magic-link as now 2 modes:
- invitation: long TTL (24), no challenge
- passwordless login: short TTL (10min), cookie challenge to ensure that
user goes back to same browser (no man in the middle capturing email)
username: now optional, if defined 2..64 chars
password: now optional (no mode __NO_PASSWORD...__)
oidc: now optional
important: if need Nextcloud, username must be defined
- SMTP has a mock to enable end to end test and validate the whole path
(via OXICLOUD_SMTP_MOCK)
- add email normalisation ( including punicode)
- api to share to external user
reflect OIDC
schema migration, User entity additions, and three defense-in-depth gaps closed, with all 280 unit tests and 13 Hurl files green
infrastructure (lettre + EmailSender port).
- Migration migrations/20260612000003_users_username_email_login.sql — adds nullable given_name/family_name columns to auth.users.
- User entity (src/domain/entities/user.rs) — has_login_credential() placeholder-check encapsulation, set_username revalidating setter, given/family-name fields + getters/setters, validate_username widened 32→254 and now accepts email shape.
from_data_full extended with two new params; all 7 callsites in user_pg_repository.rs updated.
- Schema-side legacy guards (src/application/services/auth_application_service.rs) — bumped the duplicated 32-char check in setup_create_admin and admin_create_user to 254 to match.
- Gap #1 (subject_group_service.rs) — add_member now rejects external candidates with an audit-logged AccessDenied. Service gained an Arc<UserPgRepository> field, wired through DI. New integration test test_external_user_cannot_be_added_as_member.
- Gap #2 (user_repository.rs + auth_ports.rs + user_pg_repository.rs) — list_users/search_users gained an include_external: bool param defaulting effectively to false everywhere internal-user-facing. auth_application_service exposes a new
list_users_including_external for the admin surface.
- Gap #3 (pg_acl_engine.rs) — expand_user now SELECTs is_external and skips INTERNAL_GROUP_ID for externals; defaults to is_external=true on missing user to fail closed.
- AuthzCacheLifecycleHook — invalidates the user_groups_cache Moka entry on logout/delete.
- SessionRevocationLifecycleHook — explicit per-session firing of on_user_logout (currently per-call); session revocation inside the user-delete transaction.
- DeletionMode-driven policy in HomeFolderLifecycleHook::on_user_deleted (trash vs hard-delete based on AdminDelete / GdprPurge).
- Refactor delete_user_admin to expose a transaction handle so on_user_deleted can abort atomically.
this implements first version (manageable only by admin right now)
routes:
GET /api/groups
List subject groups (paginated). Admin-only.
POST /api/groups
Create a new ReBAC subject group. Admin-only. The name must match the RFC 5321 local-part shape and be globally unique (case-insensitive).
GET /api/groups/search
Search non-virtual groups by name substring. Authenticated only (no admin role required) — backs the share-dialog recipient autocomplete.
GET /api/groups/{id}
Fetch a single group's details. Admin-only.
DELETE /api/groups/{id}
Delete a group. Cascades to `subject_group_members` (FK) and to `access_grants` rows referencing this group as a subject. Admin-only.
PATCH /api/groups/{id}
Update a group's metadata. Admin-only. v1 only persists name renames.
GET /api/groups/{id}/effective-members
List every user transitively reached through this group (members of members of members, etc.). Used by admin / audit tooling. Admin-only.
GET /api/groups/{id}/members
List the *direct* members of a group (one level only). Admin-only.
POST /api/groups/{id}/members
Add a member to a group. Exactly one of `user_id` / `group_id` must be provided. Adding a group-member runs a write-time cycle check and a nesting-depth check (max 8). Admin-only.
DELETE /api/groups/{id}/members/group/{gid}
Remove a nested group-member from a group. Admin-only.
DELETE /api/groups/{id}/members/user/{uid}
Remove a user-member from a group. Admin-only.
fix hurl
groups
round
groups
* make more coherent lifecycles
* remove specific implementation on different handlers (they do not need to know existence of ThumbnailSerice nor AudioMetadataService)
* reduce risk of orphean objects
* ensure additional services are correctly wired (ex: Thumbnail generation was not covering all upload cases)
* more details on docs/architecture/file-and-blob-lifecycle.md :
```rust
// application/ports/file_lifecycle.rs
pub trait FileLifecycleHook {
fn on_file_created(file_id, blob_hash, content_type, is_new_blob);
fn on_file_updated(file_id, blob_hash, content_type);
fn on_file_copied(file_id, blob_hash, content_type, source_id)
fn on_file_deleted(file_id);
}
// application/ports/blob_lifecycle.rs
pub trait BlobLifecycleHook {
fn on_blob_created(blob_hash, content_type);
fn on_blob_deleted(blob_hash);
}
```
Bug 1 & 2 (webdav_handler.rs handle_put() update branch):
- After a successful file update via WebDAV PUT, if the content type is a supported image:
a. delete_thumbnails(file_id) — evicts the stale moka cache entry
b. Spawns a background task to read the new blob bytes and call generate_all_sizes_background_from_bytes
Bug 3 & 4 (dedup_service.rs):
- Added thumbnail_service: Option<Arc<ThumbnailService>> field with a with_thumbnail_service() builder
- In remove_legacy_reference(): calls delete_blob_thumbnails(hash) when ref_count hits 0
- In remove_manifest_reference(): calls delete_blob_thumbnails(file_hash) when manifest's last ref is dropped
- Wired in di.rs — the thumbnail service is created before dedup service so the ordering works cleanly
Security: session hardening
Refresh token rotation with theft detection (family_id)
- Added family_id column to auth.sessions (migration 20260507000000_session_family.sql) grouping all tokens issued from the same login into a family
- On refresh, the new session inherits the parent's family_id
- If a revoked token is replayed (indicates the token was stolen after rotation), the entire family is immediately invalidated and a warning is logged — forcing re-authentication on all devices
SameSite=Strict on refresh cookie
- Access cookie stays SameSite=Lax (needed for top-level navigation)
- Refresh cookie upgraded to SameSite=Strict — it is only ever used for explicit POST to /api/auth/refresh, never via cross-site navigation
Refresh token TTL: 30 days → 7 days
- With rotation, active sessions auto-renew and effectively never expire
- Inactive sessions expire after 7 days instead of 30, reducing the theft window
Five new public endpoints under /api/s/{token}/...:
GET /contents
GET /contents/{folder_id}
GET /file/{file_id}
GET /zip
GET /zip/{folder_id}
All honour the unlock cookie from /verify, so password-protected
folder shares work end-to-end.
Folder/file IDs are validated against the share subtree via a single
ltree containment query (O(log N) on the existing GiST index).
Out-of-scope IDs return 404.
download_shared_file refactored to a Range/304/206/416-aware
serve_share_file helper, shared with the new /file/{file_id}
endpoint. content_disposition extracted from FileHandler so RFC 5987
formatting is identical across auth and share download paths.
Edouard Vanbelle