The folder listing now carries the favorite/share badge state for exactly the
items it returns, so the files browser stops fetching favorites and outgoing
shares separately. This removes the last per-navigation badge round-trips AND
fixes the correctness hole of the previous approaches: badges were derived from
only the first 200 global favorites / shares, so a favorited or shared item
outside that window showed no badge. Now every listed item is correct, and the
work is scoped to the items on screen.
Backend (`GET /api/folders/{id}/listing`):
- `FolderListingDto` gains `favorite_ids` and `shared_ids` (sorted) — listing-
level metadata, so no churn to the many FileDto/FolderDto constructors.
- The handler computes both with two batched, index-backed queries run
concurrently: `FavoritesService::favorited_ids` (auth.user_favorites, ANY) and
`PgAclEngine::shared_resource_ids` (storage.role_grants by granted_by + ANY,
which already covers public links as 'token' grants — same membership the
/grants/outgoing/resources endpoint exposes). Both fold into the ETag.
- Public-share browsing passes empty sets (anonymous, read-only context).
Frontend:
- `listFolder` reads `favorite_ids` / `shared_ids`; the files view seeds local
badge sets straight from the listing and updates them optimistically on
favorite toggle / batch / share creation (via ShareDialog's `onshared`).
- Removes the session `badges` store + its fetches entirely — the listing is now
the single, authoritative, fetch-free source.
Net: favorite/share badges cost zero extra client requests per navigation and
are correct regardless of how many favorites/shares the user has. Validated:
cargo check + clippy -D warnings (backend; integration tests need Postgres,
unavailable here), frontend npm run check + unit tests, and a headless render of
the real files route (list + grid) with the new flags present — no errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M8Vb9QHmLZnEMzHz7MrFy6
now Drive is purely a metadata
each drive has always a root folder
this model minimize Oxicloud changes, and simplify
the Drive name is simply the folder's root's name
note: owner of Drive has more permission that an owner of the root folder
Phase 2 increment 2:
- domain: Face, Person, BoundingBox, DetectedFace (512-d embeddings).
- ports: FaceAnalyzerPort (detect + embed from raw bytes; decodes internally
so the application layer stays image/ML-crate agnostic) and FaceRepository
(user-scoped face/person persistence).
- DTOs: PersonDto, FaceBoxDto.
- NoopFaceAnalyzer — reports is_ready()==false and returns no faces, so the
whole People pipeline compiles and runs inert until the operator wires a
real ONNX-backed analyzer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JW6ghFMDtnRYuYNzZhb47M
Phase 1 server side, gated on OXICLOUD_ENABLE_PLACES (off by default):
- migration: partial index on storage.file_metadata(longitude, latitude).
- FileBlobReadRepository::list_geo_clusters — plain-SQL grid aggregation
(no PostGIS) scoped to the caller's own non-trashed photos, returning a
centroid, count and a representative file id per non-empty cell.
- PlacesService (caller_id-scoped; user-scoped data needs no authz check,
mirroring RecentService) with a zoom→cell-size mapping.
- GET /api/photos/geo?bbox=w,s,e,n&zoom=N returning GeoCluster[]. The route
is mounted only when the Places service is present, and is registered in
the OpenAPI path list.
The map frontend (PMTiles serving + MapLibre module) is deferred pending
the basemap-sourcing and vendoring decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JW6ghFMDtnRYuYNzZhb47M
prepare migration of permission to roles
this simplify drastically database (permission are now simply defined in code)
and will permit reuse of the same ReBAC engine to define owners of drives
mapping:
```
Role::Viewer => &[Permission::Read],
Role::Commenter => &[Permission::Read, Permission::Comment],
Role::Contributor => &[Permission::Read, Permission::Create],
Role::Editor => &[
Permission::Read,
Permission::Comment,
Permission::Create,
Permission::Update,
],
Role::Owner => &[
Permission::Read,
Permission::Comment,
Permission::Create,
Permission::Update,
Permission::Share,
Permission::Delete,
Permission::Manage,
],
```
/api/search now finds files by CONTENT as well as by name: BM25-ranked
matches over extracted text (PDF, Office OOXML/ODF, plain text/code)
with typo-tolerant fuzzy terms and search-as-you-type prefix matching,
served from an embedded Tantivy index at {storage}/.search-index.
Pipeline (all off the request path, mirroring tree-etag + thumbnails):
- statement triggers on storage.files append to a durable dirty queue
(storage.search_index_dirty) - every write surface (REST, WebDAV,
NextCloud, WOPI, trash) is covered, crash-safe by construction
- ContentIndexWorker drains the queue on the maintenance pool, extracts
text once per unique BLAKE3 blob (storage.blob_extracted_text cache:
N copies = 1 extraction, renames/moves = 0 re-extraction) and applies
batched single-writer Tantivy commits; queue rows are deleted only
after the commit succeeds (at-least-once, idempotent upserts)
- the index is a derived artifact: a version-marker mismatch wipes and
reseeds it from Postgres, which remains the single source of truth
SearchService merges content hits into the existing name search: hits
are hydrated through ONE SQL round-trip that re-applies user scope,
trash state and every active filter (a stale index id can never leak),
scored below name matches, and returned with a plain-text snippet and
a match_source field. Index failure or
OXICLOUD_ENABLE_CONTENT_SEARCH=false degrades to name-only search; a
discard-only janitor keeps the trigger-fed queue bounded while disabled.
The frontend renders the snippet under the file name in list view.
New dependencies: tantivy 0.26, zip 8.6 (deflate only), pdf-extract 0.10.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01Sc7F4xbo83YbFAQ4xEeDrX
- add coalesced protection to avoid mail bombing if an invited goes many grant in a short period
- add resentd method in share menu item (work for both internal and external users)
- user can disable email notification via his properties
- add env variable from admin to disable notifications
- OIDC JIT define the locale only at user creation, user can so change his preference later
- invited users will inherit inviter's locale
- email will use prefered_locale
- login to a new browser will use prefered_locale
- remove the hardcoded list of locales in favor of a discovry on start time
- server will stop on badly formatted locale .json
- add server.* entries for serer side translation
server side translation will be used for templating and email
note: no json in some embded html (like in /magic), amount of work was similar
Backend
- RegisterDto — username and password both become Option<String> with #[serde(default)] so JSON can omit them entirely.
- AuthApplicationService::register — username uniqueness check skipped when None (multiple NULLs OK under the UNIQUE index); password hashing skipped when None; User::new called with the actual Options instead of forcing Some(...).
- auth_handler::register — branches on dto.password.is_none(). With password → existing 201 + UserDto. Without → triggers MagicLinkInviteService::send_login_link(&email) best-effort, then returns 200 + {"message": "Check your email…"}. The
OIDC-mode-disables-password-registration gate now only fires for the password path (email-only signup is still allowed even in OIDC-only mode, because it doesn't store a password).
- magic_link_handler::redirect_target — new 3-way decision tree:
- Resource target (folder invitation) → /#/files/folder/{id} (existing)
- NULL resource + is_external = false → /#/files (the welcome path for new internal users — they have a home folder)
- NULL resource + is_external = true → /#/sharedwithme (the existing external-user landing)
Tests
- New tests/api/registration.hurl with 9 requests covering: classic (with-password) register → 201 + UserDto, email-only register → 200 + uniform message + welcome magic-link captured, redemption → 302 to /#/files + cookies set, profile read → username
absent + is_external: false, resend magic-link works (eligible while passwordless), cleanup deletes both new users.
- Wired into tests/api/run.sh right after auth_login.hurl.
Plan additions
- auth-simplification.md gained PR 22 at the bottom of the PR sequence — device-bound magic-link redemption via challenge cookie + asymmetric TTLs (login: 10 min, invitation: 24 h). Full design recap, schema migration, config knobs
(OXICLOUD_MAGIC_LINK_LOGIN_TTL_MINUTES / _INVITE_TTL_HOURS), and Hurl coverage outline are in the plan. Slots in before PR 21's docs so the architecture page describes the final state from the start.
Checks — cargo fmt, cargo clippy --all-features --all-targets -- -D warnings, cargo test --lib (297 passed), biome, stylelint, tsc, full Hurl suite (16 files) all green.
username: now optional, if defined 2..64 chars
password: now optional (no mode __NO_PASSWORD...__)
oidc: now optional
important: if need Nextcloud, username must be defined
- add possibility to grant an external user.
- route /api/users/{id} added (rate limited for security)
- security: start route limitation for external users
ex: they must not browse /api/users/{id} nor addressbook
- SMTP has a mock to enable end to end test and validate the whole path
(via OXICLOUD_SMTP_MOCK)
- add email normalisation ( including punicode)
- api to share to external user
- Add src/application/dtos/cursor.rs with three shared types:
· PageCursor trait — default base64url+JSON encode/decode; one bare
impl line per cursor struct
· CursorQuery struct — standard limit/cursor/sort_by query params with
limit_clamped() and decode_cursor<C>() helpers; compose via flatten
· CursorListResponse<T> — standard {items, next_cursor?} envelope with
from_oversized() and with_cursor() builders
- Migrate GrantCursor to impl PageCursor (remove duplicate encode/decode)
- Update GET /api/grants/incoming/resources:
· SharedWithMeQuery now embeds CursorQuery via #[serde(flatten)]
· Replace file/folder nullable pair with ResourceContentDto (untagged
enum) under a single always-present 'resource' field
· SharedWithMeDto is now a type alias for CursorListResponse<SharedWithMeItemDto>
· Handler uses q.paging.limit_clamped() and decode_cursor<GrantCursor>()
- Add docs/architecture/resource-listing.md — authoritative contract for
all listing endpoints (cursor design, SQL keyset WHERE, sort_by naming,
Rust + JS skeletons, compliance table, migration guide)
- Register doc in VitePress sidebar and architecture index
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Share links now point to /s/{token} (was /api/s/{token}) and render a
proper HTML page instead of raw JSON.
Changes:
- static/share.html: standalone public share page
- static/css/views/share-public.css: share page styles
- static/js/views/public/publicShare.js: client-side logic that fetches
share metadata via /api/s/{token}, handles password-protected shares,
and renders file download / folder info
- build.rs: include share.html in the HTML embed pipeline
- web/mod.rs: serve /s/{token} route (unauthenticated)
- share_dto.rs: generate URLs as /s/{token} instead of /api/s/{token}
- share_handler.rs: new download_shared_file() handler that validates the
share token and streams file content without requiring authentication
- routes.rs: mount GET /api/s/{token}/download (public, uses AppState)
Edouard Vanbelle