379 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
379 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
# =============================================================
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# OxiCloud — Baseline: public-share token surface
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# =============================================================
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# Pins the legacy tokenized share flow (`/api/shares` to mint,
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# `/api/s/{token}/*` to consume) — the only public-facing
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# unauthenticated read surface in the product. Any regression
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# in scope-enforcement here breaks the share-link feature for
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# every external recipient.
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#
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# Coverage:
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# 1. Login + seed: create a folder with a file inside.
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# 2. POST /api/shares (folder share, no password) → 201
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# 3. GET /api/shares (lists ours)
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# 4. GET /api/shares/{id} (single fetch)
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# 5. GET /api/s/{token} (no auth) → 200
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# 6. GET /api/s/{token}/verify — not applicable
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# for a password-less share, but the unauthenticated
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# anonymous probe of `/api/s/{token}` already exercises
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# the access path; verify is exercised in the password
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# branch below.
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# 7. GET /api/s/{token}/contents (no auth) → 200
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# 8. GET /api/s/{token}/file/{file_id} (no auth) → 200 + body
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# 9. POST /api/shares — password-protected variant
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# 10. GET /api/s/{pw_token} → 401 (password required)
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# 11. POST /api/s/{pw_token}/verify wrong pw → 401
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# 12. POST /api/s/{pw_token}/verify right pw → 200
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# 13. DELETE /api/shares/{id} (no-password) → 204
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# 14. GET /api/s/{token} after revoke → 404 / 410
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# 15. Cleanup the password-share + folder.
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# =============================================================
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Setup — admin login, seed folder + file
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
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Content-Type: application/json
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{ "username": "{{username}}", "password": "{{password}}" }
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HTTP 200
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[Captures]
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admin_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
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GET {{base_url}}/api/folders
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Captures]
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admin_home_id: jsonpath "$[0].id"
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POST {{base_url}}/api/folders
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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Content-Type: application/json
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{ "name": "public-share-test", "parent_id": "{{admin_home_id}}" }
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HTTP 201
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[Captures]
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share_folder_id: jsonpath "$.id"
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POST {{base_url}}/api/files/upload
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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[MultipartFormData]
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folder_id: {{share_folder_id}}
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file: file,fixtures/hello.txt; text/plain
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HTTP 201
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[Captures]
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shared_file_id: jsonpath "$.id"
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 2 — Mint a password-less folder share
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/api/shares
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"item_id": "{{share_folder_id}}",
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"item_type": "folder"
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}
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HTTP 201
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[Captures]
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share_id: jsonpath "$.id"
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share_token: jsonpath "$.token"
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[Asserts]
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jsonpath "$.has_password" == false
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jsonpath "$.token" matches "^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$"
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 3 — The share appears in the owner's listing
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/api/shares
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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body contains "{{share_id}}"
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 4 — Single-share fetch
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/api/shares/{{share_id}}
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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jsonpath "$.id" == "{{share_id}}"
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jsonpath "$.item_id" == "{{share_folder_id}}"
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jsonpath "$.item_type" == "folder"
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 5 — Public access via the token, NO auth header. This is the
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# security-critical path: any auth check that creeps in
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# here breaks all external recipients.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/api/s/{{share_token}}
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HTTP 200
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 7 — Browse the shared folder contents (no auth).
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/api/s/{{share_token}}/contents
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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body contains "{{shared_file_id}}"
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 8 — Fetch a file from inside the FOLDER share via
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# /api/s/{folder-token}/file/{file_id}. This is the path NC
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# desktop and web clients use to download a single file out
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# of a shared folder without zipping the whole tree. The
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# handler must (a) accept the file_id only when the file
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# lives in the share's subtree, and (b) refuse with 404 for
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# any file outside the subtree (anti-enumeration: the same
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# status as "file doesn't exist", so the caller can't probe
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# for foreign file ids).
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/api/s/{{share_token}}/file/{{shared_file_id}}
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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header "Content-Disposition" contains "hello.txt"
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# A file the caller owns but that isn't inside the shared
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# folder MUST 404 — same shape as "no such file", so the
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# response can't be used to enumerate file ids.
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POST {{base_url}}/api/files/upload
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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[MultipartFormData]
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folder_id: {{admin_home_id}}
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file: file,fixtures/hello.txt; text/plain
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HTTP 201
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[Captures]
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outsider_file_id: jsonpath "$.id"
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GET {{base_url}}/api/s/{{share_token}}/file/{{outsider_file_id}}
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HTTP 404
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 8b — Direct file share: mint a share on the FILE itself
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# (item_type=file) and access it via /api/s/{token}.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/api/shares
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"item_id": "{{shared_file_id}}",
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"item_type": "file"
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}
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HTTP 201
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[Captures]
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file_share_id: jsonpath "$.id"
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file_share_token: jsonpath "$.token"
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GET {{base_url}}/api/s/{{file_share_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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jsonpath "$.item_type" == "file"
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 9 — Mint a password-protected share on the same folder.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/api/shares
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"item_id": "{{share_folder_id}}",
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"item_type": "folder",
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"password": "secret-share-password-1!"
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}
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HTTP 201
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[Captures]
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pw_share_id: jsonpath "$.id"
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pw_share_token: jsonpath "$.token"
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[Asserts]
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jsonpath "$.has_password" == true
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 10 — Anonymous probe must report "password required" without
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# leaking the shared item's contents.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/api/s/{{pw_share_token}}
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HTTP 401
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[Asserts]
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jsonpath "$.requiresPassword" == true
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 11 — Wrong password → 401 (does NOT issue an unlock cookie).
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/api/s/{{pw_share_token}}/verify
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Content-Type: application/json
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{ "password": "obviously-wrong" }
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HTTP 401
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 12 — Right password → 200 + Set-Cookie unlock JWT.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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POST {{base_url}}/api/s/{{pw_share_token}}/verify
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Content-Type: application/json
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{ "password": "secret-share-password-1!" }
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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header "Set-Cookie" exists
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 13 — Revoke the password-less share
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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DELETE {{base_url}}/api/shares/{{share_id}}
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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HTTP 204
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 14 — After revocation the token must not resolve. Different
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# server versions return 404 vs 410 depending on whether
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# the row was hard-deleted or marked revoked — both are
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# acceptable rejections of the token; what matters is the
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# token does NOT yield a 200.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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GET {{base_url}}/api/s/{{share_token}}
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HTTP *
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[Asserts]
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status >= 400
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status < 500
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 14b — Viewer-laundering regression (post-Drive AuthZ audit,
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# Round 1 HIGH). Before the fix, `POST /api/shares` checked
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# only "does the item exist" — any authenticated user who
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# could name the UUID could mint a public Viewer link,
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# laundering read access into a permanent anonymous URL
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# that survived their own grant revocation. Now the
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# service calls `authz.require(Share, resource)` before
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# minting the token; a caller without `Share`
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# (Viewer/Commenter/Contributor/no-grant-at-all) gets 404
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# (anti-enum) + `authz.denied` audit line. See
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# `docs/plan/authz_audit/admin_membership.md`.
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#
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# We test the strongest form: an unrelated user with no
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# grant at all. The intermediate case (Viewer with Read
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# but not Share) is covered by the same code path — Share
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# is bundled only with owner/editor role_grants.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Create/lookup the attacker. Idempotent: `HTTP *` accepts either
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# 201 (first run) or 409 (subsequent runs). Login below is the real
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# precondition.
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POST {{base_url}}/api/admin/users
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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Content-Type: application/json
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{ "username": "sh_mallory", "password": "ShMalloryPassword1!", "email": "sh_mallory@example.com", "role": "user" }
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HTTP *
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POST {{base_url}}/api/auth/login
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Content-Type: application/json
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{ "username": "sh_mallory", "password": "ShMalloryPassword1!" }
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HTTP 200
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[Captures]
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mallory_token: jsonpath "$.access_token"
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# Step 14b.i — Mallory tries to mint a public share on admin's
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# folder: 404 (anti-enum). No token appears in the
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# response body.
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POST {{base_url}}/api/shares
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Authorization: Bearer {{mallory_token}}
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"item_id": "{{share_folder_id}}",
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"item_name": "public-share-test",
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"item_type": "folder"
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}
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HTTP 404
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# Step 14b.ii — Same attempt on admin's file: 404.
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POST {{base_url}}/api/shares
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Authorization: Bearer {{mallory_token}}
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"item_id": "{{shared_file_id}}",
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"item_name": "hello.txt",
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"item_type": "file"
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}
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HTTP 404
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# Step 14b.iii — Mallory has no shares — no partial success slipped
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# through. (`GET /api/shares` returns only shares the
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# caller created; response is paginated.)
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GET {{base_url}}/api/shares
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Authorization: Bearer {{mallory_token}}
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HTTP 200
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[Asserts]
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jsonpath "$.items" isCollection
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jsonpath "$.items" count == 0
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# 15 — Teardown: revoke the password share + the direct
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# file-share, then delete the folder.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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DELETE {{base_url}}/api/shares/{{pw_share_id}}
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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HTTP 204
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DELETE {{base_url}}/api/shares/{{file_share_id}}
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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HTTP 204
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# The "outsider" hello.txt sits in admin's home folder, not under the
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# shared subtree — delete it explicitly so the next test in the
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# runner (permissions.hurl) can upload its own hello.txt to the same
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# folder without hitting the live-name unique index (409).
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DELETE {{base_url}}/api/files/{{outsider_file_id}}
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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HTTP 204
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DELETE {{base_url}}/api/folders/{{share_folder_id}}
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Authorization: Bearer {{admin_token}}
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HTTP 204
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