The transcode negative path — "the result came out larger, serve the
original and remember that" — had no test because no synthetic image
reaches it. Measured against the real encoder: flat colour goes
4780 → 186 bytes, a diagonal gradient 24852 → 102, and uniform RGBA
noise still loses by ~242 bytes at every size, a margin constant in
absolute terms and so one that never flips. Grayscale does not help
either; WebP's subtract-green transform handles R=G=B.
Two things have to be true at once and only real content does both.
The encoder is the `image` crate's own minimal VP8L writer, not
libwebp, so it wins only where redundancy is extreme enough for any
encoder to find it. And the original has to be near PNG-optimal, which
a screenshot from a real capture tool is: a 2x Retina UI is long
identical runs, flat panels and sharp edges — precisely what PNG's
scanline filters plus zlib were built for.
So the fixture is a real OxiCloud screenshot (emails masked by
overtyping rather than block-filling, which would have added back the
flat redundancy the property depends on; re-verified negative after
masking, 556180 -> 511124 bytes).
`fixture_premise` pins both halves of what tests/api/transcode_cache.hurl
will assume — this one negative, red-image.png positive. Without the
guard a future encoder bump would silently turn the negative half of
that scenario into a second positive test: still passing, no longer
checking what it was written to check.
Worth recording for whenever libwebp replaces this encoder: most of
these screenshots would likely flip to positive, which leaves every
stored negative row a stale verdict. An encoder change has to purge
them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ensure that a user that don't havee permission to a drive cannot search elements in this drive
note: current design: Index are associated to drive, so if a document / directory is shared,
the shared resource will not be in index for targetted user
design is explicitely as is to reduce complexity
- permit reuse of blob where file is trashed (by-hash and chunked)
- add hurl test on /api/files/by-hash
- add anti enumeration of blob (404 is always blob_not_owned_by_caller)
this implements first version (manageable only by admin right now)
routes:
GET /api/groups
List subject groups (paginated). Admin-only.
POST /api/groups
Create a new ReBAC subject group. Admin-only. The name must match the RFC 5321 local-part shape and be globally unique (case-insensitive).
GET /api/groups/search
Search non-virtual groups by name substring. Authenticated only (no admin role required) — backs the share-dialog recipient autocomplete.
GET /api/groups/{id}
Fetch a single group's details. Admin-only.
DELETE /api/groups/{id}
Delete a group. Cascades to `subject_group_members` (FK) and to `access_grants` rows referencing this group as a subject. Admin-only.
PATCH /api/groups/{id}
Update a group's metadata. Admin-only. v1 only persists name renames.
GET /api/groups/{id}/effective-members
List every user transitively reached through this group (members of members of members, etc.). Used by admin / audit tooling. Admin-only.
GET /api/groups/{id}/members
List the *direct* members of a group (one level only). Admin-only.
POST /api/groups/{id}/members
Add a member to a group. Exactly one of `user_id` / `group_id` must be provided. Adding a group-member runs a write-time cycle check and a nesting-depth check (max 8). Admin-only.
DELETE /api/groups/{id}/members/group/{gid}
Remove a nested group-member from a group. Admin-only.
DELETE /api/groups/{id}/members/user/{uid}
Remove a user-member from a group. Admin-only.
fix hurl
groups
round
groups