, because data-modifying CTEs share one snapshot and the function must read the row the INSERT just wrote. Verified against a scratch PG with all migrations applied: multi-chunk manifest 1→2, single-chunk alias bumped at manifest level only (the NOT EXISTS guard), chunks behind a manifest untouched, dead properties duplicated, length mismatch rejected, repeats counted. tests/api/derived_blob_copy.hurl covers it end-to-end and answers the question the copy raises: content_derived_blobs is NOT copied. A copy carries the same blob_hash, so it resolves the same derived row — the test asserts byte-identical thumbnails from both copy paths, then deletes the original, runs GC, and requires both copies to still serve. That last step only passes if the references are real. |