f4e47bad6d73a1793ea4a68b1e4cb7de5b8e8a44
2078 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Edouard Vanbelle
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f4e47bad6d |
test(transcode): prove the transcode is computed once per content
Adds `GET /api/admin/transcode/stats` and a hurl scenario that uses it
to assert both halves of the caching contract.
The endpoint exists because the property was previously unobservable.
`derived_blob_copy.hurl` records the same limitation for thumbnails:
stored blob, RAM cache and a fresh re-render return identical bytes
with identical status, so no HTTP-level assertion can tell them apart.
Counters can. `transcodes` is work done; `cache_hits` and `disk_hits`
are work avoided, and a rising `transcodes` against a flat `disk_hits`
is exactly what a broken derived tier looks like from outside.
Each case uploads the same bytes as TWO distinct files. Re-fetching one
file would only prove moka works — that cache is keyed `{file_id}:{ext}`.
A second file with identical content is a guaranteed memory miss but the
same content hash, so avoiding a transcode there can only be the
content-keyed tier answering. That is the whole point of keying
derivations by content rather than by file, and this is the first test
that can see it.
The negative half is the one the row exists for: without it the server
re-runs a full decode + encode of a half-megabyte screenshot for every
file sharing that content, on every request, to discard the result each
time.
Assertions capture-then-compare rather than computing deltas — hurl has
no arithmetic in predicates, and pinning the exact prior value is
stricter anyway, since a transcode triggered from anywhere shows up.
Absolute values are never asserted: other scenarios in the same run
transcode too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Edouard Vanbelle
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8fabbfad9e |
test(transcode): a fixture the WebP encoder cannot shrink
The transcode negative path — "the result came out larger, serve the original and remember that" — had no test because no synthetic image reaches it. Measured against the real encoder: flat colour goes 4780 → 186 bytes, a diagonal gradient 24852 → 102, and uniform RGBA noise still loses by ~242 bytes at every size, a margin constant in absolute terms and so one that never flips. Grayscale does not help either; WebP's subtract-green transform handles R=G=B. Two things have to be true at once and only real content does both. The encoder is the `image` crate's own minimal VP8L writer, not libwebp, so it wins only where redundancy is extreme enough for any encoder to find it. And the original has to be near PNG-optimal, which a screenshot from a real capture tool is: a 2x Retina UI is long identical runs, flat panels and sharp edges — precisely what PNG's scanline filters plus zlib were built for. So the fixture is a real OxiCloud screenshot (emails masked by overtyping rather than block-filling, which would have added back the flat redundancy the property depends on; re-verified negative after masking, 556180 -> 511124 bytes). `fixture_premise` pins both halves of what tests/api/transcode_cache.hurl will assume — this one negative, red-image.png positive. Without the guard a future encoder bump would silently turn the negative half of that scenario into a second positive test: still passing, no longer checking what it was written to check. Worth recording for whenever libwebp replaces this encoder: most of these screenshots would likely flip to positive, which leaves every stored negative row a stale verdict. An encoder change has to purge them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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9c63f9969a |
feat(transcode): write transcodes to the derived tier, with negative rows
Step 7 of docs/plan/derived-blobs.md, write path first — the plan is explicit that fixing it before the import means transcode_import only has to handle history, not a moving target. ImageTranscodeService now reads and writes storage.content_derived_blobs under kind='transcode', keyed by the BLAKE3 of the SOURCE content. The hash is threaded in from file_retrieval_service, which already holds it as dto.content_hash; hashing here would be a BLAKE3 over the whole file on every request. Callers without one (external mounts) keep the local cache untouched, which is what the service did before this tier existed. Negative verdicts become rows rather than zero-byte .skip files. A transcode that came out larger is deterministic in the content, so it is worth remembering; the row survives moka eviction, a restart, and the deletion of .transcoded/, none of which the marker does. Only that verdict is persisted — a timeout or a read error returns Err and is recorded nowhere, because a momentary failure written here would mark a perfectly transcodable image hopeless with nothing to retry it. Representation is a NULL blob_hash, per the plan: a sentinel hash would stop blob_hash naming a real Blob and every consumer would need to learn the exception. A CHECK keeps blob_hash and content_type NULL together — a type without bytes describes nothing, bytes without a type cannot be served. Two consumers had to be corrected for NULLs first, both of which would have broken on the first negative row ever written: * satellites_consistency reported them as derived_dangling_blob at data_loss severity. SQL comparison against NULL is NULL, so EXISTS was false and a row correctly pointing at nothing read as an artifact that had gone missing. * blob_reference_sources::list_referenced_blobs decodes blob_hash into String, so the first NULL would have failed the decode and taken the whole enumeration down. It would also have been wrong if it decoded — a negative row holds no reference, which is why the counting forms (WHERE blob_hash = <hash>) already exclude it for free. lookup_derived returns a three-way answer because Option collapses the two cases a caller deciding whether to spend a decode most needs apart: never attempted, versus attempted and known not worth it. DedupService is attached after construction via a OnceLock. DI builds the transcode service ~240 lines before DedupService exists, and the retrieval path that needs it is wired earlier still, so a constructor argument would mean reordering more than this is worth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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a7812475f4 |
fix(jobs): a startup job should not report completion twice
Every startup job logged two info lines saying the same thing: the scheduler engine's `job.run` (outcome + timing, which every dispatch has always produced) and my `job.startup_completed` right after it. Reading the boot log, that looks like the job ran twice. Demoted to debug. The engine's line is the one that matters — logging uniformly is the reason startup jobs go through `registry.trigger` rather than calling handlers directly — and the `job.startup_trigger` audit line before it already records that the startup path was the caller, along with the flags it used. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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fb0925d10a |
fix(thumbnails): a drained tier is not a teardown failure
Every boot after the migration completes logged `WARN legacy sidecar directory could not be removed / No such file or directory`. The directory being absent IS the end state — it is what success looks like from the second boot onward — so this warned about the migration having worked, forever, on every restart. Returns early when the root is gone, which also skips walking three directories that no longer exist. The remaining `Err` arms keep their warning for the cases that are genuinely failures: a directory that exists and cannot be removed or moved aside. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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ce4354f497 |
fix(thumbnails): neither import job may tear down the shared directory
Found on a sandbox restore. `thumb_derived_import` ran first, imported and deleted its own hash-named sidecars, then found `remove_dir` refused because the `ext-*.jpg` previews were still there — those belong to `thumb_attached_import`. The rename fallback fired, moving the tree to `.thumbnails.migrated`; the attached job then looked in `.thumbnails/`, found nothing, and reported zeros. That stranded the user-uploaded previews, which are the one class of file here with no render path to rebuild them. The rename exists for files NEITHER job claims — a `.DS_Store` blocking removal forever — and it fired for the sibling's work in progress instead. Inverting the job order does not help: once the tree is renamed, both jobs look at `.thumbnails/` and find nothing, whatever order they run in. Teardown is now shared and refuses to act while anything remains that either job would claim. Both jobs call it, so whichever finishes last removes the tree in the same boot rather than leaving an empty directory until the next one. The rename survives for its original purpose, and now only fires when the remaining files are genuinely nobody's. Also drops the daily tick on both imports — they are on-demand now. The boot run in repair mode IS the migration: nothing has written a sidecar since step 10d2, so the tail cannot grow afterwards, and a tick could not finish the job anyway because ticks never pass `repair`. Once drained it was a `read_dir` returning nothing, every day, forever. UX: the "at boot" badge moves from beside the job name into the cadence column. It answers WHEN a job runs, which is what that column is for — next to the name it read as a property of the job, and the row could show "on-demand" beside a badge saying otherwise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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577ecb7cef |
feat(jobs): run the thumbnail migration at startup, by default
A migration nobody triggers never finishes. Scheduled ticks deliberately never pass `repair`, so a deployment whose operator never opens the admin panel re-imported the same sidecars forever and never drained the directory — and relying on operators to edit `.env` has the same failure mode one level up. `OXICLOUD_STARTUP_JOBS` dispatches named jobs once, in the background, after the scheduler is ready. Entries use the syntax operators already type at the trigger URL (`name?repair=true`), so the value is literally the request they would otherwise make by hand. It defaults to both migration jobs in repair mode, so an untouched deployment migrates and drains itself. That is a destructive default and a real exception to no-silent-auto-repair, so the guard it rests on had to get stronger: `verify_and_unlink` now compares CONTENT, not length. A blob of the right size and the wrong bytes used to pass — a key-mapping bug handing back another file's preview at the same length would have deleted the original and kept the impostor, and thumbnails cluster tightly enough in size for that to be a real coincidence. The readback streams from the backend with no cache in front, so it proves durability rather than that a write was acknowledged. Deletion of `.thumbnails/` is attempted first and only falls back to renaming it `.thumbnails.migrated` when `remove_dir` refuses because a non-sidecar file is inside (Finder's `.DS_Store`). Either way the directory stops existing, which lets the read-path probe go back to a single `stat` on the root instead of walking the size directories. Validation is fail-fast: an unknown job name or flag panics at boot. A silently dropped `?repare=true` would leave the job in discovery-only mode while the operator believed the tier was draining, surfacing months later as "the migration never finished" with nothing pointing at the config line. Interrupted runs resume. Boot recovery flips abandoned rows to Paused with their cursor, so `run_or_resume` continues rather than rescanning — a long migration completes across however many restarts it takes. That is a scoped exception to "we do not auto-resume": here somebody did ask, in configuration, and not having to ask again is the point. `StartupJob` holds a `JobRunArgs` rather than re-listing its four fields, so a fifth flag cannot be added to the scheduler and silently ignored in configuration. Jobs named here are ordinary registered jobs — visible in the panel, triggerable by hand, same runs and findings. Their rows now carry a `startup` object so an operator can see that a job deletes on every boot rather than only when someone clicks Run. Adds docs/config/thumbnail-migration.md: what runs on first boot, how to snapshot database and storage together beforehand, and how to verify afterwards with satellites_consistency plus backend_consistency ?deep=true. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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03246305f6 |
feat(thumbnails): the sidecar fallback disables itself
Step 10e was written as a removal release: delete the fallback read path once the directories are empty. That has the same flaw as gating deletion on an empty tail, one level up — sidecars are local disk, so no release can know that every instance has drained. The only removal that can actually be written is "if the tier is gone, return". `initialize` now probes the size directories once at boot; when absent, every fallback read short-circuits on a relaxed atomic load and touches no filesystem. The code stays, costs nothing, and can be deleted whenever — or never. Two things had to change for absence to be reachable at all: * `initialize` no longer creates the directories. It create_dir_all-ed all three at every boot, so the import job removed them and the next restart put them back — the absence this gates on was unreachable by construction. Found on a sandbox where the job had drained the tier and a restart left three empty directories behind. Nothing has written a sidecar since step 10d2, so there was nothing to create them for. * The probe tests the size directories, not the root. On macOS Finder leaves a .DS_Store in the root, which blocks remove_dir there permanently; gating on the root would keep the fallback alive on every developer machine for a reason unrelated to thumbnails. No size directory means no sidecar. Every sidecar read and existence check now goes through `read_sidecar` / `sidecar_exists`, so the guard exists once rather than at each of the twelve sites that built a path and read it — the build-then-read pair was duplicated six times over. The import job's root removal reports its outcome instead of discarding it. It is the one result an operator is waiting for, and "directory not empty" with no sidecars left is a failure worth naming. Falls open: the flag starts true, so a service constructed without `initialize` behaves as before. A drain completing mid-process leaves it stale-true until restart, which costs the same failed opens as today; it never goes false while sidecars remain. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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f1f327a6c4 |
refactor(consistency): blobs_consistency reads only the database
`blobs_consistency` probed `blob_exists` once per row and, under `?deep=true`, read and re-hashed every blob. `backend_consistency` already reports the same `blob_missing_from_backend` from its merge-join — so the probe was duplicated work that found strictly less (a DB walk cannot see backend-only orphans by construction) at N round -trips instead of one enumeration. Every scheduled sweep paid for it. All three physical checks move to `backend_consistency`: * `blob_missing_from_backend` was already there; the duplicate is gone. * `blob_corrupted` / `blob_unreadable` hook the matched arm of the merge-join, which holds exactly the key pairs worth reading. Guarded by `in_range` so a pair past the horizon is not read twice, and `params.deep` is persisted on a fresh run and read back on resume so a paused deep scan does not silently continue shallow. Deep mode belongs there because it is backend work end to end: the only DB input is the hash. Keeping it in `blobs_consistency` forced that tenant to carry a backend for one flag. What remains is the half that needs no backend: `refcount_mismatch` and its repair. The constructor drops from five parameters to two — no backend, no storage_entries, no storage_path_fallback — and `?storage=<name>` / `?deep=true` are now inert there, which the job description says outright. `affected_files` is needed by both tenants, so it moves to a shared `blob_diagnostics` module rather than being copied. `PROBED_STORAGE_PARAM` moves to `backend_consistency`: it was defined in `blobs_consistency` and re-exported, which is backwards once the DB-only tenant has no entry to scope. The create-grace window goes with the probe — it existed to avoid flagging a blob whose bytes had landed before its row, and the refcount comparison reads one consistent snapshot. Known cost: `backend_consistency` returns `backend_unenumerable` on Azure and mid-migration, so on those configs missing bytes now go unreported where the per-row probe caught them. That argues for the Azure enumeration impl, not for keeping the probe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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1ea3826660 |
feat(jobs): jobs describe themselves — description, mutates, repair_description
The admin panel had no repair toggle wired to anything but a hardcoded
name list naming the two refcount tenants, so `thumb_derived_import` and
`thumb_attached_import` could not be run in repair mode from the UI at
all despite supporting it. And nothing in the job list said what any
given job does or whether clicking Run on production writes anything.
Three defaulted methods on `JobHandler` and `RecoverableJobHandler`:
fn description(&self) -> &'static str
fn mutates(&self) -> Mutates // Never | Always | OnRepairOnly
fn repair_description(&self) -> Option<&'static str>
`RecoverableAdapter` forwards them — the registry only holds
`dyn JobHandler`, so a tenant's metadata is invisible otherwise, and
falling back to the defaults would report every recoverable job as
read-only, including the ones that delete files.
Three values rather than a boolean because a job can be read-only by
default and destructive under `?repair=true`; a boolean answers wrongly
for one of its two modes, and `false` on something that unlinks files is
the dangerous direction to be wrong in. `repair_description` returning
`Option` collapses "does it repair" and "what does repair do" into one
method: presence gates the toggle, content is the confirmation text —
which the frontend cannot invent, since correcting a counter and
deleting sidecars are not the same warning.
`OnRepairOnly` with no `repair_description` is rejected at registration:
it claims to mutate only under a flag it does not support.
All 17 registered jobs declare all three. The panel now renders the
description under each name, badges read-only jobs, confirms before a
plain run of a mutating one, and offers the repair variant off the
backend flag instead of the name list.
Descriptions are English in the trait, next to the behaviour: one in
`locales/*.json` rots invisibly the moment a job changes, and a
translator cannot know what `manifests_consistency` reconciles. i18n can
layer on later keyed by job name with these as the fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Edouard Vanbelle
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b485db46fa |
feat(storage): audit every sidecar deletion, and reclaim orphaned uploads
Two changes to the import jobs' destructive path. thumb_attached_import now deletes orphaned sidecars under `repair`, matching the dead-source case on the derived side. An `ext-` file whose owner is gone is unimportable — the FK on file_id would reject the row — so leaving it means it is rediscovered every run, the tail never empties and step 10e's gate never opens. Safe despite these being the non-regenerable bytes: the preview is keyed to a file_id that no longer exists, so nothing can reference it again. Unrecoverable and unreachable are different things, and this is both. And every deletion is now audited. A one-way migration removing user-visible files should leave a trail that outlives the run history: findings are per-run and get purged, whereas target: "audit" is separable and retained. If a preview later turns out to be missing, this is the only record saying the migration removed it and when. `owner` carries the id the file belonged to — source_hash for content-keyed, file_id for uploaded — because that is where an investigation starts, and the raw logs cannot supply it: NEW BLOB names the hash of the STORED BYTES, a different value from the sidecar's own name, which is why grepping one against the other finds nothing. reason is a stable key: `imported` (replaced by a verified blob), `source_gone`, `orphaned`. The first lives inside verify_and_unlink so a verified deletion cannot be logged inconsistently; the other two are explicit, since those paths have nothing to verify against. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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1a3d7d201a |
fix(storage): skip sidecars whose source is gone, before writing anything
Running the import on a real install produced a store-then-discard loop: NEW BLOB (CDC) immediately followed by MANIFEST DELETED, once per sidecar. store_derived_blob wrote the bytes, the source-exists guard refused the row, and `inserted == 0` released the reference again. The refusal is right — `.thumbnails/` outlives years of deleted files, and importing those would recreate exactly the orphan rows e4c78ae0 eliminated. The mistake was deciding it AFTER the write. Now checked before the read and the store, via blob_exists (manifest first, blob as fallback). Two costs it removes: a blob write plus a manifest delete per dead sidecar on EVERY run, and a tail that never empties — unimportable files are rediscovered forever, so the job never reports zero and step 10e's gate never opens. Reported as `sidecar_source_gone` so the scale is visible before anything is removed, and deleted under `repair`. That is the one unlink in this job needing no readback: there is nothing to read back and nothing to regenerate from. Counted separately in the completion log, because "skipped, source gone" and "already present" mean different things to an operator deciding whether the migration has converged. Worth noting for anyone reading the raw logs: NEW BLOB names the hash of the STORED BYTES, while the sidecar filename is the SOURCE hash. They are different values, so grepping the log hash against .thumbnails finds nothing. The new finding carries both. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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b3221e265d |
feat(consistency): satellites_consistency covers both tables, and the sweep covers every job
Extends the derived check to `file_attached_blobs` and renames it, since the two tables are one concept — the content-keyed and file-keyed halves of "things attached to a Blob" — and `storage.copy_file_satellites` already established the vocabulary. The attached half is the one that cannot be recovered. `attached_dangling_blob` is data_loss with `recoverable: false`: those bytes were user-supplied and have no server-side render path, so nothing can regenerate them. Its derived twin carries `recoverable: true`, because a derived artifact is a pure function of its source and re-rendering restores it. Same finding shape, materially different stakes, and the detail says which. No orphan-mapping check on the attached side, deliberately: `file_id` is ON DELETE CASCADE, so a row cannot outlive its file. The database enforces what the derived table cannot, since a content hash has no row to point a foreign key at — which is exactly why only that half could rot. One job walking two tables needs a phase in the cursor, or an attached checkpoint would be replayed against the derived table and silently re-scan or skip. Two things the sweep was missing, found while checking whether every consistency job is actually exercised: drives_consistency and folders_consistency were registered but never run by any test. Now included; the list is exhaustive by intent. An unknown job was a warning-and-skip. That protected feature-gated builds at the cost of something worse: this list said `derived_consistency` for one commit after the rename and would have dropped that coverage without a word, leaving the suite green over a check that no longer ran. It fails now. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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4fef34b230 |
feat(consistency): derived_consistency — the last coverage-matrix gap
Finds derived mappings whose Blob is gone on either side. Nothing else can, and that is the point rather than an oversight: every other job reasons from a Blob outwards, so a row whose SOURCE was reaped breaks none of their invariants — valid reference, exactly correct refcount, bytes present on the backend. Every check agrees the system is healthy while the artifact is pinned forever. A leak that looks like correctness, which is why it took four suite runs to name. Two findings: derived_orphan_mapping (inconsistent) — source_hash has neither a manifest nor a blob row, so purge_derived_blobs can never fire for it. Storage that grows and never reclaims. derived_dangling_blob (data_loss) — blob_hash has no Blob behind it. The mapping promises an artifact that is gone, so a read finds the row and then fails. Existence means EITHER table on both sides, since source_hash and blob_hash each name a Blob: a manifest for CDC content, a bare blob row for legacy whole-file content. Checking one would report every legacy blob as missing. Paged on the full primary key with a row-value comparison rather than source_hash alone — a source has several variants, so a page boundary can fall inside one and advancing by source would skip the rest. Both existence probes fold into the page query, so a page is one round-trip rather than 2xN. Cursor round-trip is tested, including that a malformed one fails loudly: silently restarting would make a paged audit under-report, which is the worst failure available to a job whose purpose is finding what is missing. e4c78ae0 stops new orphans at the write side; this finds the ones already on disk, which that fix cannot reach. Added to the end-of-suite sweep so it runs against real state every time. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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de0f625d4c |
fix(dedup): refuse a derived mapping whose source is already gone
Permanent blob leak, three rows per image. Confirmed green after this. The leftovers named their source, and it had no manifest, no blob row and no files. Nothing will ever reap that hash again, so purge_derived_blobs can never fire for it — meaning the rows were written AFTER the source died, not left behind by a reap that skipped them. Two earlier attempts assumed the latter and fixed the wrong thing. Background thumbnail generation is spawned and unawaited, so an upload deleted promptly — constant in a test suite, occasional for real users — has its render finish after GC reaped the blob and then record three mappings to a corpse. Each pins its own thumbnail blob at ref_count 1, which GC is thereafter CORRECT to refuse: that is why three passes with force=true reclaimed nothing and why the leak was invisible, a healthy system declining to delete referenced data. store_derived_blob now inserts only WHERE the source still exists, checking both tables since source_hash names a Blob — a manifest for CDC content, a bare blob row for legacy whole-file content. A refused insert falls into the existing `inserted == 0` branch and releases the reference, so the thumbnail blob becomes collectible rather than stranded. Closed in both directions: if the source dies before the statement's snapshot the row is refused; if after, that reap's purge finds the row. 034f1050 stays — the bulk manifest reap genuinely lacked the purge that reap_blob had, and two manifest reap paths with only one purging is its own defect. It just was not this one. Still missing, and now clearly worth building: the orphan-mapping check the plan's coverage matrix already lists (content_derived_blobs. source_hash with no Blob behind it). This stops new ones; nothing yet finds the ones already on disk. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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f6bb677d91 |
test(api): exercise the deletion path, which nothing did
No test passed repair=true, so verify_and_unlink, the
sidecar_delete_unverified finding and the directory removal had never
executed. That left the one destructive part of the migration as its
least-tested code: everything else is additive and recoverable, this
unlinks files after a readback check, and a defect costs bytes.
Four assertions, because "the files are gone" cannot by itself tell a
correct drain from a destructive one:
sidecars gone — the drain happened
rows still present — it deleted the COPY, not the record. Removing
the row would strand the blob in exactly the way
the bulk-reap bug just did: a live reference
with nothing behind it, which GC is then correct
to refuse forever.
unverified == 0 — every unlink passed its readback rather than
being skipped, which is the property that makes
deleting safe at all
directory absent — the signal step 10e gates on, and why remove_dir
is used: it refuses a non-empty directory, so
success proves emptiness rather than asserting it
Preconditions assert the sidecars exist first, or a no-op run would pass
all four by doing nothing. The directory check logs rather than fails,
since a concurrent render could legitimately repopulate it.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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ea5d3003e0 |
fix(dedup): bulk manifest reap orphaned every derived row
Real leak, found by storage_cleanup_check.sh: three blobs surviving a full teardown, all `derived=1`, all naming one `src` whose manifest, blob row and files were already gone. The source had been reaped without its derived rows being purged. `reap_blob` purges correctly for the single-blob path. The BULK manifest reap did not — it iterated the deleted batch only to invalidate the manifest cache, so every manifest reaped that way left its content_derived_blobs rows behind. The predicate is not at fault. It protects a manifest that IS a derived artifact (content_derived_blobs.blob_hash) and deliberately not one that is the SOURCE of them, because counting source_hash as a reference would pin every original for as long as a thumbnail existed. The source is therefore reaped correctly and the purge simply has to follow it. The consequence is permanent, not cosmetic: the orphaned row holds chunk_manifests.ref_count at 1 on the thumbnail's own blob, so GC is thereafter CORRECT to refuse it — which is why three passes with force=true reclaimed nothing. Every deleted image left three behind, one per size, growing forever. Fixed at the reap rather than in any deletion path, which is where all of them converge: folder cascade, drive deletion, user deletion and single-file delete all reach it through the decrement trigger, so one call covers every route. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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0119110345 |
test(api): diagnose all leftovers, and name the pinning source
The run gave the decisive fact: `derived=1`. A content_derived_blobs row still points at the leftover blob, so GC is CORRECT to keep it — the leak is the row, not the bytes. purge_derived_blobs only runs when the SOURCE is reaped, so the question is why that never happened. So the dump now prints the source hash and what still holds it: src_files, src_manifest, src_blob. If the source has a live file the answer is "not deleted"; if it has none but a positive refcount, a release was missed upstream; if it has no row at all, the source was reaped WITHOUT purging, which would be a real ordering bug in reap_blob. Also fixes the dump reporting only one of three blobs. `docker compose exec -T` reads stdin, so it consumed the rest of the here-string feeding the loop — the other two were never queried and vanished silently. The same silent-truncation shape the diagnosis exists to expose, in the diagnosis. `< /dev/null` closes it. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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2b9505f344 |
fix(api): define COMPOSE_FILE so the leftover diagnosis actually runs
52c31a68 added a per-leftover refcount dump to storage_cleanup_check.sh but referenced COMPOSE_FILE, which that script never defines — only thumb_import_check.sh does. It would have run `docker compose -f ""`, failed, and been swallowed by the `|| true` guarding the loop. A silent no-op: the diagnosis would print nothing and the failure would look exactly as uninformative as the one it was written to explain. The same shape as the three bugs this suite has already caught — an error dressed up as an unremarkable result — and I wrote it into the tool meant to find them. The `|| true` stays, so one unreadable blob cannot abort the loop before the others report. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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fced39c798 |
test(api): drain GC on two zero passes, and diagnose leftovers
Three blobs survived the sweep. Five seconds of async-unlink polling did not remove them, so they were never queued — GC had not judged them collectible, and the loop had already exited. It broke on the FIRST zero-reap pass. A single zero only says nothing was collectible at that instant: releases cascade, since reaping a source drops the references its derived and attached rows held and `on_blob_deleted` does that from spawned tasks, so a pass can land in the gap between "source reaped" and "dependents released" and report zero with work outstanding. The import jobs added a level to that chain, which is when it started biting. Now two consecutive zeros, with the bound raised to match — one extra trigger over an empty store is cheaper than a false pass reporting a clean disk. The rest is diagnosis, because a list of paths cannot tell the three causes apart and they need opposite fixes: a positive refcount means a release was missed, an orphan means the reap predicate has a gap, and a row without a manifest means the registry is inconsistent. Each leftover now reports its manifest and blob refcounts plus how many files, derived rows and attached rows point at it — so if this is a real leak rather than the race, the next run names it instead of costing another full pass through the suite. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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e5746a4f48 |
test(api): the probe must NOT leave a thumbnail sidecar
storage_cleanup_check.sh asserted a sidecar exists on disk after fetching a thumbnail. Correct while `.thumbnails/` was the durable store; wrong since 10d2 removed that write. The check failed on exactly the behaviour it was meant to confirm. Inverted rather than deleted, because the inverse is the more useful guard: a sidecar reappearing means a write path regressed to the legacy shape, which would silently make `.thumbnails/` un-emptyable and strand step 10e forever — its gate is the directory being gone, and a single recreated file holds it open. The HTTP 200 above already proves the thumbnail works; this now proves it got there the new way. Both of the helper's streams are silenced at the call site. It reports absence loudly — red banner plus a `find` dump — because absence used to be the failure; here it is the expected result, and leaving that visible would cry wolf on every clean run. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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1b68ee093e |
feat(storage): both import jobs tick daily instead of manual-only
Registered with interval None, so they ran only when someone remembered to trigger them — which was your objection to gating anything on operator timing. Now daily. Not boot-time: that would delay readiness for a filesystem walk, and both jobs are idempotent and resumable, so periodic is strictly better. The tick deliberately does NOT delete. `repair` defaults false, so scheduled runs import and stop; unlinking stays a deliberate operator action, per no-silent-auto-repair. That splits the two halves the way their risk differs — the backfill is safe to automate, removing files is not. Cost once drained is a read_dir over three directories returning nothing, and after the directory itself is removed, not even that. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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c778b67006 |
feat(thumbnails): stop writing sidecars (step 10d2)
The write paths now persist only to the blob tiers. Until this, dual-write
meant any render or upload recreated .thumbnails/ seconds after the import
job removed it, so step 10e's gate — "the directory no longer exists" —
could never hold.
Rendered thumbnails: the fs::write in persist_rendered is gone. Safe
because the read flip landed first, so nothing depended on that write to
be found, and a failed derived store now costs a re-render rather than
data — regenerable by definition. Existing sidecars are untouched and stay
readable through the fallback until the import drains them.
Uploaded previews needed a change first, and the order was not optional.
upload_thumbnail_impl logged and still returned 201 when store_attached_blob
failed — safe only while ext-{file_id}.jpg was a second copy. These bytes
have NO server-side render path, so removing the sidecar while the store
stayed best-effort would lose a user's upload behind a success response.
The PUT is now fatal, and drops the RAM entry too, or the cache would keep
serving a preview that was never persisted and vanishes on eviction,
contradicting the error the client just received. Only then does the ext-
write go.
thumb_import_check.sh had to change with it: its premise was "upload, then
delete the row, and what remains on disk is legacy state", which no longer
holds now that nothing writes sidecars. It lays them down itself, with the
bytes the API just served, at the exact paths the pre-10d2 code used. The
reconstruction stays faithful — same bytes, same paths — it just no longer
depends on current code to produce a shape current code has stopped
producing. Both sidecars get identical bytes, which is realistic rather
than a shortcut: they dedup to one blob while keeping separate mappings,
which is the property the keying split exists to preserve.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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791e2da4f4 |
docs(plan): the sequence was missing "stop writing sidecars"
Step 10 went ...enable deletion, then remove the fallback "once the directory no longer exists". That gate is unreachable as written: while persist_rendered dual-writes and the PUT still writes ext-, any render or upload recreates the tree seconds after the job removes it, so the directory never stays absent and (e) can never fire. Adds it as d2, between deletion and fallback removal, with the split that only became visible while implementing 10d. Rendered sidecars can stop immediately — the read flip has landed, existing files are untouched so un-imported boxes keep their fallback, and a failed derived store costs a re-render rather than data, since that content is regenerable by definition. Uploaded ones cannot, yet. upload_thumbnail_impl logs and still returns 201 when store_attached_blob fails, which is safe only because the ext- sidecar catches it. Remove the sidecar while the store is best-effort and a user's preview vanishes silently behind a success response — and these are precisely the bytes with no server-side render path. So the PUT must become fatal first. Order recorded explicitly: make it fatal, then drop the sidecar. Reversed, it trades a silent data-loss window for an empty directory. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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df619a7ed9 |
feat(storage): thumb_attached_import drains its sidecars too
Completes step 10d. Same `?repair=true` opt-in and the same readback-before-unlink as the derived half, and the check matters more here: these sidecars hold the bytes that CANNOT be regenerated — a client-uploaded PDF preview has no server-side render path — so the read is the only thing between a migration and permanent loss, not belt-and-braces. verify_and_unlink is shared rather than copied. Two versions of "only delete after proving the replacement is readable" would be two chances to weaken one, and it is the rule the whole deletion step rests on. Deletion covers the already-imported branch as well as fresh imports, for the same reason as the derived job: a run without `repair` leaves the sidecar behind, and a later run with it would otherwise see "already imported" and never drain. Import first, enable deletion after, is the expected operator sequence, so that branch is the common path. Orphaned sidecars stay untouched — this job imports, it does not reclaim, and a destructive default on a migration is what no-silent- auto-repair forbids. Unverifiable ones are kept and reported, so the next run retries. With both halves draining, `.thumbnails/` can now actually empty and the directory removal in the derived job can succeed — though not stably until dual-write stops, since any render or upload recreates it. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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ae9ff0d8b3 |
feat(storage): thumb_derived_import drains the sidecars it imports
Step 10d, for the content-keyed half. Opt-in via the existing `repair` flag rather than a new one — the house rule is that a job does not mutate on its default setting, so early runs import only and an operator can inspect before committing. Deleting from the job rather than a later release is what makes the migration self-draining. Sidecars are LOCAL disk, so no release can know whether every instance has finished; each instance draining itself needs no coordination at all. Verification before unlinking is the load-bearing part. store_derived_blob reporting success is not proof the bytes are retrievable — a backend that accepted a write it cannot serve would otherwise have the last copy deleted on top of it. The blob is read back and its length compared against the sidecar's; a failure keeps the file, records a finding, and the next run retries. That read is the difference between a migration and a data-loss bug. Deletion applies to already-imported files too, not just fresh ones. A run without `repair` leaves the sidecar behind, and a later run with it would otherwise classify the file as "already imported" and never drain it — and import-then-enable-deletion is the expected operator sequence, so that is the common path rather than an edge case. Directories are removed once genuinely empty, because ABSENCE is what step 10e gates on, not emptiness: empty is momentary and an on-demand render can repopulate it a second later, while absence is one-way and cheaper to test (one stat, versus opendir/readdir/closedir). remove_dir refuses a non-empty directory, so it needs no emptiness check and cannot race a concurrent write into deleting live files. thumb_attached_import still needs the same treatment; verify_and_unlink should move somewhere shared rather than being copied into it. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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80d5372131 |
test(api): cover WebP/JPEG negotiation, which nothing exercised
from_accept returns JPEG unless Accept contains image/webp, and no thumbnail test sent the header — curl defaults to */*, which does not match. So the whole suite ran on JPEG and the WebP path was never exercised over HTTP, despite being what background generation writes and what the derived tier was built around. The gap was invisible because the JPEG results were all correct. Three assertions, one property each. Content-Type proves negotiation happened: thumbnail_content_type sniffs the body with `infer` rather than echoing the request, so image/webp cannot be right by accident — serve JPEG bytes down the WebP path and it reads image/jpeg and fails. Differing bytes prove they are genuinely two artifacts rather than one served twice. Differing ETags prove the validators are separate. `variant` has carried the format only since 20261022000000; before that a JPEG request could match the WebP row and be served the wrong codec, and a shared validator is exactly how a cache would then hand either to either. A final conditional request confirms each codec revalidates against its own. Together these also cover the per-format variant keying that lets one source hold both codecs — the prerequisite for JPEG clients ever leaving the sidecar, and therefore for step 10e. Note on placement: thumb_etag stays in step 4's capture block, beside thumb_bytes. Every later request omits Accept and so negotiates JPEG, so the validator must be the JPEG one — captured after the new block it would describe a different codec than the bytes next to it, and the copy assertions compare against both. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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12158ccf59 |
fix(storage): thumb_derived_import claims JPEG sidecars too
The filter was strip_suffix(".webp"), but persist_rendered writes
{hash}.{format.ext()} — so any client not advertising WebP leaves
{hash}.jpg on disk. Correct only while the derived tier was WebP-only;
once variant carried the format (20261022000000) a JPEG sidecar became
ordinary content, and leaving it unclaimed would keep .thumbnails/
permanently non-empty — the very signal step 10e gates on. The migration
could never finish.
Both codecs are now claimed and the format comes from the file's own
extension, so a .jpg imports AS JPEG. Deriving the variant and
content_type from it rather than hardcoding WebP is the point: a
mislabelled row would serve the wrong codec to whoever the read path
then matched it for.
ThumbnailFormat::ALL exists so the claim list and the write path cannot
drift — adding a format without teaching the import about it would
strand that codec silently.
The `ext-` rejection now carries real weight. Previously .jpg was
rejected wholesale, so the two jobs could not overlap by construction;
now they share an extension and only the prefix separates them. Both
directions stay under test.
Caught by the cross-job assertion, which counts every real sidecar being
claimed exactly once — the fixture gained a .jpg and the total moved 3
to 4, which is the test noticing rather than a test to update.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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f4e4b518a9 |
feat(thumbnails): classify render failures as permanent or transient
Prerequisite for persisting negative verdicts, and the reason step 7 cannot start with the storage change. generate_and_persist collapses EVERY error into empty Bytes — timeouts and closed semaphores included. That is survivable only because the sentinel lives in moka, which evicts. Write the same signal to content_derived_blobs and a thumbnail that timed out once under load is unrenderable forever. So the classification lands first, on its own, before anything can persist it. It maps onto the existing variants without restructuring, because timeouts already surface as TaskError: ImageError, UnsupportedFormat -> permanent. The decoder rejected these bytes, or they exceed MAX_DECODE_PIXELS. Facts about the image. TaskError, IoError -> transient. Timeout, closed decode semaphore, join failure, unreadable source. Facts about the moment. The asymmetry sets the default: a wrongly-persisted transient marks a good image unrenderable for good, while a wrongly-omitted permanent merely costs a repeated decode. Anything not clearly a content property is therefore transient. Tested by pinning the mapping rather than trusting variant names to stay put — the timeout case especially, since it is the one that turns a load spike into data loss. Nothing consumes this yet; it exists so the storage change cannot be written without it. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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647929ed11 |
docs(plan): negative verdicts get a nullable blob_hash
Resolves the .skip-marker question. The table can say "here is the artifact" but not "there is deliberately no artifact", and absence of a row is ambiguous — it means both never-attempted and attempted-and-not- worth-it, which destroys the only thing a negative cache holds. Two live cases, not one. Transcodes drop a .skip marker when WebP is not smaller. Thumbnails return empty Bytes for undecodable sources and ones over MAX_DECODE_PIXELS — RAM-only today, so after moka evicts, a 60-megapixel upload has its full decode attempted again, forever. Same gap, same table, so do both together. Nullable rather than a sentinel hash: a sentinel stops blob_hash naming a real blob and every future reader has to know the lie. Costs are one `AND blob_hash IS NOT NULL` in ContentDerivedReferenceSource, the same guard on the dangling-derived check, and dropping NOT NULL. Permanent vs transient is the load-bearing split, and today's code cannot tell them apart: generate_and_persist collapses every error into empty Bytes, timeouts and semaphore closures included. Survivable while the sentinel lives in moka, which evicts. Persist that same signal and a thumbnail that timed out once under load is unrenderable forever. So the renderer must return a typed outcome first, and only permanently-unrenderable earns a row. The asymmetry sets the default — a wrongly-cached transient is silent and permanent, a not-cached permanent only costs repeated work — so unclassified errors are treated as transient. No TTL and no renderer-version term. Time is the wrong axis: the verdict is deterministic in (content, encoder) and does not decay, so a TTL re-attempts an OOMing decode on a schedule while still leaving staleness for most of the window after a deploy. What removes the need for a mechanism is that negative rows are disposable — they hold no data, so a library upgrade invalidates them with a DELETE ... WHERE blob_hash IS NULL in the same migration as the dependency bump. Recorded explicitly so nobody later builds the expiry logic this replaces. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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c04f0c6824 |
docs(plan): scope step 7, the transcode dual-write
Investigated but deliberately not started — the remaining pieces span a service, its DI wiring and an unresolved design question, and a half-wired service is worse than none. ImageTranscodeService does not write the derived tier at all today, the same gap persist_rendered closed for thumbnails, and it must close before transcode_import can converge or the import chases a growing cache. Three pieces, and the first is smaller than it looks. get_transcoded takes file_id while the table is content-keyed, but the hash is already in scope one frame up — file_retrieval_service::try_transcode is called where dto.content_hash is live — so it is a parameter to thread, not a lookup to invent. Explicitly NOT by hashing original_content on the fly, which would be a BLAKE3 over the whole file per request. Second, the service has no BlobHandler field, so this touches the constructor and DI; ThumbnailService hit the same ordering problem and solved it with a per-call parameter, which is the cheaper precedent. Third, the .skip markers stay unresolved: a negative verdict has no bytes, so it does not fit a table whose row points at a blob. Either leave them local and recompute per instance, or model a sentinel. It is the only genuinely open design question left in step 10. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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d202b4b5ca |
fix(storage): the derived import conflated variant with directory
76590160 changed `variant_of` to return `{size}.{ext}`, but that value
was also being used as the on-disk DIRECTORY. Reads became
`.thumbnails/preview.webp/{hash}.webp`, which does not exist, so every
sidecar counted as unreadable and thumb_derived_import restored nothing.
Caught by thumb_import_check.sh on the run after the migration — the
harness earning its keep twice now, since this is the second defect it
has caught that no unit test could.
They are genuinely two strings and are now named as such: `dir_name` for
the path, `variant` for the row key. The cursor keeps using the
directory, so a run paused before the migration resumes at the same
position rather than restarting.
Also stops podman's compose-provider banner from burying the script's
output. Filtered rather than discarded, so genuine psql errors still
surface — swallowing those would turn a broken query into a silently
wrong assertion. Suppressing it at the source needs
`[engine] compose_warning_logs = false` in containers.conf, which is
per-developer config and cannot be relied on in CI.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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86d0d65583 |
feat(storage): derived variant encodes the output format
`content_derived_blobs.variant` held the size alone, so one source could
hold exactly one artifact per size regardless of codec. That surfaced
when the read order flipped in 10c: a JPEG request matched the WebP row
and would have been served the wrong codec — hidden previously because
the .jpg sidecar won first. The flip had to be gated to WebP, which
meant JPEG clients could never leave the sidecar, which meant the
sidecar could never be deleted.
It blocks transcodes harder: those are multi-format by nature, so two
output codecs of one source collide on the primary key without a format
term.
The axis goes inside the string rather than into a fourth PK column,
per the column's own rule — "new axes go inside this string, never into
new columns". Shape is {size}.{ext}: preview.webp, icon.jpg, later
720p.webp.
The backfill is deterministic, not a guess: store_derived_blob has only
ever written "image/webp" for thumbnails. content_type is checked anyway
rather than assumed — a row that fails the assumption is left alone and
counted in a warning, because the read path then simply misses it and
falls back to the sidecar, whereas guessing a codec would serve wrong
bytes. Idempotent via NOT LIKE '%.%', so a re-apply cannot produce
preview.webp.webp; verified on a scratch PG by applying it twice.
One helper builds the string, because it is a primary-key component:
a writer and reader that disagree do not fail loudly, they just never
find each other's rows and the derived tier silently looks empty. It
lives on the service's ThumbnailSize, not the port's — they are distinct
types, which the compiler pointed out after I put it on the wrong one.
The WebP gate on the read path is now removed: each codec has its own
row, so JPEG can finally reach the derived tier — the prerequisite for
deleting the sidecar for those clients.
file_attached_blobs keeps a bare size: store_external_thumbnail
re-encodes everything to JPEG, so it is single-format by construction
and a format term would cost a migration for nothing.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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c656e684d4 |
feat(consistency): merge-join backend_consistency, both directions
The job walked the backend and probed the DB with WHERE hash = ANY($1) over each page, so it could only ever see backend-only entries. A registry row whose bytes are gone never appears in a backend listing — it was invisible here by construction, and that half was left to blobs_consistency's per-row HEAD probe, which does not survive the row counts this plan produces. Both sides are now ordered by hash — the backend by contract since 5343fdda, the DB by ORDER BY hash — so one pass yields both deltas: orphan_blob for bytes with no row, and blob_missing_from_backend for a row with no bytes. The latter is severity data_loss rather than inconsistent: an orphan wastes space, this loses a file. Three things the merge needs that a probe did not. A horizon. The two pages cover different ranges, so only their overlap can be judged — beyond it, a hash missing from one side may simply be on the next page of the other, and emitting there would invent findings in both directions at once. When a side is exhausted its entries cannot be on a later page, so the other's tail becomes judgeable. One cursor for both sides. They share an ordering, so "resume after H" is start_after(H) on the backend and hash > H in the DB. The cursor advances to the horizon, not the backend's own next_cursor, which would skip the un-judged tail of whichever side reached further. Format is unchanged, so paused runs resume. And an ordering premise worth stating rather than assuming: hashes are lowercase BLAKE3 hex of fixed length, so collation and byte order rank identically over [0-9a-f]. A hash column admitting uppercase or variable length would break this silently. Recorded in the module docs and beside the query. blobs_consistency still emits its own blob_missing_from_backend; the two now overlap. Retiring that probe is the follow-up, not folded in here. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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d7de1c41e7 |
fix(files): missing folder_id is 400, not 500
Uploading without folder_id answered `500 Internal Error: folder_id is required to determine file owner`. A missing required field is the caller's error; as an internal_error it produced `error_type: Internal Error`, which the SPA cannot distinguish from the server breaking — so a malformed request looked like an outage. Both sites become validation_error (ErrorKind::InvalidInput → 400), with messages that say WHY the field is needed rather than restating that it is: the destination folder determines the file's owner and drive. The OpenAPI request body described it as "optional folder_id field", which is how it came to be omitted — hit while writing thumbnail_etag_content_keyed.hurl, where the upload was written from the documented contract and 500'd. Now stated as required. Regression test asserts the status AND that error_type is not "Internal Error", since the contract the SPA switches on is error_type rather than the message. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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4997eb4fb0 |
docs(plan): sequence transcode_import behind its two prerequisites
Answering "when is transcode_import planned": it is the remaining third of 10(b), but it must not be next, and both reasons were learned on the thumbnail side rather than predicted. Format has to move into `variant` first. Transcodes are inherently multi-format and `variant` is keyed on size alone — the same gap found in 10c that keeps JPEG thumbnails on the sidecar. Importing before that means migrating into a schema that cannot hold the data without collisions across formats. One migration unblocks both, which is the argument for doing it before either. And step 7 must precede the import. ImageTranscodeService writes only its file-keyed disk cache today, so the import would run against a cache that is still growing and never reach an empty tail — exactly the trap persist_rendered had to close for thumbnails, where one of four render paths recorded a row and the tail could never empty. Order: format-in-variant → step 7 → transcode_import. Also records why the .skip markers are still open: a cached negative verdict has no bytes, so it does not fit a table whose point is pointing at a blob. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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260e6bb74f |
feat(thumbnails): read the derived tier ahead of the sidecar
Step 10c. The sidecar is local disk — invisible to other instances, uncarried by a backend migration, uncovered by any consistency job. Reading the derived tier first is what makes that state deletable. Not the cost it appears to be: CachedBlobBackend gives the blob read a local disk cache and moka absorbs the repeats above it. Not a two-line swap, for two reasons. A derived MISS must fall through to the sidecar; the old code terminated the lookup with `?` because it was last. While the imports drain, most content has a sidecar and no row — terminating there would report "no thumbnail" for nearly all of it. And the derived tier is WebP-only. store_derived_blob writes image/webp and keys `variant` on the size alone, with no format term, so a JPEG request matches the WebP row and would be served the wrong codec. The old ordering hid this because the .jpg sidecar won first. So the lookup is gated to WebP, JPEG clients stay on the sidecar — and the sidecar cannot be deleted for them until `variant` encodes format. That is a new prerequisite for step 10e, recorded in the plan rather than discovered later. Also corrects the plan: I had written that this flip removes the derived-hash ETag hazard. It does not. A first render still creates the row as a side effect of producing the body, whatever the read order, so two consecutive reads still straddle its appearance. The real fix is resolving the ETag after generation on the 200 path — a 304 only fires when the client already holds a validator, which implies the row exists. That is a handler restructure, not an ordering change. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
|
48d9e164d4 |
test(thumbnails): pin get_cached_thumbnail's tier precedence
This function produced four bugs in two days, every one an ordering mistake rather than a logic error, and every one caught only by an end-to-end run comparing bytes against something independent: the content-keyed RAM entry shadowing an uploaded preview so a PUT appeared to do nothing; that precedence being right on disk but wrong in RAM; a validator flipping because a tier was populated as a side effect of producing the body; a decode error reading as "absent". They all violate one sentence — a file-specific override beats anything derived from the content, at every tier — so that is what these pin. Step 10c is entirely a precedence change (derived ahead of sidecar), and it should not be another end-to-end guess. No database needed. With `dedup: None` the two DB tiers are skipped, and what remains — per-file RAM, ext- disk, content RAM, blob-hash sidecar — is exactly where the bugs were. Seven cases: the two override rules, RAM over disk within the content tiers, the sidecar answering alone, the ext- read caching under the PER-FILE key (a content key would leak one user's preview to every file sharing the content), a hashless caller falling through instead of guessing, and moka's empty-bytes negative entry not being served as a thumbnail. Verified by mutation, not just by passing: restoring the old precedence fails exactly the two tests that encode the rule, and no others. Lives in thumbnail_service.rs rather than the sibling test file because seeding tiers needs the private `cache` field. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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2775e6d567 |
docs: the two sidecar-only paths are production-unreachable
Closing out step 10(a). The remaining `None` call sites in persist_rendered looked like an open gap; they are not reachable in production. Both `get_thumbnail` and the path variant of `generate_all_sizes_background` are called only from the `ThumbnailPort` impl, and nothing holds a `dyn ThumbnailPort` — which the existing note in get_cached_thumbnail already recorded and a grep confirms. Live renders go through get_thumbnail_from_blob and generate_all_sizes_background_from_blob, both of which carry a DedupService and dual-write. So threading a DedupService through them would be work with no runtime effect. Recorded at each call site instead, with the condition that matters: gaining a real caller means taking a DedupService first, or the gap persist_rendered exists to close reopens — sidecar-only output the import can never see, so the tail never empties and the deletion gate never opens. Marks 10(a) done in the plan with that caveat stated rather than implied. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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18649eb7b9 |
fix(thumbnails): drop derived-hash ETag until the read-order flip
The ETag is computed BEFORE the body. On a cache miss no content_derived_blobs row exists, so thumbnail_content_id returned the source-keyed form — then rendering created that row, and the next request resolved to the derived hash instead. The validator changed as a side effect of producing the body, making every first render immediately stale. Latent until aaf08532: before the consolidation, the on-demand render path never wrote a derived row, so the flip had nothing to trigger it. Fixing one gap exposed the other. Caught by thumbnail_etag_content_keyed.hurl — two consecutive GETs of an unchanged file stopped revalidating to 304. The plan already said derived-hash keying must land WITH the read-order flip and not before; I brought it forward anyway when the attachment case forced the attached half. This is the evidence for the constraint, so the plan now records the attempt and why it failed rather than leaving the note as untested caution. The attached lookup stays — it has no such window, since an upload writes its row synchronously before any read can observe it, and it fixes a real collision: a copy inherits the source hash, so an original and a copy carrying different uploaded previews would otherwise share one validator while serving different bytes. The flip removes the hazard for the derived half too: once that tier is authoritative it is populated before it is consulted, so no row can appear between two reads. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
|
7ec387003d |
refactor(thumbnails): one persist_rendered for every render path
Step 10(a), the blocker. Four render paths each wrote the sidecar and
exactly one also recorded the content_derived_blobs row, so an on-demand
render — a cache miss, a size never generated, an evicted sidecar —
produced state the migration could never see. That breaks the
migration's premise rather than being untidy: thumb_derived_import would
never reach an empty tail, so the gate for deleting the sidecar would
never open.
Now every rendered thumbnail goes through persist_rendered, which owns
what persisting means. Raw `fs::write(&thumb_path, …)` drops from five
sites to two: the one inside persist_rendered, and
store_external_thumbnail's `ext-{file_id}.jpg`, which is file-keyed and
legitimately a different thing.
The path that matters most already had what it needed:
get_thumbnail_from_blob — the REST handler's fallthrough on a cache miss
— holds `dedup` and simply never used it for persistence. It now
dual-writes at no cost.
render_and_persist_all_webp had its own copy of the dual-write logic;
that copy is gone, so retiring the interim dual-write later is one edit
here rather than a hunt.
Two paths still pass `None` and remain sidecar-only: `get_thumbnail`
(renders from an on-disk original) and `generate_all_sizes_background`
(the path variant; the _from_blob sibling has dedup). Closing those
means threading a DedupService in from their callers. Left visible as an
explicit `None` at the call site rather than an absent write — the gap
is now something a reader trips over instead of something they have to
notice is missing.
Adds ThumbnailFormat::mime() beside ext(), since the derived row needs a
media type and an extension without a matching one is how a WebP ends up
labelled JPEG.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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395296a7e7 |
fix(storage): file_exists misreported every file as missing
`SELECT 1 FROM storage.files WHERE id = $1` decoded as i64. PostgreSQL types a bare `1` as int4, so the decode always failed — and since `.ok().flatten()` turns a decode error into the same None as "no row", file_exists reported false for every file. thumb_attached_import therefore classified every sidecar as an orphan and imported nothing. Caught by thumb_import_check.sh on its first run: the derived import restored its rows, the attached one restored none. Now `SELECT EXISTS(...)`, which yields a real bool and always returns exactly one row, so absence means absence. A query error still degrades to false — the safe direction, leaving the file on disk as a reported orphan rather than importing it against a row that may not exist. The failure mode is the point, and it is the third of this shape in two days: an error converted into an innocuous-looking outcome. So the check script now dumps a job's findings when an assertion fails. The jobs already recorded exactly why they skipped each file — the attached_sidecar_orphan findings naming the cause were sitting in the run while the script reported only "did not restore the row", which is indistinguishable from the job never having run. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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4ae1531286 |
docs(plan): job-driven sidecar deletion, and the persist-consolidation blocker
Two revisions from working through step 10.
**Deletion moves into the import jobs, not a release.** Sidecars are
local disk, so a release cannot know whether every instance has drained
— gating on "an empty tail" asks an operator to coordinate a fact
nothing reports, and there is no telling when or whether they trigger
the jobs at all. Each job unlinking what it has imported makes every
instance drain itself. Constrained three ways: verify the derived blob
reads back before unlinking (a store that reported success but landed
unreadable would otherwise take the last copy), only after the
read-order flip (or the derived tier takes its first production traffic
by accident), and opt-in, since a migration that deletes by default is
surprising. Scheduled tick rather than boot trigger — idempotent and
resumable, so periodic is safe, while walking .thumbnails/ at startup
delays readiness for nothing.
**Found while checking the dual-write assumption: it does not hold.**
store_derived_blob has ONE call site; fs::write(&thumb_path, …) has
five. get_thumbnail, generate_and_persist and
generate_all_sizes_background all persist sidecar-only. That breaks the
migration's premise rather than being untidy — on-demand renders keep
producing un-migrated state after the import runs, so the tail never
empties and the deletion gate never opens. One persist_thumbnail owning
sidecar + derived + moka is therefore a prerequisite, and it makes "stop
writing sidecars" a later one-line change instead of four edits. Noted
that ThumbnailService holds no DedupService, so it must be threaded
through.
Also corrects a claim I put in thumb_derived_import's own docs:
transcoding is NOT a later step. ImageTranscodeService exists and caches
.transcoded/{ext}/{file_id}.{ext}, so a third import is needed and it
must re-key file→content — legitimate only because a transcode is
derivable. Its .skip markers remain an open question.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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671e6ac0e7 |
test(api): end-to-end check of both sidecar import jobs
Nothing exercised these jobs. Their unit tests cover the directory walk
— which files each claims — but neither had ever executed a run.
The test environment always starts fresh, so there is no pre-migration
data to import. This creates it, and the reconstruction is EXACT rather
than an imitation: the on-disk layout did not change in this work. A
rendered thumbnail has always been written to {size}/{hash}.webp and an
uploaded preview to {size}/ext-{id}.jpg; the only new thing is the row.
So upload through the real API, then delete the row, and what remains on
disk is byte-for-byte what a pre-migration install has.
Deleting the row must also release the reference it held, or the
manufactured state would carry a reference no legacy install ever had
and storage_cleanup_check.sh would report a leak this script caused.
file_attached_blobs has an ON DELETE trigger for that;
content_derived_blobs does not — its Rust purge path releases explicitly
— so the strip decrements it directly.
Three assertions, in increasing order of what they catch:
1. Both rows come back, and the imported attached row carries the nil
uploader sentinel rather than a fabricated one.
2. A COPY inherits the imported preview. This is the user-visible
point and was impossible before the row existed: the ext- sidecar
is keyed by file_id, no copy path duplicates it, so the copy
silently fell back to a render.
3. Re-running imports nothing and changes no refcount. The likeliest
silent defect — store_attached_blob is ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE, so an
import that skipped its existence check would release and retake a
reference every run, invisible except as drift.
psql runs inside the compose container rather than depending on a host
binary, matching how spawn-db.sh probes readiness. Ordered before
storage_cleanup_check.sh, which deletes everything it needs.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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49e7bb15a6 |
test(storage): cover the sidecar walk for both import jobs
Both imports run over ONE directory, where the two legacy shapes sit side by side, so the property worth asserting spans them: together they must claim every real sidecar exactly once, and neither may take the other's. A job that drifted into the other's shape would content-key user-supplied bytes — sharing one user's uploaded preview onto every file with identical content — and no per-job test in isolation would notice. So the fixture is shared. `legacy_tree` builds a directory holding a content-keyed .webp pair, an ext- upload, and a stray README, and both test modules walk it: derived claims exactly the two hashes in sorted order, attached claims exactly the ext- file, the two sets are disjoint, and between them they account for all three real sidecars. `sidecar_names` became an associated function taking the root instead of reading `self`, which is what makes this testable at all — the walk is the half that decides which files a job claims, and it needed no pool to verify. Sorting is asserted rather than assumed, since the cursor resumes by skipping everything at or before it and a stable order is the only thing that makes that correct. A missing size directory is covered too: normal on a fresh install, and it must yield no work rather than abort the walk. Not covered here, and it needs a pooled fixture that does not exist: the round trip itself — store the blob, write the row, and confirm a COPY inherits the preview. That belongs in the API-level harness, where the legacy state can be manufactured through the real write path and then stripped. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
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7a2ebe0fdc |
feat(storage): thumb_attached_import — backfill uploaded previews
Twin of thumb_derived_import, for the other sidecar shape:
{thumbnails_root}/{size}/ext-{file_id}.jpg, the previews a user
uploaded — notably the SPA's client-side PDF generator, which has no
server-side render path at all.
Until a row exists, a copy of the file LOSES the preview: the sidecar is
keyed by file_id, no copy path duplicates it, and the server silently
falls back to rendering from the source, or to nothing for a PDF. That
is the bug file_attached_blobs closed for new uploads; this closes it
for everything already on disk.
Separate job rather than an arm of the derived import, because the
keying differs and that difference is the security boundary. These bytes
are not derivable from the file's content, so content-keying them would
share one user's uploaded preview onto every file with identical
content. Each job's name filter rejects the other's shape, and both
directions are under test.
Idempotence needs more care here than in the derived twin.
store_attached_blob is ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE, so calling it for an
existing row releases the previous reference and takes a new one —
harmless once, but a job doing it every run would churn refcounts. The
row is therefore checked first and the store reached only on a genuine
insert.
uploaded_by is the nil sentinel: disk records no uploader, and inventing
one — the file's created_by, say — would fabricate provenance that could
later read as evidence an Editor replaced someone's preview. The column
is NOT NULL with no FK precisely so provenance survives, and a sentinel
says "unknown" honestly.
Orphaned sidecars (no storage.files row) are counted and reported, not
deleted. This job imports; it does not reclaim. Existence is checked
explicitly rather than letting the foreign key reject the insert, so an
orphan is counted as one instead of surfacing as an opaque constraint
error.
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Edouard Vanbelle
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f80a28763e |
feat(storage): thumb_derived_import — backfill the derived tier from sidecars
First half of step 10. Every server-rendered thumbnail written before
content_derived_blobs existed lives only as
{thumbnails_root}/{size}/{hash}.webp — local-disk state that another
instance cannot see, a backend migration does not carry, and no
consistency job covers. This walks those files into the blob store and
records the mapping, so the derived tier can become authoritative and
the sidecar can be deleted.
A registered JobRegistry tenant rather than a script: the volume is
unbounded, so it needs a cursor, resume, cooperative cancel and run
history, and an operator needs somewhere to watch it. Cursor is
{size_dir}/{filename} over a sorted walk, which totally orders the
traversal.
Idempotent by construction — each file is skipped when a row already
exists, and store_derived_blob is ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING with
release-on-conflict beneath it, so re-runs cannot inflate refcounts.
Re-running is the expected operator behaviour, since Phase 3 (deleting
the sidecars) is gated on a run reporting zero imported.
hash_from_sidecar_name deliberately rejects ext-{file_id}.jpg. Those
bytes are user-supplied and file-keyed; importing them here would
content-key them and share one user's uploaded preview onto every file
with identical content. They belong to thumb_attached_import. Both the
accept and the reject set are under test.
Unreadable files and store failures record a finding and continue: a
sidecar removed by a concurrent GC unlink between listing and read is
expected, not fatal, and the file is left in place for the next run.
Registered unconditionally rather than behind a flag — a migration
nobody can find is a migration nobody runs.
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Edouard Vanbelle
|
95648f2fa3 |
fix(thumbnails): private, no-cache — the URL is gated and mutable
Thumbnails were served `public, max-age=31536000, immutable`. Two problems, and the first is a security one. `public` on a Permission::Read gated resource lets any shared cache — a corporate proxy, a CDN — store one user's thumbnail and serve it to another. `Vary: Accept` was no defence: it does not vary on Authorization. Now `private`. `immutable` was a promise this URL cannot keep. It is keyed by file id, and its bytes change when a preview is uploaded, when content is replaced, or when an attachment is removed. `immutable` tells a client not to revalidate at all during the freshness lifetime, so with a one-year max-age a browser that fetched once would never see a new preview — which also made the content-keyed ETag unobservable in practice. A correct validator is worthless if nothing asks. Now `no-cache`, which still stores the body and only requires revalidation, answered by the ETag with a body-less 304. The hurl tests could not have caught this: hurl always sends the request, so If-None-Match was exercised and passed while a browser obeying `immutable` never got that far. Same "correct on the wire, wrong in practice" shape as the bugs before it, so the test now asserts the directives themselves rather than only the 304 behaviour. One definition, shared by the REST and NextCloud endpoints, which are gated identically and must not drift. /_app/immutable is untouched: those are hash-named static assets, genuinely content-addressed and public, where the directive is honest. Cost is a conditional request per thumbnail per page load. Recovering it needs a content-addressed URL — where `immutable` would be true — but that puts the hash in the URL of an authorized resource, so it stays `private` regardless, and it touches the SPA and the file DTO. Separate change. |
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Edouard Vanbelle
|
7d9418f63c |
fix(thumbnails): ETag names the blob actually served
fe9c4f49 keyed the ETag on the SOURCE file's content hash. That is wrong
whenever the response comes from a satellite table, and for attachments
it is wrong in two ways.
Uploading a preview does not change the file's content, so a
source-keyed ETag does not change either — and with `immutable` set,
clients never revalidate and keep the previous render for up to a year.
The exact staleness fe9c4f49 set out to fix, re-entering through the
attachment path.
Worse: a copy inherits the source hash, so an original and a copy have
identical ETags. Give either one a different uploaded preview and they
serve different bytes under one validator, which a shared cache may hand
to either request. That is a collision, not just staleness.
thumbnail_content_id resolves the identity through the same tier
precedence the read path uses: an attached blob's own hash, else a
derived blob's own hash, else the source-keyed form. An ETag naming a
different tier than the one answering is worse than a coarse one, so the
two orders must not drift.
Derived-hash keying is strictly better than source-keying and never
worse. The sidecar and the derived row are written from the same bytes;
where they can diverge — a sidecar re-rendered while the derived row
stays pinned by ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING — source-keying is wrong too,
because the renderer is not part of that key. This is the step 10 change
arriving early, forced by the attachment case; the plan note stands for
the read-order flip itself.
Known gap: a legacy ext-{file_id}.jpg with no file_attached_blobs row
yet falls through to the source-keyed form. No worse than today, and it
resolves when the import backfills.
attached_thumbnail_copy.hurl now asserts ETags, which is why this went
unnoticed: it compared bytes only, and thumbnail_etag_content_keyed
covers content replacement rather than preview upload. A fresh GET
returned the right bytes throughout — the same "healthy locally, broken
for anyone caching" shape as the two bugs before it.
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Edouard Vanbelle
|
d71dd973e7 |
fix(thumbnails): two defects the copy test exposed
1. Per-file overrides must beat the content tier in RAM as well as on
disk. The content-keyed lookup ran first, so a thumbnail already
rendered from the file's content sat in RAM under content(blob_hash)
and shadowed a preview uploaded afterwards — permanently. Invisible
before the moka rekey, because both lived under one file-id key and
the upload simply overwrote the render. Order is now uniform:
per-file RAM, per-file disk (ext-), per-file DB, then content RAM,
blob-hash disk, derived blob.
2. store_attached_blob never wrote a row. Its RETURNING clause compared
the stored hash against EXCLUDED, and PostgreSQL only permits
EXCLUDED in the SET and WHERE of DO UPDATE — a runtime syntax error
on every call. The superseded hash now comes from a SELECT taken
before the upsert; losing that race leaves one stale reference, which
the manifest recompute reports, rather than anything being lost.
The second hid behind the first for a whole cycle, and behind
`ext-{file_id}.jpg`: the ORIGINAL kept serving its uploaded preview from
local disk, so the feature looked healthy. Only a copy, which has a
different file_id and therefore no ext- file, depends on the row — and
the row was never there. The handler's best-effort warn! completed the
disguise, so it is now error!: a failure there means copies silently
lose the preview, and nothing else signals it.
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