fdf445d2b0
Benchmark-gated round (benches/ROUND9.md): every change carries a BEFORE/AFTER bench with equivalence/safety gates; verdicts below are from the committed harnesses on 4 cores / local PG 16. Backend: - Blob decorators (Retry/Cached) now forward put_blob_from_bytes_unsynced + sync_blobs — the trait default had silently reinstated HEAD-before-PUT per chunk on decorated remote stacks, undoing ROUND3 §8. Full production stack: 500 probes -> 0, 1.9x wall at 10 ms RTT (bench_s3_put §3). - NC PROPFIND per-page enrichment triple (favorites / oc:fileid / dead props) overlapped with tokio::join!: 2.07x local, 2.86x at 5 ms RTT (bench_nc_enrich_join, injected-latency decide-by-bench). - Search enrichment consumes its DTOs and carries the interned Arc<str> display fields end-to-end (SearchFileResultDto type change, OpenAPI shape preserved): enrich_file 2.0x, 11.6 -> 2.2 allocs/row; the NC REPORT conversion stops re-running all three classifiers per row (bench_search_enrich). - NC session Arc end-to-end: SharedNcSession extractor (8 -> 0 allocs), Arc<FolderDto> chroot cache (4 -> 0/hit), single shared Arc<CurrentUser> + lazy span render (11 -> 6/build) (bench_nc_session). - Storage micro-pack: atomic create_new chunk writes (2.1x fresh), stream_chunks over the manifest Arc (4097 -> 0 allocs/read incl. the Range path), manifest single-flight (herd 64 -> 1 loads), hex_lower for chunk Content-MD5 (18 -> 1 allocs) (bench_storage_micro). - OCS capabilities memoized into OnceLock<[Bytes;2]>: 237x, 102 -> 0 allocs/poll, byte-identical (bench_capabilities_static). - Drive::is_empty COUNT(*) sum -> EXISTS: 34.4x on a 100k-file drive (bench_drive_is_empty). - favorites/recents row-map ROUND7 port: path/name/blob_hash moved, -2.75 allocs/row (bench_resource_row_map §2). - Folder rows decode binary UUIDs (ROUND6 §10 port): 1.03-1.07x page fetch, honest verdict incl. one noise-band wash documented (bench_folder_uuid_decode). - Authz: file cascade decision decomposed into memoized folder-level decision + direct-grant lookup (ROUND8 deferred item). Cold shared-album first view 592 -> 418 µs/thumb; warm path unchanged; safety gates incl. new direct-grant sibling isolation, revoke-flush re-verified, full integration authz suite green (bench_thumbnail_cascade_cache). Frontend (vitest gates committed beside the code): - resolveLabel/resolveRecipient O(directory) scan -> id-keyed Map: 13.9x (recipients.bench.test.ts). - ResourceList selection-prune effect skips when nothing is selected (100 -> 0 Set builds per drain) and the photos timeline reads a listener-fed mobile flag instead of matchMedia per recompute (listDerives.bench.test.ts). Verification: cargo fmt + clippy --all-features --all-targets -D warnings clean; 524 unit + 554 integration (--cfg integration_tests) tests pass; frontend npm run check clean with 293 vitest tests green. Deferred with rationale in ROUND9.md: CalDAV authz-before-fetch reorder (maintainer sign-off), per-page batched parent resolution, JWT-claims Arc<str>, batch_operations signature widening. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XDc9VtXvskJ6dnMRraSndn
162 lines
6.1 KiB
Rust
162 lines
6.1 KiB
Rust
//! Per-request NextCloud session context.
|
|
//!
|
|
//! Bundles WHO the caller is, the raw wire username they presented,
|
|
//! and (for path-scoped endpoints) WHERE they're confined to. Built
|
|
//! by `basic_auth_middleware` and stashed in request extensions as
|
|
//! `Arc<NcSession>`; handlers extract it via [`SharedNcSession`]
|
|
//! (derefs to `NcSession`) — declare `session: SharedNcSession` in
|
|
//! the signature.
|
|
//!
|
|
//! ## Source of truth
|
|
//!
|
|
//! - `user`: authenticated identity (id, canonical username, role).
|
|
//! - `raw_username`: the opaque wire identifier from the Basic Auth
|
|
//! header. Today: plain `user` (single-drive) or `user~{drive_uuid}`
|
|
//! (multi-drive POC). May look different again when future auth
|
|
//! schemes land. **Handlers MUST NOT parse it** — it's used verbatim
|
|
//! only for echoing back into DAV/OCS URLs the client expects to
|
|
//! see (notably OCS `cloud/user`'s `id` field, which NC desktop
|
|
//! splices into every subsequent DAV path it builds) and for
|
|
//! audit logs.
|
|
//! - `chroot`: folder the request is jailed inside. `Some` for every
|
|
//! authenticated NC request today (the home folder when no drive
|
|
//! marker is present, or the resolved drive when one is). `None`
|
|
//! is reserved for future routes that don't operate on a single
|
|
//! folder (admin / cross-drive queries).
|
|
//!
|
|
//! ## Why this lives in middleware, not routes.rs
|
|
//!
|
|
//! The auth step already has every input needed (raw username from
|
|
//! header + drive marker after `~` + authenticated user). Resolving
|
|
//! the chroot there means every NC handler — DAV, OCS, uploads,
|
|
//! trashbin, sharees, … — gets a uniform `NcSession` regardless of
|
|
//! whether its URL carries a `{user}` segment. The URL `{user}`
|
|
//! segment becomes informational; the auth header is canonical.
|
|
|
|
use std::sync::Arc;
|
|
|
|
use axum::{
|
|
extract::FromRequestParts,
|
|
http::{StatusCode, request::Parts},
|
|
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
use crate::application::dtos::folder_dto::FolderDto;
|
|
use crate::interfaces::errors::AppError;
|
|
use crate::interfaces::middleware::auth::CurrentUser;
|
|
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
|
pub struct NcSession {
|
|
/// Shared with the `Arc<CurrentUser>` request extension — one identity
|
|
/// build per request instead of a clone per consumer.
|
|
pub user: Arc<CurrentUser>,
|
|
pub raw_username: String,
|
|
/// Shared with `NC_CHROOT_CACHE` (markerless branch) — a cache hit is
|
|
/// an `Arc` bump, not a `FolderDto` deep-clone.
|
|
pub chroot: Option<Arc<FolderDto>>,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl NcSession {
|
|
/// Return the chroot, or 500 if a path-scoped handler is reached
|
|
/// without one. Documents the invariant that every NC route
|
|
/// today is path-scoped — if this fires, route wiring is wrong.
|
|
pub fn require_chroot(&self) -> Result<&FolderDto, AppError> {
|
|
self.chroot.as_deref().ok_or_else(|| {
|
|
AppError::internal_error(
|
|
"NcSession: path-scoped handler reached without a chroot — route wiring bug",
|
|
)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// True when the session is scoped to the user's home folder
|
|
/// (no drive marker in the Basic Auth username). Useful for
|
|
/// handlers that want to render a friendlier display when the
|
|
/// user is on their default drive.
|
|
pub fn is_home(&self) -> bool {
|
|
!self.raw_username.contains('~')
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Pull the `{user}` segment out of a NC DAV URL.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Expected URL shapes:
|
|
/// - `/remote.php/dav/files/{user}` (root)
|
|
/// - `/remote.php/dav/files/{user}/{*subpath}`
|
|
/// - `/remote.php/dav/uploads/{user}/{upload_id}[/{*rest}]`
|
|
/// - `/remote.php/dav/trashbin/{user}[/{*subpath}]`
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns `None` for anything that doesn't follow this shape (notably
|
|
/// the OCS surfaces, where there is no `{user}` segment to compare).
|
|
fn extract_url_user(path: &str) -> Option<String> {
|
|
let mut segments = path.split('/');
|
|
if !segments.next()?.is_empty() {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
if segments.next()? != "remote.php" {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
if segments.next()? != "dav" {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
let _surface = segments.next()?; // files / uploads / trashbin
|
|
let user_seg = segments.next()?;
|
|
if user_seg.is_empty() {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
urlencoding::decode(user_seg).ok().map(|s| s.into_owned())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Axum extractor: the shared handle to the request's [`NcSession`].
|
|
///
|
|
/// Derefs to `NcSession`, so handler bodies read `session.user`,
|
|
/// `session.require_chroot()`, … unchanged. Extraction is one `Arc`
|
|
/// refcount increment — the previous extractor deep-cloned the whole
|
|
/// session (`CurrentUser` + `raw_username` + chroot `FolderDto`, ~8-9
|
|
/// `String` allocs) on every authenticated NC request.
|
|
///
|
|
/// On path-scoped DAV routes (`/remote.php/dav/{files,uploads,
|
|
/// trashbin}/{user}/…`), the URL `{user}` segment is cross-checked
|
|
/// against `session.raw_username` and 403'd on mismatch. This is a
|
|
/// consistency check, NOT a security boundary — the chroot ACL
|
|
/// (`get_folder_with_perms`) is what actually prevents cross-user
|
|
/// access. It just surfaces malformed requests early (403) instead
|
|
/// of silently letting them through.
|
|
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
|
pub struct SharedNcSession(Arc<NcSession>);
|
|
|
|
impl SharedNcSession {
|
|
/// Wrap an already-shared session (used by the bench harness; the
|
|
/// middleware inserts the `Arc` into request extensions directly).
|
|
pub fn from_arc(session: Arc<NcSession>) -> Self {
|
|
Self(session)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl std::ops::Deref for SharedNcSession {
|
|
type Target = NcSession;
|
|
|
|
fn deref(&self) -> &NcSession {
|
|
&self.0
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl<S: Send + Sync> FromRequestParts<S> for SharedNcSession {
|
|
type Rejection = Response;
|
|
|
|
async fn from_request_parts(parts: &mut Parts, _state: &S) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
|
|
let session = parts
|
|
.extensions
|
|
.get::<Arc<NcSession>>()
|
|
.cloned()
|
|
.ok_or_else(|| StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED.into_response())?;
|
|
|
|
if let Some(url_user) = extract_url_user(parts.uri.path())
|
|
&& url_user != session.raw_username
|
|
{
|
|
return Err(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN.into_response());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(Self(session))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|