- POST /api/auth/opaque/login/ke1 (public) — takes {userIdentifier, startLoginRequest}, resolves the identifier via the same @-dispatch as legacy login (AuthApplicationService::lookup_user_for_login, factored out), fetches envelope, runs ServerLogin::start (real branch for known users, dummy branch for anti-enum on unknown/unregistered), stashes state under a random exchange_id in the moka cache, returns {exchangeId, loginResponse}.
- POST /api/auth/opaque/login/ke3 (public) — atomic take from the cache FIRST (anti-enum + anti-replay), then decodes the payload, runs ServerLogin::finish, stamps opaque_migrated_at (Phase 3 signal), and mints a session via the new AuthApplicationService::mint_session_for_authenticated_user helper — returns the same AuthResponseDto shape as legacy login so the SPA has one downstream handler.
- Session mint factored: mint_session_for_authenticated_user(User) extracted from login() so both the legacy password path and OPAQUE KE3 converge through one implementation.
- OpaqueRepositoryPort::mark_migrated with COALESCE-preserving idempotent stamp of opaque_migrated_at.
- opaque-setup CLI + Dockerfile wiring already shipped (Step 0 hygiene).
- Routing fix: sub-prefix split (/api/auth/opaque/register vs /api/auth/opaque/login) — axum composes middleware between sibling nests at the same prefix, which was cross-applying auth+CSRF to my public login routes. Distinct prefixes side-step that cleanly. Documented in both main.rs and the router builder doc.
- Rate-limit sharing: login KE1/KE3 layered with the SAME login_limiter instance as legacy POST /api/auth/login, so an attacker can't halve the per-IP budget by spraying both endpoints.
Anti-enum + anti-replay hardening in KE3: take runs BEFORE payload parse so:
- Unknown / expired / already-consumed exchange_id → 401 InvalidCredentials (same shape as wrong-passphrase, no payload-shape leak)
- Consumed handle can't be re-used to spam parse attempts
OPAQUE (RFC 9807) implementation (using `opaque-ke` crate)
with opaque authentfication, server will never receive the password (in the auth=password mode)
this is a must have to create trust with users to permit end to end encryption in the future
(we cannot know if user use the same password/passphrase for his asymetric key or his oxicloud auth,
this is why server must never have the password)
pass1: prepare server
a job can be paused/resumed
a job as an exclusibity by it's name
if you want to run another job with same name:
either cancel the first one, or wait of it's terminaison
pause does not permit to run the other job, this can create
race conditions
add /api/folders/{id}/ancestors
this API to iterate parent up to the drive root or the shared folder
this will help UI to build the breadcrumb in 1 API call
and to identify the root element (is it a drive users has access to or
a shared folder ?)
ui: now only 1 API call is now required to build the breadcrumb
Close the two coverage gaps in the external-mounts feature — the admin
REST surface and the admin UI tab both previously had no automated tests.
Backend (hurl):
- tests/api/external_mounts.hurl — black-box coverage of the admin mount
endpoints (list / create / delete): input validation (empty name,
non-existent host path → 400), create → 201 with the full view, the
mount appears in the list, delete → 204 then 404, and the /api/admin
middleware denies a non-admin on every verb → 403.
- server.env: enable OXICLOUD_ENABLE_EXTERNAL_MOUNTS for the test server;
run.sh: register the new scenario.
Frontend (vitest):
- admin/page.test.ts — opening the mounts tab loads + lists mounts,
the create form calls createExternalMount, and delete goes through the
confirm modal to deleteExternalMount.
Tooling:
- devenv.nix: add b3sum (used by tests/api/run.sh's storage-integrity check).
- provide is_shared and is_favorite information in DTO, information propagated as badge/buttons per items
regarding performances I try to be minimalis on SQL to prevent any perf regression
- remove old set of sharedids and favoriteids (was not functionnal anymore)
- fix date picker (no past selection) in grant
- fix contextmenu close on /files section
Adds application/adapters/param_encoding.rs: encode/decode for the three
RFC 6868 caret-escape sequences (^n newline, ^^ literal caret, ^' literal
DQUOTE) plus render_param_value, which quotes and encodes a parameter
value only when the vCard/iCalendar param-value grammar requires it
(comma/semicolon/colon triggers quoting; an embedded DQUOTE/caret/newline
needs escaping even once quoted).
Wires render_param_value into the two vCard generators' TYPE parameter
emission (EMAIL/TEL/ADR) in carddav_adapter.rs::contact_to_vcard and
contact_service.rs::generate_vcard — contact `type` fields are free text,
not a fixed enum, so a value containing a comma or quote previously
produced outright broken vCard syntax (no quoting/escaping was applied
at all).
Scope note: this branch only fixes the generation side. The existing
vCard parser is a naive line-by-line substring scanner (`line.contains
("TYPE=WORK")`) with no real per-parameter tokenizing, so there's no
integration point yet for the decode half without a larger parser
rewrite — that's part of the vCard 4.0 work (RFC 6350), which depends on
this branch for the shared encoding utility.
webdav_patch.hurl and nc_webdav_patch.hurl existed with real coverage
since the original PATCH commits but were never added to
tests/api/run.sh, so just api-test/CI silently skipped them. Wire both
in, fix nc_webdav_patch.hurl's header-after-[BasicAuth] ordering bug
that meant it had never actually passed, and add two new
consistency-focused files chaining PATCH operations with
cross-protocol/cross-surface verification:
- webdav_patch_consistency.hurl: chained overwrites with ETag-change
checks, GET/HEAD/PROPFIND cross-protocol agreement, quota-507
leaving the file byte-for-byte unchanged, direct_put_max_bytes
prefix/suffix regression coverage.
- nc_webdav_patch_consistency.hurl: Editor/Viewer/Outsider permission
matrix, cross-surface lock interop, quota-507 via the NC surface.
Running these surfaced two real bugs in the NC PATCH handler, both
fixed here:
- The write step mapped every error (including a legitimate anti-enum
permission denial) to a raw 500 instead of AppError::from(e), unlike
the plain surface. A Viewer without Update permission got a 500
leak instead of the expected 404.
- nc_to_internal_path() didn't strip the leading '/' that chroot.path
carries from StoragePath::to_string(), so a LOCK taken via /webdav/
silently failed to block PATCH via /remote.php/dav/ on the same
file — the exact-string lock-store lookup never matched. Added a
regression unit test.
The NextCloud-compatible WebDAV surface (/remote.php/dav/…) had no PATCH
dispatch arm at all — requests fell through to 405 — unlike the plain-file
surface (see the sibling commit on this repo's rfc-5789-http-patch work).
Adds handle_patch to nextcloud/webdav_handler.rs, reusing the plain
surface's X-Update-Range mechanism directly instead of duplicating it:
- api/handlers/webdav_handler.rs::parse_update_range is now pub(crate)
so both surfaces share the same header-parsing/validation logic.
- upload_ingest::ingest_range_patch_to_cas (already surface-agnostic)
splices the request body between the file's untouched prefix/suffix
byte ranges and re-ingests through the same content-addressable
pipeline handle_put uses.
Follows this file's own handle_put conventions rather than the plain
handler's: no active-lock guard (the NC surface has no LOCK/UNLOCK
dispatch arm at all) and no explicit storage-quota check (handle_put
doesn't do one either on this surface) — matching the sibling handler
instead of importing behavior the NC surface doesn't otherwise have.
Adds PATCH to the OPTIONS Allow header.
Also fixes a pre-existing clippy::useless_borrows_in_formatting warning
in thumbnail_service.rs (unrelated to this change, but blocking a clean
clippy run on this branch).
Adds tests/api/nc_webdav_patch.hurl covering explicit-range and append
PATCH, the Content-Range rejection, the missing-header 400, and PATCH
on a nonexistent file.
RFC 4918 §9.7.1 forbids partial updates on PUT; this adds PATCH as the
supported mechanism instead, via an X-Update-Range header (bytes=<start>-<end>
or append). Reuses the existing CAS/dedup pipeline by splicing the request
body between the file's untouched prefix/suffix byte ranges and re-ingesting
as one continuous stream, so unedited chunks dedup for free.
this fix https://github.com/AtalayaLabs/OxiCloud/issues/607
which was introduced by commit 12dc648cff
when a user does activity in a drive, admin can invalidate cache via the internal
call /api/admin/internal/trigger-sweep
this permit end 2 end test to validte immediately that used_bytes corresponds to the expected result
- nc chunked-upload MOVE assembly (#12): both branches now funnel through
update_file_streaming_with_perms, whose internal fork enforces Update on
the existing file OR Create on the parent folder / drive root. Pre-fix,
the create branch went through plain upload_file_streaming with no
authz.require — a Viewer on a shared drive could MKCOL → PUT chunks →
MOVE and land a brand-new file. Error mapping switched to AppError::from
so denials keep the graduated 403/404 shape.
- trash empty-for-drive: route through authz.require(Delete, Drive) instead
of the bespoke drives_with_delete_for check + hardcoded not_found. Viewer
now gets 403 (has Read), outsider stays 404 (no Read, anti-enum). Emits
the standard authz.denied event with visibility field instead of the
ad-hoc trash.empty_drive_rejected.
- tests/api/trash_per_drive.hurl: flip Viewer/Editor asserts 404 → 403;
new Step 11b regression pin for finding #10 (Editor restore + delete
attempts must 403 AND body must not contain "success":true — trips if
the historical substring-match-on-"not found" hack ever comes back).
this is a UX improvement, always return a 404 not found when subject do not have any access on the resource
but returns an explicit 403 forbidden is subject try a forbidden action on a resourse it can read
regarding performance, the role is already in cache for the second call with read perm
Edouard Vanbelle