# ============================================================= # OxiCloud — email-only registration (PR 18) # ============================================================= # PR 18 makes `password` (and `username`) optional in # `POST /api/auth/register`. Email-only signup: # - returns a uniform 200 message (no JWT, no UserDto) # - mints a welcome magic-link mailed to `email` # - redemption lands the new internal user on `/#/files` # (not `/#/sharedwithme`, which is for externals) # # Requires `OXICLOUD_SMTP_MOCK=true` (set in tests/common/server.env). # ============================================================= # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 1 — admin login (cleanup ops at the end need her token). # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login Content-Type: application/json { "username": "{{username}}", "password": "{{password}}" } HTTP 200 [Captures] alice_token: jsonpath "$.access_token" # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 2 — Classic registration (with password). PR 20 anti- # enumeration mode (SMTP wired) returns a uniform 200 # regardless of success or collision. No UserDto in # the response — the frontend logs the user in # separately to get a session. # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/register Content-Type: application/json { "username": "charlie", "email": "charlie@example.com", "password": "TestPassword1!" } HTTP 200 [Asserts] jsonpath "$.message" contains "request received" # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 2b — Log in as charlie to confirm registration succeeded # AND to capture her user_id for cleanup. # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login Content-Type: application/json { "username": "charlie", "password": "TestPassword1!" } HTTP 200 [Captures] charlie_token: jsonpath "$.access_token" charlie_user_id: jsonpath "$.user.id" # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 3 — Email-only registration. No username, no password. # Returns 200 + uniform message; welcome magic-link # is captured by the MockEmailSender. # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/register Content-Type: application/json { "email": "pr18-emailonly@example.com" } HTTP 200 [Captures] # PR 22 — capture the browser-binding cookie so the redemption can # replay it. Hurl's automatic cookie jar doesn't reliably attach # Path-scoped cookies in this test setup, so we wire it through # explicitly via the Set-Cookie header. pr18_magic_cookie: header "set-cookie" regex "oxicloud_magic_request=([^;]+)" [Asserts] jsonpath "$.message" contains "request received" # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 4 — Capture the welcome mail + extract the magic-link. # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── GET {{base_url}}/api/admin/smtp/test/captured?to=pr18-emailonly@example.com Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}} HTTP 200 [Asserts] jsonpath "$.to" == "pr18-emailonly@example.com" jsonpath "$.text_body" matches "/magic/v1/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+" [Captures] pr18_magic_url: jsonpath "$.text_body" regex "(https?://[^\\s]+/magic/v1/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)" # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 5a — Redeem the welcome link WITHOUT the browser-binding # cookie. PR 22 shows the cross-browser confirmation # page (HTTP 200, HTML) rather than redeeming. # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── GET {{pr18_magic_url}} HTTP 200 [Asserts] header "content-type" startsWith "text/html" body contains "different browser" # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 5b — Same link, this time with the matching cookie. # PR 22 binds the magic-link to the requesting browser; # a matching cookie redeems instantly. Internal user # with no resource target → lands on `/#/files`. # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── GET {{pr18_magic_url}} Cookie: oxicloud_magic_request={{pr18_magic_cookie}} HTTP 302 [Asserts] header "Location" == "/#/files" [Captures] pr18_access_token: cookie "oxicloud_access" # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 6 — The new user can read their own profile. After PR 18 # the username field is omitted (no handle claimed yet), # and `is_external` is false (they're an internal user # who signed up directly, not via invitation). # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── GET {{base_url}}/api/auth/me Authorization: Bearer {{pr18_access_token}} HTTP 200 [Asserts] jsonpath "$.email" == "pr18-emailonly@example.com" jsonpath "$.is_external" == false jsonpath "$.username" not exists # PR 23 — the user redeemed the welcome magic-link in Step 5b, so # email_verified_at is stamped (the click IS the proof of inbox # control, regardless of whether the redemption went through the # direct or cross-browser-confirm path). jsonpath "$.email_verified_at" exists [Captures] pr18_user_id: jsonpath "$.id" # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 7 — The new user can request another magic-link (no # password configured → eligible). Anti-enumeration # 200 either way. # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/magic-link/send Content-Type: application/json { "email": "pr18-emailonly@example.com" } HTTP 200 [Asserts] jsonpath "$.message" contains "sign-in link" # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 8 — PR 20 anti-enumeration: register with charlie's # email AGAIN (different password). Response is the # same uniform 200 — attacker can't tell from the # HTTP shape whether the email was already taken. # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/register Content-Type: application/json { "username": "charlie-imposter", "email": "charlie@example.com", "password": "AttackerPassword99!" } HTTP 200 [Asserts] jsonpath "$.message" contains "request received" # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 9 — Verify the collision was silently suppressed: the # attacker's password does NOT work (the original # row is intact, no rewrite happened). # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login Content-Type: application/json { "username": "charlie@example.com", "password": "AttackerPassword99!" } HTTP 403 # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 10 — Charlie's original password still works — the # collision didn't touch her account. # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login Content-Type: application/json { "username": "charlie", "password": "TestPassword1!" } HTTP 200 # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Step 11 — Username collision (different email): same uniform # 200, no new user, audit `username_taken`. # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/register Content-Type: application/json { "username": "charlie", "email": "charlie-other@example.com", "password": "AttackerPassword99!" } HTTP 200 [Asserts] jsonpath "$.message" contains "request received" # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # Cleanup — admin deletes both test users. # ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── DELETE {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{charlie_user_id}} Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}} HTTP * DELETE {{base_url}}/api/admin/users/{{pr18_user_id}} Authorization: Bearer {{alice_token}} HTTP *